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Abstract
William Blake's works are full of the imagery of scapegoating, both violent and
non-violent. Yet most of the critical attention to scapegoating in Blake focuses on the last
of his major prophecies, Milton and Jerusalem. In contrast, this dissertation will examine
scapegoating in earlier texts, works written between 1788 and 1806. Using the rhetorical
theory of Kenneth Burke, this study will examine the relationship between Blake's
concerns about scapegoating and his antinomian rejection of law and rational systems of
order.
This study will a.chieve three primary aims. First, it will show that Blake's
obsession with scapegoating does not begin in the later works, but is already implicit in his
earliest works. Second, this study will demonstrate that Blake's perspective on
scapegoating is, like Burke's, connected to ideas about the dangers of symbolic orders,
particularly when these systems become rigid. According to Burke, systems of order
function as rhetoric, persuading us to commit ourselves to absolute attitudes and beliefs.
These beliefs lead to guilt, because no system can be perfectly obeyed. Finally, this guilt
leads to the selection of a scapegoat who redeems from guilt and unifies the community.
For Burke, this pattern is embedded in the nature of language as we use it to create
consubstantiation with others in our communities. Upon close examination, it appears that
Blake has similar concerns.
Finally, this study will trace the changes in Blake's attitude towards symbolic order
and scapegoating throughout the 1790's. In the texts that do not involve Blake's self
created mythologies, he criticizes the scapegoating potentials in particular
systems-Christianity and Empiricism. However, once Blake begins to create his own
mythologies, his critique of symbolic order become, more generalized, applying to systems
of order per se. In the Lambeth pmpheci� the figure of Urizen represents order in
general, and this order is rejected completely. But in The Four Zoas, Blake produces a
much more complex view of symbolic order and scapegoating, attempting to overcome
scapegoating and "Corporeal War" by means of what Burke calls an ''ultimate dialectic," a
hierarchy in which the quest for ultimate values occurs within a flexible and ever-shifting
system.
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Chapter I
Introduction:
William Blake, Kenneth Burke, and the Scapegoat

The poetry of William Blake abounds with images of violence, from the depictions
of violent warfare in America and Europe, to the portrayals of ritual sacrifice that pervade
Milton and Jerusalem. Even when directly violent acts are absent, as in The Songs of
Innocence and Experience, the imagery of violence often remains. For example, when

little Tom Dacre, the chimney sweeper of Songs ofInnocence, is shorn of his hair that
"curl'd like a lambs back," (1.12: E 10), the reader is invited to see Tom as a sacrificial
lamb. 1 Likewise, the poisonous tree of the "The Human Abstract" is like the Druid oaks
that appear in Blake's later prophecies.2 While Blake criticism tends to focus on the kinds
of scapegoating and sacrificial violence that appear predominantly in Blake's nineteenth
century illuminated texts, Milton and Jerusalem, violence and sacrifice are both present to
some degree throughout the opus.
In Blake's works, violence appears in a variety of forms--ritual sacrifice, state

1 All quotations from Blake are taken from David V. Erdman's 1982 edition of The Complete
Poetry and Prose of William Blake. Short poems will be cited with line number, as well as Erdman's page
number. Longer works will be cited with page or plate number followed by line number. as well as
Erdman's page number. On occasion, chapter numbers may be used where they appear. Erdman indicates
erasures from Blake's illuminated plates through the use of italics. When deleted material is quoted in this
document. the same convention will be used. Erased material may not always be quoted. The reader
should also be aware that Blake both spells and punctuates in eccentric and inconsistent ways. These
eccentricities will be copied exactly as they appear in the Erdman edition without further comment. since
the repetitive use of "Sic" would be so constant as to be distracting.
2

For a full discussion. see David V. Erdman's Blake: Prophet Against Empire, p. 272-73.
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execution, warfare, and family violence, to name just a few. Often, Blake uses sacrificial
imagery to protest forms of violence prevalent in his �ulture, including state execution and
state-sponsored warfare, yet his attitude towards both violence and sacrifice remains
complex. Revolutionary violence appears to be affirmed in early works like America: A
Prophecy, despite Blake's commitment to Mental rather than Corporeal War. Similarly,
religious images of sacrifice, ordinarily treated by Blake as unacceptable scapegoating,
assume a positive role when joined with the notion of Self-annihilation in the later poems.
In fact, the images of ritual sacrifice play a central role in Blake's opus, entwining
themselves inextricably with Blake's treatment of topics like revolution, state oppression,
the church, and even language itself Non-violent scapegoating is even more ubiquitous,
usually taking the form of accusations, recriminations, or efforts at revenge in contexts
where the accuser is as guilty as the one he or she blames. These verbal forms of
scapegoating are often the precursors of more violent actions that take place within the
same poem or closely related works.
While there is considerable incidental mention of both scapegoating and ritual
sacrifice in discussions of Blake's earlier works, those written, or at least begun, during
the late 1780's all the way through the radical 1790's, I have found no study that focuses
exclusively on either scapegoating or sacrifice in these texts. There are, however, some
discussions of sacrificial elements in the later texts that Blake produced during the
nineteenth-century, especially Milton and Jerusalem. Mary Kelly Persyn's dissertation,
''Eternal Death" and Imaginative Life: Sacrifice vs. Self-Annihilation in the Works of
William Blake, offers a valuable full-length study comparing the concepts of sacrifice and
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self-annihilation in Blake's poetry, but her focus is on Milton and Jerusalem only. Her
work explores the distinction between sacrifice and self-annihilation, and her project aims
to refute feminist claims that Blake scapegoats women. Persyn does not provide an
exploration of scapegoating and sacrifice as they function in Blake's earlier career. 3 Other
scholars like Peter F. Fisher, A. C. Owen, Jon Mee, and Jason Whittaker focus on Blake's
portrayal of Druids and Druidic sacrifice, providing excellent insights into the ways that
Blake adapts the ideas about Druids that were common in his own cultural milieu. 4 While
very oblique references to Druid oaks appear in The Songs ofExperience and in The Book
of Ahania, and direct but brief mention of them occurs in The Four Zoas, Druids only play
a major role beginning in the late works, Milton and Jerusalem. Thus, all of these studies
are mostly relevant to the understanding of these later prophecies.
However, it is my belief that the less specifically Druidic forms of scapegoating,
sacrifice, and/or violence that occur in the earlier texts provide an important basis for
understanding why Blake is so obsessed with Druids in his later works. In other words, we
will better understand the sacrificial elements of the later texts if we carefully examine
their precursors in the works that Blake wrote in his most active period in the late 1780's
and throughout the politically volatile and violent decade of the 1790's. Thus, this study
will focus on the various forms of sacrifice, scapegoating, and violence that appear in

3i>ersyn has also published an article based on part of her dissertation, "'No Human Form but
Sexual': Sensibility, Chastity, and Sacrifice in Blake's Jerusalem." This article was published in the
European Romantic Review, vol. 10, 1999.
4More detailed discussion of this approach to sacrifice will appear later in this study. The Fisher
text referred to here is the article, "Blake and the Druids." Fisher's book, The Valley of Vision, does not
include discussions of Druids or sacrifice.
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selected works from the l 790's, including The Four Zoas, which was probably completed,
or set aside, between 1806 and 1807, but which Blake began working on in 1796.
Although the later works-Milton, Jerusalem, and The Ghost of Abel-are obviously laden
with sacrificial imagery, they will not be included in this study, in part because the
scapegoating in these texts has already received some critical attention, but more
importantly, because the first two of these are so long and complex that an analysis of all
the elements of scapegoating, sacrifice, and violence in these texts would require a book
length study in and of itself. Yet, it is to be hoped that by the end of this study, the
implications ofBurkean theory for the later works will be clear, opening the path for
further exploration in a second study.
The following chapters will explore the role of a variety of forms of sacrifice,
scapegoating, and violence in William Blake's poetry, demonstrating how Blake's
depictions of these phenomena point to a relationship between language as a hierarchical
system and acts of violence and scapegoating that actually occur in culture. In doing so,
this study will demonstrate that for the antinomian Blake, scapegoating, whether violent or
non-violent, is one of the most virulent results of laws and of other forms of systematic
symbolic order, all of them linguistic phenomena of which he is deeply suspicious.
Employing the theories of a twentieth-century antinomian rhetorician and literary critic,
Kenneth Burke, I will argue that Blake's poetry demonstrates how symbolic systems and
hierarchies may function rhetorically to produce a psychology of scapegoating in those
persons to whom these symbolic actions are addressed. Furthermore, I will demonstrate
how Blake's antinomianism softens and is transformed in the middle l 790's, as he begins
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to recognize the unavoidability of hierarchical symbolic orders. With this recognition,
Blake seeks a way to create and maintain order without perpetuating a cycle of
scapegoating, violence, and ritual sacrifice.
This rhetorical approach requires, among other things, a shift in the traditional
thinking about the relationship between language and history in Blake scholarship, that is,
the artificial division of Blake criticism into two camps, mythological or language-based
studies and historical studies. This sharp break is seriously misleading, particularly when
we begin to think about the relationship between order and scapegoating in Blake's
works. To demonstrate the problems with this split, we need to look briefly at some
examples in the Blake literature. As we have already seen, we do not yet have book-length
studies on scapegoating in Blake's works, but we do have discussions of violence written
by critics whose primary concerns lie elsewhere. Generally speaking, these studies, like all
Blake criticism, are generally read either as ahistorical analyses, based on concerns with
mythology or language, or as historical studies that explore Blake's response to his own
political context. 5
One of the founding ahistorical critiq�es, Northrop Frye's classic Fearful
Symmetry, attempts a complete overview of Blake's mythology, placing Blake's treatment

of sacrifice and violence within the schema of the Ore cycle. According to Frye, Ore, the
fiery revolutionary principle, suffers oppression at the hands of the Urizenic principle of
5Because there are so many reviews of Blake criticism that chronicle the history of this split, I
will not repeat the narrative here. While some recent critics, like Nicholas M. Williams. have attempted
to bridge the gap, most criticism continues to fall either into the category of historical criticism or into the
camp of mythological or linguistically based studies. A thorough discussion of these different positions,
and the placement of specific critics into these camps� can be found in Jackie DiSalvo's introduction to
DiSalvo and Robson's Blake, Politics, and History.

6
order, but eventually hardens and becomes Urizenic himself Thus, violence is initiated by
the agents of a rigid and abstracted order, then appears in a new form as revolutionary
energy, and finally, recurs in its original rigid form as the spent energy of revolution
hardens into a type of its original persecutor. Thus, this revolutionary principle becomes a
kind of universal and cyclical myth.
Naturally, this view of violence as cyclical and recurring has been distressing to
those critics who appreciate Blake for his radical social attitudes, and who want to find in
Blake an advocate of real social change, social change that is not necessarily destined to
produce a never ending cycle of injustice and violence. While David V. Erdman in his

Blake: Prophet Against Empire does not specifically contest Frye's reading, he shifts the
emphasis to show how Blake's images of Druidism, violence, and sacrifice actually refer
to specific situations in Blake's own historical context. Ultimately, Erdman argues, Blake
sees the revolutionary violence of his own time, the American Revolution, for example, as
having the potential to escape from the death-dealing patterns of the past: ''But the
revolutionary war, with its articulate credo, is a harvest sacrifice made by people with
opened eyes and an enlightened social program for cultivating the earth as a garden
paradise" (251 ). Erdman understands Blake to be promoting violent revolutionary acts as
necessary to the cause of justice, while condemning the sacrifices demanded by state
sanctioned warfare or execution. Recent historical criticism, like that of Christopher Z.
Hobson, retains Erdman's basic assumptions while arguing that Blake's attitudes towards
revolutionary violence are complex and change more over time than Erdman recognizes.
Hobson, however, directly attacks Frye's description of the Ore cycle, arguing that 'lhe
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Ore cycle is almost entirely the product of Frye's imagination, not Blake's" (47).
Yet both Frye and Hobson are both partially correct about the cycle of violence
represented in the revolutionary figure of Ore. Blake does depict a negative cycle of
violence, as Frye suggests, but he also differentiates between better and worse forms of
violence within the historical context. Furthermore, as Hobson suggests, Blake does
recommend revolutionary violence at some stages of his career, certainly during the
1790's. Blake is not simply creating a universal myth. Yet the mythological elements of his
works do point towards general claims about human life and about language.
The difficulty with the split between the historical and ahistorical approaches is
that it assumes somehow that language is separate from history and that Blake is either as
a commentator on his time or as the creator of timeless mythologies. Yet an either/or
approach is not necessarily an appropriate response to Blake. Fortunately, some recent
critics, recognizing that the texts contain both particular historical interventions and more
general and universal language, have attempted to bridge this gap by demonstrating how
Blake's mythological language works rhetorically. 6 While Nicholas M. Williams' Ideology
6For some, especially those trained in classical rhetoric, it may seem strange to link the term
"'rhetoric" with a "Romantic poet," particularly a poet as eccentric as William Blake. Certainly, there have
been deconstructive readings of Blake, like Peter Otto's Constructive Vision, Visionary Deconstruction,
and there have been deconstructive approaches to Romanticism, perhaps the most famous being found in
the work of Paul DeMan. These approaches, which are concerned with tropes and with other rhetorical
strategies, are, nevertheless, often allied with those approaches that are seen as anti-historical. Scholars
who are concerned with rhetoric in its traditional role of persuasion have perceived Romanticism as anti
rhetorical, concerned with the self-expression of the author rather than communication with an audience.
This view, however, is often overstated. Even strongly expressivist criticism of Romanticism, like M. H.
Abrams' The Mirror and the Lamp and Morris Eaves' William Blake's Theory ofArt, leaves room for the
role of an audience. More recently, Don H.Bialostosky and Lawrence Needham in Rhetorical Traditions
in British Romanticism, collect articles that demonstrate a relationship between Romantic poetry and
audience-based rhetorical traditions, both classical and Hebraic. See Bialostosky and Needham for a more
complete discussion. For treatments of Romanticism as destructive to the discipline of rhetoric, see Brian
Vickers' Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry, John Bender and David E. Wellbery's The Ends of

8

and Utopia in the Poetry of William Blake is a Marxist study rather than a rhetorical

one-Williams never uses the term "rhetoric"-his reading offers an explanation of how
Blake's mythological language functions rhetorically. Williams suggests that the use of
mythological language allows Blake to draw upon a Utopian ideal readily recognizable in
his culture, Christian apocalypticism, and use it to criticize destructive cultural systems.
While Blake recognizes himself to be ensnared in the negative aspects of his own culture,
complicit in the forms of language and thought that he most deplores, he uses the Utopian
ideals of Christian apocalypse to confront his audience with the inadequacy of their
cultural practices. Williams effectively explores how this Utopian mythology works for
Blake by placing Blake's poetry in conversation with other works of the period. Williams,
however, pays little if any attention to the issues of scapegoating or violence.
Jon Mee, on the other hand, devotes considerable attention to Blake's interest in
sacrificial language. Mee accepts E. P. Thompson's description of Blake as a working
class radical, strongly influenced by antinomian religious sects. 7 For Mee, Blake is a
bricoleur, who combines antinomian rhetoric, along with other aspects of eighteenth

century thought, into a new self-created structure. In his book Dangerous Enthusiasm:
William Blake and the Culture ofRadicalism in the 1 790's, Mee devotes a number of

pages to a discussion of the contemporary sources for Blake's images of human sacrifice
and ritual violence. Specifically, Mee refers to texts which would have been well-known to
Rhetoric, and Patricia Bizzell and Bruce M. Herzberg's textbook The Rhetorical Tradition.
7

Thompson's Witness Against the Beast: William Blake and the Moral Law argues for a
connection between Blake and a particular antinomian sect, the Muggletonians. Whether such a
connection is true or not, Thompson makes a good case that Blake's rhetoric is strongly influenced by the
language of antinomian writing and preaching.
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eighteenth-century readers: James Macpherson's Ossian poems, William Stukeley's
discussions of Stonehenge and druidic ritual, and John Toland's A Critical History of the
Druids, among others. Mee not only argues that Blake uses these sources but also that his

adaptations of them demonstrate his essentially radical commitments. 8
All in all, Mee's depiction of Blake as bricoleur is highly persuasive. It identifies
sources for Blake's treatment of violence and sacrifice, and it takes into account another
maj or element of Blake's proj ect-his antinomian struggle with social and symbolic
systems-a struggle expressed so clearly in the words of Blake's character Los, "I must
Create a System, or be enslav'd by another Mans" (Jerusalem 10.20; El 53 ). Los's words
encapsulate Blake's struggle with many of the symbolic systems that create his culture:
Christianity in its various forms, eighteenth-century philosophy and natural science as
embodied in the writings of the 'Vnholy Trinity" of Bacon, Newton, and Locke; the arts
establishment, the monarchy; and the rapidly rising industrial systems of the late eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries. Also, Mee's choice of the term bricolage accurately
describes the patchwork quality of Blake's systems, which combine original, almost
private, symbols with symbols derived from the larger culture. Finally, Mee's approach to
Blake's system-making takes seriously the rhetorical elements of Blake's work, an aspect
that cannot be overlooked since Blake defines himself as prophet and orator, both terms
that imply a rhetorical motive-an interest in intervening in the public life of his culture. 9
8

Mee's discussion of Blake and Druidism depends in part upon the previous scholarship of A L.
Owen and Peter Fisher.
9For a fuller discussion of the terms "orator" and "prophet" as they relate to eighteenth
century rhetorical thought. see Leslie Tannenbaum's Biblical Traditi ons in Blake 's Early Prophecies:
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Placing Blake's prophecies in conversation with other radical thinkers of the period, Mee
is able to demonstrate how the unusual form of Blake's work has its roots in his own
culture and, indeed, has a rhetorical function. Blake is piecing together working-class
Protestant thought and more middle-class and upper-class aesthetic forms in an attempt to
protest church and state abuses without losing the imaginative richness of the religious
language that he loves and knows to be familiar to people of all social classes.
Nevertheless, the concept of brico/age is not entirely adequate to deal with the
ways in which rhetoric, symbolic systems, and scapegoating intersect in Blake's opus. The
notion of brico/age implies no necessary connection between hierarchical system-making
and various forms of sacrifice and violence, and Mee certainly makes no such connection.
This study, on the other hand, will argue that such a connection appears repeatedly in
Blake's eighteenth-century texts, and that whenever laws are made or systems are built in
these works, then accusations, violent abuse of other individuals, warfare, and ritual
sacrifice follow, usually immediately, and almost always as a direct result of the symbolic
orders themselves. Furthermore, all of these behaviors function as forms of scapegoating
in terms that Kenneth Burke also relates directly to language in its systematic forms. These
connections between language and violence recur even as Blake's presentation of
hierarchically ordered systems changes throughout his career. In fact, I will argue, the
connection between violence and hierarchical symbolic systems is central to Blake's work
and provides one rationale for explaining how Blake's mythological language intersects
The Great Code ofArt. Further discussion of the connection between Blake, Romanticism, and rhetoric
will appear in Chapter III.
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with his historical concerns. For Blake, symbolic actions produce history. One cannot talk
about language without talking about history, and one cannot talk about history without
talking about language.
Thus, although this study may appear at times to depend more on transhistorical
claims about language than upon actual historical events, we must always keep in mind
that historical circumstances are giving form to Blake's thought, providing impetus for the
transformation of his ideas about both particular historical situations and the functions of
language in all time periods. The excellent historical studies of scholars like Erdman,
DiSalvo, Hobson and many others is in no way incompatible with the approach taken here.
In fact, central to Blake's concern is the attempt to work out the relationship between
particular historical systems of order, particular social and cultural hierarchies, and claims
about all hierarchical systems of order in any period of history. 10
The difficulty for Blake is that as he uses language, his own poems and prophecies
take a hierarchical form. In other words, he is involved in creating the very kinds of
systems that he sees as dangerous. Ultimately, Blake's work expresses a severe tension.
On the one hand, there is his antinomian rage at the eighteenth-century British cultural
order, replete with its laws, and with its hierarchical systems of governance, science and
religion, all of which, he argues, lead to scapegoating and, finally, to sacrificial violence in
the form of state warfare. On the other hand, however, is the inescapable hierarchical
order that emerges in his own language. Thus, Blake attempts to negotiate a new
Good evidence for these types of connections is provided by those texts that explore the use of
typology in Blake's writings. See particularly DiSalvo's War of Titans and George Anthony Rosso, Jr. 's
Blake 's Prophetic Workshop.
10
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relationship between the rhetorical power of symbolic systems and the forms of violent
scapegoating that he sees these systems as producing. In his mythological works, he
shows an ever-growing awareness of the ways in which resisting the particular historical
manifestations of sacrificial violence and oppression that so troubled him can recreate the
same patterns in new and different forms. Thus he struggles to "create a system" that will
escape this pattern. In a sense, Blake's argument can be seen as creating a kind of
dialectical pattern. On the one hand, he is producing rhetoric that addresses particular
social problems common in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. On the other
hand, particularly, in his mythological works, he is producing metarhetorical discourse,
examining the ways in which language appears to work in general. Thus, he is commenting
on specific social and cultural problems, protesting particular social evils that he wishes to
correct, but he is also, through his use of mythological language, making more general
claims about language, how it works, and how it contributes to violence in the particular
social context.
In this regard, Blake can be compared to Kenneth Burke, the twentieth century
rhetorician and literary critic whose work will provide the theoretical basis for this project.
Burke's critical and rhetorical work, like Blake's poetry, is rhetoric in two senses of the
word. As Stephen Bygrave points out, Burke's work treats rhetoric as "both a practice
and the study of that practice" (110). Burke uses rhetorical strategies to make particular
interventions in the literary and social arguments of its own time, but he also makes
metarhetorical arguments, general claims about the way that rhetoric functions in any
situation or time. The connections between Blake and Burke do not end here. Bygrave has
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noted a number of similarities between Burke and Blake. For example, Bygrave claims
that Burke, like Blake, is creating "a Bible of Hell, an antinomian rhetoric . . . " (9).
Burke describes himself as an antinomian, yet, like Blake, is driven by a demand for
system. 1 1 I would add, further, that both men repeatedly use Biblical images of creation
and fall (in highly unorthodox ways) to frame their claims about society and about
language. And, most importantly for this proj ect, both men are obsessed by the human
capacity for scapegoating, and the relationship between this phenomenon and the nature of
language itself. Both, particularly, are concerned about scapegoating in its more violent
forms, or as Burke calls it in one of his poems, ''the cult of the kill" (RR 4-5)12 Both men
invite us to question our trust in familiar symbolic orders by becoming aware of the way in
which these orders function. Both of them hope that, as we engage in this questioning, we
will become open to the possibility of positive transformation and less likely to scapegoat
and destroy others in a futile attempt to hang on to rigid systems that we treat as ultimate

1

1 1n a preface to a later edition of his first boo� Counter-statement, Burke describes his delight
in the antinomian impulses of his early text, a claim that clearly justifies Bygrave' s definition of Burke as
an antinomian, like Blake (CS vii). Yet, Burke also claims, in the same breath, that all art is antinomian,
a view with which William Blake would clearly have disagreed, unless, that is, the word "true" were
addedbefore the term "art." See Blake's annotations to Sir Joshua Reynolds (E 635-61).
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Burke himself makes reference to Blake when he describes his "Lord," a divine character who
represents Logos or the positive functions of language, as a "Blakean bearded patriarch" (RR 276), a
Urizenic figure who in Blake represents both order and oppression. Further, Blake's poetry plays a large
role in Burke's early novel Towards a Better Life. Here the young writer who is the narrator and central
figure of the novel writes a short story that appears as a chapter in the novel, a short story built around
Blake's poetry. Burke generally describes the character of John Neal, the young novelist in Towards a
Better Life, in negative terms, while claiming that the work is a "ritualistic transformation" of his own
youth (ATH 390). Burke's analysis implies he identifies himself with Blake while, at the same time,
mocking some of the more antinomian (Blakean?) aspects of his own project and character. But however
mocking, this reference does support the argument that there is no real strain in connecting Burke and
Blake. See also Austin Warren and, especially, William H. Rueckert's article "Symbolic Action in
Kenneth Burke's novel, Towards a Better Life."
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when they are not. In the following section, we will examine the basics of Burke's
rhetorical theory, particularly as it pertains to the relationship between language and
scapegoating. In the process, we will explore the Burkean terminology and methodology
that will govern our exploration of Blake's work.
Kenneth Burke, the Scapegoat, and the Rlietoric of Order: A Theoretical Overview
While the sacrificial imagery in Blake's work provides the initial impetus for this
study, underlying the imagery, at its roots, is Blake's larger suspicion of symbolic systems
in and of themselves. This suspicion of law and other hierarchical structures defines Blake
as an antinomian, and certainly he sees these systems as having a variety of negative
results, the truncation of the imaginative faculty being a primary one, since such a loss
damages vision, creativity, and agency. These rigid laws and systems also lead, for Blake,
to a variety of social evils, including entrenched economic injustice and scapegoating in a
variety of forms.
The same basic principle holds true for Kenneth Burke. The strongest link
between Blake and Burke is their essential antinomianism, although Burke is antinomian to
a lesser degree than Blake, since Burke always accepts the need for systems at a
fundamental level. Nevertheless, like Blake, he deplores the limited vision that devotion to
one form of symbolic order can produce, and, also like Blake, he is concerned about the
ways in which symbolic orders can mask or perpetuate social injustice, particularly
economic injustice. But the social consequence to which he gives the most attention is
scapegoating. Thus the relationship between scapegoating and symbolic order provides an
excellent entry point into an examination of Burke's ideas about langauge. For this reason,
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and because the relationship between symbolic order and scapegoating lies at the center of
this study, we will begin our exploration of Burke's rhetorical theory with what is
probably his most complete definition of scapegoating.
In A Grammar of Motives, Burke defines the scapegoat as one who is "profoundly
consubstantial with those who, looking upon it as a chosen vessel, would ritualistically
cleanse themselves by loading the burden of their own iniquities upon it. Thus the
scapegoat represents the principle of division in that its persecutors would alienate from
themselves to it their own uncleanlinesses" (406). Yet, in representing their iniquities, it
also involves a principle of unity, or merger. ''In representing their iniquities, it performs
the role of vicarious atonement (that is, unification, or merger, granted to those who have
alienated their iniquities upon it, and so may be purified through its suffering)" (406). 13
The scapegoat purifies the community by being identified with its evil, and yet, at the same
time, being other than the community. In its role as "other," the scapegoat figure allows
the community to become unified around a common enemy.
This process is certainly subject to any number of variations. Sometimes, for
example, the suffering of a victim may be the founding event that acts symbolically to bind
a group together in the first place, and then new sacrifices are required to hold the
community together as conflicts emerge that must be purged if the group is to continue to

1 3 In contrast

to its large place in Burke's thought, scapegoating, at least in its real world
dimensions. has received relatively little attention in the literature. For an extended discussion, see C.
Allen Carter's Kenneth Burke and the Scapegoat Process. Carter metaphorically describes Burke's
scapegoating theory as related to the rod, the ladder, and the skull (law, hierarchy, and death). My
reading differs from Carter's primarily in placing an intensive focus on the relationship between Burke's
scapegoating theory and his theories of language. This difference is one of emphasis, however. Carter
also addresses these issues.
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function. Burke exemplifies this particular process by describing a boyhood club, founded
upon the killing of a rattlesnake and sustained by further "sacrifices" when conflicts over
officers and dues threatened to tear the group apart (RM 266). Such sacrifices, presumably
the sacrifice of other snakes or ritual reenactment of the original sacrifice, allowed the
boys to renew their sense of community and reassimilate it. In other cases, scapegoating
may serve to unify the psyche of an individual by purging guilt, something to which Burke
gives attention in The Rhetoric of Religion. The religious idea of the redeemer provides
another variant. As Burke himself suggests, the purgation of guilt, as exemplified in the
Christian understanding of Jesus's death, for example, can be a much more complicated
symbolic process (GM 407). Thus, it will receive separate attention later in this discussion.
In any case, whatever form of conflict scapegoating is intended to purge, it is
important to remember that for Burke, scapegoating can take a variety of forms. It can be
as simple as the use of "dyslogistic terminology" to purify oneself or one's group by
blaming someone else for whatever conflicts arise (RM 141-42). It can also take a variety
of violent forms. Burke suggests a number of them: the sacrificial death of Jesus, ritually
understood; the Holocaust; warfare; even the punishment of criminals, insofar as a
community "'purifies itself by 'moral indignation' in condemning them" (406). The
revolutionary impulse, be it Marxist or otherwise, can also derive from the scapegoating
motive. Arguing that hierarchy is inevitable in any culture or in any symbolic system,
Burke claims that the scapegoat can be "a revolutionary kind of expression," when the
moralizing of social class reverses the roles of the highest and the lowest on the hierarchy
(RM 140-41 ). In other words, revolutionaries may scapegoat their oppressors if their
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motives derive from the need to cleanse themselves by reversing the hierarchy which
places them on the bottom and the oppressors on the top. 1 4 It is not the violence of the
acts, in and of themselves, that makes them scapegoating. It is the motivation that drives
them. What is common in all these situations is the attempt to purge one's own conflicts,
anxieties, or guilt by turning against or blaming someone else who is both alike and
different from the individual or group benefitting from the sacrifice. Furthermore, in all of
these situations, some sort of union or merger occurs, within a group or individual, by the
symbolic separation from the scapegoat.
Burke is certainly not unique in arguing that the sacrificial victim is always both
different from and similar to the community that uses him or her as the vehicle of
purification. Nor is he unique in arguing that there is a relationship between the religious
sacrifice described in the Christian narrative and secular forms of killing like warfare,
genocide, or revolution. In the first decade of the nineteenth century, William Blake's
contemporary, Joseph de Mafitre, points out that even animal sacrifices are always chosen
from "the gentlest, the most innocent, those nearest to man because of instincts of habits"
(''Elucidiation" 3 58). In the twentieth century, Ren/ Girard makes the same point by
clearly delineating the marks of the human victim of scapegoating; the victim is similar
enough to be symbolically substituted for community members, but different enough to
allow the community members to victimize him or her without sanctioning violence
1 4Francois Furet and Denis Richelet provide a fascinating account that exemplifies this process in

the context of the French Revolution. According to Furet and Richelet, when arguments were being made
concerning whether or not Louis XVI should be tried prior to his beheading, Robespierre argued, "If the
king is not guilty, those who have deposed him are" (French Revolution 163). Such an argument while
having clear pragmatic and political repercussions, also reflects the kind of cleansing motive that Burke
describes here.
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against others in the community. 15 Furthermore, both M�stre and Girard describe
executions as ritual sacrifices, and Girard is clearly interested in the relationship between
scapegoating and warfare.
What is unique about Burke's contribution is his focus on the relationship between
sacrifice and language. Burke's definition of the scapegoat focuses on the principle of
division and merger as a function of language, the function that enables it to make
connections between disparate objects and to separate and distinguish among objects that
might otherwise be regarded as similar. In fact, the principles of merger and division,
which figure so prominently in Burke's understanding of scapegoating, also operate in his
overall definition of rhetoric. Burke defines rhetoric "as a symbolic means of inducing
cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols'' (RM 43). Such cooperation
occurs when human beings come to see themselves as consubstantial with other human
beings, that is, when they come to experience themselves as essentially one with another
person or persons, and to act accordingly, whether or not their interests are, in fact, the
same.

As

was mentioned earlier, a combination of consubstantiality and separation is the

necessary formula for scapegoating according to Burke's definition. Yet, these same two
elements are necessary, according to Burke, for all rhetoric. We only use rhetoric to
establish consubstantiality with others because we are in fact separate from them in some
way (Burke, RM 22). The very principle that makes scapegoating possible is the same
principle that makes rhetorical activity possible.
Insofar as rhetorical activity is a means of bridging these gaps between human
15 See Girard's The Scapegoat, chapter 2, "Stereotypes of Persecution," pages 12-23.
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beings, Burke sees all language as essentially rhetorical. All language use is a form of
"symbolic action." Scientific discourse, poetry, traditional oratory or rhetoric, or even
entire symbolic systems like mythologies or scientific theories, are human actions,
designed to produce effects on other human beings. While Burke accepts that description
is an aspect of language, one that he refers to in at least one context in terms of a "chart"
(PLF 6), his emphasis is on the ways in which all symbolic actions, including those that
can be characterized as charts, have the potential to affect human motives-one of which is
the scapegoating motive. In other words, if we describe our universe in religious terms, as
a great chain of being with God at the top, our motivations, our attitudes and actions, will
be created by that method of charting the world. Likewise, if we describe the universe as a
great machine, and our bodies as little machines, that, too will form our motivations, and
thus, our actions. Finally, if we come to see our system as absolute, whatever it is, we may
develop the willingness to sacrifice human lives to keep it unchanged, particularly since
that system allows us to maintain consubstantiation with other members of our community
who are significant to us. In this sense, all language is rhetorical. It is both a primary
determinant of our actions and one of its function is to connect us with some people while
separating us from others.
Thus, for Burke, the conditions of connection and separation that require human
beings to use language are the very conditions that make scapegoating a prevalent
tendency. Scapegoating remains a constant possibility simply because of the dialectical
potentials that exist in all language. One could argue that, at a structural level,
scapegoating is unavoidable, insofar as it is an aspect of the process of merger and
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division, which is necessary in any form of persuasive rhetoric. For example, if one argues
against war, as Burke does himself, one attempts to unite one's audience against common
foes-death, nuclear Holocaust, planetary annihilation, and so on. However, this form of
merger and division is simply an unavoidable function of language. It is fundamental to the
way language works and, as such, it is morally neutral.
Yet, because language works this way, it takes a remarkable level of attention and
wisdom to assure that the separated term, or scapegoat, is not an innocent person or
group, however innocent the process of merger and division might be in and of itself It is
even more difficult to avoid the sacrifice of relatively innocent victims, people or ideas that
are not altogether good, but certainly no worse than those on whose behalf they are being
scapegoated. Whether the scapegoated term in a symbolic action represents a person or an
idea, the choice of a scapegoat is a moral issue, and the inevitable presence of what one
might call the "structural scapegoat" 16 makes the formation of violent motivations very
easy. Yet, the scapegoating of people, treated as ritual sacrifices that will purge our guilt
or conflicts, is avoidable.

As Burke

puts it, "Trying to be as cheerful as possible, one

might say that sacrifice is not inevitable. But the temptation to victimage is ever born
anew" (DD 29).
As the previous quotation demonstrates, there are a number of terms in play here,
and Burke uses a variety of words to talk about the scapegoating principle without always
distinguishing clearly between them. The terms scapegoating, sacrifice, and victimage all
appear at various points in Burke's writing, and the phrase devil-term is also used to
1 6nus is my term, not Burke's.

21
describe the term at the bottom of a symbolic order, the "structural scapegoat" against
which a language user attempts to rally his or her audience. In the above quotation, for
example, Burke uses the term "sacrifice" as a synonym for victimage, whereas elsewhere
the term has a positive valance, and is used to talk about the self-giving that makes peace
possible.
Thus, in this study, for the sake of convenience, different terms will be assigned
particular meanings. Sacrifice is the broadest term, and can be used to describe either
positive or negative forms of division, by which we separate ourselves from particular
ideas, values, or people. If used in the negative sense, however, this will be clarified by the
context. Often, it will be often used to describe the positive renunciation of vices or
attitudes that are destructive to human relationships, the kinds of sacrifices that Burke
suggests are 'lhe essence of peace" (RM 125). These peaceful sacrifices can be contrasted
with those which are 'lhe essence of war, with men piously persuading themselves that
they are never so comforted as when contemplating a blood-bath" (RM 255).
Scapegoating, a sub-category of the term sacrifice, will be reserved for theoretically
avoidable forms of sacrifice, like the aforementioned blood-bath, those forms of sacrifice
in which relatively innocent objects are sacrificed in order to purge the conflicts of others.
This sacrifice may or may not result in physical brutality. It can include what Burke calls
dyslogistic naming, or blaming, or it may include violence, but at its essence is the use of a
person, group, or even a positive idea, as a way of displacing conflict. The term "ritual
sacrifice," will be used to distinguish a particular kind of scapegoating, involving actual
victimage or killing performed as part of a religious ritual or in activities that are similar to
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religious rituals. Finally, what I have called the structural scapegoat will be referred to as a
devil-term. This term is a value-free description of how a particular idea is functioning in
discourse. Whether or not a particular devil-term is a scapegoat in the negative sense can
always be the subject of ethical debate.
These distinctions are important to make, since the same linguistic potentials that
make victimage a temptation also make possible the Utopian gestures towards
peacemaking that motivate Burke's project, at least in its latter phase. The same principles
of merger and division that allowed Hitler to make scapegoats of the Jews are functioning
when Burke makes war his devil-term. During World War II and during the Cold War, it
is war as a principle that Burke wants to purge, whereas, in making the term "Jew" a
devil-term, Hitler paved the way for both genocide and warfare. 17 But the structure of
purification is common to both. A Grammar of Motives, written in 1 945, has the epigram
"ad bellum purificandum"-towards the purification of war. This book, along with A

Rhetoric of Motives ( 1 950), and The Rhetoric ofReligion (1 961 ) all share a thrust
towards peacemaking as their ultimate rhetorical aim. 18 While Burke is essentially skeptical
and ironic in his approach, and for him Utopia is ultimately unattainable, it is nevertheless

17

Burke provides a fascinating analysis of Hitler's rhetoric, with its use of the Jews as a common
enemy around whom the German people can unite, in "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,"' The Philosophy
ofLiterary Form, pp. 191-220.
18

Earlier works, like Permanence and Change andAttitudes Towards History, are focused
more on a Marxian concern for changes in the economic order. These concerns never go away for Burke,
but he places his emphasis differently at different phases of his career, according to what issues seem more
pressing. For a good. brief discussion of the phases of Burke's career and the changes in the social
emphasis ofhis rhetoric� see Thomas M. Conley's Rhetoric in the European Tradition, pp. 268-77. For a
further discussion of peacemaking as an objective of Burke's rhetoric, see Wayne C. Booth and,
especially, David Cratis Williams.
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possible to move in a Utopian direction, a direction that will involve relatively benign
sacrifices and the reduction or elimination of violent scapegoating.
This cleansing of the scapegoating motive can best be achieved, according to
Burke, if we recognize the dialectical nature of language, because this recognition
prevents our absolutizing our own linguistic creations and then seeking scapegoats when
we find the systems more absolute than we can endure. In A Grammar ofMotives, Burke
defines "dialectics" in the broadest sense as 'lhe employment of the possibilities of
linguistic transformation" ( 402). Symbolic systems change constantly whether we
recognize it or not, but when we recognize the transformational quality of language, we
gain a more realistic sense of the limits of our symbolic systems and we are more open to
the continued transformation of those systems through negotiation with others. If we deny
the fact that language and symbolic orders are constantly changing, we risk deifying the
orders themselves and then sacrificing other people in a futile attempt to maintain them
intact.
For the purposes of this study, it will be useful to explore Burke's analysis of
dialectics, or '1he possibilities of linguistic transformation" in two aspects. The first is his
analysis of how our rhetorical practices contribute to scapegoating. The second is his
understanding of how particular forms of discourse are used to avoid violent conflict and
how a different perspective on language can help us to avoid scapegoating activity. So far,
we have examined a definition of scapegoating that shows how it functions as a structure
of language. However, this definition only describes the process by which a scapegoat is
created in terms of a specific function of language. It does not thoroughly describe how
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the scapegoating motive is cultivated within the individual or community.
The source of the scapegoating motive can perhaps best be described in terms of a
hardening or rigidifying of symbolic systems. 19 When language is seen as an absolute, a
symbolic system may become frozen since reality and language are no longer perceived as
separate. 20 The confusion of reality with a limited description of reality always creates an
artificial limit of scope. In fact, any terminology allows us to see and limits what we can
see at the same time. Later in his career, Burke describes this phenomenon using the

1 9It

is tempting to describe this hardening of symbolic systems by using the Marxist term
"reification." In fa� David Cratis Williams uses that term to describe the results of the "perfectionistic
impulse" that Burke sees in language (203-04). Burke's concept, like Georg Lukacs', involves a freezing
of cultural structures and a painful experience of alienation. Yet, Lukacs' notion of reification is applied
quite specifically to capitalist societies, while Burke clearly means us to see the potential for such
hardening in any symbolic system, including Marxism itself. This distinction, does not, however, imply
any negation of the strong Marxist impulse in Burke's criticism. For a good, brief definition of
"reification," see the Encyclopedia of Contemporary Literary Theory: Approaches, Scholars, Terms.
Lukacs' original discussion can be found in his History and Class Consciousness. The opening chapter of
Max Horkheimer's and Theodor W. Adomo's Dialectic ofEnlightenment provides a more strictly Marxist
view of sacrifice, one that distinguishes between earlier magical forms of sacrifice and those typical of
capitalist, Enlightenment thought. While they do not use the term "reification," their work reflects a more
distinctly Marxist position.
2

°This distinction between language and reality in Burke is very important to recognize. It is easy
to read Burke as a pure social constructivist, but Burke himself was absolutely insistent that his position is
not quite that. In his 1966 preface to the second edition of The Philosophy ofLiterary Form, Burke
remarks that he is often misinterpreted as saying the world is "nothing but the things we say about it," and
he vigorously objects to this idea: "The greater my stress upon the role of symbolism in human behavior
(and misbehavior!), the greater has been my realization of the inexorable fact that, as regards the realm of
the empirical, one cannot live by the word for bread alone. And though the thing bread is tinged by the
realm of symbolic action, its empirical nature is grounded in the realm of non-symbolic, or extra-symbolic
motion." For Burke, physical reality is separate from the symbolic, although for symbol-using creatures,
reality as experienced is always found in the dialectical tension the between physical and the symbolic
(xvi). As Timothy J. Crusius notes, " . . . language is for Burke language in a scene, and this scene
includes much that is not language . . . " (18). The consistent linking of the material and symbolic in
Burke has led to his being claimed by both traditional Marxists and post-structuralists, although each
group tends to discover too much of the opposition in his approach. For a typical Marxist reading, see
Frank Lentricchia. See Cary Nelson for a representative discussion from a post-structuralist position. The
introduction to Crusius' Kenneth Burke and the Conversation After Philosophy offers a good overall
discussion of the many appropriations of Burke. See also Gregory S. Jay's account of a conference panel,
published in Pre-Text under the title, "Burke Re-Marx."
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metaphor of a 'lerministic screen," and he begins his discussion of the terministic screen
with the following description:
Even if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature as
a terminology it must be a selection of reality� and to this extent it must
function also as a deflection of reality. (I.ASA 45)
This deflection of reality by the language used to refer to it is what Burke means by a
terministic screen. Terminologies are like filters of language, and the screen through which
we look directs our attention to one aspect of a thing rather than another. For example,
Burke suggests that psychologists will interpret the same dream differently depending
upon the school to which they belong. Different terminologies may even determine entire
world views (I.ASA 45). 21
The fact that terminologies create terministic screens is not a bad thing in itself It
is simply so. We cannot help but have systems of nomenclature, and they will cause us to
focus our attention in specific ways. The problem occurs when we do not realize that we
are looking through a screen. When a limited terminology becomes fixed and frozen, the
ability to experiment with new ways of seeing is diminished. A less obvious result can be
scapegoating. In order to explore how scapegoating results from these frozen systems, we
will examine the different ways in which Burke describes the process in three maj or books:
A Grammar ofMotives, A Rhetoric ofMotives, and The Rhetoric of Religion.

The earliest of these, A Grammar ofMotives, is seriously concerned with the
problem of reductionism in the use of language. One form of reductionism is the process

21

For a full discussion of terministic screens, see the article by that title published as chapter 3 of
Language as Symbolic Action, pages 44-62.
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by which we tend to separate dialectical pairs, such that one term is good and the other
bad. For example, Burke mentions the mind/body dialectic. For Burke, the human being
must be described ambiguously, in a space that joins these two terms. If we decide instead
that mind and body are entirely separate, and then call mind good and body bad, we have
set up a situation where we reject our bodies. While Burke does not fully discuss the
implications of this splitting in the Grammar, it is only logical to conclude that a rejection
of what is an unavoidable aspect of our own being might cause us to identify another
person or group with the rejected element and thus use this person or group as a
scapegoat to purge our conflicts about embodiment. There is also the possibility of
denying the existence of either mind or body. The attempt to explain everything by means
of one set of terms is regarded by Burke as fanaticism, and fanaticism can also result in
scapegoating. If only one set of terms has any validity, it seems reasonable enough to
persecute those who use any other term. In particular, A Grammar of Motives is
concerned with the fanaticism of scientific positivism, but the risk of a fanatical
reductionism is always a possibility for any philosophical position. The aim of the
Grammar is the "encouraging of tolerance through speculation" (442).
In A Rhetoric of Motives, scapegoating is presented as a function of hierarchy,
most particularly of hierarchies that become rigidly frozen. Burke regards hierarchy as an
inevitable aspect of symbolic systems-particularly social systems-but expresses concern
about their tendency to become inflexible:
The hierarchic principle itself is inevitable in systematic thought. It is
embodied in the mere process of growth, which is synonymous with the
class divisions of youth and age, stronger and weaker, male and female, or
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the stages of learning, from apprentice to journeyman to master. But this
last hierarchy is as good an indication as any of the way in which the
"naturalness" of grades rhetorically reinforces the protection of privilege.
Though in essence purely developmental, the series is readily transformed
into rigid social classifications, and these interfere with the very process of
development that was its reason for being. (RM 14 1)
At its best, the system can provide a sense of wholeness by creating a connection
which allows all participants, at every level, to experience themselves as belonging to a
meaningful order. However, hierarchies can also cause hostility, since those at the top of
any system tend to enjoy privileges denied to others. Thus, while members of different
social classes may court each other, each class may also "deny, suppress, exorcise the
elements its shares with other classes. This attempt leads to the scapegoat [the use of
dyslogistic terms for one's own traits as manifested in an 'alien' class]" {14 1-42). In other
words, differences between individuals and groups of people (like gender differences or
differences in occupation) always create something of a sense of mystery. The sense of
mystery that social hierarchies create allows members of different social classes to see one
another as consubstantial and alienated simultaneously, thus setting up the conditions for
scapegoating. Yet any attempt simply to eliminate hierarchy is destined to fail, since some
form of hierarchy is likely to emerge in any system, even a system of equality. In principle,
if equality is valued above privilege, equality has been placed above privilege in a hierarchy
of values. 22 If the seeker after equality fails to recognize the inevitability of some sort of
hierarchy in his or her new social order, he or she may simply create a world where chaos
is valued above order (still a hierarchy). Even more likely is the scapegoating of the
22

Leland Griffin provides a good description of this phenomenon, within the framework of a
larger discussion of social movements.
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person who has obvious gifts or frailties that seem to belie the idea of equality. These
results might well follow if one went in search of a "pure" equality.
The quest for purity, the search for a "perfect" version of whatever terminology,
system, or value we espouse, is also a fundamental aspect of the hierarchical principle.
Thus, Burke calls human beings "rotten with perfection" (LASA 1 6), prone to pursue the
perfection of an idea or system to the point of self-destruction. The quest for purity
follows logically from hierarchical thinking. Anything that is cold can be colder; anything
that is hot can be hotter. The development of a terminology for good and evil thus lends
itself to the pursuit of the "perfectly good" or the "perfectly evil." Thus, the idea of
hierarchy allows us to develop a principle of ente/echy-of purpose, even ultimate purpose.
This tendency is a primary reason for both the freezing of a symbolic order, which is seen
as ultimate or perfect, and the need to scapegoat in order to cleanse it or ourselves of
corrupting, imperfect elements.
At the end ofA Rhetoric ofMotives, Burke discusses the idea of "ultimate
identification," the tendency to seek consubstantiation with the ultimate in one's pursuit of
the pure and the perfect (RM 328). Thus, he addresses the idea of mysticisms, with a
particular emphasis on false mysticisms, the seeking of unity with an ultimate that is not
really ultimate. One such ultimate might be warfare itself, which calls for complex forms of
social organization and order that some find very satisfying (RM 332), but one might even
deify a symbolic system itself, a system seen as perfect and given religious devotion. Such
a system might be a religion, a political system, a philosophical system, or a scientific
theory, but once it is deified, it is evident how readily anyone who questions it might be
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scapegoated. Since every system will really be limited, not ultimate, the need to
continually quell one's own anxious questioning would be constant, and the scapegoat
could serve to purge that anxiety. Burke sees this pattern as contributing to warfare, since
often "men seem to prefer the simple suicide and homocide of militarist devotion, having
persuaded themselves that the further dialectical growth of doctrine would be immoral"
(RM 253). Again, it is important to remember that the deification of any given system is

avoidable, as is the scapegoating that results from it, but the tendency to think in terms of
ultimate values is built into the nature of language. In and of itself, this tendency is neither
avoidable nor destructive. It is only problematic when the system itself is seen as frozen
and becomes ultimate, setting up the scapegoating process.
The description of this process in terms of order, guilt, and sacrifice reaches its full
development for Burke in The Rhetoric ofReligion. In this text, Burke begins a new form
of study, one that he calls "logology" or ''words about words" ( I ). 23 The Rhetoric of
Religion is based first on the argument that religious language, as language about ultimate

reality, can be understood as language about language. One might say that language about
an ultimate object, God being by definition the highest object conceivable, serves as the
23My discussion is based on my belief that there is a continuity between Burke's "dramatistic"
theory, as described in A Grammar ofMotives andA Rhetoric ofMotives, and the logological theory
worked out in The Rhetoric ofReligion. This position is certainly not universally accepted Robert Wess
argues that logology undermines the greatest strengths of Burke's system, its ability to treat language as a
means for social change. Bernard L. Brock treats these two stages of Burke's career as reflecting
completely different philosophical positions ("Evolution" 30-31). Others, like Trevor Melia, argue that
logology simply works out the epistemological dimensions of dramatism, which has an ontological
emphasis (1 12). My own reading is that Burke's work evolves, but this evolution develops the
implications of early arguments. For further discussion see Bieseker (15-16 and 113), Chesebro,
"Epistemology as Ontology. " Most importantly, Burke himself, in "Dramatism and Logology," claims
that he has created "two terms for one theory�" dramatism focuses on the ontological elements of Burke's
system, while logology deals with the epistemological (89).
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best means of understanding how the principle of hierarchical order works in all language.
In The Rhetoric of Religion, Burke attempts to explain the underlying logic of religious
language by examining Saint Augustine's Confessions and the first three chapters of
Genesis as interpreted within the Christian tradition. Although similar ideas are discussed
throughout the book, this discussion will examine particularly the introductory chapters of
the text and the discussion of Genesis, overlooking the interesting but less relevant issues
covered in Burke's discussion of Augustine.
In the early pages of The Rhetoric ofReligion, Burke summarizes his book's
argument in the form of a short poem:
Here are the steps
In the Iron Law of History
That welds Order and Sacrifice:
Order leads to Guilt
(For who can keep commandments!)
Guilt needs Redemption
(For who would not be cleansed!)
Redemption needs Redeemer
(Which is to say, a Victim!).
Order
Through Guilt
To Victimage
(Hence: Cult of the Kill). . . . (4-5)
This brief and pointed history of order forecasts Burke's basic argument on the Genesis
narrative, in which God creates order in both cosmic and moral terms.

As

the familiar

story goes, God first speaks a Paradise into existence and then commands that the first
couple not eat from a particular tree. There is disobedience, then a fall into a cursed state
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of existence that includes both guilt and mortality. Finally, there is redemption through
vicarious sacrifices, animal sacrifices in the Hebrew Scriptures and the sacrifice of Jesus in
the New Testament.
Burke argues that simply at the level of language, the terms of this narrative
necessarily imply one another. For example, creation suggests fall, since it involves a
movement from one unified principle, "God," to a multitude of beings (and terms for
them) that are potentially in conflict with one another. Commandments imply at least the
possibility of disobedience. We do not command stones to do or not to do certain things.
We command beings whom we think capable of a diversity of actions, and whose behavior
we believe we can influence symbolically. Finally, the notion of punishment for
disobedience suggests the notion of redemption, since a redeemer stands in for the guilty
person, just as symbols stand for the objects they represent. "TREE" stands for a tall
woody plant with branches and leaves. In an economic system, things become
substitutable or exchangable-sixty-five cents for a soft drink or for a ball point pen. The
notion that a redeemer can substitute his suffering for suffering "owed" by the guilty is a
very natural step to make as we move from one symbolic system to another.
The religious system that includes a commandment, disobedience, and, finally,
redemption through sacrifice produces an order that Burke describes as rhetoric:
The subject of religion falls under the head of rhetoric in the sense that
rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and religious cosmogonies are designed, in
the last analysis, as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion. To
persuade men towards certain acts, religions would form the kinds of
attitudes which would prepare men for such acts." And in order to plead
for such attitudes as persuasively as possible, the religious always ground
their exhortations (to themselves and others) in statements of the widest
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and deepest possible scope, concerning the authorship of men's motives.
(RR v)
Elsewhere, Burke makes a similar argument based on the concept of attitude as "incipient
action" (GM 236). 24 Once a symbolic action is performed (and such symbolic actions need
not be self-consciously rhetorical), attitudes are created that inevitably affect overt actions
in the world.
Yet, while focusing on religion as a paradigm, Burke makes it extremely clear that
religions are not the only systems capable of claiming 'lhe widest and deepest possible
scope." He offers several examples of secular systems that fall into the same pattern. One
of Burke's most powerful examples is the Cold War of the 1950's and 60's-two competing
systems of political and economic governance, each regarding the other as responsible for
all its woes, and each threatening the other with total annihilation. He also discusses the
ways in which economic systems justify their inequities through the use of a system of law
that includes strict sanctions for the violation of property rights. Finally he notes that
supposedly value-free "systems" can contain the same impulses. Of technology he argues:
Insofar as technologism is a religion and it is a 'religion' to the extent that
technology is viewed as an intrinsic good, so that its underlying, unspoken
assumption is: 'The more technology, the higher the culture,' we had better
favor a calculus that keeps us always aware of technology's possible
relation to theology's vast motivational Cathedrals." (RR 170-71)
Burke reveals here that his exploration of religion as an ultimate system of order is
actually an intervention aimed at the warmongering "divinities" of his own culture. He
claims that awareness of the principle of hierarchy in religion, with its sacrificial
2

4Burke credits I. A Richards for the term, citing Richards' The Principles ofLiterary Criticism,
but then adapts it to his own purposes.
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dimensions, will help keep us aware of the same principle when it arises in other systems
of order.
Thus, he creates a chart to describe this process, and he entitles it, "Cycle of Terms
Implicit in the Idea of 'Order'-by which he means any fully developed form of order, not
j ust the Christian system that he explicitly depicts (RR 184). Burke uses the term logology
to describe his practice here. This proj ect is based on his treating language about a
transcendent God as equivalent to language about words, that always, in a sense,
transcend the obj ects they describe. He sees the Genesis narrative as a language about
language, translated into mythic or narrative terms. For example, he treats the six days of
creation as language about the creation of order through classification:
Stated narratively. . . , such an idea of principles [ of Order] , or ''firsts"
would not be stated simply in terms of classificatio� as were we to say,
"The first of six primary classes would be such-and-such, the second such
and-such" and so on. Rather, a completely narrative style would properly
translate the idea of six classes or categories into terms of time, as it were
to assign each of the classes to a separate day . . . Further a completely
narrative style would personalize the principle of classification. This role is
performed by the references to God's creative fiat, which from the very
start infuses the natural order with the verbal principle. (RR 20 1-02)
This personalized God acts both as author of a good world ( cosmology) and as the
authority who gives good commandments. And for Burke, this pairing is exactly what
should be expected, because of the principle of the negative. The "negative" has two
functions in language-to describe and to prescribe. We say that things "are" and "are not,"
but we also tell people to do or not to do particular things. And we learn what the word
"no" means as a command long before we learn to say "The cat is not here." Thus, Burke
argues, there is always the tendency for the language of description-things are or are not
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so- to become mixed up with the language of prescription-do or do not do this thing:
First, consider the strategic ambiguity whereby the term "Order'' may- apply
both to the realm of nature in general and to the special realm of human
socio-political organizations (an ambiguity whereby, so far as sheerly
empirical things are concerned, a natural order could be thought to go on
existing even if all human beings, with their various socio-political orders,
were obliterated). This is a kind of logical pun whereby our ideas of the
natural order can become secretly infused by our ideas of the socio-political
order. (RR 1 83)
Of course, the reverse is also true. Socio-political issues can be justified by metaphors
from nature and thus particular socio-political systems can come to seem natural. These
confusions are complicated by the fact that we forget another "negative" that is
unavoidably implicit in language, i.e. that the word ''tree" is not the same thing as a tree.
Thus, we give our various orders enormous power, regarding them as accurate in ways
they cannot be, and expecting them to be· maintained without deviation.
In so doing, we forget that some idea of evil is implicit in the idea of"Order,"
because 'Order' is a polar, or dialectical term, implying the idea of 'Disorder' (RR 195).
Any order created by language necessarily will have its parallel disorder into which
practitioners can slide. There may even be alternative orders, which cari rise up in
competition with the primary order, creating attractive temptations. Even if one
deliberately resists sliding into chaos or choosing alternative systems, because the order is
not reality itself, but a limited description, it will be impossible to adhere to it perfectly.
Something important or necessary will be left out, and that missing element will reemerge
as the source of evil. There is no escape from the idea of evil as a given principle in any
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thoroughgoing system. 25
Deviations from the system are bound to occur, no matter what the system, and
these deviations tend to result in guilt and then in the quest for a sacrificial victim, one
who can substitute for us, carry guilt for us, and thus redeem us. While vicarious sacrifice
does not occur within the creation narrative itself, it appears shortly thereafter in the
Genesis text, in the form of animal sacrifice. Finally, in the Christian system, there will be
the ultimate redemptive sacrifice of the God-man Jesus. But Burke points out that in the
face of continuing violations and guilt, such sacrifices never seem to be quite enough:
For it seems that, even if one believes in the idea of a perfect, supernatural,
superpersonal victim, by identification with whose voluntary sacrifice one
can be eternally saved, there is still the goad to look for victims here on
earth as well, who should be punished for their part, real or imaginary, in
blocking the believer's path to felicity, or perhaps in threatening to send
him on his heavenly way too soon. (RR 223)
When Burke asks in his poem "Who can keep commandments?" he clearly implies that
whatever commandments are given, and whatever their source, there will be disjunctions
between those commandments and the realities of human life-disjunctions that will lead
almost inevitably to guilt, and to some sort of sacrifice, either the ritual mortification of
self punishment or the sacrifice of a scapegoat. The more thoroughgoing the system, and

25This discussion is, of course, begging the question of whether some acts deserve to be called
evil. Burke's discussion of Hitler, the contempt with which he speaks of economic abuses, and the caustic
remarks he makes about the mysticism of warfare certainly would lead the reader to believe that Burke
regards some acts as evil. Blake most assuredly does. However, in his discussion in The Rhetoric of
Religion, Burke is concerned only with a description of how systems function, not whether or not a given
system, religious, ethical, or otherwise, is more or less correct. We can be sure that "more or less correct"
is the best Burke can expect from a symbolic order, but he still has ethical values that are implicit in his
discussion: they are assumed. however, not argued. It is also clear that he regards the evil of violence as.
at least in part, the consequence of a kind of perfectionistic worship of specific systems of order. His
concern is simply to explain how that pefectionism functions rhetorically.
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the more rigid it is, the more likely it is to produce scapegoating. Thus, the purpose of
Burke's book is to remind us that, even though we must have systems of order, both
cosmic and moral, we must be aware of our tendency to divinize them and thus to sacrifice
others to them.
If this is the case, and it is the rigidity of systems that leads us to scapegoat others,
it would seem clear that one good method of avoiding scapegoating would be to keep
systems flexible, to keep them open. In fact, this is one way in which we can avoid having
scapegoats. Burke speaks of this method in terms of transcendence, which is for him a
function of dialectic. However, Burke also allows for the catharsis of symbolic sacrifices
as a means of averting actual scapegoating. The concept of catharsis is less significant than
transcendence in our analysis of Blake, but it is useful to know that both principles are
aspects of Burke's thinking about the scapegoat, and to examine why catharsis is less
relevant for the study of Blake. 26
Burke understands catharsis in an essentially Aristotelian sense, although he adds
an emphasis on scapegoating: "Catharsis involves fundamentally purgation by the imitation
of victimage . . . (I.ASA 46). The depiction of victims in Greek tragedy, for example,
creates a condition in which "rival factions can weep together'' (LASA 1 86). This common
grief is a socially unifying force that may allay conflict or, in some cases, cause people to
accept and adjust to difficult social situations. Portrayals of death in characters who are in

26Wbile Burke discusses both modes throughout his opus, he most directly describes and
distinguishes catharsis and transcendence in his essay "I, Eye, Ay-Conceming Emerson's Early Essay on
•Nature, 'and the Machinery of Transcendence," published in Language as Symbolic Action, pages 186200.
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some respects good, but who have flaws we would like to disavow in our own
communities, can result in a purgation or catharsis that has a cohesive social purpose. The
symbolic sacrifice of a fictional or mythological figure can prevent the actual scapegoating
of our neighbors. The difficulty is that it can also interfere with legitimate denunciation of
social evils, thus serving the purpose of reinforcing the status quo and perpetuating long
standing social injustices, 27 Burke summarizes this politicized understanding of
Aristotelian catharsis late in his career:
And by putting "superior'' people (whose "superiority'' the hoi polloi
cannot love them for) in an imaginary situation such that they can be
imaginatively pitied, the devices of tragedy allow for the exercising of pity
as the surrogate of love. And to that extent, within the conditions of
fiction, the harsh realities of civic conflict are symbolically transcended.
Hence, tragic purges, twice a year. Such symbolic resolutions must be
repeated, since the actual underlying situation is not resolved. (DD 14-15)28
Yet Blake's work relies little on this cathartic effect, insofar as his depictions of violence
and death do not in any way attempt to evoke sympathy for the persecutors, at least not in
the works of the l 790's. Furthermore, he would certainly object to defusing social tensions
271 am emphasizing the more negative aspect of what, for Burke, is a dialectical function

of catharsis. with both a positive and a negative pole. For a more positive treatment of the role of catharsis
in culture, see Jennerman and Rueckert's Kenneth Burke and the Drama ofHuman Relations.
Jennerman's argument also makes it clear that catharsis and transcendence are interwoven and deeply
connected.
28

Although Burke treats catharsis as an action best achieved in literature, it should not be
assumed that all violent death in literary texts involves scapegoating. In some cases, the violent death of a
character is simply the symbolization of a need for change. Insofar as death can symbolize the change, the
destruction of the character may not indicate a scapegoating impulse at all, but may simply represent a
process of transformation, personal or social. An example of such a case, described at length in A
Rhetoric ofMotives, might be the destruction of Samson at the end of Milton' s Samson Agonistes. Such
destruction symbolizes Milton's own struggle, his own desire to resist the English Restoration and remain
faithful to his own religious and political convictions, despite his blindness and his loss of political power.
This particular death is meant to inspire courage to await a coming transformation. It is not, strictly
speaking, the representation of a scapegoat (3-6).
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in ways that perpetuate injustice. Blake seems more interested in avoiding scapegoating by
transforming the structures of order.
When Burke talks about overcoming scapegoating through transcendence, he is
using a method that intersects better with Blake's approach. We can transcend the need
for anything other than a devil-term, or structural scapegoat, Burke argues, through
dialectic, by which diverse objects or diverse ideas are joined together for a common
purpose (LASA 188-90). At times, such linkages can be made simply by means of
rhetorical devices, thus allowing limited perspectives to be transcended. For example,
early in his career, Burke uses the term "perspective by incongruity" to describe a process
by which normally dissociated terms are linked in order to create a new perspective on an
issue. He particularly associates this term with Nietzsche's rhetoric, but offers other
specific examples, Thorsten Veblen's term "learned incapacity'' for one, T. S. Eliot's
phrase "decadent athleticism" for another (PC 91).
Generally speaking, however, Burke seeks to create transcendence through linking
opposed terms beneath an overarching principle that includes both. While Burke argues
that hierarchy and order are an inevitable aspect of symbolic systems, he points out that
there is a distinction between purely "dialectical order," which simply arises out of
negotiation without any ultimate guiding principles, and an ultimate order based on an
ordering god-term. As Burke states it:
The "dialectical" order would leave the competing voices in a jangling
relation with one another (a conflict solved faute de mieux by "horse
trading"); but the "ultimate" order would place these competing voices
themselves in a hierarchy, or sequence, or evaluative series; so that, in
some way, we went by a fixed and reasoned progression from one of these
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to another, the members of the entire group being arranged
developmentally with relation to one another. The ''ultimate" order of
terms would thus differ essentially from the "dialectical" (as we use the
term in this particular connection) in that there would be a "guiding idea"
or ''unitary principle" behind the diversity of voices. (RM 1 87)
Furthermore, the movement towards such an ultimate order can cause a "formless
parliamentary wrangle" to become "endowed with design." Even if the political
antagonists resist such a design, Burke notes, it may have a "contemplative effect,"
transforming the attitudes of the antagonists and giving shape and principle to the
necessary compromises that exist wherever dialectical terms clash (RM 1 88).
Since Burke describes ultimate order in almost mystical terms, it is easy to imagine
that he is actually arguing for ''thoroughgoing modes of persuasion" similar to those he
later critiques in The Rhetoric ofReligion. In fact, however, the kind of hierarchy that
Burke suggests is summed up in a term he uses late in his discussion of dialectical and
ultimate order, ''ultimate dialectic." If we remember that the term "dialectic" for Burke
always suggests the transformational possibilites in language, we will see that Burke
means for ultimate terms always to grow out of the tension of dialectical discourse. Terms
change continually. Even ultimate terms, or god-terms, are forever being displaced by new
god-terms as they engage dialectically with other terms and other systems of order. Thus,
when opposing terms, or opposing systems, meet, they will each be transformed by the
other, with a new ultimate term emerging in each encounter. The hierarchy created in this
way is never seen as absolute; rather it is an aspiration towards an absolute. As such, it
takes into account the drive towards perfection inherent in the hierarchical forms of
language while allowing for recognition that no symbolic order has atttaioe� final
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perfection. In a sense, what makes an ultimate dialectic different from a frozen, rigid
system is the attitude that its adherents have towards it. The ultimate dialectic order
differs from a purely ultimate order because its adherents do not resist, but, instead,
consciously employ the transformational processes that all symbolic orders participate in
no matter what.
As a rhetorical method the ''ultimate dialectic" aims to overcome conflict by
breaking up rigid hierarchies and their equally rigid exclusions without resorting to a
chaotic and unprincipled scramble. Burke' s books are themselves enactments of this
method, as Burke continually attempts to reveal in each thinker that he explicates elements
of those positions that the thinkers themselves treat as excluded. 29 In so doing, he
identifies points of commonality or similarity between opposing ideas. In fact, Burke's
identification of particular instances of scapegoating can be seen as deriving from an
inversion of the same method. Instead of connecting two systems so that an ultimate term
emerges from conversation between the� Burke begins with his ultimate value (the
reduction of scapegoating, or '1he purification of war") and connects opposing systems by
identifying their propensity to produce violence. By exposing their common limitations in

29

This method bears a superficial resemblance to deconstruction in some respects, and that
similarity has been noted by several recent critics, particularly Robert Wess and Barbara Biesecker.
However, deconstruction is focused more on the binary pairing itself, while Burke attempts to create a new
position ambiguously linked to the other two. Burke's system can be more properly described as a
"constructive" rather than deconstructive.as Peter Otto notes in his Derridean study of Blake, Constructive
Vision and Visionary Deconstruction). Further, David Cratis Williams discusses the peacemaking
emphasis of both theorists, while James Chesebro's article, "K-enneth Burke and Jacques Derrida"
provides an excellent discussion of thecontrasting relatio-'between Burke and Derrida, with a
description of how historical context andrhetorical situation contribute to those distinctions.
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the face of peace, the god-term of the text, Burke opens up the possibility of negotiation
between them.
For example, in A Grammar ofMotives, he describes American capitalism and
Soviet Communism as two systems bent on blaming the other for all their difficulties and
endangering the planet in the process. Or, in The Rhetoric ofReligion, he describes the
scapegoating potential in Christianity while pointing out that the adherents of ideologies of
technological progress, who see themselves as enlightened, engage in rhetorical practices
that can produce the same results. In so doing, Burke attempts to persuade his audience to
relinquish their certainty about the superiority of their own system and to open up to the
possibility of negotiation, thus reducing the psychological need for scapegoating and
providing a means of transcending, or at least, purifying, the scapegoating motive. 30
3

°This argument certainly leaves some significant ethical questions unanswered Even though
Burke acknowledges the presence of absolutes in discourse, in the form of god-terms and devil-terms, he
does not tell us how we know what such terms should be. In his own text, peace is the god-term and war
the devil-term, but even this choice of a god-term is somewhat tentative. At the end ofA Rhetoric of
Motives, Burke argues for the idea of God (not the existence of God) as god-term, probably because,
finally, no one term or doctrine can ever be the absolute, final ultimate. ""God," in this sense, does not
necessarily mean a specific deity of a specific religion. It could as easily be, and probably is, a placeholder
for the idea of the unnameable ultimate for which we strive, knowing we can never attain it.
Even for his tentative god-term of peace, Burke is willing to grant the necessity for casuistry,
arguing that at times, a blow may be the closest we can come to peace, insofar as it is not a gunshot (RM
1 55). Yet he does not provide a means for determining when to adhere to compromise or when to shift
froma particular god-term to another. He does assert that "'a scrupulous man will never abandon a purpose
which he considers absolutely good" (RM 155). The commitment to ethical action should remain central
as we choose our god-terms and our compromises.
Finally, however, a solution to these kinds of arguments is not what Burke seeks. Instead, he is
attempting to describe how language works and to look at the ethical implications of thinking about
language in particular ways. If we worship a limited system, he suggests, we are likely to create victims
defending it, precisely because language is incapable, by nature, of providing the kinds of perfection we
want for it. If we try to have no system, we will have one, despite ourselves, as long as we are using
language. and our dishonest faith in our perfect system of chaos will have its own victims. But if we have
a system about which we maintain some skepticism, we at least allow for the possibility that we can avoid
sacrificing others to it. and we are also realistic about what it can or cannot do. This does not mean.
however, that we are provided with an absolute ethical command to be flexible. The dialectic does not
allow us to say that we should always compromise, anymore than it lets us say that we should always
stand fast. We must use casuistry to apply our god-terms in particular limited situations, maintaining a
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So, as we have seen, Burke demonstrates that language can be utilized to avoid
scapegoating, either through catharsis or through transcendence. In this respect, he offers
his reader rhetorical tools for use in their own symbolic interventions. Yet, he also offers
tools for analyzing the rhetoric of others, tools for examining the ways in which their
symbolic actions either perpetuate or transcend the scapegoating motive, as the following
chapters will analyze the symbolic actions of William Blake. In the final section of this
chapter, we will examine briefly the ways in which that analysis will proceed, with further
attention to the ways in which Burke's and Blake's arguments intersect.
Synthesizing Burke and Blake

As Kenneth Burke is obsessed with the scapegoat, William Blake is similarly
obsessed. Sacrificial lambs, crucified figures from Ore and Luvah to Fuzon to Jesus Christ,
and Druidical altars where human flesh is burned in sacrifice-such images appear
repeatedly in Blake's poetry. And, as Kenneth Burke strives in his writings for '1:he
purification of war," so Blake strives to eliminate Corporeal War, with its sacrificial
victims, and replace it with Mental War. The terms are different, but the aims are
strikingly similar. Both men ultimately acknowledge that conflict is unavoidable, and both
suggest that we aim to use symbolic rather than physical weapons to deal with it.
Furthermore, Blake's effort to transcend "Corporeal War," like Burke's struggle
for '1:he purification of war," approaches the problem of scapegoating in terms of an
understanding of language as act. Referring to himself as a prophet, Blake seeks to present
a view of the word as something that is active, something that intervenes, as opposed to
dialectic between openness and commitment.
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something that simply describes. He criticizes his contemporaries for their view that the
prophet is a predictor of future events precisely because this view obliterates the function
of the prophet as one who would change things through his utterance:
Prophets in the modem sense of the word have never existed Jonah was no
prophet in the modem sense for his prophecy ofNinevah failed Every
honest man is a Prophet he utters his opinion both of private & public
matters/Thus/If you go on So/the result is So/He never says such a thing
shall happen let you do what you will. ("Annotations to An Apologyfor the
Bible" E 61 7)
The same principle is exemplified when Blake writes to a patron, the Rev. D.
Trusler, arguing that he prefers expression that is not too explicit, since it is "the fittest for
Instruction because it rouzes the faculties to act" (E 702). 31 The same concept of language
as actions goes to further, and even more Burkean lengths, when Blake writes in the
margin of Francis Bacon's essay, "Of Great Place," "Thought is Act. Christs Acts were
Nothing to Caesars if this is not so" (E 623). 32 This concept, in many respects so similar to
Burke's ideas about attitude as incipient action, has led Robert N. Essick to argue that
Blake essentially abandons a notion of representational language for a performative one,
stating that for Blake, "words, whether conceived of as identical to thoughts or as their
vehicles, are also actions" (Essick Language 102). 33
Further, Blake sees scapegoating as arising from symbolic causes quite similar to
31

Robert N. Essick discusses this letter to Trusler in some detail. See chapter 2, "In Search of the
Motived Sign" in William Blake and the Language ofAdam (72-73).
32

Again. see chapter 2 of Essick's William Blake and the Language ofAdam (102).

33

For a discussion of Blake's performative use of language in terms of modem speech-act theory,
see Angela Esterhammer's Creating States: Studies in the Performative Language ofJohn Milton and
William Blake. Kenneth's Burke's concept of "circumference," as developed in A Grammar ofMotives,
plays an important role in Esterhammer's discussions of Songs ofInnocence and Experience.

44
those identified by Burke. Throughout his works, Blake shows concern for the problems
caused by excessively exclusive and rigid symbolic systems. He exposes and critiques
these inflexible systems, using rhetorical strategies, like perspective by incongruity, in
ways similar to those described by Burke. Whereas the earliest works tend to critique
specific systems of order rather than offer new options for symbolic thought, the
mythological works begin to explore alternative ways of thinking about language. As the
mythological texts become more abstract, they begin to be very explicit that language is a
primary concern, and the possibility of creating new forms of order becomes a central
theme. In The Four Zoas, Blake creates hierarchies that strongly resemble the ultimate
dialectics that Burke describes as a desirable means of combining the quest for
transcendent principles with the need for a flexible and changing symbolic system.
In his earliest works, Blake already connects problems of social injustice and
human suffering, sometimes described through the language of sacrifice, with the function
of symbolic systems. In his early non-mythological texts, Blake reveals patterns of
exclusion in the symbolic systems of his culture, specifically Christianity and Lockean
empiricism, showing how exclusive devotion to these systems produces excessively
limiting terministic screens. The tractates deal with the limits of both of these systems,
while The Marriage of Heaven and Hell exposes what Blake regards as Christianity's
fanatical reduction of human motives to only one acceptable standard, obedience to a set
moral law. This obedience destroys the antinomian law of liberty, which, Blake suggests,
allows for a free development of sexuality and the imaginative powers.
Similar issues appear in Songs of Innocence and Experience. When published
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together, the Songs address the reductionist positions of both Christianity and empiricism
by exposing the ways in which each of these perspectives limits the vision of its working
class adherents, rendering them passive in the face of oppression and scapegoating. 34 In
the Chimney Sweeper poems for example, Blake demonstrates the limits of strictly
spiritual or strictly empirical world views, showing children whose limited understanding
gives them no possibility of changing their situation. Reading the Chimney Sweeper texts
from both Innocence and Experience, Blake's audience can see through both perspectives
simultaneously and recognize the strengths and limitations of each. Others of the Songs,
like ''Little Boy Lost," point explicitly to scapegoating as a direct result of devoting
oneself to a system. The strategy of perspective by incongruity is relevant to many of these
texts, since Blake links empirical and religious systems through formal devices, thus
revealing unsuspected connections between them.
The strategy of perspective by incongruity remains important to the study of
Blake's early mythological works, the Lambeth Prophecies, America: A Prophecy in
particular. This highly revolutionary work often use common images to link revolutionary
and conservative ideas, apparently in an effort to undercut conservative critiques of
revolutionary activity. By using similar images to describe revolutionaries and government
officials, Blake reveals the hypocrisy inherent in the conservative rhetoric that accuses
revolutionaries of violence. In showing that the government is guilty of the violence of

3

"The linking of these two terms is not meant to imply that they are synonymous or that one
necessarily produces the other. Sometimes oppression does involve a scapegoating motive, but it may also
be straightforward exploitatio� or it may involve the reification of social structures in ways that have
sources other than processes of merger and division or substitutionary atonement. But both elements are
described in the poems and related to terministic screens.
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which it accuses others, Blake reveals a scapegoating motive in conservative critiques of
revolutionary activity.
Furthermore, in the Genesis parodies, particularly The Book of Urizen, Blake
begins to link sacrificial imagery and images of rigid symbolic orders, including both
religious and scientific orders. Urizen, arguably the symbol of order in Blake's mythology,
comes to be linked with books, with religious systems, and with scientific calculation, but
he also is associated with images of frozenness and immovability. Furthermore, Urizen
crucifies of his own son, implying a condemnation of the Christian atonement narrative as
a scapegoating device used to hold people in subj ection. Close examination of this text
will reveal strong connections between Blake's narrative and the discussions of hierarchy,
mystery and scapegoating in A Rhetoric of Motives.
Yet, these parodic texts also strongly invite logological analysis. On the historical
level, The Book of Urizen, like all the Lambeth prophecies, is a strongly revolutionary
document. In all of these early mythological texts, the defiant figures, like Ore and Fuzon,
are superior to the figures associated with the established order. The Urizenic figures are
clearly connected with the church/state apparatus as well as with other intellectual
enterprises that Blake sees as supporting the status quo. Logological analysis will reveal,
however, that despite the antinomian impulses of the Genesis parodies, they do establish
their own law, their own hierarchy, in which the revolutionary principles emerge as
ultimate while Urizen, the principle of order, becomes the rej ected term.
Blake' s Biblical parodies, in fact, provide a remarkable point of contrast to
Burke's analysis of Genesis in A Rhetoric ofReligion. As Burke notes, while Genesis
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treats God's act of creation and His commandment as good, a creation narrative could
assume the opposite, and such a narrative, when analyzed logologically, would make very
different claims about language and symbolic action. The Book of Urizen is the first of
many creation stories offered by William Blake, and it precisely reverses the Biblical
Genesis narrative, offering us the inversion of the creation story that Burke mentions.
Rather than being a part of a good created order, Urizen's commandments follow his own
fall and produce a fallen state in everyone who attempts to obey them. Thus, they appear
to offer a perfect narrative description of an antinomian ideal, in which rebellion itself
appears to be the only god-term, and all order is condemned as a rigid and productive of a
scapegoating motive. These early myths seem to imply that the destruction of the current
hierarchy will be enough to resolve the problem of scapegoating. Yet, they establish a
hierarchy of their own. One might even argue that Urizenic order has become the
scapegoat in The Book of Urizen, while possible abuses of revolutionary violence go
unnoticed. 35
Yet, by the end of The Four Zoas, an unfinished work with which Blake struggles
for years, he is more willing to create hierarchies that are quite overt, and he also seems
more aware of the scapegoating potentials within the revolutionary impulse itself In this
text, Blake seeks to place the sacrificial violence of revolution within an ultimate dialectic.
Rebellion is no longer treated as the ultimate term. In fact, in The Four Zoas, the
revolutionary breakdown of hierarchy and order in the first six nights of the poem

35

See Steven Bid.lake and William Keach for discussions of the problematic violence found in
some of Blake's most revolutionary works.

48

produces a repetitive cycle of violence and scapegoating. The downward cycle of the
scapegoating process is arrested in the seventh night due to a change of attitude in Los.
From this point on, an ultimate dialectic is created, with each Zoa temporarily assuming a
supreme position in a developmental historical process. Intellectual warfare is exalted as
the highest principle at the end of the poem, and peace finally is achieved. Although each
conflict is transcended in turn, and violence is ultimately subordinated to a benevolent
motive, physical violence nevertheless remains as a necessary part of the process of
transformation. Perhaps the most marked change from the Lambeth Prophecies to The
Four Zoas is the transformation ofUrizen from a supremely negative figure to one who
embodies both positive and negative potentials, as do all of the Zoas. Viewed
logologically, this transformation implies a more flexible and positive view of symbolic
systems and their possib�lities.
The later illuminated works, Milton, Jerusalem, and The Ghost of Abel continue to
explore problems of symbolic order and scapegoating, using, as has been mentioned
earlier, a number of references to Druidic ritual sacrifices. The interest in creating a more
flexible order continues in Milton, and takes new directions in Jerusalem, both long and
intricate works that deal with new issues, both historically and in terms of a rhetoric of
order. As was mentioned earlier, these texts will not be included in this study. Here we
will focus exclusively on works that Blake produced between 1788 and approximately
1806, the last one having been begun in 1796. What will become clear through the course
of this project is that Blake's obsession with scapegoating begins in the texts of the early
l 790's, and that, from the beginning, scapegoating is connected to problems stemming
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from symbolic order. The obsession with these concerns does not begin with Milton, or
even with The Four Zoas. Furthermore, in The Four Zoas, the Blakean view of symbolic
order takes on a remarkably Burkean appearance.
Of course, this similarity cannot and does not mean that Burke and Blake are
simply saying the same thing. They come from different time periods and hold different
beliefs. Blake, for example, always calls himself a Christian, however unconventional his
ideas about Christianity may be. Burke is always skeptical about religious dogma,
although he is fascinated by the richness of religious language and treats it as
paradigmatic. Furthermore, however much Burke strives to prevent an obsession with
positivist descriptions of the world, he is far more comfortable with empirical, scientific
approaches to language than Blake is.
Even the Burkean and Blakean notions of language as act differ considerably. As
Robert Essick makes exquisitely clear in William Blake and the Language of Adam,
Blake's interest in language as act develops in conversation with empiricism on the one
hand and with a post-lapsarian understanding of Christianity on the other. Many of Blake's
contemporaries treat the separation of signifier and signified as something that occurred
only because of the Fall. Blake develops his view of language as action in conversation
with views of language that do not figure at all in Burke's world. Burke takes the
separation of"word" and "thing," or in Saussurean parlance "signifier" and "signified," for
granted. As Burke himself would tell us, dialectical terms (that is, abstract terms), are
always to be understood in relationship to those terms with which they are contrasted.
Thus, similar ideas, developed in conversation with very different opponents in a very
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different climate of attitudes, cannot be described simply as ''the saine."
Nevertheless, as Burke argues, the necessarily historical grounding of language
does not prevent our seeing relationships between periods or using the verbal strategies of
earlier periods. While arguing, for example, that literature must be understood as a
strategy for coping with the issues of its own time and situation, Burke nevertheless points
out:
This point of view does not, by any means, vow us to personal or historical
subjectivism. The situations are real; the strategies for handling them have
public content; and in so far as situations overlap from individual to
individual, or from one historical period to another, the strategies possess
universal relevance. (PLF 1)
Burke's descriptions of how language works are supported using thinkers from a variety
of time periods and cultures, including people from Blake's own period, like Jeremy
Bentham and Samuel Taylor Coleridge. As an analytical tool, Burke's theory can be used
to explore the rhetorical structures of any text. Furthermore, insofar as we are comparing
Burke's metarhetoric with Blake's, rather than simply analyzing Blake's rhetoric using
Burkean terms, it would be surprising if their projects did not overlap somewhat,
considering the antinomian tendencies common to both men. The differences in historical
conditions, content, and form enliven the conversation between these two thinkers; they
do not in any way lessen the value or the appropriateness of it.
Nevertheless, it is still important to acknowledge that Burke's is not the only
scapegoating theory that could be fruitfully applied to Blake's work. One of the earliest
scapegoating theorists, Blake's contemporary, Joseph de M�tre, stands in contrast to
Blake as an advocate of traditional Christian views of the atonement, and a comparison of
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their views on this subject, on the subject of capital punishment, and on the French
Revolution could produce a fascinating study in and of itself

,,

Rene Girard, probably the most well-known literary commentator on scapegoating
would also provide an interesting lens through which to examine Blake's depiction of
sacrifice. He regards mimesis as the root of sacrificial violence and sees the opponents in
violent conflict as monstrous doubles, who, in the course of their contentions, become
indistinguishable from one another. This view has significant parallels in Blake's
mythological works, particularly The Book of Urizen, and The Four Zoas. Furthermore,
Girard's reworking of the Christian theological understanding of Jesus' sacrificial death
also has strong parallels in Blake's works. For Girard, the traditional doctrine of the
atonement has the effect of perpetuating violence, because it treats God as demanding
blood in exchange for sin, thus making bloodletting a type of ultimate principle. Instead,
Girard asserts, we should see Christianity as offering an alternative vision: "God is not
violent, the true God has nothing to do with violence" (Scapegoat 189). For Blake, as
well, the doctrine of atonement is seen as an invitation to warfare and violence, while, at
the same time, the image of Jesus' self-offering is understood to have a redemptive
meaning. The parallels are interesting and worth exploring.
However, Girard sees violence as a response to physiologically rooted aggressive
impulses, an idea that probably would have seemed reductive to Blake, whose works show
an extremely complex and problematic relationship between "soul" and "body." Certainly,
Blake grounds his perspective on scapegoating more in language and its power over the
mind than in the body. For example, in The Book of Urizen, Urizen is not only violent, but
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his violence is linked to iron books, rigid systems of language, tools of description and
measurement, and religious doctrine-all of these things being related to the realm that
Kenneth Burke describes in terms of symbolic action. 36 Thus, Burke's theory provides an
extremely viable lens through which to view Blake's work, perhaps the best lens for
exploring the scapegoating motive. 37
Furthermore, this Burkean rhetorical theory has relevance to any number of
questions that are pertinent today, not only in our understanding of Blake, but in the ways
in which we think about language and violence in our own world. Is all violent action
scapegoating? Is there a necessary distinction between the revolutionary violence of the
oppressed and the violence of the oppressor? Are justice and non-violence always
compatible values? Does the attempt to use rhetoric in ways that promote flexibility really
reduce scapegoating? And finally, is it possible to create symbolic systems, or for that
matter, any form of rhetoric, that does not tend to exacerbate the scapegoating motive?
Ultimately, my hope is that placing William Blake and Kenneth Burke in conversation with
36

Again, the relationship between language and materiality in Burke is of some interest here.
Burke acknowledges that our bodies are subject to the laws of motion which exist apart from our own
symbolic systems and choices. Thus, an idea of innate aggression would not necessarily be alien to
Burke's thought. Yet, he chooses not to emphasize this aspect of violence because he sees it as rhetorically
ineffective. Commenting on those who emphasize the competitive, warlike, and "Jungle" heritage from
which human beings are thought to have sprung, he argues that they present a view of the world
in which "what we were admonished against [violence] was just about the only tangible thing there for
us to be" (GM 332).
37

Steven Bidlake offers a Girardian reading of violence in Blake. His study argues that
Girard's descriptions of escalating mimetic violence should make us cautious about applauding Blake's
revolutionary attitudes. Bidlake's argument suggests another reason for preferring a Burkean
methodology in approaching Blake. Girard's theory states that mimetic rivalry, and the violence that
results from it, occurs when hierarchies break down. Thus, it is easy to see in Girard an essentially
conservative vision. perhaps more so than he really intends. Nevertheless, on the face of it, Burke's
Marxist sympathies resonate more fully with Blake's revolutionary concerns. Bidlake's concern about the
violence inherent in some of Blake's poetry is nonetheless extremely important and valid
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each other may help to cast new light on these questions and on others like them. At any
rate, a conversation between Blake and Burke will, most assuredly, help us to describe
both the contributions and the limits of any antinomian rhetoric. In the next chapter, we
will begin to explore that conversation in light of texts written between 1788 and 1794,
the Tractates, The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, and The Songs of Innocence and
Experience. These texts that deal with issues similar to others that Blake begins in the

early 1790s, but they lack the mythological histories and characters that appear later in the
Lambeth prophecies. Also, their critique focuses less on systems of order in general and
more on specific systems of order that Blake finds troubling, specifically, Christianity and
Empiricism.
The next chapter will begin with the introduction of a Blakean god-term and devil
term that will remain important throughout our discussion-the terms Act and Hindrance
respectively. In chapter 2, as in the rest that follow, close reading of the selected texts will
occur, with Burke's theory functioning as a kind of lens, or perhaps a terministic screen,
to focus our attention on the relationship between scapegoating and symbolic order. At
the end of each chapter, there will be a section that directly analyzes the relationship
between these particular Blake texts and relevant aspects of Burke's theories.
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Chapter II
Hindrance, the Terministic Screen, and the Scapegoat:
The Early Non-Mythological Texts

As we have already seen, one of the many connections between Kenneth Burke
and William Blake is that both tend to be antinomian in their approach to established
systems. Both men regard symbolic orders as having several negative consequences.
These orders can create blinders and limit our ability to see accurately; they can perpetuate
oppressive social structures and, finally they can lead to scapegoating. These arguments
about symbolic orders can apply to specific systems or they can critique the negative
potentials in all systems.
Burke, for example, examines positivist philosophy, Christianity, capitalism, and
Marxism in light of his antinomian theories, but he always focuses on his general ideas
about language. However, some of Blake's earliest texts, particularly the non
mythological texts of the late l 780's and the early l 790's, are far less focused on systems
in general than Kenneth Burke is. In these early texts, the tractates, the Songs of
Innocence and Experience, and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, all of them engraved

between 1 788 and 1 794, Blake examines specific systems-traditional Christianity,
Lockean empiricism, and Deism. 1 Although one could read these texts logologically,
1Dating is based on Joseph Viscomi's extensive bibliographic study, William Blake and the Idea
of the Book. The dates given are Viscomi's best estimate of the date each work was executed. Blake often
produced new printings at different points in his life, and sometimes these involved changes to the work,
major or minor, but the execution date tells us when the work was originally conceived and/or engraved.
In the case the Songs, we know that the individual poems had often been written years before they were
engraved, but the execution date tells us when Blake collected the poems into a volume and engraved
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Blake's primary purpose is to critique these particular symbolic structures and to examine
their practical consequences. Yet the specificity of these early works is extremely
important for a Burkean approach to Blake, because, as Blake examines these particular
symbolic orders, he demonstrates exactly how terrninistic screens work to limit human
perception. Blake is, of course, far more critical of this limitation than Burke is, because
Blake seems to believe that imagination, or Poetic Genius, is able to create an authentic
vision, a vision that is not subject to those limitations. This position Burke would never
grant. Nevertheless, Blake's critique is in many respects very compatible with the Burkean
critique. In these texts, Blake makes it clear that both Christianity and Enlightenment
philosophy are capable of limiting one's perspective, perpetuating systems of oppression,
and, finally, producing scapegoating behaviors. To preserve the purity of the order and the
unity of the self and the community, individuals end up cruelly sacrificing parts of
themselves or scapegoating other human beings.
In this chapter, we will examine this process by looking first at the tractates "All
Religions Are One" and "There Is No Natural Religion" versions a and b ( 1 788). These
texts illustrate the ways in which both Empiricism and Christianity act as tenninistic
screens that prevent their adherents from seeing both a spiritual and a physical dimension
to human beings. Then we will explore the practical results of this blindness through an
examination of the two "Chimney Sweeper" poems from Songs ofInnocence and
them. Most of the works would have been conceived and engraved simultaneously. Viscomi dates the texts
discussed in this chapter as follows: "There Is No Natural Religion" and "All Religions are One," 1788,
with later printing dates; Songs ofInnocence, 1789; The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, 1790; and finally,
both Songs ofExperience and Songs ofInnocence and Experience, 1794-95. Blake printed Songs of
Experience as a separate work, but he also published both sets of Songs together in one volume. Viscomi' s
discussions of works from this period in Blake's career are on pages 187-267 of his book.
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Experience. In the next section, we will look at scapegoating in two poems from Songs of
Experience, literal scapegoating of a person in ''Little Boy Lost" and the figurative
scapegoating of human sexuality in ''The Garden of Love." Discussion of The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell will appear at various points throughout all the previous analyses.
Finally, in the final section of this chapter, we will look preview the themes of the next
chapter by focusing briefly on "The Tyger," a song from Experience which suggests in
figurative language that revolutionary violence is a viable method for breaking up the
destructive systems that have become so rigidly embedded in Blake's culture. Before we
begin examining these texts, however, it is important that we briefly consider Blake's form
of antinomianism and build some connections between Blake's terminology and that of
Kenneth Burke.
First, it is important to recognize that, while Kenneth Burke, in the twentieth
century, could call himself antinomian simply because he was opposed to rigid systems of
symbolic order, in Blake's time, the term "antinomian" had connotations more specifically
religious and more specifically class oriented. Jon Mee defines eighteenth-century
antinomianism in terms of a tendency rather than in strict doctrinal terms. He begins,
nevertheless, with a definition offered by one of Blake's contemporaries, John Evans, who
describes antinomianism as a Christian heresy in which '1he doctrine of imputed
righteousness" is exaggerated, such that it denies '1he very obligation to moral obedience"
(qtd. in Mee 57). For some antinomians, this attitude might entail dramatic transgressions
of the law, in order to prove its worthlessness. In other cases, the concept is simply
theoretical. But in all cases, the antinomian rejects the law, or at the very least, places an
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excessively high value on forgiveness in comparison to more traditional formulations.
These attitudes typically are accompanied by a dislike of religious ceremony and a
suspicion of clergy. Naturally, there would be little room for a state religion in such an
approach. 2
It is no accident that such antinomianism was typically embraced by members of
the working and artisan classes. As E. P. Thompson notes, such radical antinomian
theology is often yoked to political radicalism: ''For the Moral Law is their [the rulers']
Law, the law of 'God & his Priest & King . . . ' while the Gospel is the affirmation, in the
face of all the schools and Orthodoxies, of the truths of the pure-in-heart and the
oppressed'' ( Witness 1 4 ). Thus, as Thompson describes it, the belief in justification by faith
rather than works, in its most extreme form, is anti-hegemonic, allowing an individual or
group room to challenge the authority of the ruling ideology at a profound level ( Witness
5).
As early as I 788, William Blake reveals the antinomianism of his ethic when he
writes the following annotation at the end of his copy of Johann Caspar Lavater' s
Aphorisms on Man:
Accident is the omission of act in self & the hindering of act in another,
This is Vice but all Act [<from Individual propensity>] is Virtue. To hinder
another is not an act it is the contrary it is a restraint on action both in
ourselves & in the person hinderd. for he who hinders another omits his
own duty. at the time
Murder is Hindering Another
Theft is Hindering Another
2For a full discussion. see the chapter "Every Honest Man Is a Prophet" in Mee. See also E. P.
Thompson's Witness Against the Beast and Michael Ferber's discussion on antinomianism in The
Social Vision of William Blake, pages 116-26.
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Backbiting. Undermining C[i]rcumventing & whatever is Negative
is Vice
But the or[i]gin of this mistake in Lavater & his contemporaries, is, They
suppose that Womans Love is Sin. in consequence all the Loves & Graces
with them are Sin (E 601)
In this fascinating criticism of a book that he genuinely respects, Blake cryptically
lays out the areas in which his own ethical beliefs both converge and depart from the more
traditional thinking of Lavater and others like him. Blake defines Hindrance as Vice and
Act as Virtue, and he agrees with Lavater and others in his assessment of certain works as
evil, that is, as hindrances. Murder, theft, backbiting, and so on are defined as hindrances,
an appraisal with which Lavater would surely have agreed. But throughout this passage,
Blake reveals a marked difference between himself and Lavater. This difference comes in
his description of Hindrance, or Vice, as the "hindering of act" or the "omission of act."
Thus, Blake redefines evil, so that it is no longer the breaking of a commandment, but
rather the unwillingness to act and the tendency to prevent others from acting. Thus,
Blake asserts, evil is not part of the true nature of human beings who, because of innate
malice, must be controlled with laws. Rather, evil is the failure to live out one's true
nature and act with integrity. This failure can happen precisely as a result of laws.
This problem is what Blake addresses in the final line of the quoted passage.
Because Lavater and others like him reject sexual love as sin, they also reject any number
of good things along with it-"all the Loves and Graces" of life. Thus, we can see how
Blake sees moral law as hindrance, or evil. Killing, theft, backbiting, undermining, and so
on do not spring from the true nature of humanity. They are distortions, and one must
distinguish between them and other forms of behavior that are called "sin" but which are,
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really, positive aspects of human life. In general, murder is hindrance, but sex is act. The
one is vice, the other virtue. But neither the good nor the evil of these behaviors can be
determined by their relationship to law. The murderer does not do wrong because he
disobeys law but because he hinders his desires and the desires of another, thus bringing
forth evil fiuit.
From this argument, it is a quick step to the claim that law itself is hindrance, since
it causes people to focus on the legality of acts rather than on their human authenticity.
We begin to worry about whether or not acts are forbidden rather than notice who we
really are and what visions or deeds are authentic and thus constitute act for us. Other
uses of the terms "hinder" or "hindrance" in Blake's prose writings make similar claims
about other systems of order, and Blake's use of the term changes little over time. For
example, in his Descriptive Catalogue ( 1809), written about twenty years after the
Annotations, Blake describes the painter Rubens in these terms:
Rubens is a most outrageous demon, and by infusing the remembrances of
his Pictures, and style of execution, hinders all power of individual thought:
so that the man who is possessed by this demon, loses all admiration of any
other Artist, but Rubens, and those who were his imitators and
journeymen, he causes to the Florentine and Roman Artist fear to execute
. . . (E 547)
Rubens is a hinderer, and thus vicious, because he takes over the imagination and causes
the artist to forget his own individual vision. Certainly, this concept arises in part from the
fact that the influential painter, Sir Joshua Reynolds, was an exponent of Rubens' work,
and with his power and influence, was able to make his own view of painting in some
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sense canonical. 3 Undoubtedly, Blake did not like Rubens' work, but if it were not for the
canonical quality that Reynolds has given to Rubens, perhaps Blake's condemnation
would have been less severe. However, once Rubens' work becomes the accepted model
or standard, he becomes a hindrance to the imagination, and his work provokes almost
moralistic condemnation from Blake as an evil threat to the imaginative powers-something
that creates a symbolic screen through which an individual can no longer see the
possibilities of line and color.
Nature as an aesthetic principle receives similar abuse in A Vision of the Last
Judgment, written just one year after the Catalogue. This condemnation is also framed in

terms of hindrance as vice and act as virtue. Here that condemnation is couched in the
language of Gnosticism, which seems, at first glance, to imply a total rejection of the
natural world:
Error or Creation will be Burned Up & then & not till then Truth or
Eternity will appear It is Burnt up the Moment Men cease to behold it I
assert for My self that I do not behold the Outward Creation & that to me
it is hindrance & not Action it is as the Dirt upon my feet No part of Me.
What it will be Questiond When the Sun rises do you not see a round Disk
of fire somewhat like a Guinea O no no I see an Innumerable company of
the Heavenly host crying Holy Holy Holy is the Lord God Almighty I
question not my Corporeal or Vegetative Eye any more than I would
Question a Window concerning a Sight I look thro it & not with it. (E 56566)
These words appear within a discussion of bad vs. good art, and, although at first it
appears to deny the reality of the natural world, we can see at the end of the passage that
Blake is not denying the existence of the sun, but rather a literal and Empiricist way of

3

See mention of Rubens in Blake's "Annotations to Reynolds" on page 640 of the Erdman text.
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looking at it. He i s decrying a particular description of the sun as the result of a symbolic
system that is accepted by the artistic community at face value, and that, as a result,
destroys the ability to engage in what Blake thinks of as imaginative vision. This Empirical
view of the sun is hindrance, because it prevents the possibility of a greater vision. In
Burkean terms, the Empirical perspective is a terministic screen that deflects attention
away from spiritual vision and focuses it on the material appearance of the sun. 4
The same loss of spiritual vision is denounced by Blake in his Annotations to
Watson. Watson's defense of the Bible against Thomas Paine's Age ofReason was deeply

offensive to Blake, and he uses the term hindrance, a synonym for vice, to describe
Watson's attitude towards miracles, arguing that Watson denies the reality of ordinary,
everyday miracles, like the success of Thomas Paine, who "overthrow all the armies of
Europe with a small pamphlet" (E 6 1 7). Watson's vision of both Christianity and the
natural order are also rejected as hindrance, as Blake comments on the devastating results
of this particular terministic screen: "Jesus could not do miracles where unbelief hinderd
hence we must conclude that the man who holds miracles to be ceased puts it out of his
own power to ever witness one" (E 616).
In this case, as in all the cases described above, hindrance, or vice, is associated
not with so much with particular evil deeds, but with a way of seeing that prevents action,
4This point becomes even clearer if we look again at the Descriptive Catalogue, written just a
year earlier than the Vision. In the Catalogue, Blake's critique of Rubens is based, in part, on the sense
that Rubens does not see nature properly. He remarks on the inability of Titian and Rubens to paint
historical figures: The flush of health in flesh, exposed to the open air, nourished by the spirits of forests
and floods, in that ancient happy period, which history has recorded, cannot be like the sickly daubs of
Titian or Rubens" (E 545). Blake implies, a little further down, that imagination is necessary to see true
nature, as opposed to "nature, as it now is," (545). It is not nature as such that is reject� but rather,
nature as perceived by the modem person, that is nature as part of a particular symbolic order.
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and it is always located in some system of belief that blinds one to more authentic forms of
experience. A given act, like murder or theft, can be �ndrance (i.e., vice), but it is
reinforced, and perhaps even created, by false systems of law, aesthetics, philosophy, or
religion. Furthermore, despite his emphasis on the hindrance involved in Christianity's
strictures on sex, and despite his defense of the Deist Paine, Blake sees hindrance in Deism
and Empiricism as much as he does in Christianity, perhaps even more. Both limit the
imaginative vision that Blake sees as authentic, and neither, 1ccording to Blake, will lead
to real liberation.
This attitude separates Blake from most of the late eighteenth-century intellectual
radicals, like Paine, Mary Wollstonecraft, Joseph Priestley, and even Blake's friend,
painter Henry Fuseli, whose work Blake deeply admired. All of these thinkers were Deists
who would have been uncomfortable with Blake's language, so often echoing the
language of religious enthusiasm. For example, in The Age ofReason, published in 1794,
Paine argues that institutionalized religions, with their doctrines and laws, are simply
"human inventions, set up to terrify and enslave mankind, and monopolize power and
profit" (50). For Paine, the mysteries of religion are a mask for political and economic
oppression, and Deism, a religion based on reason, is the only possible solution. 5
Blake, however, is unwilling to accept Paine's Deist solution, probably for a
variety of reasons.

As Marilyn Butler

suggests ''Blake's roots in radical Dissent are deeper

and stronger than his connection with the French-type intellectualism of men like

5Chapter 2 of Marilyn Butler's book Romantics, Rebels, and Reactionaries provides an
interesting discussion of Blake's relationship to Deism. See especially pages 39-53.
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Fuseli . . ." (49). Thus, Butler suggests, Blake may have found himself in a very difficult
position as the Deist critiques began to undercut, not only the church and state
institutions, but the very foundations upon which Blake's own imaginative vision was
based. According to Butler, ''English radicalism had been so deeply involved with
Protestant sectarianism for at least two centuries that the development [a split between
radicalism and religion] was likely to constitute a crisis for a man like Blake. . . ." (49).
First, even as he condemns Watson's critique of Paine, Blake calls himself a Christian, and
he associates Enlightenment Christianity, like John Locke's, with atheism. Second,
Paine's debunking of Christianity, while gutting its oppressive power, also guts the
Utopian possibilities inherent in Christian apocalyptic language-a language which, as
Nicholas Williams asserts, provides Blake with a powerful basis for critique, one that is
shared by many people in his social class. Finally, as I will argue, Blake was aware of the
ways in which Empiricism, Deism, and other philosophies could also be hindrances,
limiting the circumference of human awareness and the power to act just as completely as
Christianity is capable of doing.
In setting up a fundamentally antinomian ethical system, one that values free and
honest action above all else, Blake creates his own hierarchy of values, according to which
any hindrance, whether produced by Christianity, Empiricism, Deism, or any other
symbolic system, is an absolute negative. Hindrance becomes a devil-term. On the other
hand, act becomes a god-term, and symbolic activities are only acts when they express
authentic vision and inspire others to authentic acts of expression. Symbolic orders cannot
express authentic vision, however, if they keep us from seeing parts of ourselves or our

64
world. They perform this negative function when they begin to ossify and to claim their
superiority to all other systems. In Blake's earliest engraved texts, the Tractates, we will
see his first attempt to wrestle with this phenomenon.
Terministic Screens and Poetic Genius: Empiricism and Christianity as Hindrance

Whatever may have been Blake's reservations about Deism and Empiricism, his
tractates, engraved in the late l 780's, and The Ma"iage ofHeaven and Hell, engraved in
make it clear that for Blake, traditional Christianity was equally deserving of criticism. In
both of his brief tractates, small illuminated booklets that parody philosophical argument,
Blake shows that both Christianity and Lockean Empiricism create partial reflections of
reality, and thus, as Kenneth Burke would suggest, they both select aspects of reality to
describe and in the process deflect a true vision of reality. Indeed, for Blake, both of these
systems ignore the centrality of the Poetic Genius, clearly the god-term of all of these
texts. The Poetic Genius is, according to Blake "the true faculty of knowledge," 'lhe
faculty that experiences," and it is also 'lhe true Man" (E 1 ). Empiricism, Blake argues,
denies the Poetic Genius by focusing attention on the five senses, while Christianity denies
it by failing to discern its presence in the body and in the sensory functions. So, each
system is, at least in part, a hindrance that can shut out our awareness of the Poetic
Genius, or the True Man, and thus lead to negative results.
In some ways Blake's critique of Empiricism may be the more obvious in these
early works. Certainly, Blake's "Contempt and Abhorrence" for Locke, Bacon, and
Newton are well documented, both in Blake's own writings and in the criticism (E 660).
Even Wayne Glausser, whose book Locke and Blake attempts to link the two thinkers in
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terms of common cultural concerns, comments that Blake usually demonizes Locke (4). 6
This well-documented animosity leads many critics to read Blake's early tractates as
arguments for a religious viewpoint as opposed to an empirical and scientific perspective.
William Dennis Hom, for example, compares "There Is No Natural Religion" with the late
piece, ''The Ghost of Abel," saying that both reveal 'lhe spiritual voice in opposition to
nature" (85). Other critics, like J. Middleton Murry, treat Blake as a mystic, arguing that
the tractates offer a method of knowing the world that is broader and more expansive than
empiricism can ever offer. 7
While our examination of Christian thought will break down the idea that Blake is
trying to advance the spiritual over the physical, it is clear that Blake sees Empiricism as
providing an excessively narrow terministic screen. Murry makes this argument by looking
at Blake's definition of Reason in the second version of"There is No Natural Religion."8
6For a typical discussion of Blake's rejection of Locke, see chapter I of Frye's Fearful Symmetry,
"The Case Against Locke, pp. 14-24. However, in a recent article, Steve Clark attempts to break down the
argument that Blake simply rejects Locke outright, noting that "condemnation. . . can serve as an implicit
tribute to intellectual stature" (133).
7

The critics who see Blake as emphasizing the spiritual over the physical hold a wide diversity of
opinions about what that means. George Mills Harper, for example, reads Blake as a Neoplatonist.
Leopold Damrosch, Jr. argues that Blake's position is similar to George Berkeley's, although one of
Damrosch' s central arguments is that Blake's views on dialectical pairings like soul and body tend to be
paradoxical.
8

Any reading of "There Is No Natural Religion" is dependent upon the answers to a variety of
bibliographic questions. For this particular tractate, the major difficulty is that Blake did not print one
definitive edition. Different pages were included in different texts. Erdman, whom I cite here, splits the
plates into two different tractates, offering two distinct arguments, and treating the two parts as two
distinct pieces of a whole somewhat like Songs ofInnocence and Experience. This reading allows us to
see how Blake critiques Locke by beginning with two different sets of assumptions, and rendering the
Lockean position absurd in both cases. E. D. Hirsch, Jr. argues that the two different printed versions of
''There Is No Natural Religion" come from different time periods and reflect actual changes in Blake's
beliefs. a movement from an emphasis on the spiritual to a realistic embrace of the material. material. Yet,
this viewpoint does not accord with Viscomi's more recent datings, which show The Marriage ofHeaven
and Hell, dated 1790, to be much closer to the printing of the original creation of the tractates in 1788
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Here, Reason is defined as '1:he ratio of all we have already known." Blake further notes
that it "is not the same that it shall be when we know more." (E 2). Commenting on this
definition, Murry notes:
The Ratio, in Blake's language, is the mental abstract: that idea or abstract
image of the thing, which serves, in the ordinary commerce of life and
thought, for the thing itself This is . . . a man-made construction which is
imposed upon the veritable reality. He who sees it instead of the reality-as
we all must, for it is a condition of the practical life that we should-sees
himself alone. ( 1 5)
Murry sees Blake's tractates as recommending the visionary experience of the Poetic
Genius, which experiences everything, over the construct created by Empiricism or other
systems.
In "All Religions Are One," probably written at nearly same time as ''There Is No
Natural Religion," Blake argues directly that '1:he Poetic Genius," also called '1:he Spirit of
Prophecy," is what experiences and knows (E 1 ). As we have previously seen, prophecy
for Blake is active; it provides an intervention in the culture and in the life of the world.
The term "Genius," implies an active and creative power, essential to the nature of a
person or thing. All things have Genius, Blake argues, and in human beings, that genius is
Poetic, symbolic, capable of creation by means of symbols. For Blake, then, the ''faculty
which experiences" is a creative faculty, not simply a perceptive one (E 1 ). While Murry is
than was originally thought. Viscomi argues, rather, that all the plates were produced at the same time, so
we should assume that all of the plates are a part of the original conception of the tractate. Eaves, Essick
and Viscomi provide a reconstruction of an ideal version based on Viscomi' s arguments in Blake and the
Idea ofthe Book (See Eaves, Essick, and Viscomi, pp. 25 and 26 and Viscomi, chapter 22). My argument
is based on an acceptance of Viscomi' s dating, which allows all of these early works to be placed in close
conversation with each other, despite the fact that the tractates are the only pieces engraved before the
French Revolution had even begun. While it is impossible to know exactly what Blake's intentions were,
all reconstructions other than Hirsch's allow us to see Blake as parodying Locke in an attempt to
undermine Empirical arguments. An exact reconstruction is not necessary to form this conclusion.
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correct in arguing that Blake wants to affirm a form of knowledge that is beyond the five
senses, Blake's primary claim is not that spiritual faculties are more accurate than sensual
faculties. He is arguing that human beings are not, properly speaking, designed simply to
"see" the truth. They are designed to use their symbolic faculties to act and create. 9 The
Poetic Genius that abides in each of us is "universal," and religions all derive from this
universal reality (E 1-2). Furthermore, in "There Is No Natural Religion," Blake suggests
that the Poetic Genius allows us to see the Infinite. Thus, Blake asserts, ''He who sees the
Infinite in all things sees God. He who sees the Ratio [Reason] only sees himself only"
(E 3).
As creative agents, human beings are capable of perceiving and acting in ever new
and unpredictable ways, and this capacity allows them to see what Blake describes as the
Infinite. Yet, according to Blake, Empiricism dramatically limits the human capacity for
creation and perception. Locke argues that there are only two faculties through which

9

This concept is, of course, not unusual, although it appears perhaps most fully in Esterhammer
and Jack William Jacobs, who argue that Blake's prophecy is performative. Jacobs, especially, argues
that Blake's language, whether it be performative or constative, is designed to undermine constative
language and promote the audience's ability to give up constative language and engage in linguistic
performances of their own. My argument resembles his in some respects. I, too, am arguing that Blake is
interested in how specfic arguments affect his audience's ability to act, and that he is more concerned
about this issue than he is with issues of description. Yet. I differ with Jacobs in that I do not see Blake
as rejecting all constative language as prescribing "some way things have to be." Such a claim overstates
the case. "Every honest man is a prophet," for example, is a constative claim. While it may have a
performative effect, there is no reason to believe that Blake did not see it as an accurate description.
As Kenneth Burke argues, language, even the language of the chart, has an effect on its audience's
actions. and is thus rhetorical; however, this is true of all language. It does not mean that all constative
language. and all truth claims, are equally inaccurate or equally destructive. Finally, there is a difference
between the claim that no chart is a perfect description, and becomes dangerous when its perfection is
assumed, and the claim that all constative claims are dangerous inherently. Such a claim, made inevitably
in constative terms, is finally self-contradictory. It is highly possible that, for Blake, the effects of
a particular kind of language as performance provides one way of evaluating its truth or
falsehood as a constative claim.
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human beings understand the world: ''These simple Ideas, the Materials of all our
Knowledge, are suggested and furnished to the Mind,_ only by those two ways above
mentioned, viz. Sensation and Reflection" (11.11.2.1.21-23). Yet, Locke goes on to argue
that through these faculties alone, human beings are able to gain knowledge of the
immortality of the soul and of the existence of God.
Blake objects to this idea, as is evidenced in his conversations later in life with
Henry Crabb Robinson. Robinson, who visited Blake in his last years, between 1825 and
1827, reports that Blake condemned Locke as an atheist, and would not be reassured
when Robinson pointed out that Locke was himself a Christian. Finally, Robinson reports,
Blake was willing to accept the claim that Locke's ideas lead to atheism, although Locke
did not intend such a connection (308). Years separate Robinson's B\ake from the young
man who wrote the tractates, but the reason for Blake's objection to Locke is already
clearly argued in "There Is No Natural Religion," as Blake parodies Locke's reasoning,
attempting to reduce his argument to absurdity:
I
II
III

Man cannot naturally Perceive. but through his natural or bodily
organs
Man by his reasoning power. can only compare & judge of what he
has already perceiv'd.
From a perception of only 3 senses or 3 elements none could
deduce a fourth or fifth (E 2)

Blake's parody of Lockean argument is meant to ask one basic question. If human beings
cannot deduce a fourth or fifth sense or element from three, how can they possibly deduce
divinity, infinity, or immortality by reasoning from five senses? 10 Put into Burkean terms,
1

0Critics disagree as to whether Blake's argument is really effective. Eaves, Essick, and Visconti
assen that Blake pushes Locke's argument beyond his intent (32). Yet, as Bloom argues, Blake points out
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Blake suggests that whatever Locke's intent, his Empirical method will finally create a
terministic screen that shuts out all perception other than that defined by the senses
themselves.
This critique of empiricism continues in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, a
significant fact, since this text contains passages that clearly celebrate the body and its
capacity for sensory delight. This very real and positive affirmation of the body and its
faculties occurs when one of the Devils links spirituality with the Body, its desires, and its
energies, arguing that Energy is from the Body, and that Energy is Eternal Delight (pl. 4;
E34). Yet, even here, Blake indicates that the body and its perceptions are limited. Even
as the speaker of the poem travels "on the abyss of the five senses" (pl. 6; E 3 5), he
observes a devil writing the following question:
How do you know but ev'ry Bird that cuts the airy way,
Is an immense world of delight, clos'd by your senses five? (pl. 7; E 3 5)
While the senses allow for an initial perception of the bird, they also limit what human
beings can know and enjoy about the experience of another kind of being. Only a creative
faculty, which can imagine beyond the "senses five" can even conceive of such an immense
world. For Blake, Empiricism truncates our capacity to see new things or to see old things
in new ways. It produces "the same dull round over again," by limiting our perspective to
what has already been perceived (E3). At the very best, Empiricism allows us only
perceptions of the same kind as those we have seen before. In so doing, it limits our ability
to see new possibilities. Thus, it destroys the sense of divinity that, for Blake, should lie at
an inconsistency in Locke's thought. Locke implies a relationship between the senses, reflection, and
religious belief "that is impossible after Hurne" (Apoca(vpse 25).
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the roots of true action. In this sense, Empiricism is a hindrance. Like Rubens' artistic
theory, it tells us what to see and so deprives us of our own imaginative powers.
Having attacked Empiricism in the tractates and, to a lesser degree, in The
Marriage, Blake does not spare Christianity either. Although Christianity includes a
language of Eternity or Infinity that might be supposed to support true action, for Blake,
orthodox religion also denies the active powers of the Poetic Genius. It does so, however,
in ways that are radically different from Empiricism. First, Blake suggests, Christianity
denies the importance and the goodness of the body. In its emphasis on the soul, it creates
a terministic screen that deflects our ability to recognize the Poetic Genius in the body and
in its capacity for sensation. Second, Christianity freezes the symbolic structures created
previously by the Poetic Genius, making one particular expression of this Genius more
important than the faculty itself
Looking first at Blake's treatment of soul and body, we find him insisting that '1:he
outward form of Man is derived from the Poetic Genius" ("All Religions Are One" E 1).
Thus, the Poetic Genius is higher than the body, insofar as it is the source of the body, and
thus, in some sense, it transcends the body. Nevertheless, the body is not a separate entity,
nor is it in some way inferior to the Soul in moral worth. In "All Religions Are One," the
body is part and parcel of the Soul's divinity. In The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, Blake
's affirmation of the body is carried much further, and it is placed in more specifically
Christian terms:
All Bibles or sacred codes. have been the causes of the following Errors.
I . . That Man has two real existing principles Viz: a Body & a Soul.
2. That Energy calld Evil. is alone from the Body. & that Reason. calld
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Good. is alone from the Soul.
3 . That God will torment Man in Eternity for following his Energies.
But the following Contraries to these are True
I Man has no Body distinct from his Soul for that calld Body is a portion
of Soul discernd by the five Senses. the chief inlets of Soul in this age
2. Energy is the only life and is from the Body and Reason is the bound or
outward circumference of Energy.
3 Energy is Eternal Delight (pl.4; E 34)
In this passage, Blake objects to the condemnation of the body and its energies by pointing
out the way in which the body has been moralized. It is the source of evil; thus its energies
are forbidden. Yet, in the second half of the plate, Blake argues that one part of the human
being cannot be the source of evil because the body and the soul are one.
Certainly, the actual relationship between body and soul is somewhat unclear here.
The body is part of the soul, thus making it seem at some level inferior or subordinate. Yet
Energy comes from the body; thus, the body at some level seems greater than the soul. As
a literal description of the human being, this passage might be confusing, but its
paradoxical nature works well to break through a terministic screen that asks us to split
ourselves in two and then reject a part of ourselves. In many respects, this rejection is a
kind of scapegoating of the body that occurs through the creation of a rigid soul/body
hierarchy, as opposed to a genuine dialectic between the two. Blake aims to restore that
dialectic by describing soul and body in terms that look paradoxical only because we
expect one term to dominate the other. Blake suggests instead that the two are
interdependent. The soul transcends and sustains the body, allowing it an infinite vision,
while the body provides energy for the soul.
In the next plate, Blake makes it clear that the energy which he is most concerned
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about repressing is sexual desire. He indicates that the restraint of desire renders it
"passive till it is only the shadow of desire" (pl. 5; E 34). Throughout The Ma"iage, the
sexual energies of the body are celebrated and affirmed. Blake affirms '1:he lust of the
goat," the purely bodily desire of animals. He also praises '1:he nakedness of woman" as
'1:he work of God" (pl.8; E 36). Thus, he contradicts the privileging of soul over body that
makes all bodily energy, including the sexual, appear to be dangerous and evil.
So we can see that in both the tractates and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell,
Blake criticizes the terministic screens produced by Empiricism and Christianity-screens
that prevent their adherents from seeing in important ways. While Empiricism
overemphasizes the senses, Christianity overemphasizes the soul. Blake argues that both
leave out important aspects of humanity. Furthermore, both the tractates and The
Ma"iage demonstrate that any system that is exalted above the Poetic Genius itself

becomes even more frozen and destructive. If any system claims to be the sole revelation
or the sole description of truth, it has been divinized and placed above the Poetic Genius in
stature and importance.
This problem, Blake implies, is particularly prominent in religious thought. Biake
argues this point first in "All Religions Are One:"
No man can think write or speak from his heart, but he must intend truth.
Thus all sects of Philosophy are from the Poetic Genius adapted to the
weaknesses of every individual" (E 1).
This claim includes both Empiricism and Christianity. Of course, this need not mean that
every system is equally true or equally helpful. Perhaps different people have different
levels of weakness to which the Poetic Genius must adapt. Yet Burke insists that each
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system is one manifestation of Poetic Genius, and that no system can claim an
identification with the universal Poetic Genius mentioned in Principle 4 of "All Religions
Are One." For this reason, the freezing of systems is terribly destructive. If the system is
absolutized, it takes on a divinized role which it does not properly deserve. Its terministic
screens become absolutely fixed, and its adherents can no longer recognize new
information when it appears. This critique is especially applicable to Christianity.
Empiricism, at least, will allow for a change in belief when new physical evidence appears.
Christianity, on the other hand, has defined itself as the absolute revelation, and places
itself above all other religions and philosophies in the world. "All Religions Are One"
directly attacks that assumption, affirming the inspiration of Christianity, but insisting that
other religions and philosophies may also be inspired.
Looking at the critiques of specific symbolic orders in the tractates and The
Marriage, we can gain a fuller sense of how symbolic orders function as hindrances for
Blake. First, the terministic screens that these systems produce create limited vision,
preventing the Poetic Genius from creating new wisdom and new perspectives.
Furthermore, aspects of the human personality can be permanently demonized, as when
the body becomes the devil-term in Christianity as Blake describes it.
These perceptual limitations also have social consequences. The stagnation of an
unchanging order can cause the preservation of destructive social hierarchies. The status
quo, no matter how terrible, is justified and maintained when the system is seen as
absolute and unchanging. Finally, the deification of a system of order, as in Christianity,
can lead to the actual scapegoating of real human beings, who are unjustly blamed for
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problems they did not cause or for characteristics that they share with their persecutors. In
the next two sections, we will examine some of these practical problems with symbolic
order by looking at their social results as depicted The Songs ofInnocence and
Experience.
The Chimney Sweepers of Innocence and Experience: Terministic Screens,
Mortification, and Passivity
The primary dialectic of the Songs is, of course, innocence and experience, not
body and soul, or Empiricism and Christianity. Blake criticism abounds with attempts to
produce an exact description of innocence and experience, what each state entails, which
state is to be preferred, and so on. Some argue that innocence, while pastoral and beautiful
on the surface, is, in fact, a negative state. Jacobs, for example, believes that Blake is
arguing against a "logic of innocence" in the Songs. This "logic of innocence" is the belief
that there is "some way things have to be" to which human beings must resign themselves,
a logic which, for Jacobs, prevents a full recognition of human responsibility and
creativity. Thus, for Jacobs, a state of experience is to be preferred, because liberation is
associated with this less idyllic, but more responsible, mode of perception. Hirsch sees
Innocence as a state of otherworldly religious vision, while Experience embraces the
world, and he argues that Blake himself was in a state of innocence when he wrote the
earlier Songs ofInnocence. Probably the most traditional stance, and the most common
one, is to be found in Frye's Fearful Symmetry and Bloom's Blake 's Apocalypse.
Innocence is one state, experience another. Each view is limited unless it can be
transcended by a third, more mature position.
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Frye' s and Bloom's readings emphasize an important fact about the Songs of
Innocence and Experience. Neither innocence nor experience offers a simple reflection of
Blake' s own attitudes. As Heather Glen describes in her discussion of the Songs, most of
the poems in both Innocence and Experience contain subtle critique. Many of the
personae in Songs ofInnocence are capable ofj oy and hope, but they are often blind to
the ways in which others exploit these very characteristics. On the other hand, the
experienced characters recognize the darker aspects of human society, but they are often
unable to perceive potential avenues for liberation.
In Burkean terms, the states of Innocence and Experience can be related to
terministic screens. By setting the Songs ofInnocence and Experience side by side in a
single volume, Blake achieves in his audience a kind of transcendent perspective that
allows it to explore the limits of both perspectives without losing awareness of the special
strength each perspective offers. A variety of different dichotomies, such as heaven and
earth, soul and body, child and adult, are explored under the broader heading of
"Innocence" or ''Experience." In each case, Blake is examining a different example of
what Burke would call a terministic screen.
In the chimney sweeper poems, Blake sets up a contrast between a vision of the
world based on Christianity and a vision that is based on an Empiricist perspective. The
religious perspective enables exploited children to find hope and relationship to one
another at the expense of a realistic appraisal of their physical experience. On the other
hand, empirical observation, and reflection on it, gives the second chimney sweeper a
realistic perception of his physical misery and its causes, but this awareness is bought at
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the cost of hope and a sense of relationship. In both cases, the chimney sweepers'
perspectives limit their ability to respond to their own oppression without hindrance. Yet,
at the same time, each offers a form of awareness that would be necessary if the
individual's situation, or the society, were to be genuinely transformed. Here, Blake's
treatment of traditional Christianity, its promise of heaven, and its language of divinity is
balanced with an accurate empirical and social demystification which is, nevertheless,
inadequate by itself to produce social action. Rather than stating a clear third perspective,
Blake links the two dialectically, insisting on the need for the language of both body and
soul in the improvement of the chimney sweepers' condition. Thus he refuses entirely to
confirm or renounce the philosophical and religious positions that the two boys exemplify.
This rhetorical move resembles Burke's move in describing human beings as symbol-using
animals. It avoids defining human substance in terms of either spirit or body, insisting on
the necessity for both. 1 1
In the "Chimney Sweeper" ofInnocence, there are clear hints of ritual sacrifice in
the language. In referring to little Tom Dacre as having hair like a lamb, Blake emphasizes
the child's innocence, but this term also links the boy substantially with Christ, himself a
Viscomi's 1993 study, it was believed that Songs ofInnocence was published separately
at times, but that Experience had never stood alone. Viscomi' s research invalidates this presumption.
Innocence was published separately in 1789, then the combined Songs ofInnocence and Experience were
published inl 794. Afterwards, Blake usually printed the two as a pair, with the frontispiece designed for
the combined text. Yet there were copies of Innocence published separately after 1794, and separately
published editions of Experience (Viscomi 272-75). This fact makes claims about the dialectical
relationship between the texts, including discussions like this one, somewhat suspect. In response to this
suspicions, however, I would make two arguments. The first is that Blake did make clear allusions to
Innocence in Experience. Therefore, they are related however he chose to publish the two at any given
time. Second, the combined edition of Songs ofInnocence and Experience can be described as having a
particular rhetorical effect, apart from the fact that Blake chose to present other rhetorical effects, through
separate publications, on other occasions. This analysis focuses on the effects of the combined edition, or
on the separate editions insofar as they can be placed in conversation with one another.
1 1Until
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victim who is not personally guilty. Yet this child is not a scapegoat in the usual sense.
The poem does not suggest that he acts as the charismatic vicar who purges anyone else's
guilt. There is no voice in the text that implies that he is guilty, or other, or in any way
associated with sin. In fact, he is a model of submission. When Tom is shown the vision of
a heaven that will receive him after his work in the chimneys kills him, he accepts this
vision completely, surrenders to it, and acts as a "good boy'' who does his work with joy
so that God will be his father. He is a model of a trusting religious faith, and his suffering
is solely the result of economic forces; there is no clear sense that anyone is using him for
purgative purposes.
Yet, there are scapegoating implications in the argument of the poem, ones that
become clear when we compare the poem to other discussions of class and injustice in the
period. We get a hint of these discussions in Glen's provocative account of the ways in
which chimney sweepers are typically described in eighteenth-century texts; these children
are seen as lazy, as beggars, as thieves, and as bad seeds, the offspring of persons just as
disreputable as they are themselves. At times, chimney sweepers are depicted as symbols
of political subversion ( 1 00). Such attitudes, of course, make it easier to exploit these
children, since they are seen as the kind of people who would come to no good, no matter
how well they are treated. Painting his sweep as a model of submission, Blake undercuts a
kind of scapegoating rhetoric that was typical of the period and denies his readers the
opportunity to blame the little chimney sweeper for his situation.
Furthermore, Blake refuses to offer the audience an easy cathartic release or an
easy rhetorical charm that would create consubstantiation between social classes without
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the need for a real social changes. Symbolic scapegoating as a means of creating
consubstantiation between the classes is common enough in the late eighteenth century,
making dramatic appearances in the works of a number of writers, among them, Edmund
Burke and Hannah More. Although Burke's "A Treatise on Scarcity" and Hannah More's
''Patient Joe; or the Newcastle Collier'' first appear in the l 790's, well after the engraving
of Songs ofInnocence in 1 789, they express attitudes that are certainly present in the
l 780's, although a less volatile political situation prevented their being discussed quite so
often or openly.
Burke, for example, in "A Treatise on Scarcity" asserts that physical prosperity is
not possible for the vast number of the poor, and that "cant" about ''the labouring poor" is
thus ''base and wicked" ( 1 96). The working poor should not be encouraged to reflect
upon their poverty and long for impossible prosperity. Rather, they should be encouraged
in "[p]atience, labour, sobriety, frugality, and religion . . . . All the rest is fraud' (196).
Burke makes this assertion within a broader claim that the interests of rich and poor are, in
fact identical. Therefore, he admonishes:
The consideration of this [the fact that there is no famine] ought to bind us
all, rich and poor together, against those wicked writers of the newspapers,
who would inflame the poor against their friends, guardians, patrons, and
protectors. (2 1 0)
This argument sets up a scapegoat, the newspaperman, who acts as a common enemy
against whom rich and poor can unite. Further, it encourages the farm laborer to focus on
religious and philosophical happiness rather than material prosperity, since "Philosophical
happiness is to want little" ( 1 96). The notion that things are as good as they can be, and
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that those who say otherwise are '1:he enemy," distracts from the examination of changes
that might be possible.
Hannah More's ''Patient Joe, or the Newcastle Collier," released with the Cheap
Repository Tracts of 1795, makes a somewhat different argument, one that is more
dependent on religion. More's ''Patient Joe" sees God's will and submits to it, however
negative his situation. More has those who taunt Joe's beliefs in Providence oppose it to
"chance" or "luck" (217). The possibility that neither Providence, nor luck, nor chance,
but rather changeable social and economic conditions might be the cause of want or illness
is never suggested. This omission becomes particularly marked when one of Joe's
taunters, Tim Jenkins, is killed in a mine collapse, while Joe escapes. The implication is
that Joe is spared because he is good and faithful, while Tim's death is a result of God's
judgment. The notion that, perhaps, the mine need not have collapsed at all, that perhaps
human carelessness or stinginess had created unsafe working conditions, is not even
considered.
Edmund Burke dismisses those who call the poor uninformed and attempts to
create consubstantiality between rich and poor by identifying a common enemy of ''wicked
newspapermen" who try to stir up problems. In contrast, More's scapegoating of the
taunting collier is designed to create consubstantiation between rich and poor by allowing
a cathartic purging of both. The rich can ignore their complicity in creating unsafe working
conditions while condemning the disgruntled worker, who dies, not because the mine is
unsafe, but because God has punished his blasphemous mockery of patient Joe. Likewise,
the poor can purge their own resentments, heaping the guilt for their inner rebellions and
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doubts onto Tim Jenkins, and attaining consubstantiation with patient Joe, God, and the
ruling classes, all in one sweeping gesture.
In the "Chimney Sweeper" though, Blake protests both of these scapegoating
patterns. He does not spare the reader an awareness of his or her complicity in this unjust
suffering, having the older chimney sweeper who narrates the poem say, innocently, "So
your chimneys I sweep & in soot I sleep" (Emphasis mine), thus arousing an
uncomfortable awareness of complicity in the audience (l. 4; E 1 0). 12 Further, he indicates
the process of mortification these young children must go through to become the models
of patient endurance they are asked to be.
In The Rhetoric of Religion, Burke describes mortification as the ritual process by
which one submits oneself to a symbolic order, "a systematic way of saying no to
Disorder, or obediently saying yes to Order'' (190). Such a system involves, to a greater or
lesser degree, a victimage of the self, as the individual kills "any motive that for 'doctrinal'
reasons, one thinks of as unruly" (196). Since no individual system can perfectly fulfill all
the potentials within any human being, something must always be sacrificed simply for the
preservation of the system. Such sacrifices may be quite conscious, and may not be,
properly speaking, scapegoating. Yet they can involve a destructive form of sacrifice made
in exchange for a sense of consubstantiality with others in the system. A part of the self is
cast off as negative, so that one's own identity can become one with the symbolic system
and submit to it.

1 2Trus particular point has been made many times, but, for a particularly rich discussion, see

Glen. p. 96.
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I n little Tom Dacre's case, the initial mortification occurs when his curly blonde
hair is shaved. On the master's part, this action is simply practical, designed to prevent the
child's hair from catching fire if soot is smoldering in the chimney where he works (Leader
45). For Tom, something more is at stake; he cries at the loss of his hair, demonstrating
that the loss is significant to his identity.

As Nurmi

points out, the act of shaving is

common to many initiatory rituals, those required upon entrance to prison, or the army,
or, I might add, to a religious order ("Fact and Symbol" 1 7). All of these ritual shavings
are intended to alter the identity of individuals and make them consubstantial with a new
group of people with whom their identity now lies. In this case, Tom undergoes this
transformation of his identity with the assistance of the poem's speaker, an older child
who is also a chimney sweep.
The poem's speaker comforts Tom with the words, ''Hush Tom never mind it, for
when your head's bare/ You know that the soot cannot spoil your white hair'' (I. 6-7; E
10). The older child's words are an attempt at consolation, and they work, but the
consolation requires of Tom an attitude of sacrifice and mortification. These consoling
words also harbor a remarkable paradox. The older child suggests that Tom can somehow
preserve his lost hair, keeping it "unspoiled," by sacrificing it, a term reminiscent of the
Biblical claim that one saves one's life by losing it (Pagliario 23). Tom's acquiescence to
this argument eliminates his tears and makes him happier, but it also requires him to
mortify that part of himself that recognizes his loss. The process of submitting to the
narrator's consolations prepares him for another act of submission, this one more
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encompassing than the first. 13
As Kenneth Burke says, mortification, as a submission to the social order, is
always associated with ideas about death, as the sacrifices made in the realm of the socio
political order slide over into our ideas about the natural order. In this case, however, the
slippage is literally true, since for Tom and his friends, submission to the socio-political
order, in this case the apprenticeship laws, will in all likelihood lead to physical death. At
some level, Tom knows this. His dream of coffins that resemble both the chimneys in
which the children work and the actual coffins to which their labors will lead them show
his awareness of his negative situation. But, like his tears, this awareness is undone by his
submission to a divinity who will be his father "if [he'll] be a good boy" (1. 18; E 10). In
the final stanza of the poem, Tom arises happily to do his work, making his final
acquiescence to an economic system by means of theological language. Since the Christian
vision is socially approved, it allows him to soften the awareness of impending death while
becoming consubstantial with his social world at the same time. Through the power of
symbolic actio� a shave� abandoned, and cold child has unspoiled hair, is happy, and is
warm. He has mortified his physical awareness almost out of existence.
There is no question that these two children find in the Christian system and its
vision of heaven a powerful strategy for psychic survival. In fact, they find even more, a
3

0f course, this idea that one saves the hair by losing it as been noted many times, although the
Biblical allusion does not always appear. Wicksteed points out this connection, suggesting that it leads to
Tom's dream of liberation. and that it is precisely this kind of dreaming to which Blake is calling the
reader ( 109-1 10). This purely spiritual reading ignores the ironies of the poem, which appear most fully
when one reads it in relation to the "Chimney Sweeper" of Experience, but which also are implied by the
split between the author and the naive narrator, an older child than Tom, but still a child Both Wicksteed
and Leader argue that Tom's vision comes from the words of the older child (45-46), but he is less
sanguine than Wicksteed about the effects of that vision.
1
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means ofbuilding genuine community. The chimney sweepers in Tom's dream of heaven
are all called by name, and the speaker calls Tom by name. Further, there is no evidence
that the older boy encourages Tom to stop crying for his hair out of any motive under than
benevolence. The vision of heaven gives Tom, not only hope, but a sense of being able to
create his own destiny. One might even argue that the boys are using their faculty of
Poetic Genius to cope with a difficult situation. Their symbolic acts are not in themselves
vice or hindrance. They allow the boys to engage in real relationships with each other and
to maintain a sense of safety and worth in an extremely harsh situation.
Yet the symbolic system of Christianity hinders the children by encouraging their
surrender to a destructive economic system through the mortification of very real parts of
themselves. Further, it prevents their recognizing that their physical situation could be
improved now. Tom's initial tears at the loss of his hair is an authentic response to a real
loss. When he suppresses his tears and goes happily to bed, he also suppresses awareness.
It is as if the symbolic vision of heaven replaces Tom's ability to use his five senses in
order to evaluate and respond to his situation. Thus, the "energies of the body," located in
his tears, his grief at his own impending death, his experience of the cold, are denied. Tom
has no scapegoat, but in a real sense, he submits himself to a process of mortification to
such an extent that he makes a scapegoat of the part of himself that could have
remembered how to protest. In so doing, he allows himself to make a premature peace
with those who would willingly sacrifice him in order to maintain the peace and the status
quo.
There is no evidence that Blake faults the child for his submission, however. In
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fact, the tone of the fourth stanza is celebratory. When the chimney sweepers are released
from their coffins and run down the plain and "shine in the Sun," they are doing precisely
what they should be doing, what they are meant to do (1. 16; E 10). The pleasures here are
active and profoundly corporeal, but the problem is that they are deferred. Blake's
judgment is reserved for those who use the boys' innocence and religious vision to
withhold these pleasures in the present world. As is so often observed, the last line of the
poem is a judgement against those who consent to that deferral: "So if all do their duty,
they need not fear harm"( l . 24; E 10). As Glen puts it, "In parroting the precept he has
learned, this child [the poem's speaker] is not merely laying the pretensions of his
instructors open to question, but also their whole way of conceiving and ordering
experience" ( 102). He is naively and innocently pointing to the absurdity of a social and
symbolic order that would "save" someone by literally working him to death.
Thus, we might expect that the chimney sweeper of experience would be affirmed
as the ideal, because he recognizes his situation, and his protest is open and honest. In
fact, the chimney sweeper in Experience embodies the kind of critique recommended by
Thomas Paine and others, a critique that uses the terms "God and Priest and King" to link
an exploitative, oppressive government with a state church and thus demystify its power.
Yet, as Glen observes, this child's stance is equally problematic. The second chimney
sweeper, who sees his condition clearly, nevertheless can discover no clear way out of the
social situation that he so accurately perceives.
· Therefore, the "Chimney Sweeper'' of Experience is best understood when read
dialectically in relationship to the earlier poem. While Innocence minimizes the bodily facts
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of the chimney sweeper's situation, these facts are continually highlighted in Experience.
As Lincoln's commentary suggests, even the illumination highlights the physical realities
of the situation-the child's black clothing, his pack, the blackness of his world, and the
dirty snow ("Notes" 1 82). The initial speaker in the poem, the adult who questions the
child, notices the child's color, his woeful cry, but he also refers to the child as a thing.
This word heightens our sense of the child's materiality, but it also diminishes the child.
This speaker, aware of the child's material condition, does not demonstrate equal
awareness of his personhood.
The child, also, is intensely aware of his physical situation and of the broken
relationships that have placed him there. He knows that his clothes are "clothes of death,"
a phrase that refers not merely to their funereal color, but to the actual physical death that
awaits him as a result of his labor (I. 7; E23 ). He knows that the "notes of woe" were
taught to him by other people (I. 8; E 23). He is further aware that his situation is the
result of exploitation, realizing that his parents chose to clothe him in these garments and
place him in this vulnerable situation. He is conscious also of the intricate social network
of exploitation that extends far beyond his parents. His parents do what they do in homage
to a system far greater than themselves, a system like the one to which little Tom Dacre
submits himself in the earlier poem, as the idea of God becomes the accomplice of an
oppressive social system. This child, like little Tom Dacre, has times of happiness, but,
unlike Tom, he is aware that he has been injured, and that his happiness is not an excuse
for those who cause him to suffer.
Yet, the awareness in and of itself is not enough. The child sees his situation
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accurately enough, but there is no vision, no hope, no sense of connection to which he can
turn, no vision of deliverance. The pastoral elements that appear in Tom Dacre's dream
are, for this child, clearly left behind in the past, when he was "happy upon the heath'' (I. 5;
E 22). The God who becomes a father to little Tom Dacre is allied with the priest and the
king in oppressing the child. So, this chimney sweeper's empirically accurate vision offers
the clear perspective that demystification provides, but it is also "the same dull round over
again" (E 3). No imaginative vision accompanies the awareness of exploitation, and there
is no suggestion of how that exploitation could be overcome.

As

Alicia Ostriker points out

in her discussion of the relationship between Innocence and Experience: "The rationalist,
materialist outlook was no less sentimental, because no less limited, than blind adoration
of the child or the savage" (48 ), or, for that matter, of eighteenth-century Christianity. The
"rationalist, materialist outlook" provides insight into one's condition, but simple insight
into the present state of things does not necessarily create the ability to change it, and
Blake wants his readers to recognize this fact. The terministic screen of both speakers in
the second "Chimney Sweeper" cuts off the Utopian vision that Christianity provides in
the first poem.
Thus, these chimney sweepers present a living model of the results of both
Christianity and Empiricism as terministic screens. Each child sees through a lens that
allows him to see some things, while blinding him to others. In both cases, the child
becomes unable to act on his own behalf, precisely because his vision is limited. Blake
reveals that both screens can contribute to vice, since they hinder positive action and
produce passivity. Yet, both perspectives also could contribute to virtue insofar as they
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create forms of awareness that would be necessary for transformation to occur, that is, if
they could both exist concurrently. Putting the two poems side by side allows Blake to
reveal to his audience the strengths and limitations of both systems. The blinders that the
systems create act as a way of perpetuating the status quo, that is, an unjust social
system. 14
The maintenance of the status quo is not, however, the sole negative social
consequence that terministic screens can create. There is also the possibility of divinizing
and freezing the system. When this occurs, one may readily scapegoat others to preserve
the symbolic structure. Or, one may perform scapegoating acts in order to transfer guilt or
to prevent the awareness that one is in violation of the commandments implied by a
particular system. In these early Blake poems, the most virulent forms of scapegoating,
whether they be violent or non-violent, tend to be depicted as a consequence of religion.
In the following section, we will examine some implications of scapegoating as it appears
in a particular song, "Little Boy Lost," and in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell. In all of
these cases, Christianity is the symbolic order to which victims are sacrificed, although, in
The Marriage, we begin to see the kinds of generalized, mythic depictions of scapegoating

that will be more typical of the Lambeth prophecies and other later mythological texts.
Scapegoating and Hindrance-"Little Boy Lost" and The Marriage of Heaven and Hell

In "A Little Boy Lost" from Songs ofExperience and in The Marriage of Heaven
and Hell, Blake sees traditional Christianity as a symbolic system that is based on

1

"The reader should bear in mind that, in terms of Burke's thought, there is nothing wrong with a
terministic screen per se. The problem is with the inability to recognize that one is looking through such a
screen. and with the tendency to naively assume that one is simply seeing what is so.
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hindering the natural powers of its adherents. In doing so, it creates in these same
adherents the tendency to hinder the actions of others. Further, it blinds these adherents to
their own inability to conform to the thoroughgoing system that they profess, thus causing
them to scapegoat others. The scapegoating depicted in these texts corresponds to
Kenneth Burke's definition for scapegoating, as well as his emphasis on the importance of
symbolic systems, like religious and theological doctrines, in perpetuating it. As we have
seen, for Burke, the scapegoat "is profoundly consubstantial with those who, looking
upon it as a chosen vessel, would ritualistically cleanse themselves by loading the burden
of their own iniquities upon it. Thus, the scapegoat represents the principle of division in
that its persecutors would alienate from themselves to it their own uncleanlinesses" ( GM
406). This definition does not imply, however, that the consubstantiality between the
persecutor and his or her victim is conscious. At times, the persecutor is conscious only of
his or her separation from a victim who is believed to be absolutely other.
"A Little Boy Lost" exemplifies this principle perfectly, and, in the process,
expresses Blake' s distrust of priests and religious authorities. The child in the poem
separates himself from the Priest and his religious hierarchy in two ways. First, he denies
that it is possible to obey Christ's commandment to love the neighbor as the self Second,
he denies the possibility of conceiving a divinity greater than himself In the first stanza of
the poem, the child speaks philosophically. He does not sound like a young boy at all:
Nought loves another as itself
Nor venerates another so.
Nor is it possible to Thought
A greater than itself to know:" (I. 1 -4; E 28)
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Yet, in the second stanza, the child suddenly takes on an air of innocence, as he
tells his father that he cannot love more than he does: ''I love you like the little bird/That
picks up crumbs around the door" (1. 8; E 28). The bird imagery emphasizes the child's
harmlessness. Further, the image is reminiscent of Jesus' words: ''Behold the fowls of the
air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father
feedeth them. Are ye not much better than they?" (Matthew 6:26). The rhetorical power
of the allusion is heightened by the fact that the child sees himself as a bird picking up
crumbs at his Father' s door; thus, it becomes difficult to tell whether the father addressed
is earthly or heavenly. This oblique reference leads the audience to the idea that even
birds, who have no duty to perform, and no complex theological understanding of love or
divinity, are loved and fed by God. The implication is that those who are truly
consubstantial with the Jesus they claim to follow would hear this echo and recognize their
duty to love and nurture the child, however unorthodox. Even if seen as a beast, he would
deserve ordinary care and kindness, and in terms of Blake's Lavater annotation, failing to
nurture him would be the omission of their own duty at the time. 1 5
In Blake's terms, however, this child is not a beast at all, and perhaps he is even a
prophet, insofar as "Every honest man is a Prophet'' (Annotations to An Apology for the
Bible E 6 1 7). The boy is virtuous simply because he speaks the truth from his heart. In
fact, the second half of his statement echoes Blake's own teaching in "There Is No Natural
Religion," where he argues that empiricism leads to atheism by saying, "Man, by his
reasoning power, can only compare & judge of what he has already perceived" (E 2).
1 5My word choice here is reminiscent of Blake's. See Erdman, p. 60 1 for the original wording.

90

Blake does not directly claim that nothing higher than the self exists, merely that
systematic reasoning cannot attain knowledge of it. The boy's claim is similar.
The rigidity of the priest's thinking is revealed in his assumption that the child' s
argument i s based on reason. There are the holy mysteries and there is reason. One is
right, one is wrong, and there are no other possibilities. He responds to the child's honest
heresy with absolute ferocity, seizing the child by his hair, dragging him by his clothes,
condemning him as a fiend before the community, and finally, burning him to death in a
"holy place,/Where many had been burn'd before" (I. 21 -22; E 29). Although the pious
crowd admiringly describes this ferocity as ''Priestly care" (I. 1 2; E 28), it is clear that the
priest cares for nothing except the purity of his doctrine. While he may feel some abstract
concern for the child's "soul" (and the audience is not allowed to see any such concern),
. there is no care for the child's physical life or for his family. Blake highlights the family's
suffering through the repetition of one line and one line only, ''The weeping parents wept
in vain" (I. 23 ; E 29). This repeated line emphasizes both the priest's callousness and the
bonds of love that unite the condemned boy and his parents.
The word "care," contrasted with this callous act, also offers a key to the
scapegoating motive as it functions in this poem. When the crowd describes the priest' s
action in terms of "care," the lovelessness of his action i s masked. But the priest never
mentions love, speaking only of "holy mystery" defiled by Reason. 16 His lovelessness is
16

Zachary Leader argues at length that the child's Deism is a negative that the rhetoric of the
poem leads its audience to ignore. According to Leader, Blake's bard heavyhandedly condemns the Priest,
but his sympathy for the injustice done the child causes us to ignore the falsehood ofhis beliefs, or to
assume that the blame belongs with those who taught him to accept Deistical ideas. In other words,
Leader is accusing Blake of a one-sided heavy-handedness here. ( 170-71 ). While Leader is correct that
Blake rejects Deism, it is unclear, as I have already argued. whether the child is as Deistic as Leader
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clear enough to the reader, however, who can quickly see that the child, despite his doubts
about a particular theology of love, does love in the common, human sense of the term,
and is bound in love to parents who mourn his death. As the child is stripped, chained, and
executed by religious authorities, the reader is reminded of Jesus, who was also executed
by religious authorities, and whom the Priest supposedly serves. The child and Christ
become consubstantial for the reader. The Priest, however, is unable to see that
consubstantiality. That failure makes him and his followers faithless as well as loveless,
precisely the religious crimes for which they condemn the boy. For them, the child
becomes the loveless and faithless one, the "charismatic vicar'' who must be burned in
order to purify a community which neither sees nor acknowledges its own failings.
As Andrew Lincoln points out, the literal actions described in this poem would
have seemed barbaric to Blake's contemporaries, but the poem's final rhetorical question,
"Are such things done on Albions shore," using the present tense, invites Blake's audience
to recognize their own consubstantiality with the Priest's followers (Lincoln, ''Notes" 198;
1. 24; E 29). Citing a related poem by Isaac Watts, part of Watts' popular collection of
hymns for children, Lincoln points out that the spiritual language of eighteenth century
English Christianity resembles the violence of the Priest's language in Blake's poem
(''Notes"l 98):
What if his [God's] dreadful anger bum,

assumes. The bird imagery is a key to undercutting the apparent Deism of the opening lines. In any case,
we are meant to be appalled by the child's murder, whether or not he is a Deist. Furthermore, if the
purpose of the poem is to denounce scapegoating as an activity performed by Christians, the reader need
not be concerned that Blake has been insufficiently hard on Deists in this particular text. For a good
discussion of Blake's attitude towards Deism, see Bloom, Blake 's Apocalypse, 24-28.
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While I refuse his offer'd grace,
And all his love to fury turn,
And strike me dead upon the place?
'Tis dangerous to provoke a God !
His power and vengeance none can tell!
One stroke of his almighty rod
Shall send young sinners quick to hell
Then 'twill for ever be in vain
To cry for pardon and for grace. (Watts 229) 1 7
If the late eighteenth-century child is not threatened with literal fire, he is
threatened with eternal fire, by a god who, like the priest, ignores cries of desperation and
exacts vengeance when others fail to acknowledge him. Such a god could be described as
the ultimate scapegoater, who punishes others for lovelessness when he is himself loveless,
or at least unfaithful, turning away in fickle and jealous rage the moment his love is
rejected. The closing line of Blake's poem directly addresses the audience, asking them to
confess that such things are done on Albion's shore, symbolically if not physically.
Further, he invites his audience to renounce their consubstantiality with the priest and,
instead, to identify with the tortured child, thus making the move from hindrance, or vice,
to action, or virtue.
As a symbolic action, the poem is designed to break up its audience's identification
with a religious hierarchy that Blake regards as inhuman. Furthermore, it demonstrates the
17

Zachary Leader points out that some, like John Wesley, criticize Watts for excessively
moderating his language in order to speak to children in a manner appropriate to their years (8). Leader
himself mentions "the gentle kindliness" of Watts' voice, and his difficulty reconciling that gentleness
with a severity he saws as a necessary part of his message-an interesting criticism in light
of this particular text (16-17). For further discussion of the relationship between Blake's songs and
eighteenth-century children's literature, see Leader's full discussion and chapter 1 of Glen's Vision
and Disenchantment: Blake 's Songs and Wordsworth 's Lyrical Ballads, "Poetic 'Simplicity': Blake's
Songs and Eighteenth-Century Children's Verse, pp. 8-32.
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consubstantiality that in the Burkean model accompanies the relationship between the
persecuting community and the scapegoat, who symbolically carries the traits that the
community rejects in itself By showing the hypocrisy of the persecutors and the
innocence of the child, it critiques the kind of rigid symbolic order, in this case an
institutional order, that could create such scapegoating.
Angela Esterhammer says of this poem that it treats language as performative,
applauding the performative language of individuals like the lost boy, and condemning the
performative language of institutions like the church 18 In his Annotations to Lavater,
Blake initially appears to argue that actions from "individual propensity" are bound to be
good, but he evidently thinks better of this phrase and deletes it. Rather, his emphasis is on
the distinction between action and hindrance. When one individual hinders another, this
deed is vice. The priest's action, both as an individual and as the agent of an institution, is
vice. The child's free expression of his ideas and experiences is virtuous, whether or not
his ideas are, strictly speaking, true, and whether or not his ideas happen to be held by
others within a social community. But since institutions so often bear the burden of
restraining and hindering action, it is difficult to see how any institution could be virtuous

18Esterhammer uses Burke's concept of circumference to set up her argument. By circumference,

Burke means to the range which a particular perspective offers. Esterhammer argues that circumference
for Burke has to do with the "different conclusions we make about the motives of human behavior . . .
depending on whether we adopt a circumference that includes the idea of a creating God or one limited
to a controlling Nature (77-78). Esterhammer argues that for Blake another distinction is primary. The
difference is between two kinds of language, language in which there is a direct relationship between
"'address and reply and between language and action" and another type of language in which
communication is "oblique, interrupted, and generally ineffectual" (125). Of course, the concept of
creation is important in both of these distinctions, as is the concept of language as active and effectual.
Yet Esterhammer's emphasis focuses more on the relationship between institutional and personal
language. My own discussion will focus, instead on the distinction between creation and control.
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in the antinomian ethic of Blake's early work. The institutional limit on behavior, enforced
by the "Thou Shalt Not" (the hortatory negative which, Burke as argues, "moralizes"
humanity), becomes the vice that Blake wants to uproot (LASA 1 6).
In another song from Experience, "The Garden of Love," this concern with
institutional limits is highlighted. A priest is shown in another act, or perhaps we should
call it a non-act, of restraint, binding up sexual desire with "Thou-shalt-not's and thorns
and briars, strangling the vitality of a flower garden. Thus, the speaker of the poem tells
us, there are ''tomb-stones where flowers should be"( 1. 1 O; E 26). Hindrance produces
death at a number of levels, literal and metaphorical, because it is precisely this binding
that leads to the need to kill and harm. In "The Garden of Love," hindrance of the self
creates the need to restrict others' sexual joys. In "A Little Boy Lost," the Priest's
hindrance of his own power to think independently produces the institutional murder of
the child. The often quoted proverb of hell, "Sooner murder an infant in its cradle than
nurse unacted desires" is best understood in this light (MHH pl. 10, 1. 69; E 38). The
hindering and binding of authentic desire, including sexual desire and honest questioning,
are precisely what produces the impulse to strangle the innocent. 1 9 Such an overt and final
hindering of the life of another is simply the outward expression of the internal
strangulation of innocent desire through rigid adherence to an unbending system.
Blake continues to explore the unbending quality of Christian orthodoxy and the

19

It is also arguable that Blake is directly criticizing an ethic of celibacy here. If one is celibate.
one does not produce children. There is no new life. So, in a sense, Blake implies, one has already
murdered new life in the cradle through the refusal of sexual activity.
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scapegoating it produces in The Ma"iage ofHeaven and Hell. 20 As a number of critics
note, The Marriage ofHeaven andHell parodies Swedenborgianism specifically, with
direct references to phrases and doctrines treated in Swedenborg's books. 2 1 Although
Blake admired Swedenborg during the l 780's, by the time he wrote The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell, he had turned against both Swedenborg and the Swedenborgian New
Church in London, with which he had at least a passing connection in the l 780's. Blake's
annotations to Divine Providence ( 1 790) reveal his opinion that Swedenborg is a
predestinarian. As Paley points out, this description is not entirely accurate. Swedenborg
did not believe in predestination; he thought that everyone had the opportunity for
salvation but that some rejected it. This rejection, however, is finalized at death (Paley
''New Heaven" 70).
The doctrine of eternal salvation or damnation, conceived as a destiny assigned
permanently at death, is what Blake objects to in Swedenborg and is the reason why he
calls Swedenborg a predestinarian. For Blake, the belief in eternal damnation was the final

20

Including The Marriage in a discussion of non-mythological texts may appear somewhat
inaccurate, since the opening "Argument" features mythological characters, like Rintrah, who will
appear in the later mythological texts. Furthermore, there are certainly mythological elements in Blake's
treatment of devils and angels. Yet, The Marriage is a mix of forms, as contrasted with the later works
that are mythological from start to finis� and based throughout on characters of Blake's own invention.
Early in Blake's career, he experiments with a variety of forms, like the tractates, the Songs, and the
formally diverse Marriage, sometimes seen as an anatomy. For a full discussion of the form of the
marriage, see Eaves, Essick, and Viscomi's Introduction to the Blake trust edition of the
early illuminated texts.
21

A variety of discussions exist that place Blake within his Swedenborgian context. A good
general discussion can be found in the Introduction to the Blake trust edition of the early illuminated
texts, edited by Essick, Viscomi, and Eaves. These scholars put much emphasis on how specific
allusions to Swedenborg in The Marriage create a rhetorical effect on the audience. The historical
background for this piece relies strongly on Morton Paley's "A New Heaven Is Begun." For a debate
concerning the possible audience for The Marriage, see Howard's '"An Audience for The Marriage of
Heaven and Hell and Scrivener's "A Swedenborgian Visionary and The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell. "
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end-stop of human creativity, the ultimate foreclosure of the Act. The belief in eternal
destiny, determined upon death, is also, as The Marriage of Heaven and Hell
demonstrates, an act of scapegoating, based upon the projection of guilt onto another in
order to conform to a rigid system. Despite the fact that The Marriage is a critique and a
parody of Swedenborg's writings, it is also a condemnation of orthodox Christianity in all
its forms. If Blake is particularly hard on Swedenborg, it is because he had hoped that
Swedenborg was something other than a traditional Christian.
Blake's rejection of the doctrine of eternal damnation is congruent with his
treatment of Act as the god-term, with Hindrance as the devil-term. The Memorable Fancy
beginning on plate 12 describes the process by which true prophecy can degenerate into
hindrance. Here the young prophet who is the primary speaker of the work dines with the
prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel. Isaiah says that he was "perswaded. & confirm'd; that the
vioice of honest indignation is the voice of God" (pl. 12; E 3 8). 22 The young prophet,
concerned that he will wrongly impose his ideas upon others, thus hindering them, asks
whether a firm perswasion [sic] makes a thing so, and Isaiah replies that it does. All poets
believe that this is so. Then Ezekiel argues that the Poetic Genius is the first and primary
principle. This is possible because, as Blake writes elsewhere, ''No man can think write or
speak from his heart, but he must intend truth" ("All Religions Are One E 1 )" and ''Every
honest man is a Prophet" (Annotations to An Apology for the Bible E 6 17). Truth here is

22

In referring to the speaker of The Marriage as a "'young prophet," I am following John
Howard's argument that the piece if about the formation of a young prophet's character and vocation. See
Howard'slnfemal Poetics, pages 61-96. An earlier version of this argument appears in Nurmi (1957).
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not an accurate chart of a state of affairs, but an honest symbolic action from the mind,
mouth, or pen of an honest human being. Thus "opposition is true friendship," since
honestly spoken visions create progression, change, and growth, even when they are
opposed, just like "Attraction and Repulsion, Reason and Energy, Love and Hate" and all
the Con�raries (pl. 3 ; E 34).
But when such honest perception and expression are passed along to others in a
culture and passively accepted, they develop into a rigid and frozen system in which there
is no further progression, just a static hierarchy. In The Marriage, this is the fate of
Christianity and Judaism. As Ezekiel asserts, the vulgar believed ''that all nations would at
last be subject to the jews" (E 39). This subjection has occurred, he points out, because all
nations are now subject to the jews' God. Such a subjection, insofar as it is a subjection to
another's vision, is not good but rather, a suppression of the Poetic Genius in those who
believe without benefit of vision.
What such frozen systems do, according to Blake, is..to create a totalized system,
placing the Devourers (or submitters) in a permanent position of privilege, while the
Prolific, or Visionaries, become perceived as insane, tormented, and eternally damned.
Christianity unites these two groups by creating a system which includes both only by
creating a rigid hierarchy in which one group is valued and the other group devalued. The
Marriage regards the two groups, those who passively receive and those who actively

create, as separate, but necessary. Both must remain if creation and transformation are to
continue. For Blake, the doctrine of a permanent heaven and a permanent hell is the result
of a scapegoating motive which occurs in those who are passively receptive and who wish
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to condemn the creative in order to hold on to a rigid and orthodox system of hierarchies
and classifications.
Both the violence and the scapegoating motive behind it become clear in the third
memorable fancy. When the angel sees the young prophet, he makes no attempt to engage
in conversation but leaps directly into condemnation, telling the prophet:
0 pitiable foolish young man! 0 horrible! 0 dreadful state! consider the hot
burning dungeon thou art preparing for thyself to all eternity, to which thou
art going in such career (pl. 17; E 4 1 ).
The angel is trying to limit the prophet's activities, because he is fully convinced of the
accuracy of the hell he describes. He believes that he simply describes things as they are
when he reveals his hellish perception to the young prophet, but he is clearly wrong since
the fire and the Leviathan disappear as soon as he does. For the prophet, the dangerous
raging Leviathan of hell is created by the mind of the Angel which is "like standing water"
because he "never alters his opinion" (pl. 1 9; E 42). As the prophet points out on plate 21,
angels see themselves as '1:he only wise" because they have a "confident insolence
sprouting from systematic reasoning" (pl. 21 ; E 42). 23
Thus, the prophet's vision of the angel's world is in fact the reverse image of the
world that the angel has revealed to the prophet. While the angel's metaphysic produces a
vision of the Leviathan bursting forth to devour the sinful prophet in a fiery world, the
prophet's vision shows the angels as chained monkeys who devour one another, with the
strong raping and persecuting the weak and then eating them alive. The prophet is trying

23Note that, having begun with a critique of Swedenborgian Christianity, Blake moves on to
describe angels in terms that could apply to the adherents of any systematic symbolic order.
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to show the angel that he, the prophet, is not devouring anyone or threatening anyone,
that the devourers are the angels themselves. The vision of the Leviathan, born of the
angel's rigid symbolic system, is a persecutor's vision. The angel runs from it, because he
sees it as other than himself. In fact, his own need to devour produces the image of the
devouring monsters of hell. In the "eternal state" that the prophet sees as representing the
angelic frame of perception, the only devourers are the angels themselves, who are not
really "the only wise" they believe themselves to be, but simply monkeys, who imitate the
convictions of others while enchained in rigid systems of belief. In fact, the prophet is
describing how the angels look to him in light of eternity.
The angel's scapegoating motive is further revealed when he protests the prophet's
vision of the violence by calling it an imposition of the prophet. Yet, as the prophet tells
him, each of them imposes upon the other. The fact that each has a metaphysic which he
shows the other and, to some extent, imposes upon the other, is unavoidable. But this
particular angel experiences the imposition simply as imposition, because he refuses to
engage in conversation with the prophet. This angel wants only to express his own view
and have the prophet immediately accept it in its totality, and this intellectually aggressive
attitude is directly related to his static view of language.
The prophet blames the angel's recalcitrance on Aristotle's Analytics, and at this
point, he expands the critique beyond the Christian system by attacking the principle of
systematic reasoning at its root. As Peter Fisher points out in his discussion of this
passage, Aristotle's Analytics sets forth his system of classification by means of genus and
species. This system of generalization, which classifies people as either "redeemed" or
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"damned," reduces human beings to a mere "skeleton" of their full-bodied selves (Fisher
Valley 90). Blake's use of the skeleton image here is telling. Not only is the skeleton of

definition a mere fraction of the total person; it is, furthermore, the most rigid and
unyielding part of the person, devoid of heart, flesh, muscle, and warmth. Any perception
of another human being which reduces them to a skeleton effectively diminishes them
beyond recognition. This particular angel, trapped in an unyielding system of classification
and hierarchy, is unable to see the prophet as anything but an unregenerate and pitiable
creature. Thus, he cannot respond to the message at the bottom of this same plate
"Opposition is true Friendship" (pl. 20; E 42). He is unable to hear the prophet and in fact,
he cannot speak honestly, because he is not at liberty to engage in a process of change
and progression.
This passage, however, exposes logical difficulties that will haunt Blake for the
rest of his career. The difficulty is that the prophet is also engaged, unavoidably, in a
process of classification. He calls some beings angels, some devils. Certainly, in light of his
later works, it is possible to argue that, for Blake, the angels are not actually doomed to
their cannibalistic condition eternally, as the angel believes the prophet to be. In fact, much
later, . in his nineteenth-century text, Milton, Blake will say clearly that states are eternal,
but that people can move from one state to another. At this point, however, there is no
clear definition of"eternal," simply an ironic tone on the part of the prophet, who does not
seem to take his own threats as seriously as the angel takes his. If, in fact, the prophet is
describing, not the eternal future of the angels, but rather, how they look to him in light of
his vision of eternity, he is not predicting their eternal futures, but, rather, providing them
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with an opportunity for conversation and transformation. Such a change does occur in the
final memorable fancy. Here, Blake depicts an angel who, despite his anger at the devil's
discourse, listens to the devil's antinomian message and is transformed into the prophet
Elijah.
Yet, as Joseph Anthony Wittreic� Jr. suggests, Blake is not entirely successful in
his attempt to distinguish between the imposition of the poem's persona on the angel,
which is an act of prophecy, and the imposition of the angel on the prophet, which is an
act of scapegoating. As Wittreich puts it ". . . the Angel is an incidental figure in the
prophecy-one not acting but being acted upon . . . " (198). If this is so, Blake's devils and
prophets both hinder and scapegoat just as much as do the angels. For this reason, it is
possible to argue that the poem sets up an endless spiral of irony, where everyone is
parodied. This is Dan Miller's argument. He questions whether there is any voice in the
text which can be relied upon, and finally argues that "There is no voice to be believed in
The Marriage other than an angelic or diabolic voice" ( 506). Harold Bloom, who treats
the text's ironies with less insistence, nevertheless notes that the dialectic of this work is
never really transcended, despite the fact that heaven and hell are described as "married"
("Dialectic"). Yet this parallelism of the angels and devils does not imply that Blake wants
us to suspect devils as fully as we suspect angels. Rather, he suggests that the demonic
power of prophecy can harden into doctrine, as did Ezekiel's teaching, and become the
stuff of angelic systematics. By revealing that the prophet imposes upon the angel, Blake
makes the audience just suspicious enough of the prophet to prevent this mistake from
occumng.
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Furthermore, Blake heightens the differences, if not between devils and angels,
between prophets and angels, by demonstrating in angels a lack of both awareness and
honesty. Prior to his transformation, engaging in a hypocritical effort to pretend he is not
angry, the angel turns himself from blue, to yellow, to "white pink & smiling" (pl. 23; E
43 ). This lack of honesty is necessitated by the fact that the angel' s moral code does not ·
allow him to acknowledge his own anger. Thus, his arguments are not true acts, in Blake' s
sense of the term. They are symbolic hindrances laid upon both the self and the other. The
fact that the prophet knows and is open about the fact that he is imposing his personal
vision upon others separates him from the angels, who simply perceive their own visions
as true and then force themselves and others into conformity. Thus, it is the prophet's
irony that makes his accusations something other than scapegoating. It is his irony that
leads us to believe that his vision of monkeys eating one another is a description of the
spiritual state of angels, not a threat of a hell to which they will be condemned.
Yet irony can only go so far in creating actual social change, particularly if one
wants, not simply a peace based on a mutual grudging tolerance, but peace with j ustice,
and Blake seriously desires j ustice however ironic his self-presentation in The Marriage.
As we will see, it is clear that the early Blake even supports revolutionary violence as a
path to j ustice, a difficult position to sustain if one argues that one can tell the difference
between active devils and hindering angels primarily by the irony of the devils. It is
difficult to sustain irony and revolution simultaneously. The more earnest formulation, that
we discern the difference between act and hindrance by seeking authenticity through
honesty and inspiration, is equally difficult to use as a measure of oneself and one' s enemy.
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How is one to discern who is honest and who is not? How is one to know which activities
are inspired? How, indeed, is one to avoid lying to oneself about one's own motives? We
will close this chapter by examining one of the Songs ofExperience, ''The Tyger," a
revolutionary poem that asks its audience to rethink the terministic screens with which it
associates Christianity, and to embrace the idea of revolution. In looking at this poem, we
must keep in mind, however, that the readiness for violence implied in the text might well
be interpreted as scapegoating, depending upon who looks at it. Reading this poem,
particularly in light of our discussion of The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, allows us to
see the difficulties involved in discerning the difference between scapegoating and
justifiable revolutionary violence-violence based upon the legitimate moral denunciation of
a corrupt authority.
Christian Rhetoric and the Recovery ofAnger in "The Tyger: ": Revolution as Act
In the 1790's, Blake's references to the active evil of Revolution often take the
form of questioning just how evil revolution really is.

As

Martin Nurmi points out, the

Leviathan in The Malliage ofHeaven and Hell points directly to Revolutionary France,
''three degrees east ofLondon" (Blake 's Marriage 5 1 ). To the angel, revolution appears
as a fearsome beast, but to the prophet, there is no beast, just a bard singing, a sign of
creativity and the Utopian harmony that is to come. The angel, whose scapegoating
propensities have already been discussed, is terrified by the fiery wrath with which he has
threatened the prophet. Although the prophet asserts that the angel sees the Leviathan
because his inflexibility creates "reptiles of the mind," the revolutionary wrath is
nevertheless a reality, but it is only a threat to those who wish to avoid changes in the
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symbolic order. This true wrath, the wrath that threatens the scapegoating angels, might
well be seen as the creation of God, as the Biblical Leviathan, in all its monstrousness, is
the creation of God.
Although Blake does not pursue this approach to the Leviathan, this is precisely
the argument that drives "The Tyger." As Paley argues in what remains one of the most
effective discussions of this poem, the text's contemporary audience would, most
certainly, have recognized both a religious and a secular dimension to Blake's rhetoric. On
the one hand are the many Biblical references to God's wrath in terms of various beasts of
prey. On the other hand, there are the references in the popular press to the French
revolutionaries as tigers and other wild beasts, with the purpose of condemning the
revolutionaries and placing them in sub-human status. In pulling both of these meanings
together under the one image of the tyger, Blake connects the French Revolution and the
wrath of God. 24
Such a use of tiger imagery makes a specific claim, certainly about the French
Revolution. But in Blake's own time, it is also an attempt to reclaim Christian rhetoric as a
tool for dissent, and to do so in a way that moves beyond sectarian divisions and beyond
otherworldly hope. For those who reject traditional Christianity, the tyger can still be
celebrated as a powerful image of creativity and revolutionary indignation. Further, when
the speaker asks, 'Did he who made the lamb make thee?," such reader would be

2

4For a full discussion of this issue, see "Tyger of Wrath," the second chapter of Morton Paley's

Energy and Imagination, pp. 29-60. Paley provides numerous examples of the use of the term "tiger" to

condemn revolutionaries, as well as Biblical comparisons between God's wrath and the tiger or the lion.
Paley's argument is further filled out by his discussion of Jacob Boehme' s treatment of God's wrath, an
important reference, in light ofBoehme's well-known influence on Blake.
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reminded that as agents of Poetic Genius, they can never allow themselves to embrace the
tyger alone. The lamb is still an essential symbol of human creativity-the creativity of
connection and tenderness. But when the tyger of revolution forces the nobility to throw
down their spears, as the stars in the poem do, then it should not be rejected, but
embraced as one of humanity's greatest and most creative capacities. 25 Both the capacity
for harmonious gentleness and the capacity for rebellion can be harnessed for human
creativity. This is true even for those who, like Paine, reject the Christian symbol of the
lamb as a means of atonement.
For readers who are traditional Christians, however, the question, ''Did he who
made the lamb make thee?" forces a reevaluation of the tendency to reject the tyger and
call it evil, whether we speak of real tygers or of revolutionary tygers. If the question is
answered with a no, these readers are forced to surrender a belief in God as the sole
creator. If they take that stance, they lose their ability to argue that their position is
inherently better than any other, or that it should have complete dominance. Thus, those
who support the tyger have a greatly enhanced position. On the other hand, if the
traditionalists answer the question with a yes, as orthodoxy demands, they are placed in a
position where they must recognize that the tyger is part of a good creation, even though
it is fiightening and can be dangerous. The church's tendency to see only submission and
gentleness as good and only rebellion and ferocity as evil is political at the source, not
2 5This parallel between the stars and nobility is based upon an argument of David V.Erdman,

who bases this equation upon a similar phrase that appears in The French Revolution. In this early
unfinished te� Blake directly and literally identifies the stars throwing down their spears with the ruling
classes, especially kin� and nobles. For a full discussion, see Erdman's Blake: Prophet Against Empire p.
194.
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theological. The connection between passivity and Christian virtue is broken down. In any
case, room is made for both the beast of prey and the lamb, for both activity and passivity,
and, it would appear, for both violence and tenderness. In "The Tyger," Blake makes a
revolutionary argument that is compatible with any number of different religious or
philosophical assumptions, but he does not leave room for us simply to reject either the
tyger or the lamb as straightforwardly evil or good.
Bidlake observes that Blake critics often try to downplay Blake's willingness to
accept violent revolution as a means to social ends. One sees this tendency in Erdman,
who writes about Blake's tyger and lamb in these terms: ''The creator must have smiled at
Yorktown and at Valmy, not because his people were warlike, but because they seemed
ready to coexist with the Lamb, the wrath of the Tiger having done its work" (1 96). Thus,
Erdman sees the ''wrath of the Tiger" as necessary, while arguing that for Blake, the lamb,
the innocent state, is somehow more important, more fundamental. Clearly, the lamb is an
important symbol for Blake. As Leader argues, "The Lamb" of Innocence vividly portrays
a relationship of harmony and connection (87-9 1). At this point, however, the two figures
stand side by side, and it is difficult to see that one is more important than the other. While
the tyger performs no violent act in the course of the poem, the potential is always
present, and, had Blake wished to repudiate the possibility of violence, it is unlikely he
would have included this poem in a work that he engraved between 1 793 and 1 794, when
the execution of the French king had already occurred, and the Terror was in progress. 26

26

See Viscomi's Blake and the Idea ofthe Book, chapter 28, pp. 267-75 for his arguments about
the correct dating of Songs ofExperience.
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While there is no question of Blake's desiring violence for its own sake, it appears that, at
this stage, he was willing to accept that the violence of wrath might well be a necessary
function of action, be it transcendent or human. If the act is to be possible in a world
governed largely by hindrance, then violent release from hindrance may be a necessity.
The difficulty is in determining the difference between murder as hindrance and
revolutionary violence as action. Murder is clearly a hindrance of another, as Blake says.
So are laws against murder, yet they are designed to prevent people from hindering others.
Does not revolutionary action also hinder, and, one might argue, does it not hinder
institutions that are necessary in order to avoid worse forms of hindrance? Surely, some
might argue, the violent actions that occurred in France between 1793 and 1 794
"hindered" many people, particularly those who were unjustly executed. The question
arises as to whether it is even possible to avoid hindrance. In terms of symbolic hindrance,
Blake himself addresses this issue in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, when he portrays
the speaker of the poem conversing with the prophets Isaiah and Ezekiel about how they
speak without imposing upon others. Here, honesty appears to provide a large part of the
distinction between prophets, like the poem's speakers, whose words impose to some
extent, while falling short of the scapegoating activity of the angels, who deny that their
words involve any imposition.
The difference between revolutionary violence and the violence of scapegoating
and oppression is less clear. There are hints that Blake draws the distinguishing line in
terms of who is hurt by the violence and who is protected. In ''Little Girl Lost" for
example, the beasts of prey protect the lost child, whereas the priest in "A Little Boy
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Lost" protects only the institution. Furthermore, there is the issue of honesty. The beasts
of prey are openly capable of violence, but they do not use it against the innocent. The
priest claims to be simply the agent of order, but he commits violence against an innocent
person.
This distinction is made, however, only by bringing in values that go beyond the
contrast between act and hindrance that Blake embraces in his antinomian ethic. In these
non-mythological works that refer so directly to symbolic systems like Christianity or
Lockean philosophy, this difficulty is somewhat mitigated by the fact that we can directly
associate these specific systems with particular social practices that Blake describes as
oppressive. The discussion of hindrance as the ultimate evil can be seen as an
overstatement adopted for the purpose of emphasizing the evil of particular forms of
hindrance practiced by the social institutions of the day. Yet, as Blake moves on to use
mythological forms exclusively, the equation of order and hindrance takes on a more
generalizing form, and it becomes more difficult to distinguish between the oppressive
hindrances produced by systems of order and the potential hindranc�s .enacted by those
who rebel . In the Lambeth Prophecies, where Blake's rhetoric often involves a linkage of
some kind between the representatives of the established order and the revolutionaries, the
problem of how their moral difference is to be defined becomes ever more acute.
Synthesirin1 Burke and Blake

The difficulties that we will see discerning the difference betw�en scapegoating
revolutionary violence take a somewhat different shape when we look at Kenneth Burke's
. ·· '·

arguments, and before moving on, we must stop and examine how, exactly, Burke's
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argument and Blake's agree and disagree at this point in Blake's career. Perhaps, the
primary distinction lies in the fact that for Burke, at least the Burke of the Cold War era,
avoiding violence is his primary aim, and his analysis of symbolic systems exists primarily
to purify War. While Burke does critique specific political and economic language that, in
his view, leads to economic injustice, his critique of language throughout most of the texts
we have examined is aimed primarily at the elimination of violent activity spurred on
through the freezing of social orders. Peace is his god-term. For the early Blake, however,
Poetic Genius is his god-term, and the liberation of that Genius is the most important
thing, since its liberation will allow us to fight injustice and warfare as we fully express our
divine humanity. The poem, "The Tyger" suggests that if violence is necessary to serve
this end, so be it, for the Poetic Genius itself can be violent.
While Blake will alter his position later, at this point, this difference in god-terms
makes for an enormous difference between him and Burke. It also affects, in a somewhat
dizzying way, the logical structure of Blake's arguments about hindrance and act. When
Blake suggests that hindrance is a devil-term, and act is a god-term ( assuming that act
derives from the Poetic Genius), then we have here a very rigid hierarchy. Hindrance is
bad and act is good, but, apart from a pure vision that arises spontaneously from the
Poetic Genius, we have little sense of how we are to get from one position to the other.
There is a hint that Blake himself recognizes that this structure is too rigid. In the
Annotations to Lavater, Blake remarks that Lavater is good, even though, a few lines
later, he condemns Lavater's attitudes about sexuality, associating them with hindrance (E
600-0 1 ). Furthermore, earlier in his Annotations, he praises Lavater' s concern that one
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would do better to look weak, even if good and strong, than to do evil in order to look
strong. Agreeing, Blake nevertheless adds, "Active Evil is better than Passive Good" (E
592). Here Blake sets up a more complex hierarchy, one that might grant that the violence
of the tyger is an active evil, better than a passive good, but not necessarily better than an
active good.
Such a hierarchy moves Blake in the direction of a Burkean view of order, one that
acknowledges the necessity for a hierarchy, that describes order in terms of degrees of
goodness and evil, and one that offers the possibility of change in stages. But these early
works, while they hint at this possibility developing later in Blake's career, nevertheless
focus almost entirely on the need to eliminate the hindrances imposed by the symbolic
orders of his period along with the terministic screens these orders produce, even if
violence is required to do so. Criticizing terministic screens with a thoroughness that
Burke would never engage in, Blake makes it difficult to find a mode of change that would
be anything other than sudden, revolutionary (in the modem sense of the term), and
violent. In his mythological texts, this fairly one-sided perspective on symbolic order and
on the use of violence to overthrow systems of order, will be seriously tested and finally
found wanting. This transition in attitude will be the subject of the following chapter.
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Chapter ill
Order as Scapegoat:
The Role of Urizen in the Lambeth Prophecies

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the antinomianism of the early Blake sets
up a dialectic between the virtue of Action, as associated with the divinely inspired and
honest human being, and the hindrance imposed by the devotees of systems of law and
restraint. The scapegoating practices in these early texts are propagated by hinderers,
people who are agents of tyrannical law, and scapegoating is only one of the negative
effects of hindrance. Another effect is that those who submit themselves to a system of
hindrance become complicit in their own sacrifice by mortifying their physical energy and
awareness. Thus, in works like ''The Tyger" and ''Little Girl Lost," the rebels who are
capable of violence on behalf of the poor are portrayed as true agents of divinity. Blake
grants rebels, in their role as protector, the right at least to threaten violence, while he
condemns those who, like the priest in ''Little Boy Lost," exercise violence in defense of
the dominant symbolic order.
Yet the attitude towards the poor is not the trait that Blake ordinarily uses to
distinguish between agents and hinderers. Rather, he sets up a distinction based on honesty
and inspiration as opposed to duplicity and false law. By this standard, however, it is often
difficult to discern what the difference is between the acts of Blake's revolutionary figures
and the hindrances imposed by counter-revolutionaries. Their effects are often the same:
Both frequently cause death, impose upon others, and place limits upon others, thus
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hindering them. Blake asserts that one group does so out of honesty and inspiration, while
the other is duplicitous and dominated by false law, but how he determines others' motives
is less easy to discover.
To some extent, this pattern also appears in the so-called Lambeth prophecies,
mythological works that Blake illuminated between 1 793- 1 795, while he was living and
working in the Hercules Buildings in Lambeth. In these texts, Blake's obsession with the
relationships between symbolic order, hindrance, and scapegoating is embodied in the
mythological figure ofUrizen, the bearded character whose name refers both to "Reason"
and to the Greek term for "Horizon," the boundary of human perception. 1 While these
texts all portray Urizen differently, the presentations are almost universally negative,
although, as we will see, some reflect a certain amount of ambivalence on Blake's part. In
America: A Prophecy ( 1793 ), Urizen lowers threateningly in the clouds, and he works on
behalf of Albion's prince and Albion's angel, not very subtle references to the British
crown and the church/state apparatus. In the frontispiece of Europe: A Prophecy, Urizen
appears in what Erdman calls "his finest hour," measuring the cosmos with a compass in a
pose of great dignity and strength (Illuminated 1 55). Yet, as Damrosch points out, this
remarkably beautiful picture also holds "negative implications of mathematical
constriction" (264). In using a compass to measure and set boundaries on his creation,
Urizen is also binding and limiting it. In The Book of Urizen, the bearded old man appears
1 See S. Foster Damon's A Blake Dictionary for a discussion on the merits of these differing

perceptions on the origins ofUrizen's name. Damon prefers to see the name as deriving on a pun for
"Your Reason," since such punning is a typical Blakean strategy. But he credits Kathleen Raine with the
equally suggestive argument that Urizen is a play on the Greek term for "horizon," (4 19). Both are puns
on terms that Blake often uses pejoratively, and, it seems likely, both are implied
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in his visually most disturbing forms. At times, he is cramped and frozen, writing furiously
on tablets of law reminiscent of the stone tablets of the Decalogue. In other illuminations,
he is weeping in chains, or ensnared in webs that he himself has created. In The Book of
Ahania, the visual representations are infrequent, but Urizen's actions drive the narrative,
as his son rebels against him, and as he, in turn, becomes the crucifier of that same son.
Los' s female counterpart, Enitharmon, is actually the central oppressive figure in
Europe (and thus Europe will not receive further attention in this chapter), but in these
other Lambeth texts Urizen is portrayed as the primary destructive force, associated at
every level with hindrance, violence, and scapegoating. In America, he is associated with
the political power of king and bishop, and he holds back the forces of revolution when no
human power can. In The Book of Urizen, he is the cause of the Fall. Furthermore, he is
symbolically linked with practically every major institution or intellectual system in late
eighteenth-century English culture. As has long been noted, but as Tannenbaum
demonstrates most thoroughly, the Urizen of The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania
is a parody of the Biblical God and serves to critique mainstream eighteenth-century
Christianity. 2 But Urizen is also akin to eighteenth-century philosophers and scientists. He
is obsessed with mathematics, with machinery, with reason, and with books. As Robert
Essick effectively demonstrates, Urizen and Ahania even criticize the teachings of thinkers
like Thomas Paine and Mary Wollstonecraft, with whom Blake was often in sympathy
politically.
Thus, when we look at the variety of institutions and schools of thought grouped
2

Fuller discussion of these various critical perspectives will take place later in the chapter.
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together in the figure ofUrizen, we see how easy it is to associate Urizen with the idea of
order itself In fact, a number of critics identify in The Book of Urizen a critique of
linguistic order as a fallen mode of communication. Urizen is continually seen writing and
reading, and his fall in The Book of Urizen is linked to the emergence of language as
division and difference.
It may be for this reason that Kenneth Burke subtly and ironically connects Blake's
Urizen with his own antinomian critique of language and symbolic order. The final section
of Kenneth Burke's 1 961 text, The Rhetoric ofReligion, entitled ''Epilogu e: Prologue in
Heaven," consists of a facetious discussion between "The Lord," as representative of
''Logos," or the word as the basis of a rational order, and "Satan," who represents the
principle of the negative in language. The most direct allusion here is to the ''Prologu e in
Heaven," which appears at the beginning of Johnann Wolfgang von Goethe's Faust. 3 Yet
Burke's ''Lord" is clearly a function of language. Both he and Satan blink out of existence
when, at the end of the text, human beings, as symbol-using animals, disappear. Set up as
a play, this lively discussion of problems of language, naming, and order includes a set of
stage directions in which "The Lord" is described as a "Blakean bearded patriarch" (276).
The most likely candidate for the ''Blakean bearded patriarch" to whom Burke refers is
Urizen, and the Urizen reference is echoed elsewhere in The Rhetoric of Religion. The
book opens with a poem that describes symbolic order in terms of an "iron laws" of

3

Goethe's prologue connects with Burke's in one specific way, the genial relationship between
God and the Devil. Goethe's Lord needs Mephisto, one of the "spirits that negate," to prevent his
creatures from sinking into "uninterrupted rest" (11. 338 & 342). By keeping the human being stirred up,
The Lord suggests, Mephisto will help to create the one he tempts, in this case, Faust.
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history, echoing Blake's term for describing Urizen's laws (RR 4-5; BU Ch. VIII, pl.23,
1.26, E 81 ). Furthermore, The Rhetoric ofReligion consists largely of a critique of the
Christian system, based in a discussion of the first three chapters of Genesis, the same
chapters that Blake uses to set up his Biblical parody, The Book of Urizen.
Burke's analogy between his vision of symbolic order and Blake's Urizen is
certainly apt. Blake's Urizen is universally recognized as a symbol of reason and
systematic ordering. Yet as apt as the comparison is, the references have a clearly ironic
function. The differences between Burke's ''Lord" and Blake's bearded patriarch are
marked. Burke's character is aware of his own limitations, and he shrewdly notes that
'�here the Earth-People are concerned, any terminology is suspect to the extent that it
does not allow for the progressive criticism of itself' (RR 303 ). Yet he also observes that
''the resources of the negative being what they are, authorities will continually arise which
would say No definitively to any further questioning" (303 ).
Blake's Urizen is the figure of such a negative authority, associated with the
characteristics of the Bible, the church, the state, empirical science, Deism, and even the
arts, insofar as these serve to reinforce the established order. In The Book of Urizen,
Urizen, the bearded ''Lord" to whom Burke makes reference, is the cause of the fall, a fall
which occurs because he separates himself from the rest of the eternals and sets himself up
as "the eternal priest" and lawgiver. He attempts to establish "a joy without pain," and "a
solid without fluctuation" (BU ch.2, pl.4, 1 1 0-1 1; E 71 ). Further, he creates a world of
"solid obstruction" by taming the wind and the waves, and then he creates laws, written in
metal books, and he establishes these laws as all-encompassing and final:
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Laws of peace, of love, of unity:
Of pity, compassion, forgiveness.
Let each chuse one habitation:
His ancient infinite mansion:
One command, one joy, one desire,
One curse, one weight, one measure
One King, one God, one Law. (BU ch.2, pl.4, l.34-40; E 72)
While Burke's Lord oflanguage may be, like Urizen, "a Blakean bearded patriarch," his
personality is, nevertheless, the exact opposite ofUrizen, or at least he is the opposite of
the Urizen of the Lambeth prophecies. In fact, in these early appearances, Blake's Urizen
is the Burkean concept of a god-term transformed into a principle of the demonic, as if the
very tendency to organize the world into rational systems were itself the principle of evil,
or, in Blake's own terms, hindrance.
Yet, as Burke would be quick to point out, such a position is very difficult to
sustain. In fact, Blake is unable to sustain it over time. In the earliest Lambeth prophecies,
like America, revolutionary agents and counter-revolutionary hinderers may share
characteristics, but Blake clearly differentiates between the two groups, while associating
Urizen exclusively with the latter. In The Book of Urizen (1 794), Blake continues to treat
Urizen as the master hinderer, and he implies that Urizen's son Fuzon may be able to lead
the rest ofUrizen's children out of bondage in Egypt. Finally, in The Book ofAhania
( 1 795), Fuzon returns as a highly ambiguous figure, whose moral superiority to Urizen is
far from clear. Furthermore, Fuzon' s attempts to overthrow his father simply result in his
own appropriation by Urizenic order. In this text, Blake appears to be questioning
whether it is actually possible to get rid of the bearded patriarch altogether.
This questioning may emerge, in part, because of events in France, where the
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Revolutionary government justified the Terror of 1793 and 1 794 as a defense of the
revolution, and where Robespierre, the revolutionary leader and instigator of Terror, was
guillotined in July of 1 794. 4 The figure of Robespierre-revolutionary, tyrant, and victim all
rolled into one-presents plenty of grounds for the argument that it is difficult to determine
who are the agents of positive change and who are the "hinderers," those who scapegoat
others simply to defend their own systems. As a rebel against established order, a radical
like Blake might expect Robespierre to be one of the tygers or lions affirmed in the Songs.
However, in the Revolutionary government, Robespierre often takes on a strongly
Urizenic role. He is, in fact, a mixture of act and hindrance, good and evil.
Although Urizen remains an evil figure in Blake's Biblical parodies, The Book of
Urizen ( 1 794) and The Book ofAhania ( 1 795), these texts begin to interrogate and to

complicate Blake's position, giving Urizen a quality of complexity that more closely
resembles the complexity of real human beings. These works also acknowledge more
openly the logical problems involved in an attempt to describe order itself in negative
terms. In Urizen and Ahania, readers find themselves in a world where, at first glance,
Hindrance, in the form of Urizen, appears to be impossibly evil, and revolutionary action
seems good and necessary. However, a second look reveals that Act and Hindrance are

"'The relationship between dates and historical events is extremely interesting here. Visconti
assigns the dates listed here: America: A Prophecy (1793); The Book of Urizen (1794); and The Book of
Ahania (1795). In America, Blake uses the tenn "Terror" to describe Ore, whose activities he approves in
this prophecy. See the discussion of America later in this chapter for more details. If Visconti's dating is
accurate. we have some indication that Blake approves of revolutionary events in France at this stage. The
Book of Urizen ( 1794) is more hesitant, and by the time he completes The Book ofAhania, Blake has an
entirely new attitude about what is going on in France. These events may have also affected Blake's
thinking about symbolic order itself See Visconti, chapter 29, pp. 276-88 for bibliographic arguments
concerning these and other Lambeth prophecies.
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almost indistinguishable. Action becomes entangled in Hindrance, and, at times,
Hindrance appears to be the only kind of action available. Furthermore, efforts towards
revolution are co-opted by the very systems they set out to oppose. The question of who
is the scapegoater and who the scapegoat also becomes much more complicated.
In these two books, Blake attempts to retain the absolute rejection of system and
law that he proposes earlier, but is unable to do so. His changing portrayals of hindrance,
and its relationship to the scapegoating process, hint at a changing attitude towards law
and its relationship to both hindrance and sacrificial violence. If, as I said earlier, religious
language is important to Blake in part because of its emphasis on creativity as Act, in the
Urizen books, Blake must find a way to come to terms with the fact that it matters
enormously what one creates, that creativity and hindrance are deeply entertwined, and
that even honest actions may be grounded in hindrance. In The Book of Urizen and The
Book ofAhania, Urizen is the primary cause of hindrance and the primary scapegoater;
yet, at times, Blake implies that the more positive characters, both the Eternals and the
rebels, are themselves deeply involved in hindrance, and, thus, in the scapegoating process
as well. Ultimately, dealing with these issues leads Blake to a kind of dead end-a dead end
that forces him in The Four Zoas to transform the way he portrays his characters and the
way he structures his rhetoric about violence, rebellion, and sacrifice.
This transformation occurs, in part, because, in these texts, the sense of ambiguity
about who are the hinderers and who the hindered is based in problems inherent in the
very language forms that Blake uses. As Stephen Cox observes, ''Blake's logic is a parody
of that which it would oppose" ( 1 2 1). Urizen's crime is hindering others by setting limits
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upon them. Yet Blake also sets limits, upon both himself and others:
But Blake needs his own fences, his own limited priorities, his own
conceptual horizons: and one reason why he needs them is that he insists
on the selfs unlimited freedom. If the selfs possibilities are to be
considered "infinite," at least one possibility ought to be excluded-the
possibility of self-limitation. (Cox 1 2 1 -22).
The refusal of self-limitation extends to others besides Blake himself, and in setting that
limit, Blake could be seen as hindering the decision-making powers of others. He will at
least be attempting to hinder others' desire to hinder. Thus, there is an apparent
contradiction in Blake's condemnation ofUrizen as a hinderer who sets boundaries and
Blake's own need for horizons and boundaries of his own. As he works with the Urizenic
Biblical parodies, Blake seems to be increasingly aware of these problems, and his
attitudes about language, order, and scapegoating move a little closer to a Burkean
position, where dialectical opposites are always understood to imply and contain one
another. But this is where the Lambeth prophecies end up, not where they begin. In his
first appearance, Urizen is simply a hinderer, interfering with the inspired forces of
revolution, and supporting the scapegoating practices of the British ruling class
America: A Prophecy-Ore, Urizen, and the Dialectic ofAct and Hindrance

Although Urizen is briefly mentioned in Visions of the Daughters ofAlbion, 5 his
first appearance in a text comes in the final plate of America: A Prophecy, when he arises

5 According to Viscomi, Visions was probably the first text that Blake produced in the year 1 793
(262-66). The sexually liberated Oothoon invokes Urizen at the beginning of her final speech of the poem.
calling him "Creator," and "mistaken Demon of heaven" (VZ>A pl.5, 1.4; E 48). Later, as her protest
against sexual prohibitions draws to a close, she calls him the "Father of Jealousy" (VDA pl. 7, 1. 12; E 50).
Appearing in the same year as America: A Prophecy, Visions of the Daughters ofAlbion depicts Urizen
as the same oppressive figure that we see in America. But in the earlier piece, Urizen is simply addressed
by the protagonist; he does not participate in the action as he does in America.
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with "his leprous head" to quell the fires of Revolution with "stored snows" and "icy
magazines" (Pl. 16, 11 4-5; E 57) and to defend the oppressive reign of Albion's Prince, i. e.,
King George III of England. The bearded patriarch emerges j ust as Albion' s pestilence
turns back against himself, and the flames of Ore, the spirit of rebellion, spread into
England itself, opening the doors of marriage and ''Leaving the females naked and glowing
with the lusts of youth" (Pl. 15 lll 9-22; E 57). Urizen's snows freeze over the fires of
rebellion and hide Ore in "clouds & cold mists from the earth" (Pl. 16, 1. 13; E 57), allowing
the weak to regain control over the strong. There is little question that in this context
Urizen is equivalent to Hindrance, particularly since fiery sexual liberation immediately
precedes his chilly appearance. He comes in order to turn back the revolutionary forces
that have led to breaches of his law and aroused his j ealousy (Pl. 16,1.6; E 57). But
Urizen's triumph over liberation is to be short-lived. Twelve years later, Ore's light comes
to France, the Guardians of a "law-built heaven" are unable to resist Ore further (Pl. 16,
1. 1 9; E 58), and their gates are destroyed.
While there is little question that Urizen and his allies, the Prince and Angel of
Albion, are destructive agents of law, the role of the fiery rebel, Ore, is less clear to many.
Since the Preludium ofAmerica: A Prophecy begins with Ore' s rape of the shadowy
female, and since Ore is associated with snake imagery and with violence, critics differ in
their approach to him. Some, like John Howard, ignore the relationship between
revolution and physical violence, arguing that Ore is a totally positive figure who sets out
''to destroy the delusive and restrictive law of the Decalogue" (Infernal 110). Others who,
like Howard, regard Ore favorably give considerably more attention to Ore' s violence.
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For example, Christopher Z. Hobson acknowledges the violence of Blake's position in a
way that Howard does not, arguing that Blake places a positive value on revolutionary
violence and that modem critics should approve his ardor. David Aers agrees with Hobson
that Blake is celebrating Ore's violence, but, in contrast, he criticizes Blake for glossing
over its negative aspects. Aers suggests that Ore and Urizen are both, equally, the
emblems of destructive masculine forms of power, a fact that Blake overlooks (254).
Paley differs with all of these critics, because he emphasizes the ambiguities in Blake's
treatment of Ore. America, Paley argues, maintains "a double perspective." Ore's energy
is neither good nor bad. Rather, it "hovers between redemptive potentiality and the will to
power'' (Energy 6 1 ).
While I cannot share Paley's belief that we are to read Ore as an ambiguous figure
in America: A Prophecy, Paley's argument is correct in one regard. In this text, Ore is
associated with both positive and negative terminology. For example, he is continually
described as a Terror. 6 Yet he is also identified with Jesus; Ore rises from the sea like
Jesus rising from the tomb. Furthermore, some of the imagery surrounding Ore is itself
ambiguous. He is fiery, an image that could be associated both with hell and with the
purifying fires of the divine. Although we know that the Blake of 1 793 was, generally

6

Several studies provide background information and analysis regarding the term "Terror'' in
Britain during the l 790's. See Robert M. Maniquis for discussion of the variety of associations with the
term, including the tendency to turn it back against the British authorities (375). In "Blake, Violence� and
Visionary Politics," William Keach discusses at length the use of the word "terror" in America. He
accurately points out that Blake uses the term to describe actions of both counter-revolutionaries and
revolutionaries, so he does not regard "terror" as a term that is uniformly typical of one group or the other.
See also Michael Phillips, "Blake and the Terror, 1792-1793" for a discussion of the ways in the which
the term "terror" was being used to describe revolutionaries and then turned back against the oppressive
silencing of dissent under Pitt's leadership.
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speaking, a political radical, this ambiguous use of language may, at first glance, cause us
to question whether he was still a supporter of violent revolution when he engraved
America: A Prophecy. 1
Yet, as William Richey argues, this ambiguity becomes more understandable if we
treat America: A Prophecy as a rhetorical response to the hypocritical language and
actions of counter-revolutionaries, who are themselves violent, but who represent
themselves as peaceful agents of order and revolutionaries as madmen, highwaymen, and
murderers. 8 Ore and his revolutionaries are violent, but, as Richey asserts, Blake presents
Ore's violence as less ferocious than that of the ruling authorities. In addition, Ore's
violence is necessary in order to prevent further violence. As Richey puts it, since
"monarchies are unalterably wedded to war and conquest, the only way to put an end to
bloodshed and violence is through political revolution" (198). The bloodiness of the
American Revolution is undeniable. Washington and the other American rebels are
"warlike men" (pl.3, 1.3; E 52), but Blake plays down their violence while emphasizing the
violence of George III (Richey 1 99).
When we place Richey's rhetorical argument in the context of Blake's ideas of act
and hindrance, we see that Ore and Albion both engage in a certain amount of hindrance,
7

Although Songs ofExperience appears in the previous chapter, chronologically it follows
America: A Prophecy. According to Visconti, America is produced in 1793, after Visions of the Daughters
ofA lbion. Songs ofExperience, including "The Tyger," is printed in 1794. All of these works present
ideas that are politically and morally radical.
8

These are, of course, just examples of a few of the terms that could be chosen. These
comparisons, however, can actually be found in Edmund Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in France,
page 417. See Steven Blakemore for an outstanding discussion about how, for Edmund Burke, the battle
against radical politics was largely a battle for control of language and the terms used for given
institutions and for those who protest against those institutions.
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but that Ore's ultimate aim is to liberate, not to hinder. Thus, he is the honest and inspired
agent, similar to the prophet in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, who unavoidably
imposes his views upon others, but does so openly, honestly, and with positive intent. On
the other hand, the Prince of Albion and Urizen want only to sustain a rigid order, and
thus they resemble the monkeys that Blake depicts in The Marriage. They end up
devouring everything that is weaker than themselves. Rhetorically, Blake highlights Ore's
honesty by giving him the destructive qualities that the counter-revolutionaries accuse him
of, and then using the same imagery, to an even greater degree, to describe the accusers
themselves. For example, in America, Ore rises in flame, but Albion's guardian ''bums in
his nightly tent" from the beginning (Pl.3, 1. 1; E52). Even though Washington, Franklin,
Paine, and the other American revolutionaries are ''warlike" (Pl.3, 1.4; E 52), the blood
with which they glow is ''from Albions fiery Prince" (Pl. 3, 1 .5; E52). Similarly, Ore is a
cross between a human being and a snake, a frightening and disturbing image, but Albion's
Prince is a dragon, a much larger and even more frightening reptile. Nevertheless, when
Albion's Angel calls Ore a snake, he ignores the fact that his own prince is also reptilian.
Ore, however, willingly acknowledges his snake-like qualities.
The rhetorical method Blake uses here resembles a method that Kenneth Burke
calls "perspective by incongruity," the linking of terms ordinarily seen as utterly different
in order to reveal the similarities between diverse terms (P & C 89-92). Burke sees this
type of rhetoric as a way of revealing the similarities between apparent opposites for the
purposes of creating change. While, for Burke, this procedure usually has to do with the
actual linkage of two normally incongruous words, a similar effect can certainly be
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achieved by describing a highly valued system in terms one normally uses to describe a
supposedly inferior order. 9
Blake makes this kind of move here. Much public rhetoric describes radicalism as
violent, dangerous, irreligious, and irreverant. Blake retains these images in his depiction
of revolutionary forces, but then connects them to the conservatives as well, thus revealing
the honesty of radicals and the hypocrisy of revolutionaries. Further, this linkage of terms
reveals a scapegoating motive in the counter-revolutionary position, since their
accusations of violence and evil could just as easily apply to themselves. The language of
Albion's Prince and Albion's Angel is the language of scapegoating, a displacement of
their own negative attitudes and behaviors onto Ore, through the use of dyslogistic
terminology that would apply even more aptly to their own actions. Ore and the British
hierarchy are alike, Blake argues. They are both violent. But they are also different,
because Ore and the American revolutionaries do not begin the chain of violence, nor do
they lie about the moral ambiguity of their own acts of hindrance. Therefore, Ore can be
seen as an honest and inspired prophet, while the counter-revolutionaries are violent and
dishonest. Their accusations scapegoat the revolutionaries by portraying them as the
initiators of a violence that is, in fact, characteristic of the social order itself
The representatives of the conservative social order also claim for themselves the

9Kenneth Burke does something similar in The Rhetoric ofReligion when he speaks of needing
"a calculus that keeps us always aware of technology's possible relation to theology's vast motivational
Cathedrals" ( 171). He incongruously links the idea of calculus, usually associated with science,
mathematics, and technology, and links it to theology. Then he reconnects theology and technology,
arguing that both can become thoroughgoing systems that demand sacrificial victims. Thus, he critiques
technology, which, in the 1960's, he regarded as the privileged perspective, supposedly free of all
mystification.
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language of divinity. Their agents are called Angels, and Ore is called a demon. But Blake
also gives to Ore the marks of divine inspiration that characterize Action while Albion's
Angel represents the Hindrance embodied in rigid religious law. Ore's appearance as he
rises from the sea is associated with images of Jesus' resurrection, demonstrating that even
if apocalyptic violence is part of the process of transformation, Ore's real purpose is to
overcome death and destruction. When Ore appears, ''the grave is burst, the spices shed,
the linen wrapped up" (Pl.6, 1.2; E 53). These images markedly contrast with the
accusations of Albion's angel, who argues that Ore is the Antichrist. Yet Albion's Angel
ends up harming his own position with his attacks, because he attempts to prove his
accusations against Ore by calling him a "hater of Dignities" and a ''transgresser of Gods
Law" (Pl.7, 11. 5-6; E 53-54), both traits for which Jesus' enemies condemn him in the
Gospel narratives. Although Ore readily admits his desire to overcome Urizen's laws, he
argues that the commandments are but a perversion of the ''fiery joy" that is, in reality, the
source of life and holiness (Pl. 8, 1.3 E 54). While this view is strikingly antinomian and
certainly unconventional, it is clearly meant to evoke an image of Ore, not as Antichrist,
but as a reflection of a true Christ who delivers others from a false religion, restoring
human freedom and dignity, especially to those, like prostitutes, who are condemned by
established religious authority.
From these few examples-only a sampling of a number of similar instances-it is
clear that Blake employs ambiguous language not because he objects in any way to Ore's
revolutionary violence, which he sees as justified, but because he wishes to turn his
opponents' own rhetoric against them. There are similarities between the agents and the
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hinderers in America, but these similarities are merely superficial. Albion's Angel and
Prince, along with the bearded patriarch Urizen, are hinderers because they are liars to the
core, adherents of a rigid system that they have come to confuse with divinity. On the
other hand, Ore is the true agent, the one who tells the truth and who acts out of his
deepest divine energies. The hinderers, the agents of state and church power,
hypocritically imagine themselves to be virtuous, while scapegoating Ore by accusing him
of their own most heinous crimes. In this text, the absolute hierarchy of Act and Hindrance
remains intact. Ultimately, what we find Blake depicting in America is the same kind of
clear division between Act and Hindrance that we find in The Marriage ofHeaven and
Hell. As in The Marriage, the two poles are differentiated, at least in part, by the
characteristics of honesty and inspiration.
Yet, as John R.. Harrison notes, America: A Prophecy, is also rife with
"vituperative language" (2 1 ). King George III is thoroughly demonized, called "A dragon
form clashing his scales" (Pl.3, 1. 1 5; E 52), and this is only the beginning:
In Blake's poem he [George III] is not only Guardian and Pharaoh but a
gaoler, an oppressor, a wrathful prince, a slave-owner, an Emperor, a war
god with punishing demons, a devil of medieval proportions, a plague
carrier, literally a howling, shuddering, quivering madman . . . (Harrison
21)
While Harrison focuses on Blake's treatment of the King, Blake is no gentler with other
representatives of state power. Blake heightens his judgment on the British government by
his satirical, and highly comic, portrayal of the thirteen colonial governors fleeing Ore's
terrors, "Shaking their mental chains," and groveling on the beaches of America (Pl. 13,
11.3-5; E 56).
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Insofar as Blake's rhetoric is harsh in its defense of the genuinely oppressed, it is
difficult not to feel sympathy with his position; nevertheless, it could legitimately be
argued that Blake himself is engaging in a rhetoric of scapegoating. He places all blame for
social conflict on the conservatives, who are uniformly depicted as bloody, as dragons,
and as sources of plague and pestilence. He minimizes the reader's awareness of the actual
physical violence of revolution, treating it primarily as a mental conflict, a war of words,
while the bloody realities of revolutionary action are passed over lightly. Human agents,
like King George III, actually calls his armies into battle, while the American
revolutinaries, called bloody men, do little but stand around the shore and watch the
battle: "In the flames stood & view'd the armies drawn out in the sky/Washington Franklin
Paine & Warren Allen Gates & Lee" (p. 14, 1. 1-2; E 56). Furthermore, despite the fact that
Urizen is seen as the source of stony laws and frozen immobility, one could also argue that
Blake's symbolic system is equally rigid, treating anything that is ordered, structured, or
traditional as hindrance. The idea that anything within the established system could be
used to enhance human agency appears to receives no consideration whatsoever.
This portrayal of the powers of symbolic order as radically evil is problematic
enough when it is related quite specifically to particular systems of order, like the British
monarchy. While it is easy enough to portray all supporters of any given position as
uniformly bad, the facts will seldom support such a simplistic description. Yet the problem
becomes even more difficult when Blake begins to speak in more general terms about
order and rebellion. This generalizing quality is an often unacknowledged aspect of
Blake's mythological method, and it becomes more intense in the radical works that
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follow America: A Prophecy. In Blake's earlier radical poem, The French Revolution,
historical characters appear and are called by name, with little if any reference to
mythological figures. Earlier mythological works, Tiriel and The Book of The/, are not as
closely tied to identifiable historical events. Something new occurs in America: A
Prophecy-the mingling of historically identifiable people and places with mythological
figures. Often, these mythological figures determine historical outcomes just as much as, if
not more than, the actual human beings who participate in the events. For example, in
America, it is Urizen, not Albion's Guardian, who delays Ore's successful rebellion by
bringing in a cosmic snow and frost that freezes the process of revolutionary
transformation. Likewise, Washington, Paine, and Franklin participate in the action
primarily as observers who watch and listen while Ore rises up in fury.
From this point on, Blake will write about mythological characters whom he
himself creates, and he will have these characters intersect with actual people, places, and
events in history, sometimes more obviously than others. Yet increasingly his attempts to
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change society consist, in part, in an attempt to understand how individual people and
incidents are a part of a larger pattern, what D. W. Dorrbecher refers to as a
"transhistorical" pattern. In doing so, Blake inevitably makes more general claims about
Urizenic order and Orcan rebellion, claims that can be connected to, but also are
generalizable beyond, specific events. In fact, the capacity of a mythical figure like Urizen
to represent specific social institutions and individuals while, at the same time, making
broader claims about language and order may have been one reason why mythical
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prophecies were so appealing to Blake as a form of communication. 10 As Dorrbecher
asserts, Blake's myths demonstrate not just how power works for William Pitt, but how it
works for Adolf Hitler as well:
And it is this aspect not of a transcendental but a transhistorical validity
that must have fostered Blake's interest in the 'prophetical' mode as a
means of analyzing poetically the complex psychosocial machinery of social
and political oppression which he saw as having been merely refined and
redefined over the centuries. (Dorrbecher 14 7)
Dorrbecher uses these words to describe Blake's mythological opus as a whole,
although his specific discussion focuses on Europe. But even Europe and America lack
the level of generalizing thought that we will see in The Book of Urizen and The Book of
Ahania, and Dorrbecher' s remarks take on even greater cogency when linked to these
later texts. Despite the fact that, in America, the mythological figures are somewhat
generalizable, they also have a quality of concreteness, through which mythic actions are
directly linked to specific events, people, and institutions. Thus, symbolic order as such
does not cause scapegoating in America: A Prophecy. The scapegoating in this text is
performed by the agents of a particular system who abuse their power over the symbolic

1

0Clearly, I would not want to assert that there was only one reason for Blake's use of myth. One
of the most frequent explanations is that Blake was attempting to escape persecution by writing in
apocalyptic forms that were difficult to understand, and that may well be part of the reason for his choices.
This position is taken by some of the first critics to look at Blake from the perspective of social context.
Jacob Bronkowski, for example, argues that Blake adopts a "vague" and "mazy" style of writing because
"his world urged him there" (85). Yet recent historical research makes it seem very unlikely that this
vagueness and maziness alone would have offered Blake much protection. Michael Phillips' s "Blake and
the Terror: 1792-1793" makes it clear how active anti-radical societies, like the London Corresponding
Society, were in Blake's neighborhood. In fact, residents and shopkeepers were asked to sign loyalty
statements. and Phillips identifies particular neighbors who were engaged in reporting dissidents. In this
environment, America's mythic form would have provided Blake with little protection if it were publicly
displayed in his shop. (Phillips suggests that it probably was not.) Worrall also provides strong evidence
that Biblical critiques. like those in The Book of Urizen or The Book ofAhania, would have been readily
recognized as radically political documents within their own rhetorical context. See Worrall� pp. 19-26.
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order; there is no critique of symbolic systems in general. Certainly the rigidity ofthe
British government and church/state apparatus plays a part in causing such scapegoating,
and Urizen's snows and frosts are symbolically linked to this kind of rigidity. Thus,
Blake's argument in America: A Prophecy is consistent with the Burkean idea that rigid
systems perpetuate scapegoating by creating the need to project one's unavoidable guilt
somewhere else. But the emphasis in this text is still on particular systems, not systems in
general. However antinomian America may be, the figure of Urizen is linked very clearly
to the church/state apparatus of England and, somewhat less directly, of France.
But as Blake begins to rely on mythological characters more and more, it becomes
almost inevitable that figures like Ore and Urizen become associated with claims about
,.,.
rebellion and order as such, or to use Dorrbecher's term, with claims about rebellion and
order as ''transhistorical" phenomena. The rhetorical functions of order and the
relationship between symbolic order and scapegoating take on a more universal focus. As
Urizen begins to represent a greater variety of symbolic orders, the claim that order leads
almost inevitably to rigidity, guilt, and then to scapegoating becomes a claim about
symbolic systems as such. Order, as such, takes on the qualities of hindrance. The rigidity
that hinders us and persuades us to feel guilt for our impetfection and changability .
becomes characteristic of all symbolic order. On the other hand, rebellion, as such, takes
on the qualities of action-spontaneous, honest, virtuous. However, insofar as rebellion
itself must depend on symbolic arrangements, such a strict dialectic becomes a logical
impossibility, since any order used by the radical revolutionary will hold within itself the
seeds of Urizenic hindrance and scapegoating.

13 1
In The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania, Blake begins to explore the idea
that all language, including his own, is systematic, and may participate in the processes of
hindrance that he has attributed to the specific systems of Christianity, Empiricism, and the
British government. The question of his own complicity in scapegoating, and the
complicity of other radical and revolutionary forces, also becomes more urgent and begins
to permeate texts that are filled with ambiguous uses of language in acts of commanding,
naming, and writing.
This extension almost immediately reveals the fault lines in Blake's radically
antinomian thought, although Blake tries, unsuccessfully, to continue his rejection of
Urizenic order throughout The Book of Urizen and, to a lesser degree, in The Book of
Ahania. While such efforts fail, the outlines are clearly discernible in a first look at both of
these texts, since, in both, Urizen is the initial cause, if not the final agent, of hindrance
and the scapegoating practices that always accompany it. Particularly in The Book of
Urizen, Blake continues to associate scapegoating and hindrance with established
authority, maintained through the rhetorical power of equally established symbolic
systems, but the distinction between established symbolic order and the symbolic
performances of rebellion also begin to become less distinct. In the following sectio° we
'
will examine how this paradox functions in The Book of Urizen. Although Blake's softer
judgment on Urizen is already beginning to emerge in this text, we will begin with an
initial reading that highlights Blake's antinomian condemnation ofUrizen and symbolic
order as absolute evils. Then we will move on to examine how this harsh judgment begins
to be undercut within the text itself
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Order, Hindrance and Scapegoating in The Book of Urizen

As we have already seen, Kenneth Burke's ''Lord" makes the argument that human
beings as ''word people" can use language safely only if they progressively criticize their
own symbolic frameworks. The transformation this criticism would entail is precisely what
Urizen, Blake's bearded patriarch, wants to avoid, at least the Urizen of 1793, 1 794, and
1 795 . In America: A Prophecy, Urizen tries to limit transformation by freezing Ore's
revolutionary fires. In The Book of Urizen, the rigidity of Urizen's symbolic world is
heightened by images of "his hills of stor' d snows, in his mountains/ Of hail & ice" ( Ch. 1,
pl.3, ll.32-33; E 71). Continually associated with ice, snow, and stone, Urizen is the image
of an unchanging and unyielding rational order. The action of The Book of Urizen begins
when Urizen separates himself from the unified yet fiery and ever-changing world of the
Eternals, because he wishes to attain "a joy without pain,/ For a solid without fluctuation"
(Ch.2, pl.4, ll. 10-1 1 ; E 7 1 ). He also wants unity, of course, but his idea of unity is bound
up in the idea of solitary and bounded selves, each living in "one habitation:/His ancient
infinite mansion" (Ch.2, pl.4, 1.40; E 72). Once a mansion is chosen, it cannot be
abandoned, because one's place within the system cannot change. Furthermore, each
Eternal is to obey absolutely "One King, one God, one Law" (Ch.2, pl.4, ll.36-37; E 72). 1 1
While we know little of the Eternals from whom Urizen has separated himself, we know
that he sees them as his opposite. They live in ''unquenchable burnings," which he
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The heavy use of this particular plate, plate 4, in my discussion of The Book of Urizen requires
some discussion. since this plate appears in only two of the six printings of the text. This issue will be
more fully addressed later in this chapter. For the moment, it suffices to say that plate 4 was clearly part
of the original vision of the poem, according to Viscomi' s analysis.
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experiences as torment, but which appear to represent an ideal state, an everchanging form
of order that arises naturally from the life of the Eternals. 1 2 In fact, Urizen's separation
from the other Eternals and his arrogant declaration of the power of his one Law are the
source of evil. In 1he Book of Urizen, the creation of the symbolic order is equivalent to
falleness, or evil. It marks a departure from an ideal good found in an indescribable Eternal
realm.
What is perhaps most remarkable about this particular depiction of order in the
person of Urizen is its all-encompassing quality. Previously, Blake has criticized
Christianity, or Empiricism, or the state, and he has explored relationships between them,
but there is, nevertheless, a separate and specific treatment of each. Now, in 1he Book of
Urizen and The Book ofAhania, all of these forms of order are conflated in the image of
Urizen, and all are treated as symbolic actions which have devastating effects, one of them
being scapegoating.
The symbolic system that Blake attacks most blatantly is traditional Christianity. At
least as long ago as J. Middleton Murry, it has been recognized that both 1he Book of
Urizen and The Book ofAhania are parodies of the Bible, most specifically the books of
Genesis and Exodus (Murry 129). Formally, Blake goes so far as to divide these books
into chapters and verses, and to line the text up in columns like those in Bibles. Thus, he
makes the connection more explicit. Critics identify a variety of different religious critiques
12

Paul Cantor makes an interesting observation about the nature of fire and form in a brief
comment on Blake's The French Revolution. Cantor notes: "Fire would seem to be an excellent symbol for
the supposedly uncontainable and uncontrollable force of the passions. Yet flames do assume a definite
outline of their own: it is just that the particular shape of a given fire is everchanging according to the
law of its inner nature" (34). Thus, Blake, in The French Revolution, can say that "fire delights in .
its form" (l. 1 89; E 294).
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appearing in this text. One of the most important is Blake's criticism of the character of
God as he is portrayed in traditional interpretations of the Old Testament. Mee, for
example, focuses on Blake's antinomian rejection of the idea of God as lawgiver and
judge, one who writes laws on stone tablets, as Urizen does. 13 This law, understood by
the tradition as righteous blessing, is nevertheless associated for Urizen, always, with
cursing. When Urizen first declares his ''Laws of peace" (Ch.11,pl.4, 1.34; E 72), he also
declares the crucial importance of "one curse" as well as "one Law" (Ch.II,pl.4, 1 1.39-40;
E 72). Tannenbaum emphasizes the jealous character of the Old Testament divinity as
parodied in the character of Urizen. 14 Urizen's jealousy corrupts everything and everyone
he touches, especially Los, who is sent by the other Eternals to contain Urizen's fall. As
Tannenbaum also points out, Blake's narrative includes two creative divinities, or
demiurges, Urizen and Los, thus following the Gnostic tradition of two creators. In doing
so, Blake claims that '1:he God of Creation is self-divided" (Tannenbaum 204), and that at
least one aspect of this divided divinity is evil. 15
In turning to the Gnostic tradition and treating the two creators as separate beings,
Blake heightens the readers' sense of multiple traditions and perspectives on the nature of

161-213.

1 3For a full discussion, see Mee, chapter 4, "Blake, the Bible, and its Critics in the I 790's," pp.
14
15

See Tannenbaum, chapter VIIl and IX, pp. 201 -50.

W. J. T. Mitchell argues that The Book of Urizen is a commentary on the Genesis narrative as
revised by John Milton in Paradise Lost. See Mitchell, pp. 122-37. Certainly, there is clear evidence that
Blake is looking to Milton, but he also looks to the Bible itself. If McGann is correct, Blake was aware
that God is called by two names in Genesis, and he notices and even accentuates the differences between
the two. Blake makes direct references to the Bible, and, as Mitchell demonsrates, he also directly cites
Milton. Clearly, we need not decide that Blake is alluding to either the Miltonic text or the Biblical one.
He refers to both.
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creation and divinity, as opposed to the traditional Christian idea that there is one God and
one true revelation. In addition to attacking the character of the Old Testament divinity,
Blake subverts the sense that the Bible offers a unified, and thus finally authoritative,
tradition which is carried on by the church. In a similar vein, numerous critics have noted
that each printed version of The Book of Urizen is ordered differently in each different
copy, with various plates omitted from several copies. 16 Jerome McGann argues that this
variable text is, for Blake, a deliberate reference to the Biblical scholarship of Dr.
Alexander Geddes, some of whose works were published by Blake's employer Joseph
Johnson. Geddes was an early proponent of the view that the Pentateuch, far from being a
single authoritative text handed down directly from the hands of Moses, is a conglomerate
document that combines a variety of oral traditions. 17 In making his Bible of Hell a
variable document, McGann argues, Blake supports Geddes' controversial claims and
makes a forceful attack on the idea of a unified tradition upon which the church can
establish its authority.
McGann's argument is not without its difficulties, one of the primary ones being
the fact that Blake's productions would inevitably be sold to different buyers, none of
whom would know that other copies of The Book of Urizen had been printed differently
from their own. Thus, such a rearrangement of plates would scarcely seem to be a

1 6For a full discussion of the differences between these different sources, see Viscomi, chapter 29.

Worrall provides an excellent visual resource for tracking differences between printings, using Copy D as
a copy text. as well as the Keynes/Erdman numberings based on an ideal, reconstructed text. Throughout
this discussion., Erdman' s numbering is used.
17

For a full discussion. see McGann, "The Idea of an Indeterminate Text: Blake's Bible of Hell
and Dr. Alexander Geddes" in Studies in Romanticism 25 (1986): 303-24.
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rhetorically effective method of presenting an argument. Nevertheless, McGann's article
does accurately suggest that Blake saw his own text as variable, and that he prefers the
idea of a variable creation myth. Such a preference does imply a critique of traditional
Biblical authority, whether or not Blake meant to communicate anything to readers by
printing different versions of his work in different ways. Indeed, whether one sees Blake as
drawing upon Geddes, as McGann does, or as dependent upon Gnostic traditions, as
Tannenbaum suggests, what is clear is that The Book of Urizen undercuts the idea of a
unified and absolutely authoritative tradition. As we will see shortly, there are clearly
political reasons for such an argument. But there are also strong ethical and theological
reasons for Blake to undercut such a unified tradition. Blake's ideas about action and
hindrance as ethical categories cannot be supported if there is one system that is absolutely
authoritative and that can absolutely define which specific ideas and behaviors are
virtuous. Nor can one discover the divine truth in one's own Poetic Genius if everything
has been laid out in advance.
In fact, within the text itself, this stifling of individual vision and action is depicted
as an effect of the rhetorical power of religion as a symbolic system. Blake's bard calls
Urizen the "primeval Priests" and the founder of a religion that is "spurn' d back" by the
Eternals (Pl.2,11. 1-2; E 70). Yet, his Biblical language makes it clear that this false religion
is the Christian religion of Blake's own culture. Those who follow it develop a narrow,
rigid way of looking at the world:
Six days they shrunk up from existence
And on the seventh day they rested
And they bless'd the seventh day in sick hope:
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And forgot their eternal life (ChIX,pl.25,11.39-42; E 83).
To follow Urizen's religion is to lose one's true identity as an eternal being. One becomes
small, reptilian in form, and "bound down/To earth by . . . narrowing perceptions"
(Ch.IX,pl.25,1.46-47; E 83). The rhetorical effect of Christian theology and morals, once
they become Urizenic law, is utterly disastrous, a hindrance to the full development of
vision and human agency.
Furthermore, these critiques of religion directly implicate political and state power,
making the argument that religious orthodoxy serves primarily to uphold these dominant
sources of power and the hindrances they impose. The passage just cited indicts the
economic order as it indicts the religious. The six days of labor kill the soul and shrink the
human imagination. Yet, even before the development of the modem economic system, in
the initial establishment ofUrizen's religion, Blake sees the functioning of state power.
When Urizen assumes power and declares himself a priest, he also commands that there
will be "One King, one God, one Law," in that order (Ch.II,pl.4,l.40; E 72). Since the king
is listed first, then we must assume that the other concepts are subordinate to him. The
idea of one God and one Law are designed to support the idea of one king. The divine is
no longer associated with ''the Poetic Genius,'' or ''the Soul," but rather with a symbolic
order that exists to establish hierarchical political power and to enforce laws that are
ultimately hindrances.
Jon Mee further establishes these connections between religion and political
radicalism by looking beyond the text to the historical context. Making reference to
Thomas Paine and to Alexander Geddes, Mee demonstrates that both radicals and
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conservatives saw a relationship between one's views of the Bible and one's political
convictions. In The Age of Reason, Paine criticizes the Bible not simply because he finds it
theologically objectionable (which he does), but because he sees such a critique as
necessary for political liberation. For this reason, it was important for Paine, as it was for
Blake, to establish that prophecy had never functioned as a form of historical prediction as
the church maintained: "The invention of modern conceptions of prophecy was part of a
political conspiracy for Paine. Ancient poetry had been manufactured into scripture to
serve the ends of a manipulative priestcraft" (Mee 169). That Blake shares this attitude
with Paine is clear in his annotations to Richard Watson's An Apology for the Bible.
Watson was actually a fairly liberal bishop in the Anglican Church. But when Watson
attacks Paine, Blake refers to him as a "State trickster," one who puts forth his views
simply to support established power (E 612). 18
When Alexander Geddes, who was far less radical than either Paine or Blake,
published his translation of the Bible, he was accused of being a follower of Paine and
found it necessary to publish a statement denying that he was a ''Paineist" or a "Jacobine."
As Mee

puts it, "They [Geddes' writings] were operating in one of the key domains of

that establishment. The Bible was the ultimate sacred text of the state, it was as essential a
part of the hegemony of the ruling classes as the vaunted constitutional liberties of the
free-born Englishman" (1 70). Blake's Urizen embodies this link between religious power
and state power as part of one oppressive symbolic order. By the end of the poem, most
of Urizen's children are ensnared in a ''Net of Religion"(Ch.VIII,pl.25,1.22; E 82). The last
18

See Sandler for a full discussion of Blake's annotations of Watson.
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illuminated plate shows Urizen ensnared as well.
Yet Urizen also ensnares himself and others by means of scientific method and
Enlightenment thought. While Enlightenment thinking was often seen by thinkers like
Paine and Geddes as a means of liberation from superstition and, thus, from oppressive
forms of social authority, Blake treats it as another form of rigid symbolic order. Linking
the characteristics of religion and the characteristics of the scientist in one figure, Blake
implies that science is like religion, in that it establishes laws and ensnares human
perception and divine inspiration. When Urizen establishes one King and one God, he also
establishes one weight and one measure, allowing for the development of empirical
science. When Urizen awakens after the binding of Ore, he engages in scientific activity,
"Explor[ es] his dens around" and sets about measuring and weighing the physical world
(Ch.VII, pl.20,1.32; E 80). The weighing, the measuring, and the creation of tools of
measurement like compasses and quadrants all accompany the development of religion;
the two cultural developments are essentially alike as they involve symbolic systems based
in the assumption of a fixed and unchanging order. The notion of uniformity and regularity
is as offensive to Blake in scientific thought as it is in religious belief Such absolute orders
would hinder vision and creative action as much as any religious law.
Critics identify a variety of parodic connections between The Book of Urizen and
Enlightenment thought. Harald A. Kittel, for example, finds close relationships between
Blake's language in this text and the writings of John Locke. 19 Donald Ault thoroughly
discusses Blake's critique of Newtonian science in The Book of Urizen and elsewhere in
1

9For a full discussion, see Kittel' s "The Book of Urizen and An Essay Conceming Human
Understanding" in Michael Phillips' Interpreting Blake, pp. 1 1 1-44.
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the Blake opus. 20 Robert Essick identifies within The Book of Urizen critiques of the Deist
religion established in France under Robespierre, critiques of the mathematical work of
Condorcet, as well as critiques of contemporary medical science as depicted in Los's
creation ofUrizen's body through all the stages of embryonic development. 21
Perhaps most important for the present discussion are Essick' s arguments about
Blake's portrayal of the family in The Book of Urizen, since, as we will see shortly, the
family is the predominant site for scapegoating activity in the text. Essick comments upon
Los' s sacrifice of his only son Ore, arguing that this depiction of family conflict offers a
critique of Thomas Paine's and Mary Wollstonecraft's idealization of the family as the true
and natural center of human society. For Paine and Wollstonecraft, problems within the
family occur because the aristocratic rules of primogeniture create an artificial social
system. Both argue that this system of inheritance is unnatural, since it treats only the
firstborn son as a real member of the family. Other children are born to be cast off or
devoured. If this system were destroyed, there would be a natural family system that
would reemerge. People would again nurture all of their children, according to the natural
order of things.
However, as Essick points out, in Blake's prophecy, Los, who has the first family,
chains his firstborn son, Ore, to the top of a mountain. Thus, Blake places the corruption
of the family unit at the heart of the creation narrative. From the beginning, the family is

20

166-68.
21

See Ault's Visionary Physics: Blake 's Response to Newton, especially pp. 98-99, 129-33, and

For full discussion, see Essick's "William Blake, Thomas Paine, and Biblical Revolution" in

Studies in Romanticism 30 (1991): 189-212.
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conupted. There is no trustworthy nature undergirding it which would ensure a non
tyrannical system (Essick "Blake, Paine" 202-03). Paine's and Wollstonecraft's belief in a
natural order for the family or for any other social unit is itself "an ideological
configuration that tyrannizes over man" (Essick ''Blake, Paine" 20 1 ). When Paine and
Wollstonecraft describe a particular family order as natural, they make Enlightenment
assumptions about natural law and natural religion as opposed to mystified religious and
social structures. For Blake, this natural law is as tyrannical as the religious law it intends
to displace.
While in his article, Essick makes Blake's rejection of Enlightenment notions of
rationality and law very clear, he does not discuss in this context why the family system is
tyrannical and conupt from the start. However, in his analysis of The Book of Urizen in
William Blake and the Language ofAdam, an answer is suggested, although the family is
not specifically discussed. In this text, which focuses on Blake's ideas about language,
Essick argues that Urizen's separation from the other Eternals is the "primal act" in the
text: "This event immediately constitutes, and is constituted by difference as the
fundamental ontological category'' ( 149). This process of differentiation is a departure
from the, for us, almost unimaginable unity of the Eternals, and it is central to the
formation of language itself, or at least, ''the language described by the rationalist tradition
of sign theory from the seventeenth-century grammarians through Derrida" (Essick,
Language ofAdam 149-50). Language is based on a sign system that classifies objects
according to similarities and differences. Furthermore, in Burke's rhetorical theory
language is only necessary because of the separation of one person from the other. Were
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we totally identified with one another, we would need neither language nor rhetoric. All of
our experiences and impressions would be shared from the beginning. 22
Thus, the family as a structure appears only after Urizen is differentiated from the
Eternals, and after Los has furthered the process of creation and separation by creating a
body for Urizen. Binding and pitying Urizen causes Los to divide into separate male and
female beings, and that separation, be it understood as an actual physical transformation or
simply as a change in perception, is the source of the family as a symbolic order. It is part
of the separated and fallen world created by the Urizenic law of difference, which is '1he
one law . . that separates everyone" (Essick Language ofAdam 1 5 3 ), even as it governs
everyone. In practical terms, it does not matter who creates a specific familial order or
how it is constituted. The differentiation of gender, generation, and function between
family members is all part of a symbolic order, and in The Book of Urizen, all such order is
the result ofUrizen's arrogant separation from the Eternals in order to establish his
religion and his laws. For Blake, the family is not a natural structure, but a symbolic
structure, in which each person or thing must be accorded a permanent "mansion" or

"habitation," or as Essick suggests, a fixed place in a semiotic system, by which it can be
differentiated from other persons or things. To put all this into Burkean terms, the family
is unavoidably a symbolic order; thus, our ways of ordering our sexual and family lives
have rhetorical effects upon our selves and others which can tend towards hierarchy,

22

Certainly, not everyone would share Burke's view on this issue. Some, like Wittgenstein, argue
that individuals need language simply to think. Burke, however, is concerned primarily with how
language functions in the social order.
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rigidity, alienation, guilt, and scapegoating. 23
Indeed, the family is a central site of of the scapegoating in both The Book of
Urizen and The Book ofAhania. The scapegoating action of these texts lies in the torment
of sons by their fathers and, on occasion, of wives by their husbands. Fathers are the ones
who represent an order of power and control, which extends symbolically in a chain that
includes the father of the family, as well as the king as the father of the nation, the priest as
the father of the church, God as the divine father, and even the Enlightenment intellectual
as the father of the less educated masses. 24 Fathers are the symbolic seat of power at all
levels. They establish or buy into rules that they themselves cannot keep, and when they
cannot cope with their pain, they make sacrificial victims of their families. Their behavior
fits the model of scapegoating we have seen so far. Rigid systems of order create guilt;
then dyslogistic language, enforced restraint, or ritual sacrifice are used to transfer that
guilt to another party, one who is separate from, and yet consubstantial with, the enforcer
of the system, in this case, his own divided image as found in his spouse or child.
Urizen' s scapegoating actions, which appear near the end of The Book of Urizen,

1n order to move on to a discussion of scapegoating, a full examination of language in The
of Urizen is not offered here. See the last section of this chapter for a fuller discussion of the role of
language in The Book of Urizen, particularly as it relates to Kenneth Burke's rhetorical theory.
23

2

4Mee offers a considerable discussion in which he demonstrates how radical millenarians and
other visionaries, like Richard Brothers, the self-styled "Nephew of God" use the idea of inspiration to
overcome the claim that only the learned can truly understand the Bible. Blake's reliance, and that of
others interested in the language of prophecy and inspiration, is certainly, in part, an attempt to shake off
this idea that those who are university educated somehow have a monopoly on awareness or a place in
public discourse. Even the attempt to use education and reasoning to assist the poor might well be
insulting to those who have not had the opportunity to receive such education and still wanted the right
to speak on their own behalf. Many enthusiasts would argue that the poor and uneducated were far better
able to interpret Scripture, for example, than were the educated persons on whom the poor were
supposedly dependent.
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fit the pattern almost perfectly. When his sons and daughters, 'Ws eternal creations,"
begin to appear, he sickens at the sight (Ch.VIII,pl.23,ll. 8-9; E 8 1 ). Then he looks upon
his own sons and daughters and curses them "for he saw/That no flesh nor spirit could
keep/His iron laws one moment" (Ch.VIII,pl.23,1124-26; E 8 1 ). Yet Urizen is no more
able to keep his own iron laws than are his children. To create change is to violate
Urizen's most basic principle, which is to find a "solid without fluctuation"
(Ch.II,pl.4,1. 1 l ; E 7 1 ). Urizen's laws are utterly inflexible and immovable, but to procreate
is to create change. The generation of offspring is the essence of change, since it creates
new beings who will inevitably create more changes of their own. Furthermore, this law is
not the only one that Urizen fails to obey.
In creating his religion, Urizen argues that his path is the only way to escape death.
When he first establishes his law, he entreats the Eternals to accept his religion, asking,
"Why will you die O Etemals?/Why live in unquenchable burnings?" (Ch.II,pl.4,ll. 12- 1 3 ; E
71 ). Yet in the end, he finds himself in a world where death is necessary if life is to
besustained:

For he saw that life liv' d upon death
The Ox in the slaughter house moans
The Dog at the wintry door
And he wept, & he called it Pity
And his tears flowed down on the winds (ChVIIl;pl.23,1.7pl.25,ll. l -4; E 8 1 -82).
This is the world that his desire for a solid without fluctuation, and a joy without
pain has created. But his supposed Pity for this painful world immediately follows his
curse of the children whom he has placed in it. Urizen� verbal assault on his children
allows him to notice their failure to live up to his laws, but not his own failure, and his
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response to his feelings of pity is to pile more and more laws upon them, in a further
attempt to correct them. It is at this point in the narrative that he creates the Net of
Religion which diminishes his children's life yet further, causing their ''Nerves" to change
into '�arrow," creating disease, and a level of vision so obscure that they cannot
recognize to what extent the web that encloses them is a ''woven hipocrasy''
(Ch.IX,pl.25,1.32; E 82).
Urizen the lawgiver is the most straightforward practitioner of scapegoating in The
Book of Urizen, in part because it is his own law that he defends. Unable to acknowledge
that his laws simply do not work, he tries to enforce them with increasing rigor. He is both
god and priest in his own text, and he is fully convinced of his rightness. On the other
hand, Los is caught up in a system of order for which he is not ultimately responsible and,
thus, he lives a divided life ''Beneath Urizens deathful shadow'' (Ch.VII,pl.20,1.25; E 80).
This situation causes Los to have a complex and ambivalent relationship to the symbolic
orders that he and Urizen have jointly created. Los does not desire the process of
differentiation that Urizen began. Urizen is tom from his side, becoming alien and
fiightening, and Los is devastated by the loss. Then Los is sent to Urizen by the other
Eternals so that he can contain Urizen. Frightened by Urizen's formless state, Los creates
a body for him; in doing so he binds his fellow Eternal yet further, and involves himself in
a highly Urizenic process of hindrance and limitation. Finally, as a result of his pity for
Urizen's state, Los himself is divided, creating Enitharmon, the first woman, and Ore, the
first child begotten by a man and woman. 25 As W. J. T. Mitchell suggests, Los's pity for
25

In contrast to Los, who splits into male and female portions prior to reproduction, Urizen' s
children spring from his solitary musings. Only after the rebellion of Fuzon in The Book ofAhania does
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Urizen may divide him because Los feels tom between his loyalty to Urizen and his loyalty
to the other Eternals, who spurn Urizen and ask that he be confined ( 1 20). Even after the
creation of the family structure, Los remains a divided being, one who is tom between his
own fiery nature as an eternal prophet and the petrified Urizenic world of which he is now
a part. His scapegoating activities reflect that divided identity.
When he becomes ensnared in the Urizenic system, Los's role as imaginative
prophet also becomes ensnared and distorted. As Mitchell asserts:
Once he is enclosed in Urizen's world he [Los] begins to act the part of
Urizenic prophet, foreseeing nothing but the usurpation of his own power.
Thus he imitates the actions of those whose 'inspiration' seives only as a
jealous, fearful (and futile) attempt to ward off the future, adopting the role
of Abraham sacrificing Isaac, Jupiter chaining down Prometheus, or Laius
exposing Oedipus. ( 121)
Under the "deathful shadow" of Urizen, Los scapegoats his son, placing his son in a bind
in an attempt to escape his own.
Los's binding of his son Ore with a chain ofjealousy-a chain that grows from
hisown breast-is the most obvious act of scapegoating in the text. This binding and
exposure of Ore is often referred to in terms of the Freudian Oedipal conflict, yet what
Blake describes is actually something rather different. We know nothing about Ore's initial
feelings for his mother Enitharmon except that he clings to her, as we see on plate 2 1b. 26
We know even less about Ore's feelings for his father Los. Los' s conflict, not Ore's, is at
the center of the narrative. Los resents Ore's attachment to Enitharmon, so he chains his
Urizen divide from his female emanation.
261 am using here the plate order as given by Erdman in The Illuminated Blake to identify

the plates that do not have written text. Erdman' s ordering is taken from Keynes. See The Illuminated
Blake, p. 182 and 203 .
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son's ')'oung limbs to the rock/With the Chain of Jealousy/Beneath Urizens deathful
shadow" (Ch.Vii,Pl.20,11.22-25; E 80). As Diana Hume George points out, Freud's
Oedipal complex involves a "description of mental process in the boy child" ( 1 1 7).
However, The Book of Urizen has a different focus:
In Blake's story the original process takes place, then, in the mind of the
father as well as in the mind of the son-perhaps, even, in the mind of the
father instead of in the mind of the son [Italics mine] . It is true that Ore
will grow into a principle of revolutionary energy, but that development
may be largely determined by the father's behavior toward him (George
1 1 8).
Los's chaining of Ore does not resemble the Oedipal complex as described by
Freud so much as it evokes Rene' Girard's description of the same process in Violence and
the Sacred. For Girard, the Oedipal complex, which could be equated to the chain of

jealousy that ensnares Ore, is not based upon a child's desire to usurp his father. Rather,
the child is placed in a double bind by a father who responds with hostility when the child,
in the process of learning to desire by imitation (the only means available to him),
demonstrates an interest in the father's goods, among them the mother. Since the child has
no choice but to imitate his father's desires, he becomes entangled in a painful double bind
( 170-79). While Blake does not entirely prefigure Girard's mimetic understanding of the
Oedipal conflict, he does develop the story of Los and Ore along Girardian lines, insofar
as Los' s jealousy is the source of the conflict, not Ore's; thus, Ore becomes the scapegoat
for Los' s jealousy and hostility.
As Mitchell suggests in the quotation cited above, at least part of this hostility has
to do with usurpation. Just as Laius fears usurpation by Oedipus, Los fears usurpation by
Ore. Los is already in the "deathful shadow" ofUrizen who set up this process of symbolic
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differentiation by assuming a priestly power not truly his own. The eternal prophet has
now created his own system of order, characterized, like Urizen's order, by the binding
effects of differentiation, with all of its fixed habitations and its ultimately hindering
effects. His family, the first family, is one of these differentiated orders. Los is living under
the shadow of an authority who is himself a usurper, and he has now assumed paternal
powers of his own. It is no surprise then that Los, dwelling in Urizen' s shadow, would
anticipate usurpation by his own son. Blake's depiction of Oedipal struggle has to do with
symbolic order because it has to do with the preservation of the "habitations" assigned to
any individual within that order. This quest for preservation has at least two prongs. First,
those who hold authority within these systems want to continue to hold on to their
authority, and they do so, Blake asserts, by creating laws that help justify their power. But
once a symbolic order is established, it also develops a persuasive power of its own that
makes its adherents want to protect it against the new. As has already been suggested in
our discussion ofUrizen, the arrival of the child sets in process an almost endless potential
for change.
But Los' s jealousy also has something to do with commandments and with guilt
about the defiance of commandments as much as it has to do with the fear of change and
usurpation that is related to hierarchical structures. To be under the "deathful shadow" of
Urizen is to be haunted by a myriad of laws, as suggested by the frontispiece of The Book
of Urizen. Here Urizen sits in front of Mosaic tablets of law, tablets that, not incidentally,
also strongly resemble tombstones. Thus, Blake suggests, in typical antinomian fashion, a

149
link between law and death. 27 The death-dealing quality of law, and its relationship to
jealousy and scapegoating, become apparent as we explore the Abraham/Isaac and
Jupiter/Prometheus parallels in the binding of Ore.
The close connection between The Book of Urizen and Genesis clearly invite us to
see a connection between Los and Abraham. As Nelson Hilton points out, Los, like
Abraham, binds his son on top of a mountain. (196). In the Biblical account, Abraham's is
a reluctant sacrifice made in order to prove his fidelity to God. Likewise, Los "sacrific[es]
the joys of energy [as represented by his son Ore] in an assent to Urizen' s concept of sin"
(Tannenbaum 214), in this case, the sin of sexual desire. As we have already seen in
America: A Prophecy, sexual desire is bound by Urizen's laws, and Urizen's response to
breaches of that law is jealousy, precisely because maintenance of his law sustains his own
place in the hierarchy. For Urizen, sexual desire threatens his authority as the priest of his
religion.
For Los, the issue is more complicated. The burning quality of desire is akin to
Los's nature as an Eternal, and it is retained in his son, the fiery boy Ore. Yet, insofar as as
Los dwells beneath Urizen's shadow, he lives in a world in which Urizen is the ultimate
authority. In the world ofUrizen, sexual desire is forbidden, and Los has already
succumbed to his desire for Enitharmon. While that desire is itself connected to the fires of
Eternity, once it is entangled with Urizenic law, it becomes the source of guilt and rigid

27

Worrall also suggests that these Mosaic tablets strongly resemble tombstones, but he
understands this image in terms of a radical politics of equality rather than as a statement about the nature
of law. See Worrall, page 26. David Erdman. in The Illuminated Blake, does not make any direct
observation about grave-like appearance of the stone tablets, but he does see a connection between the
illumination and the Eternals' observation that Urizen is death ( 183 ).
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control by laws and systems of order, and it places Los in potential conflict with Urizen.
Certainly Los, like Urizen, is jealous in protecting his own place, and he resents Ore's
threatening his place in the family order. But, in becoming part of Urizen's system, Los
has also been bound by Urizen's jealousy, the jealousy that has created the laws that bind
Los himself As Los reacts violently to the early signs of desire in his son, he attempts to
rid himself of the chain of his own jealousy and Urizen's, by making a sacrifice to atone
for his own sin of desire. In offering up Ore, Los obeys Urizen as Abraham obeys his God.
But for the divided Los, the scapegoating process is only partially successful. This
fact becomes clear when we examine the chain ofjealousy itself in light of the
Jupiter/Prometheus narrative. One of the primary changes in Blake's account is that the
tortures that Jupiter inflicts on Prometheus are actually divided between Los and Ore. In
the Jupiter/Prometheus narrative, Jupiter punishes Prometheus for his defiance by chaining
him to a mountain, where his liver is plucked out nightly only to grow again in the
morning. In Blake's narrative, the Promethean role is divided between Los and Ore. At
first, Los is the one tortured, because the chain ofjealousy grows out of his own chest and

ensnares him. Each day he breaks free of this unnatural addition to his body, only to have
it grow anew. The jealousy is his punishment for sexual desire within the Urizenic system,
which allows no room for desire. Los rids himself of this Promethean torture by using the
chain to bind his son, as Prometheus is bound, to a rock. Ore is bound like Prometheus
but, unlike Prometheus, he is not being punished for any known violation of law. He has
committed no act of defiance; rather, he has crossed a paternal boundary of which he was
unaware. In binding his son, Los attempts to transfer his own guilt and anxiety about
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sexual law onto the boy. Los rids himself of the physical chain, and he surely produces
jealousy within his son. But his own jealousy continues. Thus he walls in his wife
Enithannon so that no other male can see her, not even his helplessly bound son or the
"'divine" Urizen for whom the boy was sacrificed (Ch.7,pl.20,l.44; E 8 1). The binding of
Ore does not take away Los' s forbidden desire either. ''Encircled," and thus hidden, by the
"fires of Prophecy," Enitharmon gives birth to "an enormous race" (Ch.VII,pl.20,11.42-45;
E 81 ), the fruit of Los' s continuing desire and jealousy, and it might be added, an entire
race of children who will each, in their turn, probably prove a threat to their anxious
father.
As we have seen, both of these cases of scapegoating deal with the cruelty of
fathers towards their children, and all of them have to do with Urizen's character as
lawgiver. So far, our examination of order, hindrance, and scapegoating suggests that
Urizen, as the creator of a symbolic order based on differentiation, is the source of
binding, of hindrance, and finally, of the scapegoating mentality that systems of order
ultimately create in their adherents. The sheer fact of naming functions as a kind of
commandment that fixes an object into its place within the system, and it is Urizen who
sets that order into place initially.
Los, in his attempt to limit Urizen's fall, creates his body, but the body he creates
simply perpetuates the process of division, differentiation, naming, and assigning of places.
Thus, Los's creation parodies the "good" process of creation in Genesis. He forms Urizen
over a period of seven Ages, as God forms the world in seven days, and this alternative
creation narrative is puncutated by the repeated expression, "And a first Age passed
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over,/And a state of dismal woe," with the ages counted and evaluated, as they are in the
Biblical account of creation, but evaluated in the opposite way (Ch.4b,pl. 10,ll.42-43; E
75). This process of ordering is dismal and painful rather than positive, just as Urizen's
actions were dismal and negative, even as he proclaims his intention of producing ''Laws
of peace, of love, of unity:/Of pity, compassion, forgiveness" (Ch.II,pl. 5,11.33-34; E 72).
In The Book of Urizen, Blake portrays a world in which it is almost inconceivable what
kind of system of order might possibly be beneficial rather than harmful.
This pessimism is heightened by the Eternals' apparent complicity in the process of
binding and hindrance. Esterhammer goes so far as to suggest that the Eternals themselves
significantly contribute to the process of fallenness in the text, because some of them are
the first to use a name to describe the "abominable void" that appears at the beginning of
the poem: ''It is Urizen" (Ch.I,pl.3 .11.4 and 6; E 70). Furthermore, the Eternals describe
Urizen as ''Death" and as "a clod of clay," and the narrator later reveals to us that this is
exactly what Urizen has become (Ch.III,pl.6,11.9-10; E 74). Thus, Esterhammer suggests,
" . . . we begin to wonder what effect metaphors have in permanently imposing attributes
on their objects" (1 55).
In the same vein, Mitchell points out that the Eternals try to act like "an unfallen
remnant of the prelapsarian condition. All their efforts are directed at avoiding any contact
with the detestable . . . Urizen" (1 1 5). The Eternals call upon Los to confine Urizen,
which as Mitchell suggests, seems excessive since Urizen has already confined himself
( 1 1 5-16). Then they abandon Los, because he too becomes ensnared in Urizen's world.
Thus, Mitchell points out:
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It is very difficult to know what to make of these actions, whether to see
them as attempts to preserve a last bastion of the original visionary
perfection, or as frightened reactions which do nothing to heal the
''wrenching apart" of the eternal order, and which may even worsen the
schism by ratifying and imitating Urizen's initial act of withdrawal. ( 1 1 5)
If the Eternals themselves are unable to heal the breach, to marry their heaven with
Urizen's hell, so to speak, then it is hard to imagine what kind of action would heal it.
Furthermore, if the Eternals in some sense seal both Urizen and Los into a place into
which they unwittingly fell, is not their hostility towards the two possibly a kind of
scapegoating activity in its own right? Urizen somehow falls and becomes a void, and then
the Eternals name him and set him permanently into place, blaming him for being in the
place where they have affixed him. The same is true for Los. The Eternals send him to
contain Urizen, but shrink away in horror and cover Los, Enitharmon and Ore once Los's
closeness to the Urizen causes him to divide and fall . They desire not to see him because
they want to protect themselves, and there is no sign that they accept any responsibility for
putting Los in danger. What is more, their reaction is described in Urizenic terms. They
are "petrified," or turned to stone, by the sight ofEnitharmon, and by the strong emotions
that sight produces for them (Ch.V,pl. 1 8,1. 1 5; E 78). Thus, they put up a ''Tent of
Science" to separate themselves from Los and his family (Ch.V,pl. 1 9,11. 1 -9; E 78).
Since the narrator makes a point of telling us that Urizen is an "eternal name," it is
unlikely the Eternals' naming is meant to be as destructive as Urizen's symbolic order
(Ch. IVb,pl. 1 0,1. 1 2; E 75). Still, at best, it is as if Urizen' s separation, his assumption of
priestly power, as the Preludium calls it, sets up a situation in which any attempt to act in
response to Urizen automatically becomes caught up in the process of hindrance that he
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has enacted through his creation of boundaries and limits. The Eternals respond to the
separation ofUrizen, or to his pronouncement of his laws, depending on which copy one
examines, with violent cataracts of"Rage, fury, [and] intense indignation" (Ch.III,
pl.4,1.45; E 72), thus creating a more complete separation. Also, Los's prophetic powers
are hindered and damaged by their exposure to Urizenic boundaries.
As critics often suggest, even Blake's own prophecies are implicated in this
condemnation of symbolic order as the source of hindrance. Like Blake, Urizen writes his
"secrets of wisdom" in ''books formd of metals" (Ch.Il,pl.4,11.24-25; E 72). Although
Blake uses copper plates, while Urizen's are brass, the connection is hard not to make.
Mee suggests that the connection is inappropriate because Urizen's plates are fixed, while
Blake's text, as we have seen, is variable (106). This difference is, however, a difference in
degree, not in kind. While the Urizen text does vary considerably from copy to copy, each
copy nevertheless creates its own order, and each plate is itself an order that remains
relatively fixed, with only minor adjustments possible once the engraving is complete. 28
Furthermore, the differences between copies are clearly differences between various

versions of similar, if not identical, arguments.
In fact, the different versions may involve changing emphases, but changes in the
overall argument are slight, as we can see by looking closely at one textual variant that is
especially important for this particular discussion of The Book of Urizen. Plate 4, which
figures heavily in my previous discussion of The Book of Urizen, appears in only two of

28

Viscomi mentions changes in headings, as well as adjustments to the figures printed in the
illuminated plates. Plate 25, for example, has an additional face, while plate 16 has a beard in copy � and
no beard in copy B (282-86). Textual changes within plates tend to be minor.
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the six printings of the text. This plate, the only one in which Urizen speaks, contains the
references to Urizen's desire for solidity, his one law, and his metal books, and is
constantly quoted in discussions of The Book of Urizen, including this one. According to
Viscomi, plate 4 is part of the original engraving of the text. Thus, it was part of Blake's
original vision for the work, but his choice about whether or not to collate the plate into
the bound copies is erratic. He continued to print it, and then, in many cases, chose to
leave it out. It is omitted from copy G, the last printing, which was made in 1 8 1 5 at the
earliest, although we know that he printed plate 4 for this copy and did not include it
because of a technical error. 29 He did, however, include plate 4 in copy A, which Viscomi
suggests was printed first, before the other 1 794 copies, but collated last, after the three
other 1 794 printings that did not include this plate (279-83). Thus, we cannot say for sure
that at some clear moment in time, Blake decided that the plate did not belong. Since this
is the case, using this portion of The Book of Urizen to discover the character of Urizen
could be considered problematic, particularly since we cannot be sure why he left it out of
so many copies.
There are a variety of critical perspectives on why the plate is so often missing.
Based on a study of copy G, Essick suggests that the reasons may be largely technical (For
citation information, see the last footnote). Viscomi maintains that plate 4 makes Urizen
look too heroic, because it gives so much attention to his speech and allows us to see his
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See Robert N. Essick's "Variation. Accident, and Intention in William Blake's The Book of
Urizen" in Studies in Bibliography 39 ( 1986): 230-34. Looking at copy G and at a loose copy of plate 4
that was omitted from this copy, Essick argues that plate 4 was left out of copy G because of a technical
problem. Viscomi,agrees (41 3). However, as McGann points out, this does not necessarily explain the
omission of plate 4 from copies printed in the l 790's (323).
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mixed motives: peace, love, unity, pity, compassion, and forgiveness, as well as desire to
establish an unchanging order (283 ). John H. Jones, on the other hand, argues that the
omission of plate 4 makes the reason for Urizen's fall less clear, thus casting doubt on
whether Urizen is fully responsible for the fall (83). Similarly, Helen Ellis points out that
the omission of plate 4 gives Los's role in the poem more weight and Urizen's less. 30
,
While I would agree with Jones and Ellis that Urizen s character changes when
plate 4 is omitted, the change is less marked than it might seem. It is true that without his
self-aggrandizing remarks on plate 4, Urizen is a more pathetic figure, one who falls away
from his life as an Eternal for reasons that are decidedly unclear. Without plate 4, the
bounded world appears to be far less exclusively his responsibility, while Los and the
Eternals seem to be more equally co-contributors to the problems of rigid symbolic order.
Yet, as Michael Ferber suggests, even with plate 4, there is no clear evidence as to how
and why Urizen falls. The separation from the Eternals is basically mysterious (Social 47).
My own tendency is to read plate 4 as the explanation for the fall, at least in part, and
Ferber hints that it may be his tendency as well. Yet such a connection is never explicitly

,
stated, and Urizen s words on plate 4 could be the justification of his isolation from the
other Eternals created after the fact, after he has attempted to make sense of his struggle
with chaos as a fallen being.
3

°Robert Essick even argues that the reasons for the omission of plate 4 could have been largely
technical. A print of this plate, matching copy G, is defective, being improperly aligned on the page.
Thus, Essick argues, Blake could have omitted the plate because he tended to have printing problems
with it. (See Essick "Variation, Accident, and Intention in William Blake's The Book of Urizen," 1 986.
I have not included this argument in my full discussion, because it predates Viscomi's exhaustive
analysis of all copies of the text, as well as individual prints. In fact, there are several prints of plate 4
that match earlier copies and that were not included. Viscomi does not mention that these prints are in
any way misaligned. Evidently, the only plate 4 which was omitted for aesthetic reasons was the one
prepared for copy G.
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If we do not blame Urizen for his own fall, we have more room to emphasize the
complicity of the Eternals, including Los, in the disaster that follows. But they are
complicit in any case. Also, in any case, Urizen is, the first of the Eternals to form a
separate, differentiated existence, and his basically negative character as lawmaker remains
in all versions of the text. Without plate 4, Urizen is still surrounded by Mosaic tablets of
law, his laws are still "iron," and he still scapegoats and harms his children. Thus, I would
suggest that Blake's vacillations about including this plate suggest only a very slight
vacillation in his attitude about Urizen. While he rejects Urizenic order in all versions of
The Book of Urizen, perhaps he is hesitating to claim that Urizenic order is the entire

problem with the human condition. So he vacillates between presenting a text in which
Urizen is the sole cause of the fall and presenting one in which Urizen is the predominant
problem in a mysteriously fallen world. Either way, Urizen is a destructive figure, and one
whom it is almost impossible to fight on his own ground, that is, the ground of symbolic
order and limitation. Blake's own symbolic actions would, necessarily, fall within Urizen's
territory and thus would always be, at some level, complicit in Urizen's systems.
At the end of The Book of Urizen, however, Blake does leave a faint glimmer of
hope. Urizen's son Fuzon performs a new act of naming as the text closes. He calls
together all of his brothers and sisters who can still see how hypocritical and oppressive
their father really is. They look at ''the pendulous earth," the joint creation of Urizen and
Los, they call it Egypt, and they leave it (Ch.IX,pl.28,ll.22; E 83) . Here we see a new if
undefined possibility. Whereas the Eternals respond to Urizen with rage, and Los tries to
contain him, Fuzon and his siblings simply go away. Blake suggests the possibility of
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creating something new simply by leaving Urizen behind, rather than reacting to him or
trying to change him, but Blake is unable to define what this other place might be like. In
fact, to define it would subject it to Urizenic processes of order and thus ruin it. But he
nevertheless leaves open the possibility that an Exodus from the old order might well be
possible. In another year, however, by the time Blake engraves The Book ofAhania in
1 795, he has abandoned this idea altogether.
Order, Hindrance, and Scapegoating in The Book of Ahania
Although at the end of The Book of Urizen, Fuzon is leading a remnant of Urizen's
children out of bondage in their father's Egypt, the first lines of The Book ofAhania reveal
him returning to his father's country, determined to engage in combat with Urizen. After
rising like flame in his chariot, Fuzon assaults his father with a fiery globe, formed from his
own wrath. This globe strikes Urizen in the loins, causing him to divide from his female
counterpart, Ahania, and call her sin. Believing that he has killed his father, Fuzon declares
himself a god, and then is immediately shot down by his father. Urizen then crucifies his
defiant son, who hangs, "[a] pale living Corse/' for forty years (Ch.4,pl.4,1. 10; E 87).
How we understand this transformation in Fuzon's behavior may be determined in
part by the relationship we see between The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania. Is
Ahania a sequel to Urizen, or are they entirely separate meditations on similar themes?
Essick, for example, argues the latter, noting that Blake printed Urizen and Ahania in
different styles (Essick Language 140). On the other hand, Viscomi points out that '1he
double columns of text in Book ofAhania and Book ofLos visually connect these works
to Urizen, despite their different sizes, lengths, and techniques. Thematically the works are
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also connected" (287). 31 The fact that these works are the only ones printed in two
columns with chapters and verse numbers, like the Bible, surely indicates a connection
between them. Further, it might be added that Ahania clearly takes place after Urizen.
When the narrator discusses events concerning Urizen' s initial separation from the
Eternals, he treats these events as past actions that occurred prior to the events in Ahania.
According to The Book- ofAhania, The Tree of Mystery upon which Fuzon is crucified
has its origins in these earlier events, despite the fact that this tree does not appear in the
narrative portion of The Book of Urizen. Yet, as Mitchell notes, the final plate in Urizen
portrays the bearded patriarch entangled in a net that looks something like roots or stems.
Although the plate is often described as a portrayal ofUrizen entangled in his own Net of
Religion, Mitchell points out that no such event is ever described in The Book of Urizen.
There, Urizen stays well above his net, casting it down upon others. However, The Book
ofAhania describes Urizen becoming entangled in a forest of stems that spring up from
the roots of the Tree ofMystery soon after the creation (141). Thus, this final visual image
links the two works, as does Fuzon, whose actions end the narrative of one poem and
begin the other.
Although Fuzon' s actions at the beginning of Ahania appear to contradict his
behavior at the end of Urizen, as we will see, Urizen's character and behavior remain
similar in both poems. For example, he is still associated with language and with books.
31

While The Book ofLos will be referred to again later in this chapter, it is excluded from
discussion because it does not include any portrayals of scapegoating per se. It does retell the story of
creation from Los's perspective, and emphasizes the restrictive quality of Los's binding of Urizen. Dated
1 795 like The Book ofAhania, Los is part of the Bible of Hell. Like Urizen andAhania, it includes a
Biblical layout, complete with chapters and verses.
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He sits beneath his Tree of Mystery and writes in a book of iron. The references to
language and law are not as fully developed in Ahania as they are in Urizen, but the
allusions to Urizen's books, particularly his metal book, resonate with the critique of
language and symbolic order already established in the earlier work In Ahania, Urizen
also demonstrates his obsession with law through his extreme concern for sexuality and its
repression. Since, as has already been argued, Ahania shows clear signs of being linked to
Urizen almost as a sequel, we can, to a certain extent, transfer our awareness ofUrizen's
role as lawmaker, and use it to explain the sexual phenomena that appear in the later work.
The issue leads back to the question of whether Fuzon really changes in the
transition between the two texts. . Some critics argue that Fuzon's identification with
Moses at the end of The Book of Urizen implies that he, like his father, is a lawgiver. But
Urizen could just as easily embody the legalistic aspects of Moses while Fuzon embodies
the liberating aspects of this same figure. Thus, if we had only The Book of Urizen we
could see Fuzon's departure as a simple reversal or parody of the Pentateuch. Obedience
to the divinity does not liberate, as it does in Exodus; rather, true liberation comes from
turning one's back on commandments and supposedly divine systems of order. 32
However, Fuzon's actions at the beginning of The Book ofAhania indicate that he
was either unable or unwilling to turn away completely from Urizen's systemizing. Instead
of leaving Urizen behind, he comes back and proceeds to take up arms against him. The
nature of this rebellion is variously understood by different critics. This is not surprising,
for, as Paley effectively demonstrates, Fuzon's appearances are surrounded by allusions
32For a full discussion of this idea� see Mee, page 190.
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that suggest any number of diverse figures: Moses, Satan, Absalom, Prometheus, Jesus,
St. Sebastian, Odin, Adonis, and Robespierre (8 1 ).33 If the figure of Ore is somewhat
ambiguous in America: A Prophecy, Fuzon in The Book ofAhania is even more so. Yet
determining his character is very important, because analyzing the scapegoating patterns in
the text requires us to discern who is scapegoating whom. Who are the victims? Who is
displacing guilt onto others? Is Fuzon' s violence against his father justified, or is it
scapegoating? Is Urizen's violence against Fuzon a justified act of self-defense, or is it
scapegoating?
Most frequently, Fuzon is seen as a rebel who is himself Urizenic, a usurper like his
father, and, as such, he represents Blake's attitudes about the French Revolution.
Christopher Z. Hobson points out that Fuzon is tyrannical, because unlike the true
revolutionary, he attempts to usurp his father's power, not simply to break free of it.
Because Los's son Ore is still bound at the time of Fuzon's rebellion, we are not to see
Fuzon as a true apocalyptic rebel. According to Hobson, Blake uses Fuzon to represent
the failed French Revolution in order to avoid a condemnation of Ore, leaving open the
possibility for some other superior type of revolutionary action in the future (1 40-44). For
Paley, Fuzon is a more ambiguous figure than the failed revolutionary that Hobson
describes. He is fiery and beautiful, which are signs of his superiority to his father, but in
his attempt to fight his father, he, too, becomes a tyrant (Energy 81 -83). Erdman, who,
like Paley, sees Fuzon as ambiguous, notes that his chariot is like the chariot driven by
Christ in Milton's Paradise Lost, and he regards this image as negative. Yet Erdman also
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Full evidence for this argument can be found in Paley's Energy and Imagination, pp. 8 1 -86.
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argues that Fuzon is a positive figure, insofar as he wants to defy Urizen. Fuzon is a
sympathetic, if flawed, revolutionary, and in him, Erdman sees Blake's commentary on
Robespierre (Prophet 3 1 5). Mee very persuasively argues that we should expect Fuzon to
be a failed rebel from the beginning of The Book ofAhania. He is, after all, Urizen's son,
and, furthermore, his chariot is "iron-wing'd" (Ch. l,pl.2,1. 1 � E 84). Urizen rules with iron
laws and writes in an iron book. Thus, the substance of Fuzon's chariot reflects his kinship
with his father. Furthermore, the fiery globe with which he attacks his father is compared
to a "thunder-stone" (Ch. l ,pl.2,1. 7; E 84), something that while hot, like Los's fires, is
also hard, like Urizen's rock and ice (Mee 1 90-93). Even the tygers of wrath which Fuzon
releases before his death, and which many commentators see as evidence of his oppressive
nature, are open to various interpretations. There is no strong reason to see these animals
as particularly negative. As we have already seen, for Blake, tygers are often the wrathful
liberators from tyranny and the protectors of the vulnerable. They play an important
function in the transformation of a fallen world. The imagery surrounding Fuzon is clearly
mixed.
So, perhaps, are his motives in assaulting his father. Critics come up with a variety
of reasons for the attack. Worrall argues that Fuzon's intention is to kill his father, a
notion that appears to be validated by Fuzon's glee when he believes Urizen to be dead
( 1 5 3). In an interesting psychological argument, Howard asserts that Fuzon is castrating
his father in a kind of reversed Oedipal conflict. He wishes to do to his father what his
father's laws have done to him (Infernal 1 88-98). Bloom, on the other hand, claims that
Fuzon simply wants to arouse Urizen (Apocalypse 1 77), an argument that has

163
considerable validity, since Urizen's loins are described as cold, and his immediate
response to being struck by Fuzon's beam is to groan because his Lust shrieks within him
(Ch. 1 .,pl.2,11.30-3 1 ; E 84)). It is as ifFuzon wants his father to become warm and
breathing again, not an "abstract non-entity" or a "cloudy God" (Ch. l,pl.2,11. 1 1 -12; E 84).
In this reading, Fuzon wants to humanize Urizen, a role that fits well with Fuzon's link to
Jesus later in the text, since Jesus represents the divine humanity, the one who gives God
human form. Any one of these claims is viable and matches the textual evidence. The one
thing that is absolutely clear is that Fuzon finds himself unable to go away and leave his
father's world behind. The indeterminacy of the text, as regards the quality ofFuzon's
character, makes a fairly determinate argument, that Fuzon, whatever his character and
whatever his motives, will ultimately be unable to set limits upon his father without getting
appropriated or sacrificed by Urizenic forms of order.
Finally, many of the claims that Fuzon's motives are tyrannical, like his father's,
are based on his declaration of his own divinity, another piece of evidence that turns out to
be ambiguous. When he believes that he has killed Urizen, Fuzon cries out, "I am God . . .
eldest of things" (Ch.II,pl.3,1.38; E 86). This claim is almost universally treated as a
demonstration ofFuzon's tyranny. Indeed, the claim is both inaccurate and arrogant.
Inaccurate, because the bard in The Book of Urizen reports that Fuzon is the first begotten
and last born of Urizen's children. 34 Arrogant, because it seems to place Fuzon above
others, a move that Blake's description of him carefully avoids. The bard in Urizen
carefully balances the ways in which Fuzon is first with those in which he is last, whereas
3

4Thls image may suggest that, while rebellion against repressive order is late to appear in the
public realm. it is inevitable from the very beginning.
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Fuzon sees himself only as ''the eldest."
Yet, even in this moment of failure, Fuzon is an ambiguous rather than an evil
figure. Blake himself declares earlier, in The Marriage ofHeaven and Hell, that there is
no God to be found except in great men: "All deities reside in the human breast" (Pl. 1 1 ; E
3 8). Later in life, he holds this same position, telling Henry Crabb Robinson that Jesus
Christ "is the only God. But then . . . and so am I, and so are you" (Robinson 303). It is
hard to understand why a claim of divinity would necessarily be negative in a character
whose creator held such views about the divine nature of human beings. Those who
condemn Fuzon simply for claiming to be God rely upon far more conventional
understandings of divinity than those held by Blake. Within Blake's perspective, Fuzon's
declaration of his own divinity is, in fact, correct. Yet, his pretension to be the first-born
when he is not shows him to be aggrandizing himself as his father did. He is ensnared in
the principle of hierarchy that is characteristic of Urizenic order. Insofar as he represents
rebellion, he is guilty of celebrating his own rebellion as the ultimate source and aim of all
things.
Nevertheless, despite this failure, in every other respect, Fuzon compares favorably
with Urizen. Fuzon calls Urizen a ''Demon of smoke."(Ch.I,pl.2,l. 10; E 84). This language
echoes the Eternals of The Book of Urizen, who call Urizen a demon when they see the
void he has created by separating himself from them. In opposition to his father, who is all
winter, Fuzon is fiery, hot, and bright. Thus, Fuzon is also like the Eternals in substance.
They, too, are fiery and associated with a process of fluctuation and movement, while
Urizen's wintriness associates him with frozenness and immobility. Images of winter, rock,
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and poison characterize Urizen throughout both Urizen and Ahania. Nowhere does
Urizen receive sympathetic treatment by the narrator. On the other hand, Fuzon is
described as having "[a] beautiful visage," and '1:resses/fhat gave light to the mornings of
heaven" (Ch.II,pl.3,l.40; E 86). These images are offered precisely after Fuzon receives a
fatal wound from his father's poisoned rock, and they immediately precede images of his
fall and deformation. While it is only fair to note that this beauty, particularly the beauty of
Fuzon's hair, associate him with King David's son, Absalom, himself a usurper, the
juxtaposition of these images of beauty and deformity heighten the sense that Fuzon is, at
least in some ways, originally superior to that which ultimately destroys him.
Finally, Fuzon's weapons are less destructive than Urizen's. The fiery beam with
which Fuzon wounds his father becomes "a pillar of fire" that acts a guide to those
wandering in Egypt (Ch.I,pl.2,11.45-46; E 85). Eventually, Los ''beat in a mass/ With the
body of the sun," a confusing image, but one which most likely means that Fuzon's
weapon becomes, through Los' s efforts, a positive emblem of the fiery world of the
Eternals set within the sky of the bound created realm (Ch.I,pl.2.11.47-48; E 85). On the
other hand, Urizen's weapon falls to the earth and become Mount Sinai, the place of
lawgiving.
While many see the reference to Fuzon as a Moses figure at the end of The Book
of Urizen as a sign that Fuzon is also engaged in the oppressive lawmaking which for
Blake is characteristic of Mount Sinai, there is no scene in which Fuzon oppresses anyone,
no scene in which he is violent towards anyone except Urizen, no portrayals of him
hunched over stone tablets, in fact, no evidence at all that he is possessed by his father's
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desire for control. When we look closely at the evidence, Fuzon is, at worst, a beautiful
but flawed figure who is tragically destroyed because he tries to resist his father using his
father's own methods of hindrance, and because he is caught up in his father's hierarchical
systems. At best, he is a Christ-figure who attempts to restore his father's vitality and pays
for it with his life.
In any case, the ambiguity ofFuzon's character heightens the reader's sense that it
scarcely matters what a rebel's motives are. The outcomes tend to be the same. The
rebel's actions are ineffectual. When Fuzon's globe strikes Urizen's genitals, Urizen's
awakening desire causes him to turn against his emanation Ahania. He calls her Sin, puts
her away from him, hides her, and then holds and kisses her in possessive jealousy even
though he now abhors her. He kisses her and weeps over her because he both desires her
and hates her, and the effects on her are disastrous. She becomes a mere shadow of
herself, and, further, she becomes a "mother of Pestilence" (Ch.I,pl.2.1.43; E 85). No
longer able to see her sexuality as something positive, she becomes incapable of real
fiuitfulness, and her reproductive powers become the source of destruction. Thus, Fuzon's
efforts fail. Instead of overthrowing Urizen, Fuzon actually incites his father to become
more oppressive. Urizen now scapegoats his female counterpart, making her responsible
for his sexual desire. He divides himself because he continues to embrace his laws, even
when they lead to self-hatred, and he jealously clings to and hides his wife even when his
desire for her leads to guilt. So Ahania is made to pay for Urizen's internal conflict.
Urizen's next action, after scapegoating Ahania, is to punish Fuzon for his
rebellion. While Urizen's treatment of Ahania clearly has a scapegoating motive, because
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she has done no harm, the punishment ofFuzon could easily be read as self-defense,
particularly in light ofFuzon's glee when he believes his father is dead. Surely self-defense
is what Urizen would call it, just as the British counter-revolutionaries would describe
their war against France and their suppression of radicals at home as self-defense. In fact,
we might avoid seeing any scapegoating motive in the punishment ofFuzon ifUrizen had
responded to Fuzon's attack with undiluted anger or an unequivocal and calm call for
justice. But Urizen's response is not anger, but, rather, anguish, tears, and "bitter
contrition" (Ch.II,pl.3,11. 1-4; E 85). If he feels contrition now, it could be for his sexual
guilt, his treatment of Ahania, his past treatment ofFuzon, or, perhaps even for the action
he is planning against his son. Contrition is a motive associated with guilt, not self
defense, but as Howard points out, Urizen's response to contrition is to punish someone
else (Infernal 192). Feeling guilty, he does not change himself; he weeps with regret and
continues in the same path, killing Fuzon, and then hanging the body on a tree where it can
serve as a warning to other rebels against Urizen's authority. As Fuzon's corpse hangs on
the tree, it becomes pale and living, simultaneously dead and resurrected. In this condition,
Fuzon's influence is altogether harmful. Pestilence flies around his living corpse, and he
groans for years while Urizen's other children "reptilize upon the Earth" (Ch.IV,pl.4,l.43;
E 88).
As has often been noted, there is an obvious connection between Fuzon's
crucifixion and the crucifixion of Jesus, and several critics make persuasive arguments
about the relationships between late eighteenth-century critiques of the Christian doctrine
of the Atonement and Blake's critique of this same doctrine in The Book ofAhania. In this
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text, Blake enters into a conversation about the Atonement in which Paine, Joseph
Priestley, Jacob Bryant, and others are already participating. According to Tannenbaum,
Blake treats the Jewish sacrificial system and the Christian doctrine of the Atonement as
offshoots of Canaanite sacrificial rites (236). Mee makes an argument similar to
Tannenbaum's, while extending the pagan sacrifice analogy to include druid sacrificial
practices, and suggesting links between Blake's critique of the Atonement doctrine and
that of other thinkers of the time, among them Thomas Paine ( 1 00). 35
While endless connections can be made between Blake and other late eighteenth
century discussions of the Atonement, Paine's remarks in The Age ofReason are
particularly relevant. This highly controversial work was published in 1 794, one year
before the printing of Ahania, and Blake's Annotations to Watson, cited earlier, were
written in response to Watson's attack on the Paine text. In this Deist examination of the
Bible, Paine makes several scathing remarks about the Atonement doctrine, one of which
is his initial reaction when, as a child, he first heard it preached:
I revolted at the recollection of what I had heard, and thought to myself
that it was making God Almighty act like a passionate man who killed His
son when he could not revenge Himself in any other way, and, as I was
sure a man would be hanged who did such a thing, I could not see for what
purpose they preached such sermons. (Paine 83)
Paine goes on to suggest that "any system of religion that has anything in it that shocks the
mind of a child cannot be a true system" (83).

3

5Mee offers an excellent description of the way in which Blake inverts the relationship that
Jacob Bryant establishes between ancient sacrificial rites and Jewish and Christian understandings of
sacrifice. In his book, A New System, which Blake had worked on as an engraver, Bryant saw pagan
practices as distortions of the original concept of sacrifice, lost at the time of the flood. But Blake inverts
this idea, arguing that Jewish and Christian views on sacrifice actually have their roots in pagan practices
(Mee 132-34).
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Blake's comment on the doctrine of atonement is like Paine's critique insofar as
Urizen is exactly like the angry man that Paine imagines. Yet Blake's critique is even more
radical than Paine's, because it treats Fuzon's death as a result, not of one false system,
but of system-building as such. We have already seen how Urizen represents a diversity of
systems, and how he himself cannot conform to the systems he creates. Furthermore, we
have examined how his punishment of his son reflects his own guilt and his anxiety about
maintaining the hierarchical order he has created. But the connection between symbolic
order and sacrificial crucifixion is also reflected in Blake's treatment of the Tree of
Mystery itself The tree upon which Fuzon is crucified grows out of a rock made of
Urizen's "petrified" fancies; then the tree is watered by his tears (Ch.III,pl.3,11.54-64). In
other words, the tree is unrelated to any true eternal vision. It grows out of the
petrification ofUrizen's thought processes into a frozen systematic form, and from his
sorrow when he is isolated from the other Eternals through a process of symbolic
differentiation . .
This association is further developed by the description of the Tree of Mystery
growing behind Urizen, who sits beneath it writing in his iron book, that is, his book of
law. There is an inevitable association between this tree, as the instrument of sacrifice, and
the laws that made the sacrifice necessary. Even if, at some level, Urizen's destruction of
his son is "punishment" rather than "sacrifice," it is clear that, for Blake, death,
administered as punishment, is always a kind of human sacrifice made in homage to the
dominant symbolic order, a destructive sacrifice for which mainstream Christianity is
largely responsible.
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The rebellion and defiance which Urizen punishes is also an inevitable fruit of the
law and its Tree of Mystery. In The Book of Urizen, Fuzon is Urizen's first-begotten and
last-born child. Insofar as Fuzon represents rebellion, he is the first-begotten because
rebellion is the inevitable outgrowth of all law, and he is last born only because, in the
public sphere, it may take a very long time before such defiance appears. Defiance is,
however, as necessarily bound to law as is sacrifice. The three are implicitly linked to one
another.
Thus, when Fuzon's corpse undergoes its mock resurrection and lives on for years,
groaning on the tree, Blake.is able to portray the effects of the cycle of law, rebellion, and
sacrifice upon Urizen' s other children. Fuzon is still alive because the public spectacle of
his death is a symbolic action that has long-lasting effects on the perceptions and actions
of a community. Worrall suggests that Urizen actually writes the story ofFuzon's death in
his iron book after hanging Fuzon on the tree, thus reinterpreting events in his own terms
(155). This reading does not seem to reflect accurately the order of events in the text; it
ignores the fact that Blake mentions the nailing of Fuzon to the tree before and after the

narrative in which the Tree of Mystery grows and Urizen writes in his iron book. The
creation of the tree and the writing of the iron book are clearly parenthetical references to
a time earlier than the current action ofFuzon's rebellion and punishment. Nevertheless,
Worrall makes an important point. The Book ofAhania does imply that the traditional
Christian narrative is the victor's narrative, the narrative as told by the representatives of
the dominant symbolic order.
Whereas the Christian narrative sees Jesus' s death as a sacrificial offering that
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liberates others from sin, Blake's narrative treats a similar death as an act of scapegoating
perpetrated by a tyrant determined to preserve his power. In doing this, The Book of
Ahania suggests that as rhetoric that creates and maintains community attitudes and

beliefs, the mainstream Christian account of Jesus' death is perpetuating a continual cycle
of sacrifices. The church retains power and the leaders of the dominant system can mask
their own tyranny by teaching that Jesus' death was not a brutal act of tyranny perpetuated
in the name of a tyrannical God and social order, but a sacrificial offering to the
benevolent Urizenic divinity in order to atone for the defiance and rebellion of the faithful.
Such a narrative makes the faithful themselves scapegoats for the tyrannical authority of
those at the top of the hierarchy. Their sins caused Jesus' death, not the sins of the
Urizenic rulers and their Urizenic divinities. The scapegoating process becomes
interminable.
As Tannenbaum points out, this endless process of sacrifice takes place within the
text as well. The Book ofAhania ends with Ahania' s lament, where she speaks of a blissful
world before the fall, where she and Urizen loved passionately, and where she happily
suckled their children. Now she speaks of''bones ofbeasts" "strown/On the bleak and
snowy mountains/Where bones from the birth are buried/Before they see the light"
(Ch.5,pl. 5,1.44-47; E 90). As Tannenbaum points out, in this passage, Ahania describes
both animal and human sacrifice as a process that continues after the sacrifice of her son
Fuzon. His crucifixion is simply the beginning of a long history of sacrifices, sacrifices
that have taken the place of sexual love and fruitfulness. In linking Fuzon and Jesus, Blake
implies that Christianity has turned Jesus' death into an excuse for further sacrifices.

As
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Blake writes in the margins of his Four Zoas manuscript, "Christs [sic] Crucifix shall be
made an excuse for Executing Criminals" (E 697). One could just as easily argue that the
crucifix has become an excuse for warfare, and that all of these sacrifices are directly
linked to religious and legal prohibitions of sexual expression and other forms of vital
human energy.
As it turns out, what is most troubling about this argument in The Book of Urizen
and The Book of Ahania is that rigid symbolic orders and scapegoating both appear to be
almost unavoidable. The Book of Urizen clearly indicates that, while Urizen resembles the
Old Testament deity, he represents a large range of systematic thought. Likewise, Fuzon
represents more than the New Testament Christ or any one particular rebel. In the imagery
surrounding Fuzon' s death, critics have identified references to sacrificial victims from all
kinds of different cultures. 36 Once Urizen creates his differentiated and hierarchical
symbolic orders, whatever they might be, even the Eternals and Los, Urizen's peers in
Eternity, are unable to restore the primaeval unity. Their actions involve binding,
separating, confining and so on-all acts of hindrance, involving the restraint of others.
Those who come after Urizen in the order of creation are also subject to his laws,
whether they are benevolent visionaries like Jesus, self-seeking usurpers like Absalom, or
revolutionaries like Robespierre. Their efforts tend to be ensnared by Urizenic law or
appropriated, and they themselves are either corrupted or sacrificed or both. Cycles of
scapegoating, violent and otherwise, follow attempts at liberation. The carnage depicted

36

Chapters 2 and 3 of Mee's Dangerous Enthusiasm contain useful accounts of some of the
different sacrificial images to be found in Ahania. See Worrall's notes in the Blake Trust edition of the
Urizen books for a briefer account of some of these sources.

1 73
on the final plate ofAhania, complete with decapitated bodies, clearly points to the
sacrifices that were currently being enacted in France, where cycles of violence begot
more and more violence. The dismembered corpses on the last plate of Ahania leave us
with the sense that Blake was sickened by the carnage of the French Revolution and
longed for some other less violent and less sacrificial method of transformation.
What that transformation would produce is not absolutely clear, but we catch a
hint of it in the Eternals' unified but fiery and ever changing life and in Ahania's
empassioned description of both sexual and maternal love. The last of the six Lambeth
books, The Book ofLos, leaves no doubt about the freedom that Blake sees as the
ultimate paradisal existence.
3 : 0 Times remote!
When Love & Joy were adoration:
And none impure were deem' d.
Not Eyeless Covet
Nor Thin-lip'd Envy
Nor Bristled Wrath
Nor Curled Wantonness
4: But Covet was poured full:
Envy fed with fat of lambs:
Wrath with lions gore:
Wantonness lulld to sleep
Or sated with her love.
5 : Till Covet broke his locks & bars,
And slept with open doors:
Envy sung at the rich mans feast:
Wrath was follow'd up and down
By a little ewe lamb
And Wantonness on his own true love
Begot a giant race . . . (Ch.I,pl.3,1. 7-26; E 90-9 1)
Here, much of what is called evil exists only because human beings have denied and
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forbidden fulfillment to human desire and, thus, corrupted it. Satisfied desire does no one
any harm. The Law that forbids the satisfaction of desire is the source of sin. Blake is as
antinomian as ever; he despises Urizenic law, sees it as the source of evil, and believes we
would be better off without it.
Yet the problem remains as to how to return to a state, not of violent and chaotic
anarchy, but of positive antinomian lawlessness. While Blake continues to condemn the
scapegoating behavior of Urizenic law, he finds himself unable to recommend revolution
straightforwardly as he had done in America: A Prophecy. The Book of Urizen, standing
alone, seems to point to a hope that it will be possible simply to leave Urizen's fallen
world behind, but The Book ofAhania dashes that hope, and leaves us with a lament for
lost sexual bliss, lost motherhood, and lost children. Ultimately, Blake's treatment of
language in The Book of Urizen seems to open up the question of whether there is a way
out of hindrance and sacrifice once the process of law and hindrance enter the world. If
the roots of hindrance are entangled in the nature of language itself, then Blake's own
language is inevitably complicit, and so are the symbolic orders created by any
revolutionary force. There is an element of hopelessness in these poems, as Paley
,
recognizes when he describes these particular prophecies in terms of "heroic fatality. m
The idea that there can be a distinct line drawn between Action and Hindrance as
dialectical opposites, one good and one evil, seems to have been untenable, both in
theoretical and historical terms. A brief examination of The Book of Urizen and The Book
ofAhania in terms of Kenneth Burke's logological theory in The Rhetoric ofReligion will

37"Heroic fatality" is the title of chapter three of Paley's Energy and Imagination.
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make it extremely clear why this impasse occurs, as well as provide a look at how an
another essentially antinomian thinker deals with the same issues in his own analysis of
Genesis 1 -3 and its place in the Christian tradition.
Symbolic Order as the Source of the Scapegoating Motive: Urizen, Ahania, and the
Burkean Model

As we saw at the beginning of the chapter, Burke offers subtle but unmistakable
allusions to Blake's Urizen in The Rhetoric ofReligion: Studies in Logology, a text that,
like Blake's Urizen books, places the first three chapters of Genesis in conversation with
the Christian system of creation, fall, sacrifice, and redemption. Although there have been
a number of studies of Blake texts, especially The Book of Urizen, that deal with language,
remarkably, none of them has specifically applied Burke's logological method. 38 Since
Burke explicitly links his text to Blake's, and since both men are antinomian thinkers, such
an analysis can yield important insights into the logic of Blake's argument.
Burke defines logology as "studies in words about words" (vi), and he suggests
that religious language, as language about the ultimate, provides an outstanding
framework for studying the nature of words. Religious language, Burke claims, is

38Language critiques of The Book of Urizen and other Blake texts are commonplace. Robert
Gleckner's article. "Most Holy Forms of Thought," makes the argument that Blake's works can be
understood as arguments about the nature of language. Mann offers a deconstructive reading of The
Book of Urizen, as does Kathleen Lundeen in her discussion of "Blake's Quaking Word." Essick's
William Blake and the Language ofAdam and Angela Esterhammer's Creating States have already been
discussed earlier in the chapter and are the most relevant to this study. Not coincidentally, both make
reference to the works of Kenneth Burke. In arguing that Urizen creates a language based on
differentiation� Essick discusses the idea that such language is predicated on a concept of the negative:
This is not that. In a footnote, he points out the similarity of his own description of the negative to
Burke's. Esterhammer makes significant references to Burke throughout her book, but most important
for the purpose of this discussion is her reference to The Rhetoric ofReligion as an alternative approach
to the first three chapters of Genesis. However, neither of these critics actually examines the relationship
between Blake's narrative critique of the Genesis creation story and Burke's logological critique.
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particularly thoroughgoing in its nature:
[I]nsofar as religious doctrine is verbal, it will necessarily exemplify its
nature as verbalization; and insofar as religious doctrine is thorough, its
ways of exemplifying verbal principles should be correspondingly thorough
Hence, it should be possible to analyze remarks about the "nature of
'God,"' like remarks about ''the nature of 'Reason, "' in their sheer
formality as observations about the nature of language. And such a
correspondence between the theological and "logological" realms should
be there, whether or not "God" actually exists. For regardless of whether
the entity named "God" exists outside his nature sheerly as key term in a
system of terms, words 'about him' must reveal their nature as words. ( 1 -2
RR)
When understood logologically, the concept of God is analogous to those terms,
called god-terms, that sum up or pull together a variety of subordinate terms into one
broad framework, transcending them and holding them together into some kind of
systematic order. Thus, logology could provide a way of looking at Blake's mythological
works, since Blake's use of religious language, or a language of the ultimate, can be so
analyzed even in texts that do not explicitly claim to be about language, or even by a critic
who understands Blake's creation myths to be an expression of faith in some kind of
alternative Gnostic creation narrative rather than as commentaries about language. 39
39

Critics debate the extent to which Blake is actually attempting to describe a creation event in
The Book of Urizen. Some critics are confident that Blake is arguing for an alternative understanding of
the actual physical creation of the world, a Gnostic creation by two demiurges or a physical creation
caused by fallen human perception. In his conversations with Henry Crabb Robinson late in his life, Blake
describes his view of creation in markedly Gnostic terms, saying that "nature is the work of the devil''
(3 10). Kathleen Raine provides a fairly full discussion of possible sources where Blake could have learned
about such Gnostic forms of thought (v.2, 12-16). A number of critics, argue that for Blake the physical
world is a result of fallen human perception. As Hom succinctly puts it, in Blake's writing, the physical
world is "the result of reason's reification (Blake's word is 'abstraction') of the entire sensory and
intellectual world into static forms" (8 1 ). Other critics, like Paul Cantor, suggest that Blake merely means
to demonstrate how perception becomes fallen. It is not the physical world is problematic, Cantor argues,
but that human perception makes us perceive the world as monstrous ( 46-4 7). These points need not be
resolved, however, in a Burkean analysis, because logology does not require that we know whether or not
a religious myth is true or false. Its claim is simply that religious language, language about ultimate order,
will reveal insights about language and how it works.
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Logology attempts to discover what religious language can tell us about language, not
whether or not a particular religious language in fact describes ultimate reality accurately.
The term "God" functions a certain way linguistically, Burke would argue, whether or not
such a God actually exists.
The analysis of Blake's prophecies provided earlier in this chapter offers close
reading of the text placed within the broad theoretical framework of Burke's claims about
order and sacrifice, claims that we have already discussed in the opening chapter, but that
can best be summed up by the Burke poem that is included in the Introduction to The
Rhetoric ofReligion and mentioned also in the introduction to this text:

Here are the steps
In the Iron Law of History
That welds Order and Sacrifice:
Order leads go Guilt
(For who can keep commandments!)
Guilt needs Redemption
(for who would not be cleansed !)
Redemption needs Redeemer
(which is to say, a Victim! ).
Order

Through Guilt

To Victimage
(Hence: Cult of the Kill) . . . . (RR 4-5)

The previous sections of this chapter have shown how this process occurs narratively
within the text. Urizen's iron laws cannot be kept; thus Order leads to Guilt for Urizen and
Los., who have each., in varying degrees accepted the fOfCe of these laws. Guilt requires
redemption., so some form of scapegoating is the final result, although we do not see the
cult of the kill in full operation until we reach the end of The Book ofAhania and discover
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the dismembered bodies that represent the cult of the kill as it was enacted in France. A
direct relationship is established between order, commandment, violation, and
scapegoating, such that scapegoating will in fact occur within history, because of the fact
that systems of order function as rhetoric to persuade us of their ultimacy and then
produce guilt and the need for redemption or expiation when we cannot live up to them.
The iron law of history is the enactment of this process in the world.
However, Burke would argue that it is impossible to avoid having systems of order
in some form or another. Even Blake, who in the Urizen books seems to reject Order
altogether, is creating such a system himself While there will not be room in the present
discussion to thoroughly examine Burke's logological theory or to fully explicate a
logological reading of The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania, this section will
briefly explore some central terms in Burke's reading of the book of Genesis, explaining
how Burke analyzes these terms, and how a similar analysis would affect our
understanding of Blake's arguments about language and order.
In narrative terms, God is a personification of the power to create through
language, the fact of"symbol-using" as a "distinctive ingredient of 'personality"' (RR
203), and God is positively associated with the idea of order. A major component of
Burke's analysis of Genesis lies in his identification of dialectical pairs of opposites that
structure the systems of order the text represents. One of these terms is generally
associated with positively valued terms like order, goodness, blessing, and so on, while the
opposite is a cluster of negative terms like disorder, evil, cursing, and the like. A hierarchy
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is necessarily implied from the beginning. 40
Burke also argues that the idea of order in Genesis contains two specific concepts,
both of them related to the negative in language. The first is the idea of order as in the
natural order, the world of things that we describe and put in order, and the second is the
socio-political and moral order, having to do with commandments. In Genesis, both have
their source in God; the two kinds of order are merged and connected, such that God is
the author of both and both are infused with the idea of commandment. Implicit in the idea
of order is the idea of disorder, or chaos, its opposite. Further, both obedience and
disobedience are implicit in the idea of commandment:
The word-using animal not only understands a thou-shalt-not; it can carry
the principle of the negative a step further, and answer the thou-shalt-not
with a disobedient No. In this sense, moral disobedience is "doctrinal."
Like faith, it is grounded in language. (Burke RR 187)
Thus, we have in the Biblical narrative an affirmation of order as a positive good, a
gift from God, and both forms of order are seen as good, the natural order and the moral
order. Both are also seen as having the same source. If we compare this analysis to
Blake's narrative, we find points of agreement and disagreement. Urizen is like the creator
God in Genesis, but he does not create order; he creates disorder through his creation of
· the world and through the creation of law. Blake offers the paradoxical idea that what is
usually called order is, in reality, chaos. Further, he implies that what is usually called
goodness, the commandment of God as recorded in the Bible, for example, is, in the actual
view of Eternity, evil. The terms are reversed. Nevertheless, an implied hierarchy of good

"°Burke presents this information visually in a chart that can be found in The Rhetoric of

Religion. p. 184.
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and evil are still present. The original state of the Eternals is good, and the order ofUrizen
is bad, but the state of the Eternals, Los, and Fuzon after the fall is mixed. These
characters are tom between Urizen's framework and the old world of the Eternals. Thus,
Blake implies that Urizenic order is the demonic opposite of the Eternals' world of flux,
''Eternity'' being the only real god-term in the text. The Eternals' world is, however
completely unavailable, so Urizen's antagonists are actually not his dialectical opposites,
but mixtures of Eternal and Urizenic characteristics who could perhaps be placed in some
kind of hierarchy between Urizen, at the bottom of the chain, and the unattainable Eternal
state at the top. Urizen's true opposite lies outside the system in the text, but it is part of
the symbolic order created by it, undescribable but nevertheless present as an ideal. Thus,
a bounded, hierarchical order exists within the work, an order that is every bit as bounded
and hierarchical as Urizen's. Structurally, Blake's order is like Urizen's, even as he seeks
freedom from such structures. Blake finds himself in a kind of contradiction that Burke
escapes because he does not reject a Urizenic order outright.
Burke's idea that the dialectical terms imply one another also match some of
Blake's arguments in the Urizen texts. For example, creation is one of the terms
associated with order in the Genesis cosmology. Creation is seen as a positive good. Its
opposite is the Fall, the transformation of a good creation into an evil or destructive
world. Yet, Burke points out, the idea of a Fall is actually implied already in the idea of
creation. If one imagines an original unity, the creation would be a fall into division and
classification, a breakup of an original wholeness. In fact, Burke argues, mythic narrative
often involves classification in narrative form. The story will say that the sky was formed
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at one time, the sea at another, animals at another, and so on. Such narrative distinctions
are a narrative way of explaining what the different classes and orders of beings are, and
how they are related to one another. This process of classification is possible because of
the process of differentiation implied in creation, and in language as the tool of human
creativity.
This is similar to Blake's approach to the idea of creation. Fallenness for Blake is
implied in the idea of creation because of the differentiation and classification that
separates one entity from the other in a created world. For Burke, though, this claim about
linguistic differentiation is simply a neutral description of the way in which language
works, whereas for Blake, the fall implied really is a negative. Urizen and Los are Blake's
creators, with Urizen originating the process. However, while both of the fallen Eternals'
processes are negative, they are not negative in the same degree. Urizen is the one who
actually rends the original eternal unity, being tom from Los' s side. Then he produces
chaos, a hand, a foot, differentiated but unrelated parts, and abstractions, words, tools for
making abstract measurements, and so on. Los, still connected to the Eternals at some
level, creates an order, like the Genesis order of seven days, that is at least coherent and
particular. But it does involve a process of breaking apart the human form and classifying
it into parts, treating it as separate pieces. The created order of the Biblical narrative is not
something to celebrate, Blake suggests, whether it is understood literally, or as a metaphor
for the creation of human perception through language.
Neither is the moral order that proceeds from Urizen' s laws. Consistent obedience
to them is impossible. Those who try become limited and shrunken. Those who, like
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Fuzon, rebel, end up being destroyed, sacrificed to the legal order and appropriated into
its system of punishment. Some, like Los, find themselves torn, obedient and disobedient
simultaneously, and thus, engaged in the process of scapegoating others to seek
absolution. Once creation and commandment appear in the Urizen texts, blessing becomes
impossible. The obedient and the disobedient all become subject to a curse. This may be
Blake's most severe indictment of the Biblical narrative, and it is far more severe than
Burke's. As Burke describes it, blessing and cursing are implicit in the idea of
commandments in Genesis. Obedience brings God's blessing, while disobedience brings a
curse. But Blake's parody totally denies that blessing is even possible in a world where
commandments are given. While Burke makes no claims whatsoever about the possibility
or impossibility of blessing, he does indicate that disobedience is inevitable once there are
commandments. Thus Fuzon, the rebel, really is the first-begotten of Urizen' s children.
Once U rizen said "Thou shalt not" it was inevitable that someone would say to him in kind
"Thou shalt not make that commandment. " Once a ''No" is spoken, it is available to
anyone, whatever their place in the hierarchy, so disobedience becomes almost inevitable.
Thus, there is the attempt at redemption through sacrifice. The Bible implies that
such redemption is possible; the suffering of Christ makes redemption possible. Burke
relates the idea of redemption to economics. In this sense, he shares an attitude towards
redemption like Paine's, who objected that the doctrine of Atonement made morality a
manner of monetary exchange, with forgiveness purchasable. For Burke, however, such
substitionary thinking is, again, built into the language. The movement to sacrifice is easily
made, since language itself involves the substitution of one thing for another; a word is a
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symbol for an actual object or perception from the world. Monetary exchange is one
example of this kind of symbolic process; a particular amount of money is equivalent to a
particular item and one can be exchanged for another. Similarly, Ore can be equivalent to
his father and die in his stead, or Ahania can be equivalent to her husband and be cast out
for his sake. Ultimately, Burke, argues, these sacrifices do not provide a permanent
solution to the problem of guilt:
For it seems that, even if one believes in the idea of a perfect, supernatural,
superpersonal victim, by identification with whose voluntary sacrifice one
can be eternally saved, there is still the goad to look for victims here on
earth as well, who should be punished for their part, real or imaginary, in
blocking the believer's path to felicity, or perhaps threatening to send him
on his heavenly way too soon. (RR 223)
Blake's presentation of sacrifice is not as concerned with economic parallels as
Burke's, at least not in these particular texts. He seems more interested in the actual
consubstantiality of the victim with the one for whom he or she suffers. Perhaps because
of his intense focus on the primal unity that Urizen's creation destroyed, Blake focuses on
the sacrifice of a man's wife or children, those who are most deeply consubstantial with
him. But Blake and Burke do agree on the fundamental idea that the scapegoating cycle,
once begun, is interminable. Not only, Burke argues, are the faithful, themselves redeemed
through sacrifice, likely to continue to sacrifice others, their very theology includes a
permanent sacrifice enacted in hell. Without reference to continuing suffering in the
afterlife, Blake portrays the movement from the private scapegoating of a family member,
to the crucifixion ofFuzon which becomes the basis for religious practice, and finally to
the actual historical cycle of carnage depicted in the final plate of Ahania.
Thus, we see in Blake a thoroughgoing condemnation of the principle of Order as
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described in the Biblical narrative. Like Burke, Blake implies that the Christian system is a
model for all systems, as he associates Urizen with systems of all kinds, while placing him
within a Biblical parody. Also, like Burke, Blake argues that the ordering system is more
complex than the Biblical text grants. In the fallen world, the good and the bad are not as
separable as the Bible attempts to make them. But Blake's attitude towards Order differs
from Burke's in at least two crucial ways. In the Urizen books, Blake rejects order at
some level, while Burke never does so. He simply tries to keep the bearded patriarch
forever in a process of transition. Second, Blake tries to find a way to circumvent
differentiated systems of order, to escape them. For him, the opposite of order is the
counter-order of eternity, but finally, there is no way to get there. Logically, there is no
way to get there because, in the Urizen texts, Blake treats hindrance, or limitation, as an
absolute opposite of action, and he treats order as hindrance. Once the Eternals try to
separate themselves from Urizen' s fall, they become involved in hindrance. The same is
true for Los and Fuzon. As Burke shows in his logological analysis of Genesis, dialectical
terms imply one another. If we act, we only do so by hindering another action. If we
hinder, we must do something in order to hinder. Hindrance itself implies action. They are
no more separate than creation and fall are separate, no more separate than obedience or
disobedience are separate.
In treating action as a pure god-term and hindrance as a pure devil-term, Blake has
set up his own Urizenic order. Hindrance is forbidden a.nd, action is commanded. But who
can keep commandments? Blake's own iron law cannot be obeyed anymore than Urizen's,
because Blake himself must set up a hierarchy and a system of order to produce his text.
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Urizen can readily become his scapegoat, because he is blamed for doing what Blake
himself is doing, creating a separate ordered world. Again, the rebellion of Fuzon and the
last page of Ahania with its dismembered corpses say it all. Commandments have entered
the world, and are embodied in the very structure of the language we use. Even the
Eternals cannot escape the cycle. Rejecting Urizenic order becomes a simple inversion,
where Fuzon and his rebellion become "God, the eldest of all things." When this happens,
a new hierarchy is created, one that is either as oppressive as the old one was, or, one that
simply makes a god-term of chaos and rejects order. This rejection would not lead to
liberation, but to a brutal anarchy. The partial solutions provided by the Eternals, or Los,
seem unsatisfactory as well, since they partake of Urizenic binding, as does Blake's own
use of language. Blake's simple dialectic between action and hindrance, and his
identification of order and hindrance, has placed him at a dead end.
Burke's ''bearded patriarch" offers a different solution, however. He recommends,
not the rejection of the boundedness of order, or a simple breaking of bounds, but the
acceptance of an order that it, itself, perpetually self-critiquing and transforming: "[A]ny
terminology is suspect to the extent that it does not allow for the progressive criticism of
itself' (RR 303). This is not a solution to all human problems or all problems with
language use, since ''the resources of the negative being what they are, authorities will
continually arise which would say No definitively to any further questioning" (303).
Nevertheless, it is a step in the right direction. While a term can be denied the status of a
god-term, no term must be absolutely rejected in each and every conceivable situation.
Terms must be placed in an order that is flexible. The ways in which opposites imply one
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another must be recognized and respected. And all systems, even a system that would
reject the tyranny of order, must recognize the impossibility of doing without it. The
problem with order is not is existence, but its intransigence. As we will see in the
following chapter, for Burke, the commitment to an ever-changing order, one that is
always involved in a process of self-critique, requires a considerable level of skepticism
and irony.
After The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania, Blake begins to move, in some
respects, towards a Burkean position. Urizen will never again receive such harsh
treatment. These two Biblical parodies represent the turning point, the place where
Blake's equation of symbolic systems, law, and hindrance is finally revealed as untenable.
In fact, it is not only untenable, but it is itself an act of symbolic scapegoating, making
order itself the cause of all evil, and, in doing so, making it logically impossible to improve
the human situation for as long as language exists.
Blake will struggle again, in The Four Zoas, to justify an apocalyptic
understanding of violence and to portray revolution as part of the path to a better world.
Yet never again will he attempt to explain that transformation in terms of a simple
hierarchical relationship between Urizenic order as hindrance and Orcan revolution as
inspired divine act, as he did in America, for example. Henceforth, like Burke, Blake will
attempt to produce a complex rhetoric of order that consists in a perpetual transformation
of terms, established in a shifting, but nevertheless hierarchical relationship with one
another. In its form, The Four Zoas presents a kind of absolute dialectical order, a
perpetual play of terms that, nevertheless, reaches towards and aspires to an ultimate
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ethical end. Like Burke's Lord, Blake's Urizen will become a figure capable of
transformation. But, unlike Burke's Lord, he will not be at the center of Blake's vision.
Nor will irony or comic resignation become central for Blake as it does for Burke,
however rich Blake's own ironies may be. In The Four Zoas, Blake remains as Utopian as
ever, and more serious than ever about the quest for a more just order.
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Chapter IV
The Four Zoas:
Ultimate Dialectic and the Transformation of Sacrifice

In the last chapter, we saw that in l'he Book of Urizen and l'he Book ofAhania,
Blake begins to interrogate his own perspective on Act and Hindrance. Once Urizen
becomes associated with reason, order, and language in all its forms, it becomes evident
that action without hindrance, or limitation, is impossible. Further, it becomes clear that
the extreme rejection ofUrizen, or rational order, can result in scapegoating activities as
severe and as distressing as those forms of scapegoating pursued by counter-revolutionary
forces. l'he Book ofAhania, in particular, reveals a dead-end in Blake's thinking about act
and hindrance, a paradox that can only be overcome through serious readjustments in his
ideas. It is not that the concepts of act and hindrance cease to be significant for Blake. In
fact, these terms appear in A Vision of the Last Judgement, a document that is dated 1 81 0,
and the earlier valuation of Hindrance as vice and Act as virtue clearly remains in this
text. 1 Thus it still makes perfectly good sense to use the terms Act and Hindrance when
thinking about l'he Four Zoas, which, most scholars agree, Blake finally set aside in about
1 806, having worked on it since 1 796.

1 InA Vision ofthe Last Judgement, Blake says that "I assert for My self that I do not behold the
Outward Creation & that to me it is hindrance & not Action it is as the Dirt upon my feet No part of Me"
(E 565). He is clearly using the same definition of "Hindrance" as vice and "Action" as virtue that he
employs earlier, but he is claiming that an emphasis on the reality of the outer world is hindrance. While
in some respects this appears to be a Gnostic denial of the body, it can also be seen as a way of
understanding our thinking about the physical world, a symbolic order which places physical objects
above the imaginative ones on a hierarchical scale.

189
Still, The Four Zoas portrays Hindrance and Act in a way that is strikingly
different from his depiction of these same ideas in the earlier Urizen texts. Instead of
identifying hindrance with order, as he does in Urizen and Ahania, Blake differentiates
between different kinds of order, some of which are associated with Hindrance and some
of which support Act. Furthermore, he allows for intermediate stages that can provide a
transition between absolutely positive Acts and utterly destructive Hindrances. In fact, one
of the main functions of The Four Zoas is to help us to see the possibility of moving away
from destructive forms of symbolic action that hinder us, and towards forms that are life
giving and conducive to truly visionary human action, action that releases the positive
values of universal humanity and peace.
This chapter will argue that Blake makes this shift in four distinct ways, each of
which pulls him just a little closer to the Burkean description of the relationship between
order and sacrifice. The first shift involves a transformation ofUrizen's role. In The Book
of Urizen, Urizen is associated with books and with structures of order in a way that
suggests that he should be identified with order as such, and of course, with those persons
and institutions who represent the dominant orders. Ore and Fuzon, particularly Fuzon,
seem to represent rebellion as such, while Los' s role is frankly somewhat confusing, if not
interpreted in light of documents that had not yet appeared when the Urizen books were
engraved. All that we really know about Los is that he was sent by the Eternals and
remains connected both to them and to Urizen.
In The Four Zoas, Fuzon no longer appears, while the roles of Urizen and Ore
change enormously and the role of Los is clarified. These characters begin to function as
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faculties within the human being, as well as representatives of patterns of action in the
world. In addition, a new figure, Tharmas, is introdu�ed, and each of these male characters
is given a female consort, or Emanation. Brian Wilkie and Mary Lynn Johnson provide a
succinct statement of the traditional critical consensus concerning the nature of each Zoa.
Urizen is Reason, Los/Urthona is imagination, Luvah/Orc, the passions, and Tharmas is
instinct,2 while Albion, or the Universal Man, is the whole of which each of these faculties
is only a part (xviii). 3 Thus, Urizen is no longer functioning as symbolic order per se. He
is, instead, reason, one of the faculties by which human beings process their experience
and order their existence. 4
In his role as Reason, Urizen is no longer exclusively responsible for the fall.
Throughout the text, fall narratives appear, with characters attempting to interpret and

2

Bloom suggests that Tharmas is the body, or "the body's instinctual energy" (Apocalypse 95).
This idea actually creates an interesting connection to Lockean thought, which divides human experience
into two primary forms. sensation and reflection. (See Locke, Book II, chapter 1, paragraph 3). The
traditional four faculties were reason (or understanding), imagination, passion, and will. The power to
determine the direction towards unity, or wholeness, does not seem to lie in Tharmas more than any other
Zoa, an4 when things begin to restored to be their right place, Albion has awakened and is determining
which faculties are to predominate at any moment; thus, will, for Blake, insofar as it has any meaning for
him at all, would appear to be a function of the total person, operating as a unity. Tharmas, the fourth
Zoa, thus departs from the traditional eighteenth-century description of the faculties, which always treated
the Will, not the senses, as the fourth faculty.
3

Los is the name of the fallen Urthona, while Ore is the name of Luvah once he reappears in the
form of Los' s and Enitharmon' s son.
4

0f course, this identification with the Zoas as faculties is not agreed upon by all. Damrosch
makes an excellent point when he argues that "The Zoas are not faculties, and certainly not discrete
beings; they are an ever-shifting system of relationships within the self' (128). Damrosch is certainly
correct that these faculties are not rigidly differentiated. Yet it is also true that each Zoa does have
characteristic patterns of behavior that fit reasonably well with the idea of faculties. Moreover, Blake
treats these faculties as mythic, not as real discrete entities within the self. Thus, in a sense, the rigidity
the shifts that Damrosch desribes do not really contradict the connection of the Zoas with faculties, if the
faculties are understood as mythic descriptions of scarcely understood divisions within the self and the
social order.
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understand their sense of being separated and fallen; Urizen is only one of the characters
involved in this mythic fall event. Furthermore, Urizen is only one of the characters who
responds negatively to the alienated situation that occurs after the fall. Almost all of the
characters respond to separation, suffering, or the fear of death by blaming others, making
rigid rules to hinder others, or scapegoating others to preserve their own status or safety.
Second, order is no longer associated exclusively with Urizen; all the characters
show a pressing need for order throughout the text, and whenever chaos ensues,
characters engage in frantic efforts to overcome it, either by creating structures themselves
or by demanding that others do it for them. These new social and intellectual orders are
accompanied by a kind of scapegoating that is not really apparent in the Lambeth
prophecies--scapegoating that exists more for the purpose of creating consubstantiation
than it does for the relief or disguising of guilt. This form of scapegoating is an important
part of Burkean theory, but it receives little attention in Blake's mythological work before
now. In The Four Zoas, however, scapegoating appears as a founding event, one that
makes it possible to cooperate in the creation of an order. It also works to hold the order
together once increasing levels of differentiation and diversification threaten it. Still, at
every stage in the development of symbolic order, scapegoating remains as a means of
dealing with guilt, just as it did in Blake's earlier texts. 5
50ne of the most interesting points of distinction between Kenneth Burke's theory of sacrifice

and that of Renci Girard lies at the point of guilt. Burke and Girard both acknowledge in their theories the
sacrificial element involved in the creation of community. What Burke describes as the creation of
consubstantiation through sacrifice, Girard discusses in terms of a founding event, a sacrifice that stops
conflict by deflecting hostility onto a victim. There is a difference in emphasis even here, but the basic
principle is similar. Scapegoating can be used to create community in times of conflict or confusion.
Burke. however, believes that the violation of order does create a sense of guilt which is also dealt with
through scapegoating and sacrifice. For Girard. guilt is really not the issue, and the expiatory function of
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Thus, we have a very complex situation, in which excessive chaos can function as a
hindrance that prevents creative action and leads to excessively rigid forms of order.
Despite this fact, chaos nevertheless inspires the creation of new forms of order, however
imperfect. Furthermore, destructive forms of order that lead to scapegoating can be
reinterpreted and transformed so that they lead to action as much as to hindrance. Even
scapegoating itself can function ambiguously as a source of both hindrance and act,
allowing for the creation of structures that, while imperfect, may be better than no
structure at all.
There is a marked contrast here from the earlier Urizen texts, where Blake's
antinomian solution to the problem of order, scapegoating and Hindrance was the
elimination of order in the hope that when it collapsed, something better would emerge.
As we have seen, this position is finally untenable. So the third change in Blake's
presentation of symbolic order and its relationship to scapegoating is a shift in his
conception of how symbolic order is transformed. His vision remains apocalyptic.
Ultimately, there is a kind of sudden and absolute transformation. However, this
Apocalypse is only possible because of a series of changes that occur throughout the

sacrifice is a distraction: "'There is no question of 'expiation. ' Rather, society is seeking to deflect upon a
relatively indifferent victim, a 'sacrificeable' victim, the violence that would otherwise be vented upon its
own members, the people it most desires to protect" (4). Girard's theory works in one direction, while
Burke's works in two. Girard sees sacrifice as something that people use to create communities and hold
them together to prevent widespread violence. Burke's claim that sacrificial scapegoating can create
consubstantiation is parallel to Girard's belief that the scapegoat keeps a community together by becoming
the target of corporate violence and thus binding everyone else together. Burke, however, sees the
scapegoat as a means of expiation as well, since order produces guilt. So for Burke, both chaos and order
can lead to scapegoating, for the purpose of creating consbustantiation or expiating guilt. The common
element of these two forms of scapegoating is that both are rooted in the characteristics of language and
symbolic orders.
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poem-changes in the ways in which particular symbolic orders are understood and used in
the culture.

As

The Four Zoas progresses, Blake sets up a distinction between different

kinds of order and different kinds of chaos. He seeks to strike a balance between chaos
and the rigid forms of order that he has generally associated with Urizen.
That balance is best described in terms of a distinction between closed orders,
somewhat more characteristic ofUrizen, and open orders, somewhat more characteristic
of Los. However, in order to have a truly workable order, elements of both must be
present. Early in the text, we catch these differences in Los's ability to repent of his own
scapegoating acts-a position that is much more difficult for Urizen. Then we see a further
development in Los's ability to derive a different interpretation of a cultural model from
the one propagated by Urizen. In illustrating how the same cultural trope, in this case, the
story of Jesus' s crucifixion, can be differently understood and applied, Blake shows that it
is possible to transform contemporary symbolic orders, retaining them and using them for
rhetorically new purposes.
Fourth and finally, in the Apocalypse in Night the Ninth, Blake sets up what can
aptly be described as a Burkean "ultimate dialectic." Such a dialectic is a moving and
flexible order, one that contains both fixed and mobile terms and that pursues absolute
values by a variety of means, allowing the different terms within the system to assume
primacy at different times.

As

circumstances change, different terms may assume primacy,

yet the overall aim, which Blake refers to as "intellectual war" and "Sweet Science,"
remains stable. While these orders may require sacrifices, these sacrifices need not involve
scapegoating at all and may require a lesser degree of Hindrance than more fixedly
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hierarchical orders do. Finally, such an ultimate dialectic is both Losian and Urizenic, open
and closed, with both the possibility of change and with real limits and boundaries.
Certainly to suggest that the antinomian Blake in any way supports limit is
somewhat paradoxical, and may seem heretical to some. Nevertheless, it is important to
re�ember that Blake's aesthetic is based upon the clear line, a boundary or limit that must
exist for the work of art to exist. 6 As Christine Gallant notes in William Blake and the
Assimilation of Chaos, Blake is no worshiper of chaos. If, like Frye, we treat Urizen as a
representative of boundedness, 7 Blake's own art has a Urizenic aspect, found in the
creation of the clear line which allows the work of art to be something other than a
formless mass. In fact, Gallant identifies two kinds of chaos in Blake's work. In the
Lambeth prophecies, Blake describes chaos in terms of ''the primeval Void from whose
undifferentiated elements the cosmos was formed," but he also depicts a kind of"entropy,
manifested in an overly systematic poetry as well as a sealed-off attitude to life" (Gallant
9-1 0). On the one hand, there is the positive bounding line that protects us from
formlessness, and, on the other, there is the relentlessly rigid boundary that produces the
equally rigid system, and which could easily be described as a chaos masquerading as
order. Thus, in The Four Zoas, Blake takes on the complex task of attempting to
6

0ne of the few times Blake ever affirms Sir Joshua Reynolds' language
about painting takes place when Reynolds says that "A firm and determined outline is one of the
characteristics of the great style in painting." Blake responds "A Noble Sentence Here is a
Sentence Which overthrows all his Book" (E 649).
7

For Frye, "The whole four represent more or less the four aspects of God's imaginative energy,
Urthona being his creative fertility, which reappears in the fallen world as Los; Tharmas his power
to bring what he creates into complete existence, the first privilege lost to man at the Fall; Luvah
his capacity for love and joy; and Urizen his wisdom and sense of form" (294).
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differentiate between good order and bad order, or between order as act and order as
hindrance, just as there must be a distinction between a chaos that hinders and an opening
out, or boundary breaking, that allows for action.
The order that Blake affirms, however, cannot exist as a unity if some parts of the
whole are perpetually elevated above others, while other faculties within the individual
human body and mind, or while some groups within the social body are perpetually
dominated or scapegoated within a frozen and rigid system. Thus, in the absolute dialectic
of The Four Zoas, each function has its own ruling hour, both within the process of the
fall and the process of redemption. There is certainly a hierarchy. In fact, there must be, in
terms of the language of the poem, since it is impossible to say everything at once.
However, the hierarchy that Blake creates is flexible and mobile. Different functions
assume ascendency at different times for different purposes. This rotating hierarchy is
depicted throughout The Four Zoas, and ideas that are far from Blake's ideal are given a
worthwhile place within the order. In depicting this process, Blake distinguishes between
the partial good of those forces and attitudes which he criticizes and the absolute good
toward which he strives, as well as the absolute evil which he deplores.
This absolute good involves intellectual rather than physical conflict and the
brotherhood of all as opposed to a hierarchy based on exclusion and scapegoating.
Nevertheless, despite his criticism of physical warfare, Blake grants revolutionary violence
a purifying and cleansing place within a process of transformation, and within the
hierarchical framework of the text as a whole. In fact, even the absolute good towards
which he strives, "intellectual warfare" or "sweet Science," is itself a dialectical system of
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discourse that is forever in a process of transformation. Thus, the maintenance of
difference and conflict, even within unity, is necessary if the continuing process of
transformation is to take place.
The closed element of such a dialectical order has to do with the god-terms and
devil-terms that structure the discourse. The devil-term of The Four Zoas, is ''Mystery,"
the rigid form of religious thought that ensnares human beings, unites itself with the
political order, and inspires sacrificial violence and warfare. Here the old Blakean idea of
hindrance is given full expression, but in a form that is significantly subtler than the earlier
depictions of Hindrance. Largely, this subtlety occurs because Mystery as Hindrance is
contrasted with a variety of opposites: rebellion, self-sacrifice, forgiveness, and violent
revolution are all partial solutions. Finally, intellectual warfare and sweet Science are
absolute expressions of Brotherhood, the god-terms that function as the absolute opposite
of Mystery. Intellectual warfare and sweet Science are both typical of a world of action;
they do not hinder.
Yet both Mystery and Intellectual Warfare are actually forms of rhetoric. Both are
symbolic orders, one demonic and one ideal, one leading to Hindrance and the other to
Act. The contrast between the two replaces the rejection of symbolic order that occurs
within The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania. The religious rhetoric of Mystery
exists within the framework of a fallen world and perpetuates social injustice as well as
scapegoating. In fact, it could even be argued that it perpetuates--social injustice as one
form of scapegoating. Intellectual warfare and does not exist in -purity within the world as
we know it, but it is the ideal image of symbolic order to which we aspire, and they
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perpetuate the forms of ''Brotherhood" that Blake, in 1he Four Zoas, envisions in the
Council of God, and finally, in the apocalyptic conclusion of the poem. At the same time,
other forms of symbolic order, partaking of both Mystery and Intellectual Warfare; the
two exist side by side in the world as we know it.
For both William Blake and Kenneth Burke, the final goal of the ultimate dialectic
has to do with peace, that is, with the elimination, or at least the reduction, of warfare,
which both men treat as the ultimate form of scapegoating. To express his goal, Burke
chooses the terms peace and '1:he purification of war." Blake, on the other hand, speaks of
''unity" and "intellectual war." But their ethical commitments are very similar. To attain an
understanding of Blake's aims, however, and the ways in which they connect to Burke's
aims, we must go back to the beginning, back to a more detailed discussion of the concept
of order that appears in The Four Zoas. Furthermore, to explore any of these issues
reliably, it will be necessary first to examine the critics' quest for order within an
infamously disordered manuscript.
The Text of The Four Zoas

Blake never printed The Four Zoas, and it exists only in manuscript form, a fact
that has been, and continues to be, the subject of much discussion, and with good reason,
since the unpublished manuscript has been so heavily emended as to be at times almost
unreadable, as in sections of the first seven pages of the text. 8 In other sections, the

8

In the textual notes of his 1982 edition of The Complete Poetry and Prose of William
Blake, Erdman thoroughly discusses the difficulties with the manuscript. See his general discussion
on pages 816- 18, as well as the more specific discussion of the opening lines of Night the First,
all of which are written over significant amounts of erasure (8 19).
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material has been edited extensively enough to make it almost impossible to tell what
Blake meant to include and what he meant to omit. Perhaps the most important textual
problem is the existence of two versions of Night the Seventh. There has been
considerable debate as to which of these versions should be regarded as the real seventh
Night, or whether Blake intended to include them both. 9 Finally, it is not always possible
to tell what additions and emendations were done when, which makes even the most
carefully researched interpretation somewhat speculative, if it is based in any way upon the
ordering of the text or upon the dating of individual layers of text. 'fhe Four Zoas is
clearly a heavily edited palimpsest text, written over a period of years. Since it was never
engraved, bibliographers cannot readily establish an accurate copy text upon which to base
critical analysis.
Thus, critics have disagreed vehemently about whether or not 'fhe Four Zoas is an
ordered work, in some sense complete, or at least having a clear and discernible
architecture that sets forth an orderly, if unconventional narrative. Early critics see its
disorderly aspects as signs of poor editing or as marks of incompleteness. Some
contemporary critics recognize an order within the text, but believe that the poem is,
nevertheless, an attempt to expose the undecidability of language and the impossibility of
discovering a world beneath language. This is the position of Donald R. Ault, who argues
that "The presence of an implied world behind the text is progressively obliterated by The
Four Zoas" (4). However, a number of recent critics like Jackie DiSalvo, George Anthony

9Bibliographic analysis of Night the Seventh will appear in more detail in the section of this
chapter sub-titled 'The Tree of Mystery and the Lamb of God"
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Rosso, Jr., Andrew Lincoln, and Peter Otto have focused on the order that shines through
the labyrinth of textual revisions. 9 They believe that The Four Zoas makes arguments
about a real world that is assumed to exist beyond the text itself Lincoln's analysis in his
book Spiritual History goes so far as to build a layered reading, which aims to track the
argument of the text through its many different versions and revisions and to suggest a
philosophy of history behind each.
Despite the remarkable and spectacularly detailed postmodern analysis performed
by Ault in Narrative Unbound, the more recent scholarship of Rosso, Lincoln, and Otto,
as well as my own careful attention to the poem, lead me to begin with the assumption
that the text is aiming towards an orderly attempt to say something about an historical
world that the reader is to assume really exists behind the text, and about the equally real
inner lives of human beings who must find ways to describe and order the world they
experience. 10 This working assumption is justifiable despite the fact that this order is
difficult to find beneath the apocalyptic imagery and the often ambiguous editorial changes

9

1n this chapter all citations to Andrew Lincoln refer to his book Spiritual History, unless
expressly noted. Similarly, references to Peter Otto in this chapter are based on his 200 1 text, Blake 's
Critique of Transcendence. Finally, references to Donald Ault are directing the reader to the book

Na"ative Unbound.

1 °This chapter owes a debt to these three critics as well as to several others, among them Jackie

DiSalvo. Brian Wilkie and Mary Lynn Johnson, and Harold Bloom. All of these critics have contributed
far more to this study than can be referenced in footnotes or citations. First, DiSalvo, Rosso, and Lincoln
all offer viable historical readings, none of which are incompatible with the assumptions of this study, and
all of which reinforce the view that Blake saw structures of language and systems of order, in the church,
in poetry, or in other kinds of writing, as forming history in an active way. Otto's close examination of the
visual material in The Four Zoas is invaluable both for its thoroughness and its depth of insight. While I
do not agree entirely with Otto's conclusions, as will become apparent later in this argument, they are
extremely provocative. In addition, Wilkie's and Johnson's older study, which is the first full-length book
on The Four Zoas, is still extremely interesting and useful. This work and Harold Bloom's briefer
examination of The Four Zoas in Blake 's Apocalypse (195-283) were most essential to the process of
simply making sense of this difficult text through the first several readings.
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in the text. While the details can at times be terribly puzzling and subject to a wide range
of interpretations, the overall plot structure is clear. The Four Zoas describes first the
experience offalleness and fragmentation; then Urizen's assumption of power; his fall,
followed by the ascendency of Tharmas, Los, and the Spectre ofUrthona; Urizen's
resurgence and his appropriation of Orc in the establishment of Mystery as a full-blown
pattern of domination; the transformation of Los, Enitharmon, and the Spectre; the death
of Jesus; and, finally, the Apocalyptic conclusion of the work. Thus, this study is
developed with the assumption that most of the poem can be integrated into a meaningful
analysis, although there are passages that are not fully integrated with one another because
of the text's evolution over such a long period oftime. 1 1
Furthermore, like Otto's study, this discussion will rest on the assumption that
Erdman's third edition of The Complete Poetry and Prose of William Blake is ''the best
approximation to the 'final state' of the poem," in part as a matter of convenient reference
(Otto, Blake 's Critique 9), but also because the critical consensus seems to support this
conclusion, albeit with significant dissent. 12 Because of the uncertainties, where relevant to

1 1 As mentioned in the

first pages of this chapter, The Four Zoas was written over a period
of approximately ten years. Erdman reports that the title is dated 1797, but work on the original
manuscript, entitled Vala, may have begun in 1796. He estimates that Blake ceased working on The Four
Zoas in 1807 ("Textual Notes" 8 1 7). However, Erdman and his co-editor, Cettino Tramontano Magno
suggest that Blake may have made small changes in the manuscript up until the time it was given to John
Linnell about 25 years after it was begun. It is simply impossible to tell exactly when Blake put The Four
Zoas aside for good (13-14).
12

Lincoln's appendix on bibliography in Spiritual History affirms this to be the modem
consensus, although Lincoln points out that "there are no signs that Blake himself intended such an
arrangement" (298). Blake: An Illustrated Quarterly, devotes an entire issue to this topic of discussion.
See volume 12, 1978. See also the introduction to Otto's Blake 's Critique of Transcendence. Brian Wilkie
and Mary Lynn Johnson suggest that readers should try a variety of different arrangements, especially of
chapter 7 (273).
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the discussion, bibliographic issues will be addressed within the text or within footnotes,
particularly as regards Nights I and VII. Fortunately, an examination of the relationship
between the rhetoric of order and the role of sacrifice in The Four Zoas is mostly
dependent upon the broad framework of the text, and on particular incidents within it,
rather than on intricate relationships between segments of the work. Blake's struggle
towards an order that is not the order of the fallen Urizen is clear enough, as is his effort
to demonstrate that his earlier attempts to blame Urizenic order for all the problems of the
human condition were too narrowly focused. In fact, the very concept of identifying one
particular individual, group, or faculty as the cause of a fallen situation is treated as
problematic in The Four Zoas.
This problem is evidenced by the confusion of the characters themselves. None of
them agrees fully on the cause of their fragmented condition, and the reader has little
means of discerning whom to trust. As Blake portrays his characters' struggle for
understanding, he shows them telling each other stories about the fall, and in doing so, he
interrogates the uses of creation/fall narratives, which throughout the text function as an
agency for blame. The narratives of the fall refer to the loss of an earlier ideal state, but at
times, they also function as a kind of law. Although the first of these narratives comes
before the reign of Urizen, and they are not necessarily Urizenic, they perpetuate the
process of scapegoating that goes on throughout the text, even as they also serve to point
towards a possibly ideal order. In that sense, they function as both Hindrance and Act.
They limit and blame, while they also keep alive the sense that a better order is possible.
As we examine the first narrative that is a part of the main plot of the poem, and as we
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examine the stories of creation and fall that function as myths within the larger myth of the
The Four Zoas, it will become clear almost immediately how much Blake's idea of order
has changed since the earlier Lambeth prophecies. In the following section, we will
explore the ways in which Blake reframes order in The Four Zoas, transforming and
revising both his condemnation of order and his wholesale condemnation ofUrizen.
The Myths of the Fall: Fragmentation, Accusation, and the Rehabilitation of Urizen

In The Book of Urizen, as we have seen, order is essentially bound up in Urizen's
decision to separate himself from the rest of the Eternals. Differentiation itself is a
fundamental cause of fallenness in these early texts. In contrast, The Four Zoas assumes,
admittedly with some ambiguity, that differentiation is an inherent aspect of reality, even in
Eternity. As the Aged Mother sings at the beginning of the poem:
Four Mighty Ones are in every Man; a Perfect Unity . . .
Cannot Exist. but from the Universal Brotherhood of Eden . . .
The Universal Man. To Whom be Glory Evermore Amen (p.3, 11.3-5; E
300-01). 1 3
Urizen, Los, and the other Zoas exist in every person. Yet they exist also in the
"Universal Man," the ''Universal Brotherhood" that comprises all humankind. 14 From the
whole, that is through attention to and action on behalf of the whole, they are all held in a
perfect unity. Their division is the source of both the creation and fall, just as Urizen's
separation from the other Eternals is the source of creation and fall in The Book of Urizen.

1 3It

should be noted that in the original manuscri� line 4-11, which includes two of the lines
quoted above, were written over erased material (Erdman, "Textual Notes" 819).
1

4For discussion of the use of gender specific language, see the note on page 204.
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Yet that division is not caused by a single Zoa, and it cannot be resolved by any one Zoa
acting alone. The whole must be transformed, although what happens to the whole affects
the part, and vice versa.
Yet the division between the Zoas is acted out on the stage of history as well as
within the individual, just as it is in the Urizen texts. The Zoas' separation from one
another is a kind of disorder that exists within and between all of them, and it is manifested
both within the individual and within the human community as a whole.

As

the fallen Los

maintains in his prophecy in Night the First, he is able to see the coming bloodshed, ''the
swords & spears of futurity/Tho in the Brain of Man we live, & in his circling Nerves"
(p. l l,ll.14-15; E 306). Unity within and unity without are connected, and so are strife
within and strife without. While the Zoas live within the Human Brai� their battles are
acted out on the stage of history, where physical blood is shed. In a sense, this physical
blood is the unavoidable outgrowth of the symbolic blood that is shed within the
individual, as the different pieces of the self fight with one another. The implication is that
were unity attained within every person, unity would be attained in the world as well. Yet
changes in the external world can also produces changes within the individual.
This reciprocity is possible because the Zoas are all a part of one another, but each
Zoa still has specific traits that are characteristic of him specifically. These traits are
recognizable within individual human beings and within broader social movements.
Nevertheless, even though Blake gives each Zoa a name, and associates each one with
patterns of behavior that are familiar to us, he also makes it clear in the poem's invocation
that, in fact, the truth about the makeup of the human soul, and the Universal man, is
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unknowable and inexpressible in terms of our fallen language:
[ What] are the Natures of those Living Creatures the Heavenly Father only
[Knoweth] no Individual [Knoweth nor] Can Know in all Eternity. (p.3,ll.78; E 300-0 1 ) 15

The various faculties are one way of talking about the mysterious inner forces that work
within human beings and within their social orders.
Yet to talk about these beings, Blake must name them, and, as Kenneth Burke
makes so clear in both The Rhetoric ofMotives and The Rhetoric ofReligion, all language
exists by division and classification, simply because language must classify in order to
name. So, of course, the Zoas in their full unity are "unknowable" in human terms,
because "unnameable." At the same time, unless one returns to a pre-verbal state, one
must strive to create an order that comes as close as possible to allowing for unity-unity
within diversity, wholeness within a framework of naming. So at least part of the work of
The Four Zoas is to describe the problems of ordering an unnameable, ineffable human
identity that has "fallen" into the divisions of language, allowing the divided self to move
closer and closer to unity, peace, and universal brotherhood. 16
At the beginning of the poem's action, fragmentation is overtaking unity. The
process appears to be relatively new, because the characters do not know what is
happening to them, and they are desperately trying to figure out what happened and what

15 These lines were written over erased material. See footnote on previous page.
1 6nespite problems of sexist language, the term "brotherhood" is chosen deliberately. The
characters who remain at the end of The Four Zoas are all male. Since gender is such an issue in this text
and the later prophecies, it seems necessary to honor the changes that occur in Blake's treatment of
gender. Here, brotherhood truly appears to be the final aim of the text. In Blake's later illuminated works,
Milton and Jerusalem, the relationship between the genders is somewhat more complicated.
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to do about it. From the beginning of the actual narrative it is clear, however, that Urizen
is not the exclusive author of the confusion.

As

the scene opens, Urizen is nowhere in

sight, but Tharmas and his Emanation Enion are in the midst of a conflict that has to do
with sin and judgment. Tharmas has hidden Jerusalem and other Emanations in his bosom,
and Enion is jealous and accuses him of si� saying she has found it in the 'Tiark recesses"
of his soul (p.4,1.24; E 30 1 ). Tharmas acknowledges that he has sinned and that his
"Emanations are become harlots" (p.4,1.36; E 302), but then he goes on to accuse Enion:
"O Enion thou art thyself a root growing in hell/Tho thus heavenly beautiful to draw me to
destruction (p.4;ll.39-40; E 302). He has come to see his desire, even for his own
Emanatio� as sinful. Ultimately, this process of mutual recrimination leads to Enion' s
weaving Tharmas's Spectre, a monstrous, deformed being who arises to condemn her,
saying that he is "pure and unpolluted" and will "bring her to rigid strict account" for her
wrongdoings (p.6,11. 1 0- 1 1 ; E 303). His language reminds us of the kinds ofjudgments
typical of Urizen in the Lambeth prophecies.
Yet as Wilkie and Johnson point out, some of Tharmas's first words in this
passage have to do with his experience of himself and Enion as "a Victim" 17 and his sense
of contrition at having hidden away Albion's Emanation Jerusalem in his bosom, thus
pointing to the themes of destructive atonement that are pursued throughout most of the
poem (22) Furthermore, Enio� only a few lines later, refers to Tharmas in terms

17Note the singular noun form. Despite the conflict that has emerged between them, Tharmas still
sees himself and Enion as one being. The text referred to here can be found in The Four Zoas, p.3, 1.8;
30 1).
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reminiscent of the Biblical God, pointing out that she cannot look upon him and live. 1 8
Closely connected is her concern that "All Love is lost Terror succeeds & Hatred instead
of Love/And stern demand� of Right & Duty instead of Liberty" (p.4,11.18-19; E 301). At
one level, this is very familiar Blakean material: law, sin, guilt, and sexual frustration all
bound together, along with dyslogistic naming as a form of scapegoating. In the earlier
works, however, Urizen is clearly the source oflaw, whereas in this text, law and sin
become issues before Urizen has even made an appearance. 1 9
Since Enion identifies Tharmas with the God of Exodus, it is possible to see
Tharmas as the Urizenic figure in this passage. In fact, Guinn Batten makes this claim
directly, saying that Tharmas is "merely a more nostalgic, and morose, version of Urizen"
(105). On the other hand, Ault suggests that Urizen and Tharmas "are inversions of each
other" (Narrative 158), a somewhat more subtle and inviting expression of a similar idea,
since Tharmas is not a promising lawmaker. Throughout most of the poem, he is indeed as
controlling and problematic as the old Urizen of the Lambeth prophecies, but, as we will
see, so are all the Zoas. Besides, Tharmas is soft where Urizen is hard, watery where
Urizen is solid and rocky, and chaotic where Urizen is orderly. When Tharmas becomes
the reigning power after the fall of Urizen, he is incapable of structuring experience in the
manner required of a lawgiver; in fact, he is incapable of organizing anything, including his

18

1n Exodus 33:23, God allows Moses, who is both liberator and lawgiver to his people, a glimpse
of his back. because noone can look at God's face and live.
19

This point is debatable, since Night the Second, which begins with Urizen's assumption of
power at Albion's behest, was the original Night the First. However, as will be discussed later in this
chapter, Blake' s choice to move Night 2 is clearly marked

207

own thoughts. When he wants his kingdom ordered in Night IV, he must force Los and
the Spectre ofUrthona to do it for him.
To account for this problem, we might assume, as some do, that Urizen is still the
lawmaker in this text, and thus argue that Tharmas and Enion are already under Urizen's
control. However, Urizen's actions later in the chapter, when he lures Los into a league
against Luvah, indicate that Urizen has not yet consolidated his power during Night the
First. 20 In fact, Albion, the Universal Man, relinquishes his scepter to Urizen at the
beginning of Night the Second, in direct response to Enion's lament that appears at the
end of Night the First. Textual evidence indicates that Blake actually moved Night the
Second out of its original position as the opening night, thus indicating clearly that he did
not want to begin the poem with Urizen's assumption of control. 21 The ambiguous source
of law, sin, and guilt at the beginning of the poem is basic to its structure, despite concerns
about textual problems in Night the First. In this passage, law is already functioning as
hindrance with all the accompanying difficulties of guilt and scapegoating, and without the
presence ofUrizen as lawgiver.

20
As

Lincoln points out, the early copperplate version of the text does not include this passage
(30). It begins with the sexual union of Enion and the Spectre of Tharmas and the birth of Los and
Enithannon as a result of this union. The lines in the Erdman edition are written over erasures of an
earlier version ("Textual Notes" 819). Nevertheless, it makes sense to treat this narrative as part of the
final version of the poem. The earlier material was erased, and the narrative, obscure already, becomes
nonsensical if it simply begins with a union between the Spectre and Enion, without any indication of
what a Spectre is or where it came from.
21

Night the Second is not given a number in the heading on the manuscript. The original title
was Night the Third, which was erased Then Night the First appears to have been written twice and
erased. At the end of this Night, Blake has written "End of the Second Night." All of these marks were
erased. The title heading was never rewritten, but Night the First and Night the Third are both clearly
marked. Erdman concludes that night the Second "was evidently twice tried and rejected as First"
("Textual Notes" 828).

208
Wilkie and Johnson explain the guilt of Tharmas and Enion by means of a
distinction between moral and psychological guilt (24). 22 Yet this move finally explains
relatively little. "Moral" and "psychological" are not terms Blake himself uses, so "moral"
could refer to Urizenic law, or to a state more akin to the prior realm of Eternity or Eden.
Yet what we normally mean by "moral" would probably fit, within Blake's context, with
the idea ofUrizenic law and sexual repression. In Blake's writings up to this point, moral
law, functioning as hindrance, is the source of the psychological experience of guilt. Thus,
Wilkie's and Johnson's distinction would seem artificial.
The narrative simply does not tell us the source ofTharmas and Enion's guilt. The
implication is that both Tharmas and Enion believe that emanations are to remain with
their own Zoas, that the male figures are not to hide other males' emanations in their
bosoms, and that emanations are not to ''Examine every little fibre" of their Zoas' souls, as
Enion has done (p.4,1.29; E 302). Yet it is unclear where these ideas, or laws, come from,
or whether they are "true laws." The characters believe that a boundary has been broken,
but the reader cannot tell whether Tharmas and Enion simply found the world in this
fragmented condition, whether they somehow assisted in its fall, or whether others caused
a fall into fragmentation and Tharmas and Enion are to some extent victims of others'
choices. In fact, this fragmentation could even be part of a natural growth process, a
movement into the realm of language and individuation. Fragmentation is just the
2
2 Usually,

this issue is not addressed, perhaps because a number of critics, Bloom and Lincoln
among them, see the fall as beginning with Tharmas. The body is the first to fall, while Urizen falls later.
However, this view does not match the narratives told by the characters themselves (Bloom, Apocalypse
1 95; Lincoln 72-76).
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condition in which the characters find themselves. Yet the fact that the characters believe
that a primal order has been violated is enormously significant for their actions, in a sense
that points to a kind of truth in Batten's claim that Tharmas is a watery Urizen.
Once Tharmas and Enion believe that their feeling of fragmentation is caused by
violation of a primal order, then their suffering leads to guilt, as they struggle to
understand the cause of the suffering. Then their guilt leads to the creation of rigid
boundaries and laws. Tharmas and Enion make a desperate attempt to regain some kind of
order or control, that is, to establish in their minds precisely what law they have broken to
cause their pain so that they can now obey that law, or punish the guilty, or make
atonement so as to revise their situation. Their mutual recriminations are an attempt to
repair their situation by placing blame somewhere. Both alternate between taking it upon
themselves and finding it in the other. 23
At one level, Tharmas knows that he and Enion are the Victim of others' choices
or of some kind of process that they did not initiate themselves. 24 On the other hand, he
23
This

way of coping with chaos and suffering is entirely compatible with Kenneth Burke's
thinking about how "symbol-using animals" make meaning out of their experience. This exact scenario
does not appear in Kenneth Burke's discussions of order, guilt, and scapegoating, yet is it a logical
outgrowth of Burkean rhetoric. If language contains within it the principle of commandment-of yes and
no-then the tendency to create moral constructs is present in all human beings once they begin using
language, as is the tendency to see events as the results of one's own moral successes or failures. In The
Rhetoric ofReligion. Burke discusses in detail the way in which symbol-users conflate moral and natural
orders. so that death comes to be seen as punishment for violations of order (201-12). Other forms of
suffering can readily take on the same kind of meaning. Burke also argues that the idea works in reverse.
One can see moral failure and then look for punishment, or one can see suffering and begin to look for
moral failure. Tharmas and Enion engage in a process of this kind. It is arguable that, as language-users,
they experience themselves as morally responsible. Thus, their incomprehensible suffering tends to be
seen as punishment. whether or not they are aware of any wrongdoing. Self-recrimination. mutual
recrimination. and, finally, scapegoating, occur as a result.
24

As we \\'ill later learn. the division of the Zoas is apparently the result of choices made by
Urizen. Luvah. and most importantly, Albion. the Universal Man himsel( unless, as Ault suggests.
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feels contrition. While he personally did not make the choices that led to the chaos around
him, to the flight of the emanations of other Zoas to him, and to the conflicts between
himself and Enion, he, nevertheless participates in the continued destruction of the primal
unity, simply by responding to the new circumstances. The fear and conflict produced by
the fall into a chaotic and boundless state causes the Emanations of other Zoas to begin
running to Tharmas, as the parent power, for shelter. It causes Tharmas, with the best of
motives, to feel the need to enclose these Emanations, to create artificial boundaries for
them. When this act creates jealousy in Enion, he then desires to enclose her, in a
misguided attempt at appeasement. Enion, in her turn, desires to control Tharmas, and in
the process weaves his Spectre, who after a brief initial period of smiling infancy, becomes
even less biddable than Tharmas himself. This kind of boundary building is a desperate
response to the experience of fragmentation, but it also involves the attempt to control and
thus hinder the self and the other. Ultimately, the entire process is fraught with contrition,
accusation, a sense of victimization, and finally, the actual scapegoating of one another. As
John B. Pierce suggests, Tharmas is a victim who becomes a tyrant as a result of his
victimization, and often because he is trying to repair his world (490-92).
Thus, Tharmas is a victim and he is contrite, because he cannot stop himself from
violating his own sense of how things ought to be based upon the old "order'' of unfallen
primal oneness, an order that necessarily has its own shape and boundaries. Throughout

the narratives are simply methods of evading current problems by focusing on the source of those
difficulties in an illusory fall event.
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the text, Tharmas desperately seeks for order, on the assumption that perhaps some kind
of symbolic order might restore Enion to him, and in the process he becomes a controlling
Urizenic figure, although he is a pitifully ineffective one. The episode reveals Urizenic
behavior on the part of a Zoa other than Urizen, and it also reveals the necessity for some
kind of boundaries, which even the boundless Tharmas will try, ineffectually, to create for
himself if there is no other ordering power, like Urizen or Los, available to him.
Yet Tharmas' s efforts create an even more fallen situation. He and Enion are
completely separated. He becomes a formless chaos and all that remains of him is the
Spectre. Then the mating of the Spectre and Enion causes the fall of Urthona, who is
divided into two fragmented beings, the male Los and the female Enitharmon, both of
whom are born of the union between Enion and the Spectre of Tharmas. Eventually,
Enion will become a desolate wanderer while Tharmas will move in and out of
shapelessness, all the while crying for his lost Enion. This episode, placed at the opening
of the poem, sets up the sense of a fallen and fragmented world, the source of which is as
unclear to the reader as it is to the characters.
As the text

progresses, however, the characters begin to tell each other stories of

the fall, in an attempt to explain what has happened to them and who is responsible.
However, because the fall narrative is told in different versions by so many different
characters, it is never entirely clear what causes the fragmented condition that exists when
the narrative opens. Eight of the nine nights present narratives of the fall as it is perceived
by the characters, and all of the narrators are more or less unreliable. These speakers are
limited in their perception of how the fall occurred, in part because, as fallen beings, they
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have only a limited perspective, and in part because their own personal desires and
machinations skew their narratives.
There are a variety of critical responses to the differing fall narratives in The Four
Zoas, including that of Donald Ault, who maintains that "The central event of the 'fall' has
no structure or content other than serving as a pretext for setting incommensurable
perspectives in motion" ( 1 1 ). By offering these different accounts, Ault asserts, Blake
undermines ''Newtonian narrative" which "presupposes that behind the text lies a single
unified field (ur-narrative, privileged originating event, state of consciousness, and so on)
whose essential features do not irreconcilably and incommensurably conflict with one
another and can (in theory at least) be fully captured through systematic analytic
explanation" (3).
Of course, it is impossible to know for sure what state existed before the
creation/fall events described in the narrative; they are outside the text, and Blake does not
allow us a clear vision of what an original, primal condition might have been. Certainly, it
is possible that the characters have created this past paradise as a response to their chaotic
condition in the present. However, as Otto suggests when he discusses the differing
narratives concerning the birth of Los, 'lhe reader nonetheless gains the impression that
they [the storytellers within the text] are attempting to describe a common world," and I
would add, a common experience of some kind, despite their different versions of the
story (Critique 107). All of the characters agree that a fall has taken place, and the
recurring and varied accounts all have basic features. Even if the fall narratives offer
inaccurate memories based on nostalgia, and it is impossible to tell whether this is so or
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not, they all share a few basic perspectives on the events that led them to where they are.
Rosso maintains that the fall narratives contain ''two basic, but interrelated,
perspectives: that of Albion 'falling' for Vala and/or of Albion abdicating power because
of a Urizen-Luvah conspiracy" (65). 25 As we will see, neither of these basic plot elements
supports the idea that Urizen is the sole cause of the fall, that all "Urizenic" order is the
province ofUrize° or that all order is Urizenic. These concepts have been left behind with
'
the Lambeth prophecies. Indeed, the basic fall narratives assume an ideal order in which
there is an appropriate sense of what is the part and what is the whole, an order that
involves boundaries but without law, and form but without the imposition of form from
above. They also reveal, however, a tendency towards self-justificatio° and sometimes
'
even scapegoating, in response, not to a rigid order, but to a condition of fragmentation.
In a sense, they reiterate the feelings and behavior exhibited by Tharmas and Enion, who
yearn for unity, yet respond to fragmentation by mutual recrimination and a desire for
power over one another, thus undermining their own desire for reunion.
This desire for mutual recrimination and for power over others is certainly evident
in the first creation narrative told by anyone other than the narrator. In Night the First,
Enitharmon relates this version of the story to Los: 26
25

Rosso' s claim here does account for most of the stories, and it accounts for all of the characters
who appear in fall narratives. However, in some of the Urizen/Luvah narratives, it is unclear that there
was any conspiracy between these two Zoas. At times they are portrayed in conflict with one another,
\\'ithout a clear reference to a plot to overthrow Albion.
26

0ne could argue that the first narrative in The Four Zoas, the story of Thannas and Enion just
discussed above. is a fall narrative. In fact. Rosso treats it as such in this chapter entitl¢ "'Plotting the
Fall" (64-68). In a sense. Rosso is correct, but it is important to differentiate between the fall narratives
told by the narrator and those related by the characters themselves. In this particular segment of the
chapter. I am choosing to consider only those fall narratives presented by the characters themselves, in
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The Fallen Man takes his repose: Urizen sleeps in the porch
Luvah and Vala woke & flew up from the Human Heart
Into the Brain; from thence upon the pillow Vala slumber' d.
And Luvah siez'd the Horses of Light, & rose into the Chariot of Day
(p. 10,11. 1 0- 1 3 ; E 305)
In this account, Urizen and Albion are both victims of a usurpation plotted by Luvah and
Vala and executed while its victims are asleep. Urizen is clearly not at fault, and neither is
Albion, at least not initially. Luvah and Vala engage in a violation of the original order at
two levels. Vala, often named as Nature by Blake interpreters, is also the Emanation of
Luvah, and, as such, a part of Albion. Thus, her seduction of Albion is the seduction of the
whole by a fragment, which, if successful, would ensnare him in an attachment to a part of
himself. Such an attachment would necessarily lead to imbalance and disorder, at both the
personal and the social level. Falling in love with Vala would distract Albion from a vision
of the whole Human Form Divine, causing him to gaze with enamored delight upon one
part of his own being. 27
Luvah, on the other hand, attempts to usurp the place of another Zoa, Urizen. In
doing so, he violates the order of equality among the Zoas. As Damrosch points out,
Luvah's main error here is in assuming that Urizen's place and possessions are better than
his own or that '1.Jrizen is supreme" (135). In making that assumption, Luvah assumes a

order to evaluate how their stories clarify Blake's use of myth and his ideas about symbolic order.
Nevertheless, it is valuable to consider whether this may, in fa� be the beginning of the actual fall, for
which the others are purely and simply a coverup.
27

Otto has already explored this whole/part connection, albeit to a somewhat different purpose. In
describing Albion's behavior in the spectre's account, Otto writes: "Albion's desire is no longer for others
but for a portion of himself. In fainting against the breast of Vala, he narcissistically attempts to embrace
a portion of his own being . . . [T] his activity of the entire Man reproduces the same event in his
members" (Critique 1 10).
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hierarchical reality and thus creates it. S o in this narrative, Luvah, not Urizen, i s the author
of what we have come to think of as Urizenic order, initiated not by the creation of law,
but by the violation of a primaeval harmony. This particular fall narrative describes a fall
that is not Urizen's fault.
This tale cannot be accepted at face value, however, for three reasons. First, as
Victoria Myers points out, Enitharmon likes this story because she likes to identify herself
with Vala and to see herself as the one who breaches the boundaries of her world and
becomes the lover of the Universal Man (230). Second, Enitharmon tells this story to
make Los jealous, and succeeds royally; he becomes so enraged that he violently assaults
her. Finally, in telling the story in this way, she is currying favor with Urizen, whose help
she calls upon when Los strikes her, and whom she evidently sees as her potential pathway
to glory. In addition, Enitharmon has been born into this fallen creation. She does not have
a clear perspective on how it came into being. Thus, we cannot entirely trust Enitharmon' s
suggestion that Urizen is an innocent victim ofLuvah's treachery. 28
While Vala's role is most significant to Enitharmon, later in Night the First, the
daughters of Beulah, who preside over a kind of middle space between Eden and the
Fallen World, offer another much longer version, and their account omits Vala from the
narrative altogether. In this version, Urizen suggests to Luvah that the two should
conspire together against Albion and each seize a kingdom. He goes on to offer Luvah his
horses of light, suggesting that he, Urizen, will remain in the human brain and take

28

This particular conflict between Los and Enitharmon will be discussed again in greater detail
later in the chapter.
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possession of Jerusalem, her children, Urizen's children and Luvah's children, while Luvah
flees to another kingdom with Urizen's steeds. Luvah, on the other hand, tells Urizen,
'1>ictate to thy Equals. am not I/The Prince of all the hosts of Men nor Equal know [sic]
in Heaven . . . (p.22,11.36-3 7; E 3 1 1). Luvah, wanting ascendency himself, refuses to
cooperate, believing that Urizen intends to take control and leave him out altogether. He
wishes to overthrow Albion and then make war on Urizen. Both Zoas speak in a voice
that, in earlier texts would have been associated with Urizen alone. Urizen claims that
once he takes control of Albion's Emanation Jerusalem, her children, Los' s children, and
Urizen's own children, then he will "lay [his] scepter'' on them and his "strong command
shall be obeyd" (p.21 ,11. 30 & 33; E 3 1 1). Luvah, in like manner, says that he does not
want to leave Urizen behind, asking " . . . wilt thou not rebel to my laws remain/In
darkness building thy strong throne . . . " (p.22,11.5-6; E 3 1 1). The ensuing battle between
them causes the fall of all the Zoas.
In this account, Albion's only fault is sleeping, but Urizen and Luvah are each
every bit as destructive as the other, struggling to gain ascendency over one another and
over Albion himself 29 Both Zoas are Urizenic law-givers, both are tyrants, and both are
guilty of trying to take on the role of Albion, of whom each of them is only a part (p.21 ,
1. 13-22, & 1.40 and p. 19,11. 1-5; E 3 1 1 -1 2). Their attempt at usurpation is a violation of an
original hierarchy, and it is, for both of them, an attempt to establish what, in the Lambeth

29Whether or not Albion's sleep is innocent is another question. Rosso, for one, asserts that
Albion's sleeping is negligent, part of a pattern of male indolence and inactivity that affects Albion as
well as other characters. See Rosso, page 75, for a discussion of Albion's indolence in the course of
Ahania' s fall narrative.

217
prophecies, we would have seen as Urizenic order.
However, this account is also biased. The messengers of Beulah are concerned for
the well-being of the sick Albion and his Emanation Jerusalem. Their report is meant to
inspire the Council of God to "Gird on thy Sword . . . Destroy these opressors of
Jerusalem & those who ruin Shiloh" (p. l 9,ll.4-5; E 3 1 2). Their narrative denies any
culpability to Albion himself, focusing instead on the two obvious malefactors who could
readily be punished. At this moment in the text, these generally gentle and benevolent
creatures are seeking someone to punish in order to assuage their own terror at what is
happening.
This tendency to use creation/fall narratives in order to promote schemes of
vengeance or personal aggrandizement is typical of most of the narratives. In Night the
Seventh, the Shadow ofEnithannon tells a story designed to denigrate Urizen, who now
holds her and her son Ore in thrall, and to bring down Vala whom she envies. Immediately
afterwards, the Spectre ofUrthona, a character who rejects the flesh even as he attempts
the seduction of the Shadow, blames the fall on the emergence of the female characters. In
so doing, he reaffirms both his desire for a "reunion" with Enitharmon and his repugance
towards sexuality, all at the same time.
Even those characters who blame themselves for the fall tend to do so in a tone of
self-aggrandizement. The only narrative which names Urizen as the sole author of the fall
is Urizen's own, a story which he tells only to himself in Night the Fifth when he awakens
to find his golden world destroyed and himself reduced to the form given him by Los.
Here Urizen takes total responsibility for the fall, a gesture that appears at first glance to
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be positive. Yet, as Lincoln suggests, Urizen seems to have significant gaps in his memory
(125). It might be further noted that those gaps produce an argument that upon close
examination is as full of self-aggrandizement as it is self-pity. The self-pity appears first:
Ah how shall Urizen the King submit to this dark mansion/Ah how is this! Once on the
heights I stretchd my throne sublime" (p.63;ll.24-25; E 343). Then Urizen offers a litany of
his failings: he withheld his horses from Albion; he forgot that Albion was king; he refused
to go and seek out Tharmas as Albion had commanded; finally, he caused the fall.
At this point, his story becomes completely inconsistent. First he says that he fell
when he disobeyed Albion, pulling Urthona down with him, then seizing Luvah and
bringing him down, as well. Yet a few lines later, his explanation changes:
Because thou [Luvah] gavest Urizen the wine of the Almighty
For steeds of Light that they might run in they golden chariot of pride
I gave to thee the Steeds I pourd the stolen wine
And drunken with the immortal draught fell from my throne sublime
(p.65,ll.5-8; E 344)
When he begins to talk about the fall of Luvah, Urizen' s account is incoherent. He says at
first that he pulls Luvah down. Then he acknowledges an interaction with Luvah that
involves some sort of a plot between them, thus implying that Luvah is at least partially
responsible. Yet he still blames himself for Luvah's fall, regretting that Luvah, whose feet
were '1:00 pure for other feet" and whose locks were ''fair," is now ''faded" and ''bound"
(p.64,1.28; p.65,ll. l-4; E 344). Urizen sees himself as having caused everything. But
nowhere does he acknowledge that he built a kingdom by sacrificing this same Luvah,
events that have happened within the main line of the narrative. He takes the blame in
ways that do not make sense while ignoring the ways in which he clearly is to blame.
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Predictably, Urizen is echoed in Night the Seventh by Ore, the fallen Luvah, who
bound down and tormented, nevertheless claims to have stolen Urizen's steeds and his
fire, thus causing Urizen to be in the abstracted and cold condition in which he exists in
Night the Seventh. These narratives, in balancing one another, show both Urizen and
Luvah still determined to defeat and best one another, if only by taking full credit for the
disaster in which they have jointly participated, and by which they have both been so
horribly reduced in grandeur and power.
Each of these narratives may or may not have a basis in a primal experience of an
unfallen world that all the Zoas once shared. As myths, they function to describe three
aspects of the Zoas' present situation. The stories express the fragmentation of Albion.
They describe the fruitless and painful quest for hierarchical supremacy that exists between
the different pieces of him, the different elements of society, and even between systems of
order themselves. Finally, they express the terrible sexual anxiety that perpetually tortures
the relationships between Zoa and Emanation in a fragmented world. Each of these stories
also functions as rhetoric designed to further the interests of a given character at a given
moment. Yet none of them allow us to turn Urizen into the prime mover of all evil, as he
was in The Book of Urizen3° .
Instead, the stories we have examined so far all reflect a desire for vengeance,
flattery, or self-aggrandizement in some form, and these destructive desires belong to all
/
3°My argument here is, in part, anticipated by Dora Czikos,
who uses the analysis of language
surrounding Urizen and psychological theory to track changes in Urizen's personality and significance.
She suggests that Urizen's character is transformed between The Book of Urlzen and The Book ofAhania,
and then again between Ahania and The Four Zoas. In The Four Zoas, Cziko� sees both ''regressive and
progressive sides" to Urizen ( 131).
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the Zoas. One fall narrative, however, the story told by Ahania, Urizen's Emanation,
comes closer than any other to offering a fall narrative that is driven by positive
motivations. Ahania certainly has her own agenda, and it affects her perception of how the
fall narrative should be presented. Nevertheless, hers is the one story that places the
primary responsibility for fragmentation upon Albion, the whole human being, 3 1 and that
also gives the first suggestion as to how the Zoas and their Emanations might overcome
their fragmented condition.
Ahania' s story is presented in Night the Third, after she has heard the lament of
Enion, wandering alone and mourning for the suffering which persists despite, and perhaps
because of, the glory ofUrizen's golden world. Ahania is speaking to Urizen, responding
to his anxiety about the future rebirth of Luvah and the potential loss of his own kingdom,
and her rhetorical aim is to get Urizen to renounce his position as King and return to his
role as Prince of Light, restoring responsibility for the future to Albion, the Universal
Man. She describes the fall as an act of religious idolatry perpetrated by the Universal
Man. The fall begins when the Man walks with Vala as his consort, thus, as we have
previously seen, setting up a narcissistic devotion to a fragment of his own being. Urizen is
sleeping and Luvah is dwelling in a cloud above the Man and Vala, and the Man goes on
to make his second mistake.
In his anxiety about his attachment to Vala, he begins to worship another part of
himself The description is ambiguous, however:

31

0ne might just as well say "upon the Universal Man, the whole human community."

22 1
. . . Luvah dwelt in the cloud
Then Man ascended mourning into the splendors of his palace
Above him rose a Shadow from his wearied intellect
Of living gold, pure, perfect, holy; in white linen pure he hover'd
A sweet entrancing self delusion, a watry vision of Man
Soft exulting in existence all the Man absorbing
Man fell upon his face prostrate before the watry shadow
Saying O Lord whence is this change thou knowest I am nothing
And Vala trembled & coverd her face, & her locks. were spread on the
pavement
I heard astonishd at the Vision & my heart trembled within me
I heard the voice of the Slumberous Man & thus he spoke
Idolatrous to his own Shadow word of Eternity uttering
0 I am nothing when I enter into judgment with thee (p.40,ll. 1 - 1 3; E 327).
As Bloom points out, this last line, along with the five lines that follow it, allude to Psalm
149 ("Commentary" 949). Essentially, the Ancient Man Albion kneels before a piece of
himself and declares himself to be nothing in comparison to it-fragmentation at its most
basic and divisive. Such a reversal would, in effect, completely invert the appropriate
hierarchical relationship between part and whole. It subjects Albion's will, the will of the
total being, to one piece of himself, thus isolating other parts and setting up a hierarchical
struggle between the different Zoas.
What is more, the narrative makes it unclear exactly which Zoa Albion is
worshiping. Since the vision that he worships is watery, and Luvah is dwelling in a watery
cloud, it could well be Luvah. In fact, Lincoln argues that it is Luvah, and if this is so, the
Man's worship of Luvah reflects a kind of obsession with the passions born of a
narcissistic investment in Vala (64). Immediately after this speech is made, Luvah
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descends from the cloud and strikes the Man down, causing his illness, and thus making
that illness appear to be a punishment for the sin of adultery.
On the other hand, Rosso argues that Albion is bowing before Urizen, also a
logical choice that fits some aspects of the textual evidence (74). Luvah has hidden Los
and Enitharmon in a cloud, and he himself is in that same cloud; thus, one might assume
that he too is hidden. Further, the Shadow that the Man worships rises "from his wearied
intellect." The intellect is Urizen's realm, and Urizen is sleeping at the time. Thus the man
could be, in a sense, beholding Urizen' s dreams, his "sweet entrancing self delusion." If
this is the case, Luvah's descent to smite Albion is most likely an act of jealousy for
Albion's involvement with Vala and his exaltation ofUrizen into a po.sition higher than
Luvah's. However, if this is the case, Urizen's dream ofhimself"soft exulting in existence
all the Man absorbing" is a Luvah-like dream, a passionate, ardent vision of self
enhancement. In any case, it is simply impossible to determine with certainty which Zoa
Albion is worshiping. In either case, it is clear that Albion has set up conflict between parts
of himself by glorifying some parts over others and setting up a hierarchical order between
them. In fact, if this were an accurate story of the origins of the fall, it could be that the
confusion about whom Albion is worshiping is at the root ofUrizen's and Luvah's
struggle for power.
In her article on the fall narratives in The Four Zoas, Myers suggests that this
particular narrative is the one we should accept as accurate, because Ahania's intentions in
telling the story are unselfish (234). Ahania has heard the mourning ofEnion in her
fragmented conditio� and she also recognizes that Urizen's godlike position of deity,
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bestowed upon him by Albio� is not good for him or her. Myers suggests that Ahania's
fall narrative is the only one that is not dominated by a sense of self-protectiveness and a
spirit of domination. In a sense, Myers is correct. Ahania's motives are more unselfish than
those of the other Zoas and Emanations who offer narratives of the fall. However, Ahania
also has rhetorical purposes of her own. She is risking criticism of Urize� and must
placate him throughout her speech. Judith Lee even suggests that we should read Ahania's
story as an excessively submissive fabrication designed to divert his wrath. This argument
is unlikely, given that Ahania's words anger Urize� not because Ahania is submissive to
Urize� but because she asks Urizen to surrender his power to Albion. Nevertheless, in
claiming that Ahania's account is also affected by self-interest, Lee makes an important
point ( 1 3 5-36).
In its totality, Ahania's story cannot be taken as entirely correct any more than the
other fall narratives. Nevertheless, one aspect of her version is particularly pertinent to this
discussion. Ahania is aware that the part cannot overthrow or depose the whole without
consent from the whole. Urizen cannot be the villain that he was in the Lambeth
prophecies, because he could not have power if it were not given him by the Universal
Man. Her story accurately reflects the substance of the narrative at the beginning of Night
the Second, when Albion hands over his sceptre to Urizen. Albion deliberately turns
dominion of his inner life over to a fragment of himself, while blaming another fragment of
himself, Luvah, for his illness. Yet Luvah could not have made Albion sick had Albion not
fallen in love with and worshipped fragmentary bits of his own being. Furthermore, Albion
makes the decision to give all his power to Urizen despite the fact that he knows, at some
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level, that Urizen and Luvah have quarreled and that the two are jointly responsible for his
suffering:
Rising upon his Couch of Death Albion beheld his Sons
Turning his Eyes outward to Self. losing the Divine Vision
Albion calld Urizen & said. Behold these sickning Spheres
Whence is this Voice of Enion that soundeth in my Porches
Take thou possession! take this Scepter! go forth in my might
For I am weary, & must sleep in the dark sleep of Death
Thy brother Luvah hath smitten me but pity thou his youth
Tho thou hast not pitid my Age O Urizen Prince of Light (P.23,11. 1 -8; E
3 13)
Luvah is the one who smites Albion, but Albion himself admits that Urizen has also
mistreated the Universal Man and may not be entirely trustworthy. Urizen receives power
only because Albion does not realize that his illness is his own doing, the result of
"Turning his Eyes outward to Self, losing the Divine Vision" by glorifying parts of himself
and forgetting his own divine life.
Thus, it is up to Albion to find a way to tum his eyes back inward, to focus on the
whole Human Form Divine. Yet he assumes that his fragmented pieces actually have
power over him and acts accordingly. Although Albion begs Urizen to have mercy on
Luvah, he himself is scapegoating Luvah, blaming him completely for Albion's sufferings
and choosing another guilty party to reign over Luvah and contain him. Throughout the
rest of the poem, Urizen will make the choice to scapegoat Luvah, because Albion has
already done so. Albion's choice in this situation drives all the action from Night the
Second onward. This choice, along with the story of the fragmentation of Tharmas and
Enion and the birth of Los and Enitharmon, can be seen as part of the central myth of The
Four Zoas. These narratives describe what happens in the world of the poem. The creation
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tales are myths within a myth. They tell the characters' stories about what has brought
them to where they are. They also say something about where the characters ought to be,
but the ideal order their stories imply is usually contradicted by their own purposes in
telling the story. The characters' creation myths imply an ideal order in which the parts
dwell in harmony, in which male and female are somehow united, and in which the whole
maintains an integrity greater than that of the parts. In a sense, these parts come into
existence in the process of being named, and should never take priority over the fullness of
the Divine Form itself However, except for Ahania, the characters use the stories in an
effort to attain supremacy for themselves, as fragments, or for the supremacy of other
fragments with whom they are allied. All such efforts are, finally, plots against Albion
himself
In setting up these myths within myths, Blake implicates his own mythmaking as
well. He describes his own mythic efforts to explain the broken state of the world and to
find solutions for it. Furthermore, he recognizes that the order he establishes in his myth
making describes his ideal from his limited perspective as a storyteller. Even as a prophet
and man of vision, he cannot know the true and full nature of the inner life of the
individual human being, much less of the Universal Man, which "no Individual [Knoweth
nor] Can know in all Eternity'' (p.3,l.8; E 301). In commenting on the nature of myth,

Blake also makes it clear that the purpose of a myth is to function as prophecy, not to
accurately predict the future or even to describe the past, but to "rouzes the faculties to
act" in history (E 702). The purpose is not to describe the world accurately, but to live in
it accurately. However, one's descriptions of reality can and will affect the way in which
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one lives. It is for that reason that Blake had critiqued the Genesis narrative in the
Lambeth prophecies. He wanted to show how his contemporaries use the creation story,
and other Biblical narratives, as a way to oppress others.
Now, in The Four Zoas, Blake moves on to revise the myths he created in these
earlier texts. Just as the Zoas and Emanations use their creation narratives to serve narrow
ends, or to blame particular characters, Blake himself had done the same in his previous
Urizen texts. Now he examines the limited aims of the earlier texts that scapegoat Urizen
by implying that the bearded patriarch is the source of all division in the world and that his
elimination will make redemption possible. However, Blake has discovered that this
pattern of thinking reaches a dead-end, logically and historically. It allows no possibility
for further movement. So he rehabilitates Urizen in The Four Zoas . . The Urizen of The
Four Zoas is not the sole cause of the fall, nor is he unredeemably evil. As Lincoln
suggests in his discussion of the early copperplate version of the poem:
The treatment of the idea of creation in the copperplate text is much more
complex than that in Urizen, not only in structure but also in tone. The
golden feast and the Golden World are described in a language that reveals
simultaneously their limitations and their genuinely seductive appeal, while
Urizen himself at times is allowed an almost tragic dignity. (66-67)
In The Four Zoas, Urizen ceases to be a "demon of smoke" and becomes, instead, a kind
of fallen angel, possessed of a genuinely creative and valuable intellectual power.
Even in the later nights, when Urizen's role is more exclusively negative, the
importance ofUrizen as a limit-setting faculty is reiterated. Near the end of The Four
Zoas, in Night the Ninth, Albion recovers and arises to claim his authority, and one of his
first acts is to call for the repentance and redemption ofUrizen, whom he calls
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"Schoolmaster of souls," and who, he suggests, should be dwelling in the villages where
children will "play around [his] feet in gentle awe/Fearing [his] frown loving [his] smile"
(p. 1 20,11.24-25; E 389). 32 Urizen's role as limit and teacher is necessary, and even in his
semi-fallen condition early in the poem, he prevents Los and Enitharmon from murdering
one another and creates a kingdom that provides a beautiful dwelling-place for many of
those who have fallen.
Nevertheless, Blake's rehabilitation ofUrizen is only partial, and for most of the
poem, he is extremely destructive. In part, this destructiveness has to do with something
essential to Urizen's nature, something that is good unless it is made supreme. Frye calls
Urizen God's '�sdom and sense of form" (274). Form is necessary, and it can only exist
where there is a bounding line, that line that was, for Blake, so important to his art. But
when he has sovereign power, Urizen's creation ofboundaries becomes rigidity and an
unwillingness to forgive. Rigidity and vengefulness become the source of Urizen's law, a
source of error, both religious and political.
Ahania's plea to Urizen to renounce his anxious sovereignty and yield up his
power suggests that, if at any point in the process of the fall, there could have been a
mutual yielding between adversaries, a mutual forgiveness, rather than scapegoating and
recrimination, the disaster could have been reversed. However, in placing Urizen, or
reason, in the position of sovereignty, Albion makes the ideas of limit, boundary, and
32

0f course, not everyone reads this moment in the text as a real affirmation ofUrizen's value.
For example, Otto argues that the Eternal Man has been asleep and is "'unaware that Urizen's dragon form
is the culmination of his attempts to arise" and obey the kinds of commands the Eternal Man is now
making (29 1). However. the success of Albion's speech at reminding Urizen of his humanity belies the
idea that his affirmation is simply inaccurate.
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abstract rule the most important principles. In so doing, he locks out the possibility of a
ready yielding or a ready forgiveness. Law, in the negative, antinomian sense, becomes
supreme, and scapegoating follows in its wake.
For Blake, Urizen's fallen world is certainly a representation of an eighteenth
century culture that has made reason and abstraction supreme over all other human
faculties, something that has been recognized in Blake studies for some time. Yet Blake is
also making a transhistorical claim about a certain kind of symbolic order and its rhetorical
effects in history, especially when that order is accompanied by the quest for hierarchical
supremacy and self-justification. A good portion of The Four Zoas is given to the
depiction of the historical effects of the reign ofUrizenic law, as well as to the kinds of
chaos that ensue in its wake when it collapses. In Nights 1-5, we see that scapegoating is a
central act ofUrizen's reign from the very beginning. It is his way of establishing order
and maintaining it. But we also see that when other characters, like Los, engage in a battle
for supremacy, they can also create destructive orders built on scapegoating, orders every
bit as destructive as Urizen's. In the next section, we will examine the ways in which
scapegoating serves as a foundation for Urizenic and Losian forms of order, even as the
qualities of fixity and openness that differentiate the two forms of order begin to appear.
The Scapegoat as a Function of Urizenic and Losian Order in Nights One through
Five
If we had only the first five nights of The Four Zoas, we would have a text that is
every bit as pessimistic and dark as The Book of Urizen and The Book ofAhania.
Although Urizen has been somewhat rehabilitated, scapegoating is ubiquitous, and most of
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the characters participate in it to some degree, especially Urizen and Los, who bear the
principle responsibility for ordering reality. The scapegoating activities within the text take
a variety of fonns. At the level of physical violence, there is personal assault. There is the
violence nonnally associated with the powers of the monarchy or the state, warfare, for
instance, and judicially authorized execution. There is the violence of ritual sacrifice
associated with religion in almost all of its institutional fonns, including but not limited to
Druidism and the doctrine of atonement as it appears in Christianity. Moving away from
literal, physical violence, there is the kind of dyslogistic naming and mutual recrimination
that we have already seen in Tharmas and Enion. Finally, there is the psychic violence
enacted between the generations, the force by which one generation binds its offspring
into submission to it. While such binding does not necessarily imply the use of physical
force, Blake describes it in these tenns, and with the use of strongly sacrificial imagery. All
of those activities are for Blake fonns of human sacrifice, and all proceed from motives
that connect to Burkean ideas about symbolic order, consubstantiation, and scapegoating.
In times of chaos, scapegoating usually serves as a means to create
consubstantiation. The characters use sacrifice as a means to bind themselves to others and
to create a social order to replace the one that is lost. On the other hand, once order has
been established, sacrifices continue, both to recreate the ever fragile bonds that tie the
characters together and to relieve guilt. Yet, in a sense, most of these sacrifices also have
to do with the displacement of either guilt or suffering from the self to another. As we
have seen, the need for sacrificial activity grows from the characters' sense of falleness and
fragmentation, because these unpleasant realities are seen as consequences of a violated
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order. The mutual recrimination apparent in the dialogue between Tharmas and Enion are
an early example of scapegoating by means of dyslogistic language. The same tendency
appears in the ways the various characters use creation/fall narratives to assign blame and
to establish power and hierarchy as principles which enhance their own aims over those of
others. Guilt and its displacement through mutual recrimination occur because there is
chaos. Sacrificial activity creates consubstantiation and restores order. Then order begets
transgression, creating its own guilt and the need for more sacrifices to redeem the
violators. These forms of scapegoating obviously involve hindering others in order to
advance one's own end. But, such scapegoating also involves an element of action, as new
structures, however faulty and partial, replace the chaos of total fragmentation.
As we have already seen, this process begins with Tharmas and Enion. Before
Night the First ends, their children, Los and Enitharmon, join forces with Urizen to
scapegoat Luvah and Vala as a means of creating consubstantiation between themselves
and Urizen, thus establishing a new order. Urizen establishes his power, in part, because
he is able to use Luvah as a common enemy to unite himself with Los and Enitharmon,
both to prevent their mutual murder and to draw upon their imaginative powers for his
own purposes. This possibility is available to Urizen, because Los and Enitharmon have
inherited the pattern of mutual hatred, accusations, and verbal recrimination from their
parents, Enion and the Spectre of Tharmas. Yet their destructiveness surpasses that of
their parents because it escalates into violence. Recriminations alone are enough to destroy
Tharmas and Enion, but their offspring, are only able to save themselves from actual
physical murder by joining forces with Urizen and turning against Luvah.

23 1
In Night the First, Los' s physical assault of Enitharmon is provoked by his jealous
response to her fall narrative, in which she celebrates Vala' s romance with Albion while
envying Vala's role in the story. Furious, Los knocks Enitharmon down, and lays the
blame for the fall of Albion on her and Vala. Furthermore, he accuses her of returning
hostility for devotion: "I have refusd to look upon the Universal Vision/And wilt thou slay
with death him who devotes himself to thee" (p. 1 0,ll.23-24; E 306). Identifying himself
with Albion abandoned by the unfaithful Vala, the prophetic Los accurately perceives a
vision of warfare coming in "a shower of blood" along with "the swords & spears of
futurity" (p. 1 1 ,1. 1 3 ; E 306). Inaccurately, and as a result of his rage, he predicts that this
disaster will overtake Enitharmon specifically. She follows with recriminations of her own.
Since Los physically assaults one who has merely threatened him verbally, and since both
he and Enitharmon have been engaging in a game of withholding sexual favors while
chasing away other suitors, his attack contains a strong scapegoating element. That
element is accentuated by Los' s willingness to blame Enitharmon for his own choice to
focus on her rather than on the Eternal vision.
Enitharmon escalates the quarrel to an even higher pitch. Invoking the aid of
Urizen with violent language, she threatens Los with punishment and with the destruction
of "Human Nature" through ''War & Princedom & Victory & Blood" (p. 1 1 ,1.24; E 306).
Urizen's descent at this time, declaring himself to be an eternal God, establishes his
ambiguous role in the first half of the text. On the one hand, he comes with the purpose of
putting together a tenuous alliance between Los and Enitharmon because he needs Los' s
support in his battle with Luvah, and he needs Los's imaginative powers as a foundation
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for his own order. 33 On the other, his nature as boundary and limit-setter is necessary in
this fallen situation, " the one must have murderd the other if he had not descended"
(p. 12,1.6; E 306). Urizen's presence and his bargain with Los sets a limit to the couple's
mutual hostility, and the two are married under Urizen' s auspices.
Yet the joining o� these two ambivalent beings creates a union, or a state of
consubstantiation, based upon further violence. Urizen, Los, and Enitharmon join together
in opposition to Luvah and Vala. This alliance is celebrated with a primitive form of
mystery, founded upon Urizen's claims of divinity and upon the anticipated sacrifice of
Luvah and the many victims of the coming warfare. Los's and Enitharmon's marriage rites
begin with what Bloom calls a "demonic" communion of ''fleshly bread" and "nervous
wine" that leaves Luvah and Vala on the outside ''forsaken in fierce jealousy" and
"suspended in blood"("Commentary'' 950; p. 1 3,11.4-5; E 308), while the ''Elemental Gods"
sing wedding songs about warfare, violence, and slaughter. The wedding feast ends with a
prophecy of Luvah and Vala being melted and cut into wedges, a vision which will be
fulfilled in Night the Second.
These images make it clear that the union of Los and Enitharmon is sustained
sacrificially. The sacrifices link them to Urizen in a common rejection ofLuvah.
Furthermore, ritual sacrifices satisfy Urizen's desire to punish Luvah continually and
repeatedly for the supposed theft ofUrizen's horses, or for whatever breach has occurred

33My reading here is heavily dependent upon Lindo� pages 77-79. In fact, in his Spiritual
History, Lincoln emphasizes repeatedly how Urizen and Los each need the other. Furthermore, Lincoln
also argues on page 79 that Urizen comes to Los and Enitharmon offering both love and law, but his is a
love that is soft. tender. and pitying, devoid of the passions that have their source in Luvah.
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in the relationship between the two Zoas. The one marriage in the poe� the one sexual
relationship based upon formal symbolic rites, is linked at its inception with slaughter and
violence, and it leads to no long-term satisfaction for the couple. Rather they are
perpetually "discontent. . . . /Craving the more the more enjoying" (p. 16, 1.18-19; E 310).
Arguably, they continue to crave more sex as well as more violence, and at this point the
two are always linked for them, since in their rage and ambivalence towards one another,
they can only unite as lovers through the ritual sacrifice of Luvah, Vala, and the other
victims ofUrizen's wars. Ironically, Luvah is generally understood to represent the faculty
of passion, so Los's and Enitharmon's marriage is based upon the sacrifice of passion
itself, a strong commentary on Urizenic marriage.
The sacrifice ofLuvah envisioned in Night the First becomes an actuality in Night
the Second, as Luvah is m�lted down in a furnace at the instigation of Urizen's sons. This
time, the sacrifice ofLuvah occurs precisely because the sick and dying Albion
relinquishes control of his warring members, turning everything over to Urizen and simply
requesting that Urizen be merciful to Luvah, a request that Urizen, with his obsession with
avenging the violation of his boundaries, has no interest in respecting. Furthermore,
Albion's plea for mercy is particularly ineffective when he himself is scapegoating Luvah
for his own and Urizen's actions, even as he speaks.
However, Luvah's sacrifice is not the first to take place in Night the Second. In
this Night, sacrifice continues to move beyond the personal desire to reduce guilt and
transfer it to the other and becomes linked to the creation and preservation of a new
symbolic order. The creation of this order requires consubstantiation, so sacrifice
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continues, in part, to create the bonds that will allow Urizen and his "bands" to unite in the
task of creation. The sacrificial nature of this creation is nevertheless determined in part by
the attitudes which drive Urizen to the process of creation. When Urizen takes control at
Albion's behest, his first act is to have his sons build the Mundane Shell. Yet Urizen's
command is not simply a spontaneous act of creativity on his part. Rather, Urizen begins
this action because Albion's weakened condition and relinqueshment of control causes
Urizen to become conscious of a Void opening up beneath him:
Terrific Urizen strode above, in fear & pale dismay
He saw the indefinite space beneath & his soul shrunk with horror
His feet upon the verge of Non Existence; his voice went forth
Luvah & Vala trembling & shrinking, beheld the great
Work master
And heard his Word! Divide ye bands influence by influence
Build we a Bower for heavens darling in the grizly deep. . . (p.24,11.2-7; E
3 14)
Urizen is terrified of Non Existence, or death, so he attempts to save Albion, and thus
himself, by creating a world as a ''Bower" for Albion. As Bloom suggests, "Urizen thinks
he is establishing a merciful limit beyond which reality cannot contract . . . "(Apocalypse
212). The problem is that this creation is a defensive act designed simply to hold death at
bay, Albion's death and his own. Since Urizen falsely identifies Albion's interests with his
own, and vice versa, Urizen automatically assumes that those who are his enemies are
Albion's enemies. Thus, his world is built upon exclusion of other parts of Albion, Luvah
and Vala in particular and, by extension, many others. Yet all of these excluded fragments
are actually necessary to Albion's continued survival and healing.
Thus, whatever his intention, Urizen is creating hindrance, although it is, like the
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hindrances enacted by Fuzon in The Book of Ahania, intended to protect against evil. This
good intention, however, does not prevent it from becoming a further step in the process
of the fall. Once Urizen's leopards, tygers, and lions, along with all the Sons of Heaven,
begin to create the implements needed for weaving, agriculture, measurement (and thus
trade) and metalwork, they also stand around their master, ''Petrifying all the Human
Imagination into rock & sand" (p.25, 1.6; E 314). This petrification is a direct result both
ofUrizen's fear of death and of the fixing of cultural forms. In other words, once the
Human Imagination is petrified with fear, symbolic systems become stony, frozen and
locked, in a futile attempt to hold the fragmented world steady.
Predictably, from a Burkean standpoint, sacrifices begin immediately after this
petrification, within one line in fact. Once a rigid system is in place, violations will
inevitably occur, and, in Urizen's order, they will require expiation. Tybum, the place of
execution in Blake's own time, and the Druid Temples, where human sacrifice was
supposedly performed in ancient Britain, both begin to reverberate with the sounds of
human groans. Yet the groans of those individuals who are sacrificed, either through state
execution or through ritual means, contribute to the death throes of Albion or the
Universal Man:
Groans ran along Tybums brook and along the River of Oxford
Among the Druid Temples. Albion groand on Tybums brook
Albion gave his loud death groan . . . (p.25,117-9; E 314)
While in many way's Urizen's Mundane Shell is beautiful, the sacrifices that sustain it are
simply destructive. Sacrificing parts of Albion's being to preserve his life only hastens his
death. Blake implies a particular process of degeneration in the use of images of judicial
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execution. First there is the loss of spiritual vision in the fragmentation of human faculties
and human culture. Then there is the creation of a false order based upon hierarchy and
designed to set up a rigid boundary against death. This order is founded upon a sacrificial
vision in the first place, and as it continues, it further requires the necessity for the ritual
sacrifice of those who violate it. Thus. the order ends up causing and perpetuating the
death that supposedly it was designed to protect against. Finally, Urizen himself becomes
directly involved in sacrifice, dwelling "on Salisbury plain among the druid stones," that is,
Stonehenge, a place believed by many of Blake's contemporaries to be the earliest site of
human sacrifices (p.25,1.33; E 3 1 7). 34
This series of sacrifices culminates in the sacrifice of Urizen's arch-rival Luvah. In
Urizen's judgment, the Non-Existence that he fears (in fact, an unreality in Blake's terms)
has become a possibility because of Luvah's actions. Thus, Luvah is offered up as a
sacrifice to the violated boundary itself, as if such expiation could hold death at bay and
protect Urizen from his own potential Non-Existence. If Luvah is entirely guilty of the
violation, and is sacrificed, perhaps neither Death nor Despair will claim Urizen:
Luvah was cast into the Furnaces of affliction & sealed
And Vala fed in cruel delight, the furnaces with fire

3

"For discussion of Blake and Druidism, see the final chapter of A. L. Owen's The Famous
Druids. See also Peter F. Fisher's article "Blake and the Druids," as well as two chapter of Jon Mee's
Dangerous Enthusiasm. The most recent discussion appears in Jason Whittaker's William Blake and the
Myths ofBritain, particularly the chapter entitled "Druids, Deism, and Patriarchy" (141-51). Generally,

Blake uses Druids in his depictions of sacrifice to link Old Testament religion and the roots of English
history. While many of his contemporaries see a link between the Druids and Old Testament Judaism, and
treat the similarity as a cause for national pride, Blake judges Old Testament religion, eighteenth-century
Christianity, and British statecraft, and finds them all lacking, precisely in those dimensions which he
considers to be Druidical. Druids play the largest role in the later illuminated works, Milton and

Jerusalem.
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Stem Urizen beheld urg'd by necessity to keep
The evil day afar, & if perchance with iron power
He might avert his own despair. . . (p.25, 11.40-44; E 3 1 7).
Luvah's death, believed by Urizen to be an eternal death, will supposedly avert Urizen's
own despair, fear of death, and ultimately death itself
As a

scapegoat, Luvah serves all three scapegoating functions. At the most basic

level, Luvah's death is scapegoating simply because, it is supposed to prevent Urizen's
death. Furthermore, like the mutual recriminations of Tharmas and Enion, it relieves the
guilt and anxiety that arise simply from the condition of fragmentation.

As Burke notes,

once there is an idea of a primal order that can be broken through disobedience,
willfulness, or pride, the guilt such transgressions of order produce is almost inevitably
linked with the idea of death as punishment (RR 201 - 1 2). If there is death, it is possible to
reason backwards and to assume that there must have been a crime for which that death is
punishment. If the criminal is sacrificed, perhaps others will be saved.
Such a method becomes even more necessary, if, as in Urizen's case, the
executioner, through neglect (sleep), an error in judgment (handing over the reins) or
direct collusion (plotting with Luvah against Albion) is complicit in the original crime. In
this case the sacrifice of the other party to the crime is seen as a path out of both judgment
and death, and the second scapegoating function becomes active. The sacrifice of Luvah
relieves Urizen from the awareness of, and, presumably, from the consequences of guilt.
Finally, Luvah's death becomes a catalyst for even more civilizing activity.

As

the

lava from his furnace flows down, more system building occurs. Luvah's death binds other
members of the community together and creates a flurry of activity, busy if blind. Some
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attend to families, others buy and sell, others create schools, and yet others engage in
scientific study. One reason for this flurry of activity is that Luvah's sacrificial death
creates consubstantiation between other members of the community. He is the enemy,
others are bound together against him, and their energies are revitalized by his destruction.
As Otto suggests, the continued vitality of Urizen' s world is dependent upon this sacrifice
ofLuvah, as enacted in the marriage feast of Night the First: "Consumption of the victim
provides the energy that allows Urizen and his priests to maintain the purity of their
world" (Critique 89). 35 The maintenance of an elaborate system of order in the face of a
internal fragmentation requires a kind of purification of vision that is in fact a symbolic
denial of substantial portions of reality. By enacting and reenacting the sacrificial event,
the members of Urizen's community are enabled to maintain their tenuous connection to
one another and to sustain their vast project of building and activity, ignoring conflicts that
might exist between them, and ignoring those elements of reality that do not fit their
system. Yet all of these deeds involve an increasing engagement with greater and greater

35 As mentioned in an earlier note, Otto's argument in Blake 's Critique of Transcendence has
strongly influenced my own reading. Otto maintains that the drive for transcendence, expressed in this
quotation as a drive for purity, leads to the rejection of the body, as expressed in the suffering of Luvah.
Thus, Blake critiques transcendence in order to focus on the needs of the suffering and rejected body. This
argument has difficulties, I would suggest, because it divides the ideas of "transcendence" and "body" in a
way that I do not believe Blake would accept. In the earlier texts, like The Marriage, the body is clearly
meant to function as means of transcendence; furthermore, throughout his life, Blake talks about the
passage of the spirit into a different realm after death. Thus, there are real problems with the claim that
Blake sets up an impassable gulfbetween transcendence and the body, rejecting the one and affirming the
other. Despite this point of disagreement with Otto, I believe that his argument points to something
crucial about the role of transcendence in The Four Zoas, something that is strongly linked to sacrificial
thinking. While Blake may not reject transcendence per se, he does reject those forms of transcendence
that require the sacrifice of the body, or of another person, for their fulfillment. Bypassing the body does
not bring transcendence, nor does the evasion of one's own suffering in a vain attempt to pass it on to
someone else.

239
levels of symbolic differentiation and systemetization, and thus, in all probability, to further
petrification of imagination and further sacrifices.
Such differentiation is apparent at the most basic level in Night the Third when
Urizen separates from ''His Shadowy Female Semblance," Ahania (P.29, 1.23; E 3 1 9).
After the creation of the Mundane Shell, Ahania is partially separated from Urizen. She is
still a part of him, but she has a shadowy separate substance, and she cannot tolerate the
· movement of the relationship, either in terms of Urizen's changing moods from smiling to
frowning, or in his comings and goings. Without him she trembles and grows "cold in
paling fears" (pl.30, 1.28; E 320), in all likelihood, because she fears her husband's
rejection, since Urizen is becoming more and more abstracted. The sacrifice and denial of
Albion's passionate dimension as manifested in Luvah would have cooled Urizen's sexual
desires considerably. These fears, and, in all probability, Urizen's classification of Ahania
as something other than himself, petrify her, since her limbs must be revived by fire when
Urizen is gone; ultimately this petrification of Ahania's separate female identity causes her
sons to sacrifice "Victims sacrificed upon an altar of brass," animals as well as birds
(p.30,l.36; E 320). These burnt offerings warm and preserve her, because they involve a
"relation between the vanished fires of Luvah/Vala and those Urizen refuses his female"
(Ault 126). These sacrifices give Ahania a certain cohesion within herself as well as a kind
of consubstantiation with Urizen, but they are also associated with yet further
differentiation between them.
When Urizen returns, he finds her to be entirely separate from himself, completely
differentiated. At a symbolic level, such a change involves a complete separation between
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those categories of being that he would describe as male and those he would describe as
female, and vice versa. This break between Urizen and Ahania is symptomatic of the kinds
of problems that occur when a highly differentiated symbolic order is purified to the point
of excluding crucial elements of human reality. Luvah' s exclusion has created
consubstantiation between some characters, but only by eliminating the passion that had
bound others together. Urizen �as able to connect with Los only by sacrificing the kinds
of passions that had linked him to Ahania.
Urizen has sacrificed Luvah in part because this sacrifice created consubstantiation
with Los. Sadly, this sacrifice ultimately is ineffectual. Los was necessary to Urizen's
creation of the Mundane Shell, because the reasoning power with its bounding line can
only be creative if imagination provides a new vision of the world that reason can
structure. Now Los's imagination has been petrified by the rigidity ofUrizenic order. As
has already been noted, the alliance between Urizen, Los, and Enitharmon was highly
tenuous to begin with. Now Los and Enitharmon, their prophetic power reduced by the
petrification of imagination in Urizen's golden world, feel envious and desire power for
themselves. Thus, they bring Enion's song of suffering to Ahania's pillow and make
Ahania aware of the suffering and exclusion fostered by Urizen's system. Speaking of
those who, like Urizen, have sacrificed others to gain prosperity, Enion cries out:
Then the groan & the dolor are quite forgotten & the slave grinding at the
mill
And the captive in chains & the poor in the prison, & the soldier in the field
When the shatterd bone hath laid him groaning among the happier dead
It is an easy thing to rejoice in the tents of prosperity
Thus could I sing & thus rejoice, but it is not so with me! (p.36,ll.9-13; E
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325)
The separation of Urizen and Ahania becomes complete when, moved by the
lament of Enion that Enithannon and Los have spirited to her pillow, Ahania, using the fall
narrative that was discussed previously, tells Urizen that perhaps his power and divinity
are unreal. She is, in fact, right about this; at least she is correct that Urizen does not have
a unique divinity of the kind he pretends to. However, her receptiveness to this truth is
seen by Urizen as passivity. Rejecting this receptive and vulnerable side of his own being,
as projected upon Ahania, Urizen scapegoats her by casting her down, while blaming her
for every negative aspect of his life, both in the present and the past, and comparing her to
Vala, who causes the fall of her consort, Luvah, by casting him down:
. . . Art thou also become like Vala. thus I cast thee out
Shall the feminine indolent bliss. the indulgent self of weariness
The passive idle sleep the enormous night & darkness of Death
Set herself up to give her laws to the active masculine virtue
Thou little diminutive portion that darst be a counterpart
Thy passivity thy laws of obedience & insincerity
Are my abohorrence. Wherefore hast thou taken that fair form
Whence is this power given to thee! once thou wast in my breast
A sluggish current of dim waters. on whose verdant margin
A cavern shaggd with horrid shades. dark cool & deadly. where
I laid my head in the hot noon after the broken clods
Had wearied me. there I laid my plow & there my horses fed
And thou hast risen with thy moist locks into a watry image
Reflecting all my indolence my weakness & my death
To weigh me down beneath the grave into non Entity (p.43,11.5-19;
E 328-29)
Urizen understands Ahania to be saying that the watery figure that Albion worships is a
projection of Urizen. The idea is so intolerable to him that he must object, claiming that
any watery image projected and floating above him is Ahania herself She has projected
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this image with her "moist locks" and her indolence and weakness. This accusation is
followed by the rhetorical questions: "Am I not God" and ''Who is Equal to me''
(p.42,1. 19; E 328). He denies his status as Albion's regent altogether and claims an eternal
reign for himself.
Following this speech, he casts her down, and it is that act that precipitates the fall
of his kingdom, thus demonstrating that it was not her passivity that was dangerous to
him, but his own aggressive desire for divinity and dominance. Because she asserts that he
is less than divine, absolute, and complete, he blames her for being diminutive, passive,
and partial. However, it is the loss of those very qualities that leads to his own destruction.
In scapegoating Ahania and casting her away, he casts off the part of himself that is
capable of reuniting with the other Zoas and restoring the health of Albion.
What Blake makes clear in these early nights is that scapegoating activity may
initially produce a tentative consubstantiation between different parties and between
divergent and conflicting parts of ourselves, the kinds of consubstantiation that Burke
describes as following from scapegoating. Los and Enitharmon, at their wedding, are
made consubstantial with each other and with Urizen through the warsongs and violence
celebrated at the wedding feast and perpetrated shortly thereafter against Luvah. Urizen' s
sons gain consubstantiation with their king and with one another when they melt Luvah in
the furnace, and that consubstantiation produces all the marks of civilization.
Nevertheless, the social order built upon victimage produces further division, more
classification, and further solidification of differences, thus producing a need for more
victims to maintain cohesion, as in the offerings presented to warm the increasingly solid
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and isolated Ahania. Finally, this order produces the permanently fixed sufferings of those
whose tortures are lamented by Enion at the end of Night the Second. Enion, herself an
exile and wanderer who has no place in Urizen's order, bemoans the tortures of"captives
in chains," and ''the poor in the prison" (p.6,1. 10; E 325). The suffering bodies of the
slave, the captive, the prisoner, and the soldier are aninevitable off-scouring of the kind of
kingdom that Urizen has built-one that is based upon sacrifice and scapegoating at a
number of levels.
Of course, among these sacrifices are those that fit the usual framework that we
have been discussing, sacrifices that produce social unity, or that transfer one's guilt onto
another for the purpose of redemption. These sacrifices sometimes take the form of
religious rituals, like the Druid rites or the sacrifices on Ahania's altar, or of government
actions, like judicial executions. Some of the sacrifices are less violent, involving only
verbal scapegoating and projection. Yet the song of Enion indicates that there is another
kind of scapegoating implicit in the retention of power through the petrification of
symbolic structures, since, whether or not those at the margins of the order redeem
anyone from a sense of guilt, they redeem the person or persons at the top of the hierarchy
from death. Death here can be understood in several different senses. First, Urizen, the
kingly figure, is spared the symbolic death, or transformation, that would accommodate a
more mobile structure. Second, he is literally able to "buy'' his own survival through the
suffering of others, who bear the bodily risks of heavy labor and warfare. But all of these
scapegoating strategies are based upon lies of various kinds, lies that tum back against
Urizen through the agency of Ahania, technically a part of himself
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The problem is that Ahania knows both that these sacrifices are ultimately
destructive. She recognizes, first, that the human suffering lamented by Enion is wrong,
and that it is intrinsically bound up in Urizen' s kingdom. Second, she realizes that Urizen's
kingdom cannot be permanently insured. Luvah's sacrifice was not permanent, and Luvah
is returning in the person of Ore. She asks Urizen to cease his attempts to control such a
return. Finally, she recognizes that the righteousness and divinity which Urizen has bought
for himself through the destruction ofLuvah is fallacious. Urizen has become a god
through the idolotry of Albion. He should not be the king; he has exceeded his own proper
boundaries just as surely as Luvah did when he stole the horses from the unfallen Urizen,
the Prince of Light. The fear which Urizen felt when Albion, the whole human being,
renounced his rightful authority and turned everything over to Urizen, a mere fragment of
himself, was a reasonable response to an out of control situation. This fact did not change
with the scapegoating ofLuvah. What did change was Urizen's perception of himself
Once Urizen sees himself as righteous and kingly, he can no longer tolerate hearing the
truth, but rather tells Ahania that she is the source of everything negative. This final act of
scapegoating produces one division too many. There is no one left with whom Urizen can
create consubstantiation through his scapegoating practices, so his kingdom crashes down.
This fall occurs because the creation of one rigid boundary after another to protect
or avenge an original violated boundary creates more and more exclusion, more and more
guilt, more and more scapegoating, and finally, the loss of the very "kingdom" that all the
boundaries and the victimage were intended to protect. This process involves Los, the
imaginative faculty, as assuredly as it does the rational faculty, Urizen. When we consider
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the earlier Lambeth prophecies, it is no surprise that Urizen is involved in a cycle of
creation, fall, and scapegoating. Nor is it surprising that Los would be sucked into such a
cycle once Urizen initiated it. However, in The Four Zoas, Los's involvement does not
really have its source in Urizen. Here Los's involvement in what we would once have
called Urizenic behavior is far more his own choice, and it is far more centered in his own
quest for personal dominance or revenge.
Yet Los's responses are also distinctly differentiated from Urizen's in a way that
was not present in Blake's earlier works. In The Four Zoas, Blake uses the characters of
Urizen and Los in a way that involves a strong dialectical tension. First, he makes it clear
that Los, the imaginative faculty, can be just as destructive as the rational one. Both
faculties have the potential for act and hindrance. Second, he argues that each faculty
needs the other. Finally, he demonstrates why the eighteenth-century tendency to glorify
reason as the foundation for order is so dangerous. Despite their basic equality, reason
without imagination is particularly deadly, because imagination is the faculty of openness
and transformation. It is what makes both change and forgiveness possible. Thus, it is
absolutely necessary if one is to move beyond hindrance to action.
Initially, however, Los with his self-seeking and concern for hierarchical ·
superiority is only marginally different from Urizen. As we have already seen, having fallen
through the union ofEnion and the Spectre of Tharmas, Los and his emanation
Enitharmon embody the mutual recriminations, the sexual guilt, and the tendency to bind
themselves sexually that we have already seen in their parents. We have seen further that
Los and Enitharmon engage in mutual scapegoating, each accusing the other of behaviors
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engaged in by both. Even after they have been married in a ceremony overseen by Urizen
and allied themselves with him, they continue to resent Urizen and conspire against him,
setting up the division between Ahania and Urizen by carrying Enion's song to Ahania's
pillow and, thus, transforming Ahania's awareness and producing Urizen's fall. Los's
desire at this point is to elevate himself to the position of deity and the king. He renounces
his true father, Tharmas, calling. him "weak father of worms & clay" and claims that he is
Urizen's true heir: ". . . Los remains God over all" (p.48, 1. 1 8; E 332).
Yet the result ofUrizen's fall is a return, not to Los, but to Tharmas, the parent
power, as the primary force. Tharmas is, at some level, both the greatest of the Zoas,
being ''the parent power," the source, and the weakest (p.4,l.6; E 3 0 1 ). He desires
simplicity and he desires his partner, the fulfillment of his sexual being. Such desires fit
coherently with the identification of Tharmas with the body, the originary power, but one
that remains in chaos without the ordering structure of the symbolic as represented by
Urizen and Los. Los, the prophet in his embodied form, is in fact, the son of Tharmas.
That is, he represents in narrative form the direct relationship of imaginative power to the
power and wisdom of the body which is its source, the Energies of the body that Blake
celebrated earlier in his career.
However, when Los makes his somewhat sullen alliance with Urizen, he
subordinates his own powers to Urizen's.

As

a result, he denies his filial relationship with

Tharmas, and he also further divides himself When Los threatens Tharmas after Urizen's
fall, Tharmas recognizes this internal division. He completes the break between Los and
Enitharmon by ripping her from Los's side, and he conspires with The Spectre ofUrthona,
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like Los and Enitharmon a split-off part of the original Zoa Urthona, to force Los to obey
Tharmas.
Thus, Los finds himself in the role of having to bind Urizen, because Tharmas has
commanded it. Tharmas's command is in part positive, because it arises from the
recognition that Luvah and Urizen have both brought about difficulties through "foul
ambition." (p.5 1,1.24; E 334). This command also detaches Los from his false servility to
Urizen. Finally, it allows Los to borrow Urizen' s boundary function so that a new world
can be created and structured by the Imagination. Nevertheless, in making this command,
Tharmas involves Los in a process of hindrance. Binding Urizen and limiting him by force
involves Los in a negative process of creation that, combined with Los's hatred ofUrizen
and desire for power over him, ultimately binds and limits the imaginative powers of the
prophet himself.
This binding, like the binding ofUrizen in The Book of Urizen, can be seen as a
second creation narrative, just as the J and E narratives in the Genesis texts are separate
creation narratives. Urizen creates, in the Mundane Shell, a cosmos, whereas Los creates a
body, and as the creation of the body takes place over seven ages, the Biblical text is again
echoed, as it was in Urizen: "And a seventh age passed over & a state of dismal woe"
(p. 55,1.9� E 337). Whereas some critics see Los's binding ofUrizen in The Book of Urizen
as positive, at least in its intentio� here Los' s actions are clearly done with malice. While
he forms chains for Urizen's body at the behest of Tharmas, Los thoroughly enjoys the
process, even though it means that he also chains his own emanatio� Enitharmon:
But Enitharmon wrapd in clouds waild loud. for as Los beat
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The anvils of Urthona link by link the chains of sorrow
Warping upon the winds & whirling round in the dark deep
Lashd on the limbs of Enitharmon & the sulphur fires
Belchd from the furnaces wreathd round her. chaind in ceaseless fire
The lovely female howld & Urizen beneath deep groand
Deadly between the hammers beating grateful to the Ears
Of Los. absorbed in dire revenge he drank with joy the cries
OfEnitharmon & the groans of Urizen fuel for his wrath
And for his pity secret feeding on thoughts of cruelty. . . (p.53, 11. 5- 14; E
33 5-36)
Having become involved in Hindrance to this extent, Los takes on the character of the
hinderer in earnest. As Rosso puts it, "Indeed, when Los binds Urizen he takes on those
qualities of the priest that he seeks to humanize" (1 19).
In malice, Los uses his prophetic and imaginative power to enslave Urizen in a
particular vision of the body, but then he himself becomes that vision:
Pale terror siezd the Eyes of Los as he beat round
The hurtling Demon. terrifid at the shapes
Enslavd humanity put on he became what he beheld
He became what he was doing he was himself transformd (p.55,
11.20-23; E 338)
As

a result of this transformation, almost immediately after the binding of Urizen, Los's

"features stonify" (p.57; 1.2; E 338), amd Enitharmon is also transformed, her "immortal
limbs freeze stiflhing pale inflexible" (p.57; 1.6; E 339). Los becomes enslaved by his own
creation. He becomes even more like Urizen than he already was, both in his desire to
dominate and in his need to freeze his own symbolic order.
Certainly, some of Los' s imaginative mobility remains insofar as he is able to
engage in the art of dance, but his dance is mad, jerky, and mechanical, caught up as it is
in the process of hindrance:
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The bones ofUrizen hurtle on the wind the bones of Los
Twinge & his iron sinews bend like lead & fold
Into unusual forms dancing & howling stamping the Abyss (p. 5 5 second
portion, 11.33-35; E 338)
While Los can still bend, he is hard and metallic, iron, like Urizenic law, and his prophecy
appears to have degenerated into madness.
It is only after Los becomes petrified in his own symbolic order, the order of the
body and sexuality, that he and Enitharmon join together to conceive their son Ore, a
reembodiment of Luvah in a form of rage and flame. Again, like the binding of Urizen, the
story of the binding of Ore in Ihe Four Zoas takes on rather different dimensions from
those it contained in Ihe Book of Urizen. In The Four Zoas, Blake becomes explicit that
Los' s fear of his son derives from a fear of death. When the child is born, Los comes to
fear ''Eternal Death & uttermost Extinction" (p.60,l.2; E 340). Like Urizen, he builds a
city, not because he wishes to clothe, house, or protect others, nor because he wants to
express a meaningful vision, but because he is trying desperately to overcome death. The
birth of the child carries the mark of death because it necessarily involves transformation.
The "stonification" that Los undergoes when he creates the chains of Urizen and becomes
like what he beholds creates in him an inability to tolerate the process of change that is
implied by generation and birth. By the time Ore is fourteen years old, Los perceives the
child to be plotting to destroy the father and he develops a "bloody cord" growing out of
his chest (p.60,1. 1 1 ; E 340), like the girdle that grows from Los's bosom in The Book of
Urizen.
In The Four Zoas, the Oedipal overtones are more marked than they are in the
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earlier wor� because Blake makes it clear that Los sees death in Ore's eyes. Nevertheless,
as Diana George points out, it is just as difficult to tell whether or not this intention is
really in Ore, or whether Los perceives it because of his own jealousy and his fear of
transformation (1 1 8). We also know that Los himself desired to destroy his own father,
Tharmas, and his adopted "father" and god Urizen. Thus, his perception that this is his
son's intention may be accurate, or it may be a projection of the guilt that Los feels based
upon his own parricidal impulses.
Yet, despite the Oedipal overtones, it is still somewhat unclear what role sexual
jealousy plays in this episode, because the "Chain of Jealousy" is Enitharmon's name for
what she sees in her husband, and her perceptions may well be twisted by her own anxiety
about sexuality and by her feelings towards her son, which she guiltily imagines to be
perceived by her husband. In any case, the one motive that Blake clearly identifies is the
fear of murder by the son, and Los is willing to go to any length to avoid that possibility.
He binds his son so that parricide cannot occur, and transfers the chain that afflicts him to
his son, along with whatever sexual anxieties, parricidal desires, and other torments
accompany it. The binding of Ore still includes a strong sacrificial element, by which Los
buys his own peace of mind at the expense of his son, and transfers his own conflicts onto
the adolescent boy.
The sacrificial imagery connected with Ore's binding is, in fact, decidedly more
marked than in The Book of Urizen, because Los actually nails his son down before
binding him with the chain of jealousy. Thus, Ore is not simply bound, but he is crucified
as well, on an "iron mountains top" (p.60,1.26; E 34 1 ). As we have seen, iron is associated
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with Urizen throughout The Book of Urizen, and in The Four Zoas, it is again associated
with Urizenic law (p.60,l.2; E 353 ). Thus, while the "shadow of Urizen" is not mentioned
here as it is in The Book of Urizen, we clearly hear the echo of Urizenic law in Los's
action, and we recognize sacrifice, not merely as a means of appeasing guilt, but also as a
method of warding off death and retaining power in an unchanging order.
Yet, we also see another vital change in this narrative from its earlier appearance in
The Book of Urizen, one that is crucial in understanding the role of the imagination in the
creation of a sane order. In the earlier text, there is no mention that Los has regrets, but in
The Four Zoas, Los is so grieved by the suffering of his wife and son that he goes back to
the mountain to release Ore, because
. . . he thought to give to Enitharmon
Her son in tenfold joy & to compensate for her tears
Even if his own death resulted so much pity him paind (p.62, ll. 1 820; E 342)
The fact that Ore has become physically linked to his chains is a part of the continuing
process of falling that goes on through the first six nights of the poem, but Los's
repentance is still real. Furthermore it is not Los's first moment of remorse, and it reflects
an important distinction that Blake makes between Urizen's systematizing and Los's.
This distinction is reflected in Bloom's remark that throughout the text, Los
appears to be less culpably fallen than the other Zoas, being "engendered in the fallen
world" without ever falling of his own accord (Apocalypse 200). Certainly, Los is in no
way involved in the narratives of the fall that are told throughout the work. Urthona is
always described as having been pulled down by the other falling Zoas. However, by Night
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the Fourth, Los' s fallen condition is clear. He seeks dominance, vengeance, and the
securing of his own position by any means necessary. Still there is a maj or difference
between Los and Urizen. Los tends to back away from and to regret his own scapegoating
activities, not through the kinds of pity that are typical ofUrizen, who weeps with tender
sympathy and then responds to his own tears by abusing someone else, but by actual
attempts to reverse the harm he has done. This was true when Los inj ured Enitharmon in
Night the Second, and it is equally true when Los repents from binding Ore. This failure,
however, does not negate Los' s sincerity in wanting to make it happen.
This characteristic of Los, which will figure so prominently in the Apocalyptic
redemption that occurs later in the poem, is, I would argue, actually a result of his
identification with the faculty of imagination. Just as reason involves the creation of a kind
of systematic order that makes j udgments and creates boundaries, imagination entails an
ordering process that expresses visions that have not been seen before. Blake recognizes
the necessity for the boundary-setting functions ofUrizen. Los needs to borrow Urizen' s
functions in order to create his own world. Yet Urizenic reason is also associated with the
tendency to close off boundaries and possibilities. It is easier for the Urizenic functions,
when isolated from other functions within the individual or within the society, to petrify,
to become rigid, and, therefore, to become j udgmental. The function of law, as a boundary
function, readily becomes the inability to bend or forgive in Blake's antinomian model.
For the imagination, however, the creation of newness is a necessary part of the
faculty' s function. Thus, a certain openness is inherent in imagination. Blake associates
this openness, at a moral level, with the tendency to forgive, to yield, and to open out
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boundaries. This does not mean that imagination cannot be petrified. When Urizen's lions
and tigers create the Mundane Shell, they "petrify" the human imagination. When Los
binds Urizen, he becomes like what he beholds and begins to stonify, thus becoming, like
Urizen, afraid of change, and determined to freeze and solidify the symbolic structure of
his own family by binding his son. By the time we have finished reading Night the Fifth,
we have seen Los scapegoat Enitharmon and Ore, blaming both for actions and feelings no
different from his own and projecting his own negative attitudes and feelings upon them.
In each of these cases, he is refusing to forgive, and his own imaginative functions are, to
one degree or another, "stonified."
Yet, in every case, Los cannot sustain the process of scapegoating for long. He
again opens out, and in that process of opening out, he develops an active sense of
remorse that causes him to change his conduct in serious ways. This willingness marks the
difference for Blake between different kinds of creation and different kinds of sacrifices.
This difference becomes particularly clear when we compare Urizen's sacrifice of Luvah
with the death of Jesus, who willingly wears "Luvah's robes of blood," so that Luvah will
not fall into eternal death. For Urizen, Jesus is simply another Luvah to be sacrificed, and
the Christian narrative simply becomes another form of rhetoric by means of which Urizen
can consolidate power. For Los, Jesus' story can be differently understood, in light of
Los's own suffering, his infliction of suffering on others, his regret, and his imaginative
openness to new forms of experience. For Los, Jesus' story is a form of symbolic action
that can lead to the destruction of Urizen' s systems and the transformation of all the Zoas.
Thus, as we will see in the next section of this chapter, Los is capable of reworking
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a narrative or a symbolic order and changing its meaning. This possibility is exemplified in
Los's transformation of the ideas of sacrifice and redemption in Night the Seventh.
Furthermore, Los's interpretation of the Jesus narrative suggests the possibility of
transforming all kinds of symbolic orders so that their purposes can be differently
understood. When this event takes place, we can see how it is possible for the same
symbolic order to create either act or hindrance. The contrast between Urizen's and Los's
understanding of sacrifice, and the relationship of both perspectives to Christianity, will be
the subject of the next section. Through this comparison, we will see how it is possible,
through a change of attitude, to transform the meaning of a particular symbolic order.
The Tree ofMystery and the Lamb of God: Sacrifice as Hindrance and Act in Nights
6-8

According to Lincoln's analysis of the layers of composition in The Four Zoas, all
of the material related to Jesus was added late in Blake's revision of the text. 36 For a
variety of reasons, the role of this late material about Jesus is hotly debated. Bloom feels
that Jesus and the Council of God are a "saving remnant" incorporated into The Four
Zoas "because his [Blake's] fable needs them, but his fable has no room for them." They
are, Bloom suggests, an "afterthought" (205-06). Other critics, like Sugnet and Dawson,
suggest that Jesus, along with the Council of God, should be understood as representing a
real transcendent form of divinity, albeit a somewhat unorthodox one, a form of divinity
that is intrinsic to the meaning of the poem. Sugnet describes Jesus as the point of
intersection between time and eternity, the one ''who bridges the gap between the two"
36

See Lincoln, pages 1-27 for his summary of the different layers of the text. See pages 222-26
for his basic description of the Christian la.ye, which he reads as a late addition.
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(175 ). Alternatively, as Dawson suggests, the council of God and Jesus could be
understood as Albion's peers in eternity, living in the state from which Albion has fallen
and attempting to draw him back. This transcendent realm is necessary, in Dawson's
reading, for there to be any way out of ensnarement for Albion. Hobson, on the other
hand, suggests that Jesus's descent is precipitated by Enitharmon's actions and that Jesus
is a marker for "collective human action" (176). Just as the relationship of soul and body is
difficult to untangle in the tractates, the role of Jesus is difficult to untangle in The Four
Zoas. Is he a symbol of a common humanity or is he actually a divine presence in human
form, a mediator between divinity and humanity who makes it possible for human beings
to rediscover their divine nature?
This study will not attempt to answer these questions, important as they are,
because, in either case, the figure of Jesus plays a rhetorical role in the poem, and that role
retains its validity and importance whatever religious beliefs Blake may have wished to
communicate. Furthermore, if we examine Jesus as a cultural trope, so to speak, we can
skirt some of the problems of agency that many, Hobson among them, suggest as central
to the poem. In other words, Jesus's story is a form of symbolic action that can be
reinterpreted in order to change and repair the damaged world that Blake describes in The
Four Zoas (156). Understood in this way, the Gospel narrative becomes a cultural agency,
an already present resource that Blake and his contemporaries can use to rethink their
cultural perspectives on law, symbolic order, and violence. At the level of history, The
Four Zoas, when amended to include Jesus as a significant figure, functions in part as a
kind of argument between Blake and the state church concerning the rhetorical purposes
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for which Jesus' life and death are to be used within the culture.
Furthennore, when we look at The Four Zoas through the lens of Kenneth Burke's
logological theory, we must consider how the religious language of the text makes claims
that could be applicable to all kinds of symbolic orders. While Blake examines how the
story of Jesus's death functions culturally, he is also exploring the relationship of
Christianity, as a thoroughgoing system of order, to sacrifice. This argument could apply
equally well to Deism or other doctrines that might be applied in a thoroughgoing way.
We have already seen one critique of the eighteenth-century understanding of
Atonement in The Book ofAhania. There, when Urizen crucifies his rebellious son Fuzon,
Fuzon hangs for years, "a pale living Corse" on the Tree of Mystery, creating pestilence
and deepening Urizen's power (Ch.IV, 1.36; E 88). By implication, Jesus's death functions
in the same way for the church, deepening its Urizenic hold over both the minds and the
bodies of individuals, and enslaving them in manacles that are both mind-forged and
material. In Ahania, Blake portrays Jesus as the victim of rigid law and as a sacrifice to a
cruel God, or to a tyrannical social order masquerading as divine. In The Four Zoas, the
Jesus figure is murdered by the powers that be, who reframe his murder by calling it
sacrificial atonement. Thus, the power of the ruling authorities is reinforced through the
guilt of those who see Jesus as a sacrifice for their own sins, not a scapegoat who is
slaughtered to cover up the sins of the ruling classes. If Blake's critique stopped here, with
The Book ofAhania, it would match very closely with Thomas Paine's critique of the
Atonement, in which Paine claims that this doctrine simply treats both human moral
obligation and forgiveness as commodities that can be bought and sold. Thus, of course,
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they remain a commodity that will ultimately be controlled by the dominant wealthy
classes.
For Paine, Deism is the alternative world view that makes change possible. For
Paine, what is necessary is to let go of Christianity as a religion of Mystery and the
miraculous, and to let go of the divinity of Christ, honoring him instead as a great man and
a great moral teacher. Then one will be free to use Reason in order to discover the truth
and to create a rational social order. As we have seen, this solution is totally unsatisfactory
for Blake. For him, reason is as objectionable a limitation on imaginative vision as is
religious dogma, and the idea of inspiration that Deists like Paine would reject as
superstitious remains a crucial and positive reality. But if Blake rejects both Deism and the
Christian narrative, he leaves himself in the position of having few rhetorical resources left
with which to move his readers from where they are to where he wants them to go. Even
if Blake sees his ultimate aim as something other than the rhetorics of order available in his
culture, he cannot weave this system from whole cloth. He must move his readers by
means of something that they know. Blake attempts to achieve his aims by offering in
Nights 7 and 8 at least two different perspectives on sacrifice in general and on the
sacrifice of Jesus in particular, hoping to make available an understanding of Jesus and his
death on the cross that will provide a viable alternative to the narrative offered by the state
church. In doing so, he accepts an essentially Burkean rhetorical principle-that connecting
human beings by means of a symbolic order does involve some kind of sacrifice, but that
this sacrifice need not involve the scapegoating of others.
The multiple sacrifices of Nights 7 and 8 take place in the context of two rival
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systems of order. One of these systems is embodied in Golgonooza, Los's city of art,
originally built to ward off death, but transformed during Nights 7 and 8. The other is
manifested in Urizen's system of Vortexes, Sciences, and books, and, finally, in his Web of
Religion, all of them created after Urizen has awakened to find himself in a universe ruled
by Tharmas and Los. In Night the Fifth, when Urizen awakens to discover himself in a
position of essential powerlessness, he enters into a state something like repentance. As
we have already seen, he regrets withholding his horses from Albion and he feels
responsible that Luvah has fallen and lost his beauty; yet his concerns exist within a
context of self-pity and a kind of inverted self-aggrandizement. He treats the fall as
entirely his own responsibility in a way that suggests that he once wielded infinite power.
But he also goes to seek Luvah, now embodied in the form of the bound Ore, in hopes
that "love shall shew its root in deepest Hell" (p.65,1. 12; E 344).
Once he begins to explore, however, and discovers that his own children are in the
service of Tharmas and that he himself is even more powerless than he had realized,
Urizen begins to reassert his efforts towards dominance:
So he began to dig form[ing] of gold silver & iron
And brass vast instruments to measure out the immense & fix
The whole into another world better suited to obey
His will where none should dare oppose his will himself being King
Of All & all futurity be bound in his vast chain (p.73,11. 16-20; E 3 50).
Urizen's method of gaining control will be to gain power over Luvah, now in the form of
Los' s son Ore, and thus ally with him against Los, just as he made an alliance with Los
earlier in order to gain power over Luvah.
After Urizen begins to reassert his power, Night the Seventh begins, and along
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with it a massive number of textual difficulties. There are, in fact, two versions ofNight
the Seventh. The critical consensus is that the version normally referred to as 7b was
probably written first. 7b, which appears in pages 9 1 -98, tells ofUrizen's construction of a
temple in the shape of a human heart, that is, in the shape of Luvah's original domain. This
temple is dedicated to warfare and secret sexual rituals, thus establishing a relationship
between sexuality and the need for violence. Warfare becomes a new form of sacrifice that
perpetuates the system of order, and it involves all the Zoas, including Los. In addition to
the sacrifice of warriors in combat, Night 7b also contains two brief references to
crucifixion, both of them linked to Luvah/Orc. One of these is the crucifixion of Luvah, in
which lots are cast for his clothing as they were cast for the clothing of Christ. Another is
the more oblique crucifixion of Ore, who is entwined around (not nailed to) the tree of
Mystery in the form of a snake, an idea that is more fully developed in 7 a. In fact, the
source of this tree would be difficult to discern if one had access only to Night 7b.
Evidently, Blake saw difficulties with this version himself, because he tampered with it
considerably, making notes to shift pages 95 -97 so as to precede pages 91 -94. 37
Night 7a, according to most critics, is a later version. This text develops in fuller
narrative detail some of the themes of 7b, but the story line is significantly different. In 7a
Urizen alternately bullies and courts Ore in order to gain his submission. Furthermore, in
7a, Blake depicts the growth of the Tree ofMystery as a result ofUrizen's envy of Ore.
Ore's crucifixion on the tree of mystery is fully described, as is a destructive courtship

37

Page 98 simply marks the end of Night 7, so it naturally does not change position, but remains
at the end of any version of this night, no matter what version or edition.
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between the Shadow ofEnitharmon and the Spectre ofUrthona. This courtship results in
a disastrous union that leads to the rebirth of Vala. Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
Night 7a portrays a transformation in Los, Enitharmon, and the Spectre that prepares for a
distinction between Urizen's and Los's response to Jesus's appearance.
Critical opinion about the proper inclusion and ordering of these two versions of
Night 7 varies considerably. Erdman, in his 1982 edition of Blake's complete works,
includes both versions ofNight 7. This edition uses Blake's marginal notes to reorder
Night 7b, and it places this rearranged version between two sections of 7a. This is only
one arrangement, however, and different choices abound. Wilkie and Johnson, for
example, offer a reading based upon 7a alone, treating that version of the narrative as
definitive (140). 38
Of course, it is impossible to determine Blake's intentions precisely, since he left
no final directions for the relationship between the two versions. Yet both include material
that is necessary if Nights 8 and 9 are to make sense. Without 7a, for example, the work
of Los and Enitharmon in Night 8, or the references to the destruction of Mystery in Night
9, simply would not make sense. Furthermore, the appearance of warfare, only described

38 Willcie and Johnson suggest that serious students of The Four Zoas try five possible orderings.

One of these involves the omission of 7a, while another would leave out 7b. Early in his career, Erdman
supported the latter of these options. Other possibilities include various arrangements of the different parts
of 7a and 7b. For a full discussion of these, see Wilkie and Johnson, page 272 as well as Erdman's
"Textual Notes," page 836. See also the articles published by Erdman, Lincoln, Mark Lefebvre, and John
Kilgore in Blake: An Illustrated Quarterly, volume 12, 1 978. It should be observed that Erdman changed
his view on the correct ordering of Night VII between 1 978 and the completion of his 1982 edition of the
Collected Works. In this edition. Erdman uses Lefebvre's ordering, putting 7b between two halves of 7a,
and transposing the two sections of 7b- according to marginal instructions left by Blake. My argument, as
previously stated, relies upon the 1982 Erdman edition, but, in fact, it depends upon the content of the two
segments more than upon any particular ordering of them.
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in 7b, is also assumed later in the poem. Thus, both versions appear to be necessary to the
plot. Nevertheless, some elements of 7a and 7b are repetitive; for example, Ore's
crucifixion in 7b is a faint shadow of the fully developed version in 7a. It seems likely that
Blake simply did not finish this segment of the poem, and that the complete relationship
between all the parts was not ever finally worked out.
However, both versions provide contrasts between sacrificial activity as practiced
by Urizen and his denizens and the sacrifice of Jesus as understood by Los and
Enitharmon. 7a also offers a perspective on how Los, Enitharmon, and the Spectre of
Urthona become prepared to see Jesus's activity in a way that Urizen cannot. Thus, we
will look first at the actual sacrificial events ofUrizenic warfare and crucifixion as they
appear in both versions ofNight 7, showing how they prepare and create Urizen's
response to Jesus in Night 8. Then we will examine the experiences of Los, Enitharmon,
and the Spectre of Urthona in Nights 7a and 8, delineating the differences in their
perceptions of Jesus's death as compared to Urizen's. As Wilkie and Johnson suggest,
Luvah/Orc's crucifixions are a "debasement," representing an understanding of Jesus's
death as submission to Urizenic sacrifice. Jesus, on the other hand, engages in an act of
"heroic self-sacrifice" ( 142). In this study, we will examine how this often-noted contrast
offers both an intervention in Blake's own culture and a comment on the way symbolic
order and sacrifice connect with one another in any symbolic order.
The sacrificial material in Night 7b, the earlier version, is fairly straightforward.
Urizen creates a temple in the shape of the human heart and dedicated to warfare and
secret rituals designed to hide "wonders allegoric of the Generations/Of secret lust. . .
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(p.96, 4-5; E 361), that is, hidden, unacknowledged sexuality. This temple, which Blake
never connects directly with the term ''Mystery," is, nevertheless, a perfect example of that
idea. In this temple, Urizen formalizes a religion celebrating the initial sacrifice ofLuvah in
earlier Nights. S exuality is Luvah's special sphere, insofar as he governs passion. The
temple is a means of continuing to perpetuate the consubstantiation created by the original
sacrifice ofLuvah. He is celebrated as the scapegoat around whom Urizen' s followers can
unite, while warfare perpetuates the cycle of sacrifice with new victims.
The sacrifice of warrior victims serves several purposes. Warfare provides an
outlet for the pent-up passions while conveniently creating more consubstantiation for
Urizen's community, because the war allows Urizen's party to unite against a common
foe, who are sacrificed, along with Urizen's own dead, to the pure ideal of his abstract
law. One might add that the sacrificial deaths of soldiers would also act as a kind of
propitiation for the continued sexual feelings that would perpetually reemerge in an order
where sexuality is tightly controlled and concealed. 39
The appropriation of Los' s sun for this temple is a necessary part of this continual
process of suppression and sacrifice. Urizen' s priests and priestesses steal this sun so as to
make in the temple a semblance of a universe:
they took the S un that glowd oer Los
And with immense machines down rolling. the terrific orb
Compell'd . . .
. . . they put the Sun
Into the temple ofUrizen to give light to the Abyss
To light the War by day to hide his secret beams by night
39

1n fact, it might be possible to argue, in somewhat more Foucaultian terms, that the denial of
sexuality creates passions that then require warfare for their continued suppression.
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For he divided day & night in different orderd portions
The day for war the night for secret religion in his temple (p.96,11.9-11,1518; E 361)
Creating the temple so that it functions imaginatively as a cosmos makes Urizen's religious
order look "natural," thus allowing for an easy conflation of nature, religion, and politics.
Thus, the mystification involved in Urizen's religion grows deeper and deeper.
Additionally, the theft of Los's sun also serves as a pretext for drawing Los into conflict
with Urizen. Urizen's warriors can engage in ritual warfare only if there is an enemy, so
they steal from Los in order to arouse him to action. Los enters the conflict precisely after
the theft of his goods. Although Tharmas sees Los's involvement as a part of his own plan
for revenge, the time of Los's rising up, immediately after the theft of property, suggests
that his real concern is Urizen's violation of his creative energies. Thus Los is inspired to
rise against Urizen so that he can become the enemy around whom Urizen's denizens can
unite.
Throughout this segment of Night 7b, Blake treats religion, sexual denial, and
warfare as interconnected social realities, bound up within a united, and mystified, system
of order, where worship reinforces the political desire for conquest. Sacrifice, in this case
the earlier sacrifice of Luvah at the beginning of the poem, underlies them all and
perpetuates them all This discussion of war as a sacrificial dimension of religion is the
unique contribution of Night 7b to The Four Zoas as a whole. Crucifixions, on the other
hand, occur in both 7a and 7b. The crucifixion of Ore in 7b is a pale shadow compared to
a similar event in 7a, so we will omit analysis of Ore's crucifixion in 7b. However, the
crucifixion of Luvah in 7b is unique to this version and makes its own argument, one
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centered around a comparison between the crucifixion ofLuvah and that of Jesus. The
comparison centers around two points, the first being the context of the two crucifixions.
Jesus' execution is a judicial act, albeit an unfair one, that has come to be understood
theologicially, as a sacrifice on behalf of sinful people. Luvah's crucifixion in 7b is the
execution of a prisoner of war. Thus, Blake comments on the essentially religious and
sacrificial character of warfare.
The second aspect of the comparison centers around an episode recounted in three
of the four Gospels in which the soldiers who crucify Jesus cast lots for his clothing. By
contrast, in the The Four Zoas, the soldiers divide up the garments of the dead enemy,
then cast lots to see who among the prisoners will be subjected to crucifixion:
Now sound the clarions of Victory now strip the slain
clothe yourselves in golden arms brothers of war
They sound the clarions strong they chain the howling captives
they give the Oath of blood They cast the lots into the helmet,
They vote the death of Luvah & they naild him to the tree
They pierced him with a spear & laid him in a sepulcher . . . (p. 92, 11. 9-14;
E 364)
The allusions to the Gospel in this discussion of the spoils of war draws the reader's
attention to the idea that warfare is sacrificial in nature, and the slaughtered pri&oner
becomes associated with the innocence of Christ.
This emphasis is heightened by the specific allusion to the soldiers who cast lots
for Jesus's robe, here transmogrified into soldiers who cast lots for a man's flesh. In the
Gospel of John, it is specifically Jesus's robe for which the soldiers gamble (John 19:23).
In the context of The Four Zoas, this allusion is particularly telling, because throughout
the poem, Jesus is referred to as wearing 'Luvah's robes of blood"; in other words, as
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Paley suggests, Jesus willingly takes on flesh like Luvah's (''Figure" 129). In casting lots
to decide whether or not Luvah will die, the soldiers are casting lots for his "robes of
blood," his body, in order randomly to identify a sacrificial obj ect. In making such a
sacrifice, the soldiers make themselves consubstantial with both Luvah and the enemy
soldiers, at least in part. They use consubstantiation with a victim, no more guilty than
they are themselves, as a way of evading their own deaths. When the soldiers kill Luvah,
they have already killed many other enemies in battle. Furthermore, they have made
themselves consubstantial with the fallen enemy by taking and wearing their clothes, j ust
as Jesus has worn the clothes ofLuvah. However, their consubstantiation is deliberately
partial. All sacrifices, be they made on the altar or in warfare, require that we see the other
as like ourselves and different from ourselves at the same time. We dissociate ourselves
from the evil we see in the other, and from their tragic fate, but take as our own the
beneficial effects we imagine will come through their death. The soldiers' execution of
Luvah is similar. The ritual quality ofLuvah's execution-the casting of lots, the
crucifixion, and the careful entombment of a dead prisoner, all of these indicate a
sacrificial impulse. The soldiers cast lots to see who will die for them, meaning literally,
who will die in their place.
Nevertheless, such a sacrifice is woefully ineffective. The soldiers themselves may
at any time be sacrificed, randomly, to Urizen's wars and to his purposes. The sacrifices of
warfare are endless, with one death following another interminably, and the soldiers are
gruesomely complicit in the very system that endangers them. The soldiers who cast lots
into a helmet to decide whether or not Luvah will die are choosing to kill Luvah in an
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attempt to save themselves. One must die so that the other will live. Yet the soldiers who
cast lots for Jesus' robes, even as they kill Luvah/Christ to save themselves, also place
themselves in the position of being the next one to die, the next one to wear the "robe of
blood." Their sacrifice is simply one more submission to Urizen's system. The system of
sacrifice is in no way threatened. Human desire, as embodied in Luvah, human
compassion, as embodied in Jesus, and finally, innumerable human bodies, the bodies of
soldiers, must be sacrificed to Urizen's repressive sexual laws, and to the continuation of
"soldiering" as a way of life. This sacrifice, and the forms of consubstantiation it supports,
stand in marked contrast to the death of Jesus in the Gospels. Jesus is understood to be
guiltless, but he nevertheless makes himself consubstantial with malefactors by sharing in
their execution. This contrast sets up a dissonance between the original Christian text and
the practice of warfare as a form of religious sacrifice.
This version of Luvah's crucifixion protests the use of sacrifice in the Urizenic
system, and it explains a great deal about how that system works. Yet, at the same time, it
fails to indicate, in any clear way, how the personal attitudes of leaders and victims
influence the process of sacrifice. Thus, while the sacrifice in 7b may influence readers'
ideas about warfare and sacrifice, it does not clearly display the underlying motives that
contribute to these phenomena, nor does it demonstrate how rhetoric in general and the
Christian narrative in particular serve to reinforce the tangled web of mystery that
connects political domination and religion as a system of order.
The depictions and discussions of sacrifice in Night 7 a achieve these aims with far
greater thoroughness. 7a shows exactly how Urizen tricks Ore into obedience to law and
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to Urizen's system of mystery. In 7a, Blake depicts Urizen's duplicity and his willingness
to sacrifice others to save, not only himself, but his system-not obliquely, as in 7b, but
with utter directness. This duplicity is contrasted with Los' growing integrity. Los
transformed by his reunion with his Spectre, sacrifices himself by giving to others, even
when he suspects that his refusal to harm others may cost him his own life. In creating
this contrast between Urizen and Los, Blake also contrasts two kinds of ordering
principles-one based upon avoidance of change and the other more flexible and open.
Similarly, Ore's reluctant complicity in his own crucifixion is also stunningly clear
in version 7a. Ore ultimately submits himself to Urizen's system because Urizen has
tapped into Ore's anxieties, doubts, and terrors. Ore allows himself to be crucified because
he allows Urizen to weaken his resolve through the manipulation of language, including a
variety of symbolic orders. This victim ofUrizen's order is contrasted to Jesus, whom
Urizen also sacrifices later in the poem, in Night 8. Yet Jesus's crucifixion occurs, not
because he submits to Urizen, but because he resists Urizen' s laws and punishments.
These contrasting images of systems of order, as embodied in Urizen and Los, and of
sacrificial victims, as embodied in Ore and Jesus, become Blake's argument for
undermining what he sees as the sacrificial order of mainstream Christianity and for
reclaiming the Christian narrative for his own rhetorical purposes.
These purposes include an intervention in the historical realities of his own culture,
insofar as Blake attacks warfare and imperialism by portraying Urizen's distortion of
Christianity. Yet Blake is also making a statement about all thoroughgoing systems of
order. If Christianity's social effects can be changed through reinterpretation, so can the
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social effects of other symbolic systems. Urizen's forte is the development of symbolic
orders that he then renders hard, rigid, and unchangeable in order to freeze them and make
them obey his own desire. Before Urizen makes his way to Ore's den in Night the
Seventh, he has already begun using his system of vortexes (mathematics), his scientific
and technological acumen, and his web of religion to assist him in his battle with Tharmas
and the Spectre of Urthona.
In Night 7a, Urizen continues to use his symbolic orders to further a desire for
personal dominance, this time over Los, Enitharmon, and the Spectre ofUrthona. As
Urizen tells his daughters, their interaction with Ore has as its purpose "To bring the
shadow of Enitharmon beneath our wondrous tree/That Los may Evaporate like smoke &
be no more" (p. 80;ll. 5-6; E 355). Placing Ore on the Tree of Mystery will draw
Enitharmon to it, thus drawing the Shadow ofUrthona to the tree as well; finally, the
union of these two will lead to the destruction of Los. 40
However, despite its dire purposes, Urizen's crucifixion of Ore is the result of a
remarkable mix of the two phenomena that Kenneth Burke refers to as scapegoating and
courtship. These phenomena are supposed to be opposites, yet these opposites are blended
as Urizen attempts to seduce Ore in order to get the fiery and angry young captive to
submit willingly to victimization. The seduction is made using a variety of systems of
order: science, history (or at least military history and strategy), religion, economics, and,

4¾1rls prediction is only half true. Ore's crucifixion on the Tree of Mystery does draw
Enithannon. which does draw the Shadow. What Urizen does not anticipate is that this union, and the
rebirth of Vala that is its result, will lead,. not to the destuction of Los, but to his reunion with his Spectre,
to the empowerment and. healing of all concerned.
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finally, the family order that had been Ore's undoing originally.
At first, Urizen seems to believe that courtship will not be necessary. Perhaps, he
can put out Ore's fires and gain control of him simply by putting Ore into a Urizenic
element. As a result, Urizen throws snow and ice at Ore in hopes of cooling him off The
snows fall for "Age after Age," apparently without result (p. 78,1.4; E 3 53). The Tree of
Mystery, upon which Ore and Jesus will both be crucified, is a growth that results from
Urizen's "envy" of Ore. It seems that, once Urizen recognizes his inability to undermine
Ore using the direct force of snow and ice, he unconsciously develops a new and more
intricately complex means for controlling the bound youth, and for expressing his fury that
the younger man is not subject to him. In fact, Urizen has so little awareness of the tree's
growth that it almost overtakes him, and he seems unaware that it has taken root by means
of contact between the ground and his own body. In a moment that Martin Bidney rightly
identifies as comic, the startled Urizen has to flee, because this labyrinthine tangle of Tree,
which grows rapidly and wildly, almost ensnares Urizen himself (Bidney 2 1 6- 1 7):
Amazd started Urizen when he found himself compassd round
And high roofed over with trees. he arose but the stems
Stood so thick he with difficulty & great pain brought
His books out of the dismal shade. all but the book of iron
Again he took his seat & rangd his Books around
On a rock of iron frowning over the foaming fires of Ore (p. 78;ll.9- 14; E
353).
The relationship between the tree and Urizen's books is also highly significant. 41 If
41

While this discussion of Urizen's books focuses on them as a negative tool, it is important to
remember that in The Four Zoas as a whole, Urizen's books are as ambiguous as Urizen himself. When
the Lamb of God saves Urizen from falling into Eternal Death in Night the Sixth, Urizen's books are the
one thing that remains constant through each death and rebirth of the Urizenic principle. Thus, Urizen's
books, which he carries with him constantly from Night 6 on, bear a kind of resemblance to Eternity; they
partake of an eternal principle, even if they themselves fail to be eternal.
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we recall the language of Urizen and Ahania, iron is the substance from which Urizen
makes his laws. Because of the rapid growth of the tree of mystery-, Urizen must abandon
his book of iron. Thus, law becomes entangled with the envy that motivates Urizen's
attack on Ore, so that law and envy become essentially one entity. Nevertheless, Urizen's
envy is in no way abated by this event, and his snows have been useless, probably because,
unlike Los, Ore's passion has created very- little structure of his own, so that there is no
symbolic system for Urizen to attack and petrify. Thus, Urizen begins to maneuver and
seduce Ore by means of language, at one point having his daughters feed Ore '1:he bread
of suffering" while reading to him from the book of iron. It is as if Urizen is trying to mold
Ore with language, to discover and create the symbolic structures that will make Ore
malleable to his will.
At first, Urizen's symbolic efforts are pure courtship. He tells Ore first that he,
Urizen, has only approached the bound youth out of concern: ''Pity for thee movd me to
break my dark & long repose/And to reveal myself before thee in a form of wisdom"
(p.78,11.30-3 1 ; E 354). This maneuver being unavailing, as Ore does everything but call
Urizen a fool, the bearded patriarch goes on to tempt Ore by means of knowledge, most
specifically, the instrumental knowledge of navigation and warfare: 'Vrizen answerd Read
my books explore my Constellations/Enquire of my Sons & they shall teach thee how to
War'' (p. 79 ,11. 20-2 I ; E 3 5 5). Thus, he appeals to the violence of Ore's anger, suggesting
that his systems of order will, in fact, help Ore to be more successfully angry-, more
fruitfully enraged.
However, in the same breath, Urizen sends his daughters to feed Ore the bread of
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sorrow and read to him from the book of iron, that is, the book of law. Urizen's messages
are contradictory. The offer of assistance in developing a revolutionary strategy is merely
a means of softening Ore's resistance and making him ready to listen to Urizenic law.
Since this law is directly connected to the envy that bound it up in the Tree of Mystery, its
purpose is clearly to disempower.
Then Urizen himself reads, evidently to both his daughters and to Ore, from his
book of brass. In The Book of Urizen, the book of brass is the text which Urizen reads to
the Eternals when he is first introducing them to his religion. Thus, it is somewhat distinct
from the book of iron, even as it is closely related. While the content of the book of brass
in Urizen is unknown, in The Four Zoas, it is clear. The book of brass teaches its readers
and hearers how to manipulate the poor through rhetoric, and it is an overt and direct
version of the somewhat more subtle expressions actually available in Blake's culture,
especially in Malthusian economics (Schorer 277-78) and in the Malthusian political
philosophy of William Pitt (Rosso 1 36):
Compell the poor to live upon a Crust of bread by soft mild arts
Smile when they frown frown when they smile & when a man looks pale
With labour & abstinence say he looks healthy & happy
And when his children sicken let them die there are enough
Born even too many & our Earth will be overrun
Without these arts . . . (p. 80,ll.9- 14; E 355)
The link to Malthus's economics is particularly vivid, since Malthus argues in First Essay
on Principles ofPopulation, first published in 1 798, that giving to the poor is actually
harmful to them. If the poor have enough to eat, it will allow them to reproduce more,
thus becoming more plentiful and finally more in danger of starvation, since population
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growth will always outstrip food supply. 42
There could be no better definition of Mystery than this. Urizen is encouraging his
daughters to mingle religious law with economic expediency, so that Ore will cooperate
with Urizen and perhaps even agree that his own persecution and suffering are necessary.
Ultimately, Urizen's desire is to "Reduce all to our will as spaniels are taught with art"
(p.80,1.2 1 ; E 355). By these means, Urizen will gain Ore's cooperation in his battle against
Los while preventing him from gaining enough power to assault Urizen himself.
However, none of this has the effect on Ore that Urizen desires. Thus, Urizen
resorts to an attack on Ore's most vulnerable front, that is, the family order imposed upon
him by his father Los. As Wilkie and Johnson suggest, this attack is ''both more cruel" and
"more effective in raising self-doubt" than earlier ones (149). Whatever the nature of
Ore's original feelings for his mother, Los' s actions in binding the young man have
produced in Ore something like a religious veneration for her. The chained Ore is
surrounded by the emblems of sacrificial religion. There are "raging lamps of mercy," an
oddly mixed image that may well describe the ambiguousness of Ore's adoration of the
motlier who was unable to save him from crucifixion (p.77,1. 1 1 ; E 353). He rages at her
and pities her all at once. There is also blood flowing everywhere, nourishing '1:he
immortal seed" for '1:he slaughter," an image that links childbearing with sacrificial
violence, probably in the form of warfare, a sacrifice even more violent than Los' s living

42

Frye makes an interesting link between symbolic orders and the type of oppression described in
this passage. He suggests that oppression is a necessary outcome of the desire for a uniform order: "What
Urizen wants is mental uniformity, common sense, and the social product of this is the rule of tyrants over
victims. Two friends of equal status are not n�ssarily uniform in their minds; a master and a slave are,
because the master is as much a product of a slave state as a slave, and is equally ensnared by it" (222-23).
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sacrifice of Ore (p.77,1. 1 5; E 353). Finally, there is Ore's own spirit, which ''Darted &
darted higher & higher to the shrine of Enitharmon" (p. 77,1.22; E 353). Ore's binding has
merely increased his longing for his mother so that it is now a form of religious worship.
This adoration of Enitharmon is Ore's vulnerable point. Thus, Ore can withstand
Urizen's other temptations. He can even withstand the pressures of an economic order
that scapegoats him and others who suffer by telling them that they are not really suffering
or that they are totally responsible for their own pain, thus letting rulers like Urizen off the
hook. What Ore cannot tolerate is the breakdown of the symbolic order he himself has
created in order to deal with Los's having separated him from his mother. The image of
the mother as a virginal and sacred being must be retained, or Ore can no longer maintain
his anger and his resistance. Thus Urizen finally gains control of Ore by describing
Enitharmon as pregnant, and what is worse, pregnant as a result of her own sexual desire:
Lo how the heart & brain are formed in the breeding womb
Of Enitharmon how it buds with life & forms the bones
The little heart the liver & the red blood in its labyrinths
By gratified desire by strong devouring appetite she fills
Los with ambitious fury that his race shall all devour (p.80,1.22-26; E 3 56)
The reference to Los is not the significant factor here, because Ore does not remember
that Los is the one who bound him. In fact, just a few lines later, he asks Urizen whether
or not Urizen is the one who bound him. Rather, it is the image of Enitharmon pregnant
because of her own desire that infuriates and weakens Ore, causing him to divide into two
beings, one bound and angry but too weak to break free from his bonds, the other free, but
peaceful and submissive to Urizen.
Ore unites with Urizen, whom he knows to be his enemy, by climbing the tree of
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Mystery, because Urizen has shattered the symbolic order that allowed Ore to maintain his
desire for his mother and yet see her as unavailable. In other words, Urizen has broken the
system of Mystery that Ore had created for himself, and left him no way of coping with his
frustration but to take on Urizen's form of Mystery instead. By breaking apart Ore's
system of order, Urizen compels Ore to take on his own system. The battle between
Urizen and Ore is undertaken at the level of rhetoric, although Urizen's ultimate aim is
corporeal warfare against Los.
This reading ofUrizen's use of symbolic orders to manipulate Ore can be linked to
a variety of different versions of historical critique. It fits the vision of Ore as
revolutionary France, insofar as Ore's worship ofEnitharmon can readily be seen as a
satire upon the veneration of the Virgin Mother in the Catholic France, which, when lost,
is translated into submission to Urizenic warfare and empire as a way of life. It is
compatible with Robson's notion that Ore represents the working classes, although we
must recognize that they are led into submission as much by the psychological residue of
the family order as by political means. Finally, it is compatible with a critique of faculty
psychology, which subordinates passion to reason, perhaps in part because the rational
faculty is able to play upon the anxieties about authority and sexual desire that are
developed within the familial system.
However we understand Ore, we can see that even though he overtly despises and
rejects Urizen, and suspects Urizen of lying, once he climbs Urizen's tree and begins to
"Organize a Serpent body" for himself, he puts himself in Urizen's power (p.80,l.44; E
356). Knowing Ore to be Luvah, Urizen sacrifices him again, subjecting him to a kind of
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crucifixion:
. . . he made Ore
In Serpent form compelld stretch out & up the mysterious tree
He sufferd him to Climb that he might draw all human forms
Into submission to his will nor knew the dread result (p.8 l,ll.3-6; E 3 56)
Thus any revolutionary power Ore might have had is controlled and recast to Urizen's
own purposes. Whereas in Ahania is it Fuzon whom Urizen crucifies, thus leaving the
revolutionary reader to hope that perhaps Ore would still break free from bondage and
produce a new and better revolution, in The Four Zoas, Urizen co-opts the prophetic and
revolutionary power of Los's son, rendering Ore's revolutionary interests futile.
Furthermore, Urizen uses Ore's sufferings to further his own power. When Ore
mounts the tree of mystery as a snake, Urizen says that he will "draw all human forms/Into
submission to his will nor knew the dread result." These words about being lifted up
directly allude to a passage from the Gospel of John, in which Jesus says, "And I, if I be
lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me" (John 12:32). Thus, Ore is identified
with Jesus. Yet Urizen is the one to whom humanity will be drawn by this particular
crucifixion. This allusion suggests another Biblical passage as well. In Exodus, the Hebrew
people worship the golden calf, in violation of the commandment against idolatry, and, as
punishment, they are smitten with illness and die in great numbers. They can, however, be
saved by gazing upon a golden snake that Moses has formed and held up before them.
Later, in the New Testament Gospel of John, this snake is linked with Jesus as well, as the
Evangelist writes, "And as Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the
Son of Man be lifted up:/That whosoever believeth in him should not perish but have
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everlasting life" (John 3 : 14-1 5). In driving Ore up the tree in the form of a snake, Urizen
acts the part of Jehovah and/or his spokesman Moses, who punishes those who disobey
his laws but provides a sacrificial means of redemption for them through the "crucified"
snake.
For Blake, both of these passages can be used to put Jesus in the position of being
a Urizenic pawn, an offering to appease Urizen's bloodlust, but also a means to draw
everyone into Urizen's power through conviction of sinfulness and gratitude for
redemption. This is the case despite the reality that Urizen creates the sins by establishing
the law and tree of mystery in the first place. While Ore can be understood here to
represent particular groups of people in culture, he also represents a certain way of
understanding and applying the Christian narrative in the social order. Jesus/Ore submits
to Urizen peacefully. Therefore, others should do so as well. The peaceful Ore, who
submits to Urizen and becomes complicit with him, even in his death, becomes the type of
Christ and the model of behavior. Of course, as the poem progresses, Ore continues to
rage. Yet his rage becomes warfare on Urizen's terms, as in Night 8, when Ore battles in
fury "among the Constellations of Urizen'' (p. 1 0 1 ,1.8; E 373), while growing more and
more into the form of a jeweled serpent who eats continually from the fruit of the tree of
mystery, while "communing" with Urizen and the Sanhedrin of Satan in joint warfare
against Los. Ironically, the submissive, peaceful Christ, in yielding to Urizen, becomes the
warrior Christ, or at least, the warrior Christian. This Urizenic warfare is again sacrificial
in nature, since its purpose is "avert/His [Urizen's] own despair even at the cost of every
thing that breathes" (p. 1 02;11.21 -22; E 375). Urizen's relationship with Ore describes a
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particular understanding of the Christian system.
By the middle of Night the Eighth, Urizen spends much of his time in his ''temple
of the Sun" consecrating his books by "reading incessantly/fo myriads of perturbed spirits
thro the universe" (p.102,11.23-25; E 375). He creates many, many believers who follow
his laws and accept his ideas, following in Ore's footsteps. The ''Victims" of his laws
create, by means of their "tears & sighs & death sweat" the Lake ofUdan in a place called
Entuthon Benithon (p.113,1.27; E 377). This lake keeps the roots ofUrizen's tree of
mystery watered. Thus Urizen has created a veritable machine of mystery and sacrifice,
which literally reproduces itself Ore's suffering has drawn others to Urizen, and these
others have been made to suffer, thus watering the tree upon which Ore was entwined,
drawing more followers to Urizen, and so on.
For this reason, when Jesus appears "wearing Luvah's robes of blood," in Night 8,
Urizen is terribly disturbed. Urizen is confused by that appearance, because he knows that
Ore is Luvah and he believes that he has Ore more or less under control. Furthermore, he
has sacrifice as a system thoroughly under control.

As a

result, Urizen is ''Perplexd &

terrifid" (p.101,1.2; E 373) by the appearance of Jesus, looking like Luvah and wearing
Luvah's sacrificial garment. The appearance of this version of Jesus is a genuine problem
for Urizen, because Jesus undermines the system of sin and sacrificial violence that Urizen
uses to sustain his power, and which has become the center of his symbolic order. It is no
longer a part of the order; it is the order. Yet Jesus comes to Entuthon Benithon where
the Victims create the lake that feeds Urizen's sacrificial system. There ''taking refuge in
his arms/The Victims fled from punishment for all his words were peace" (p. l 05,11.3-4; E
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378). Such forgiveness would completely undermine Urizen's system, because such free
forgiveness would render sacrifices unnecessary. Urizen's control, based on bloodshed,
would be lost. At an even more basic level, law itself would be undermined; Urizen's
special function as the creator of boundaries seems to be at stake here.
So Urizen's next action is to confer with the "synagogue of Satan" and crucify
Jesus, with the assistance of Rahab and her sisters. 43 These women simultaneously love
and torment their victims. As Otto suggests, Rahab and the others love their victims, but
they believe they themselves can only receive the promised redemption by killing the
beloved. Thus, "noone opposes the crucifixion because they believe it is the only path to
eternal life" (263). So the daughters of Rahab worship as a divine redeemer the very one
whom they themselves destroy:
Thus was the Lamb of God condemnd to death
They naild him upon the tree of Mystery weeping over him
And then mocking & then worshipping calling him Lord & King (p. l 06,1. 1 3; E 379)
This is the same principle upon which the temple of the Sun is founded in Night 7b, where
Luvah is honored even as his sacrifice must be perpetually reenacted. If Jesus' s death can
be interpreted as one more sacrifice to Urizen, even a voluntary one, then that death
would simply perpetuate Urizen's system, drawing more people into his snare, the snare of
perpetual sacrifice in a temple devoted to death..

43

1n Night 8, the term "synagogue of Satan," which sounds rather anti-Semitic, is linked with the
Sanhedrin (1.4) who collaborate with the Roman governor to put Jesus to death in the Gospels. Elsewhere
in Blake's writings there is evidence of some anti-Semitism. Nevertheless, as Bloom suggests, Blake is
using the term in this-context to link the religious structures that put Jesus to death with the supposedly
Christian church of his own era (261 ). The point is the Satanic quality of both systems, not some uniquely
Jewish form of evil.
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Certainly Urizen sees things in this way. Jesus, wearing Luvah's robes of blood, is
simply another Luvah, sacrificed in precisely the same way. At first appears as if Los
shares this vision also, since he cooperates with Jerusalem when she suggests that they
build a sepulcher for Jesus and "worship Death in fear while yet we live" (p. l 06,1.1 O; E
3 79). Rather than focusing on Jesus's mercy, Jerusalem focuses on death. If she and Los
and the others all worship his death, as such, they put themselves back into the Urizenic
order which would have them willingly participate in their own sacrifice in the same way
that Ore did. Thus, whatever Jesus may have been or intended, Urizen would be able to
incorporate him and his worshipers into the Urizenic system. In fact, Jerusalem falls into
this precise trap, allowing Rahab to persuade her to sacrifice her own children on Urizen's
''bloody Altar'' (p.111,1.4; E 3 85).
Jerusalem's actions are a direct response to Rahab's interpretation of Jesus's
death. After his body is taken down from the Cross, Rahab removes Luvah's robe from
Jesus's body, and "it rolld apart, revealing to all in heaven/And all on Earth the Temple &
the Synagogue of Satan & Mystery" (p.1 1 3 second portion, 1.3 8-40; E 379). These lines
seem to indicate that Jesus's generosity in assuming Luvah's robes of blood is finally just
another submission to the Urizenic order. By letting himself be killed, Jesus submits to
Urizen, and his death reveals Urizen's power and the power of Mystery. Jesus's death is
the sacrifice of a rebel, just like all the others, and, like all the others, it will preserve the
system. Lincoln sees this moment as the stripping away of the love in Jesus's act, so that
Urizenic judgment becomes the only visible reality (269-70). Similarly, Peter Otto
privileges this perspective on the crucifixion, arguing that if Jesus's death is emphasized at
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all, Urizen's sacrificial system is supported. Even more disastrous is the emphasis on his
death as a sacrifice. Instead, Otto suggests, Jesus's Incarnation, or embodiment, is the
appropriate point of focus, because that emphasis affirms the body that Urizen has
degraded, suppressed, and murdered throughout the poem (Critique 99).
Yet Blake allows for another way of reading of Jesus's death, even as Rahab,
Urizen's conspirator, is still in the picture. Without necessarily rejecting Otto's perspective
altogether, one can read the text as do Wilkie and Johnson, who suggest that it is precisely
Jesus's death, understood as self-sacrifice, that destroys Orcan sacrifice, since Ore's
crucifixion is based upon Urizenic accusations of sin, and Ore cooperates because he buys
into Urizen's system (1 52). Jesus's sacrifice has a different motivation from Ore's, and
that different motivation allows it to have a different kind of influence. This view bears
some resemblance to that of Rosso, who suggests that Jesus's sacrifice supports the idea
of self-sacrifice, and that self-sacrifice renders Urizenic morality obsolete (142). Urizenic
sacrifice, after all, began with Urizen's attempts to evade his own guilt and his own fear of
destruction. He persuades Ore to accept crucifixion for the same reason, and Ore is willing
to accept his own crucifixion because Urizen has destroyed his power to resist. Jesus, on
the other hand, resists Urizen's accusations of sin to the end, refusing to accept Urizen's
definition of others as sinners. Furthermore, he even refuses to respond to Urizen with
violence in order to preserve himself. From this perspective, when Rahab pulls back the
robe and reveals the Tree of Mystery, she is accidentally revealing the source of Jesus's
murder in all its turpitude. The interpretation of the death, and of the unfurled robe, lies
within the eye of the viewer, and that is precisely the point. Blake is asking his readers to
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choose what Jesus's death will mean for them.
Yet in The Four Zoas, Los's view is the one that has the most authority, and his
perspective grows through events in Night 7a. While Urizen is busy seducing and
enslaving Ore, Los is engaged in the process of reuniting with the Spectre-a rejected
fragment of the original Urthona-and, as a result, he is rethinking his perspective on
sacrifice. As has been previously mentioned, the male Los, the male Spectre, and the
female Enitharmon are all fragments of the original Urthona. The Spectre suggests a
reunion between himself, Los, and Enitharmon after the Spectre and Enitharmon engage in
sexual union on the Tree of Mystery and, in the process, cause the rebirth of Vala in a new
and different form. When Vala arises, along with her comes an absolutely disastrous
resurrection of the dead "[i]n male forms without female counterparts or
Emanations/Cruel and ravening with Enmity & Hatred & War'' (p.85 181 portion, 11. 19-20;
E 360). Whatever this peculiar event might represent, a provocative question in its own
right, it is clear that it is negative, disturbing even to Urizen and utterly horrifying to the
Spectre who, along with Enitharmon, caused the disaster to occur. 44
The Spectre is distasteful even to himself and he recognizes that he is distasteful to
«-rite hermaphrodites in Blake's texts are puzzling and fascinating, more so because they are
clearly bad things. Yet, in Night the Ninth, when the Apocalypse comes and the Zoas are reunited, the
female forms disappear. Thus, the hermaphrodites are both like and unlike the Zoas when they are whole.
The difference is probably that in the true Zoas, male and female are united Neither element of humanity
is actually cut off. The hermaphrodites, however, remind the reader of the true Zoas, because they lack
separate female and male selves. But the difference is that these figures have no female side at all,
whereas the unified Zoas include both male and female qualities within themselves. Blake's
hermaphrodites may be half-beings, like the divided Zoas, who are incapable of mating with anything.
They can also be seen as utterly detached from the body. Both of these perspectives are arguable. Yet these
matters need not be worked out in full, if our aim is to explore the way in which the hermaphrodite
episodes contribute to an argument on sacrifice. What is central for the purposes of this discussion is the
Spectre's horror at helping to create even more fragmented beings. This remorse makes him want to
embrace Los, become one with him, and find a way to work together to help the hermaphrodites.
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Los. Furthermore, his distaste for himself is matched by his distaste for Los. Nevertheless
he insists that the two must be reunited, and Enitharmon along with them:
Thou never canst embrace sweet Enitharmon terrible Demon. Till
Thou art united with thy Spectre Consummating by pains & labours
That mortal body & by Self annihilation back returning
To Life Eternal be assurd I am thy real Self
Tho thus divided from thee & the Slave of Every passion
Of thy fierce Soul Unbar the Gates of Memory look upon me
Not as another but as thy real Self I am thy Spectre
Thou didst subdue me in old times by thy Immortal Strength
When I was a ravning hungring & thirsting cruel lust & murder
Tho horrible & Ghastly to thine Eyes tho buried beneath
The ruins of the Universe, hear what inspird I speak & be silent
If we unite in one[,] another better world will be
Opend within your heart & loins & wondrous brain (p.85 second
portion,11.32-44; E 368)
To the Spectre Los is a terrible Demon who has subdued him. To Los, the Spectre is
"cruel lust and murder" itself, "horrible and Ghastly." Yet the answer to their mutual
disgust, the Spectre urges, is a reunion between them. That reunion is effected by "Self
annihilation," a Blakean term that will reappear constantly in the later works, but which
appears here for the first time in the mythological texts. This self-annihilation is not
suicide, however; nor it is Ore's submission to Urizen. It is, rather, a renunciation of one's
claim to superior status, including the claim to moral superiority over the other. Thus, one
is enabled to forgive both one's own weaknesses and those of others. Forgiveness implies
that the person is more important than the symbolic order that he or she may have
violated.
Nevertheless, openness and forgiveness are not Los's immediate reactions to the
Spectre's offer. Instead, Los is "furious," he sees the Spectre as "horrible," and he is
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astounded at the suggestion that the two should j oin. Nevertheless, he is quickly
convinced that the Spectre is telling the truth; as a result, he experiences the doors
opening up within him, and comes to recognize that it is time for forgiveness: "I will quell
my fury & teach/Peace to the S oul of dark revenge & repentance to Cruelty'' (p. 86,11. 1 112; E 368). Los responds to the S pectre's words by embracing him. The two are united,
and from this point become capable of working together. Furthermore, a new way of
responding to guilt emerges. Throughout the text, from Tharmas and Enion's first
recriminations, to Los's binding of Ore, to Urizen's domination of Ore, the characters in
The Four Zoas have been scapegoating others, through either blame or actual sacrifice, in
order to assuage their own guilt, ensure the dominance and the purity of their own
systems, or save their own lives. Even though the two are unable, at first, to get
Enitharmon to j oin them, the reconciliation of Los and the Spectre opens the way to
forgiveness as an option.
This transformation is not immediate, however. Enitharmon is thoroughly
entangled in the Urizenic system. She believes that she will die eternally if someone does
not ransom her, and she insists that Los must eat Urizen's fruit and j oin her in her misery.
Furthermore, Urthona's Spectre blames himself for the Spectres of the Dead who have no
female counterparts and who suffer terribly, and he also feels the need for ransom. He
wants to clothe bodies for the dead, giving them counterparts. At first, it appears that Los
and his companions will be creating new entities solely for the purpose of sacrificing them
in order to gain redemption. When Los agrees with the Spectre's plan, he uses the
language of sacrifice in his affirmation, but he also uses that language in an ambiguous
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way:
They [the dead who are victims of battle] feed upon our life we are their
victims. Stem desire
I feel to fabricate embodied semblances in which the dead
May live before us in our palaces & in our gardens of labour
Which now opend within the Center we behold spread abroad
To form a world of Sacrifice of brothers & sons & daughters
To comfort Ore in his dire sufferings; . . . (p.90,ll.8-13; E 370)
It is unclear here whether or not Los ultimately intends to allow the newly recreated a time
of life in his city Golgonooza before sacrificing them, or whether their life will somehow
be his sacrifice, the sacrifice of his labors. Enitharmon, however clearly sees the newly
clothed dead as potential "ransoms" that will allow her own soul and Los' s soul to survive
(p.90,1.24; E 370).
Ultimately, however, once the process of forgiveness and yielding to the other has
begun in the mutual embrace of Los and the Spectre, the process continues. As Los
creates artistic forms, the spectrous dead see them and are able to take these forms to
themselves for bodies. This is a strange idea, but, clearly, it has to do with art's capacity,
not so much to create bodies, as to create our perceptions of our bodies and of the
world's body. Los and Enitharmon both find that they love the new life that they have
created through their work, and so does the bound Ore, the part of Ore that has never
yielded to Urizen. Thus, if these new beings are ransoms for Los and Enitharmon, it is
only because Los and Enitharmon are "ransomed" by their own love and labor, not by the
blood of sacrifices:
But Los loved them & refusd to Sacrifice their infant limbs
And Enitharmons smiles & tears prevaild over self protection
They rather chose to meet Eternal death than to destroy
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The offspring of their Care & Pity Urthonas spectre was comforted
(p.90,ll.50-53; E 371 )
The idea of sacrifice as the method for avoiding death, even the Eternal death which
throughout the text the characters have regarded as the ultimate terror, still exists in the
minds of these characters. But they have come to value the lives of their offspring as more
precious to them than their own lives. Once this shift occurs, one would rather be stained
permanently by guilt or lose one's own life than harm another.
Through this transformation, the movement towards the Apocalypse of the later
nights becomes possible. It also becomes possible to understand Jesus's death in a way
that is very different from Urizen's. While Urizen sees in Jesus's crucifixion another death
that can be used to redeem his own life and the lives of his followers, Los can see Jesus as
another like himself who refuses to sacrifice others simply to save himself Los and Jesus,
unlike Urizen or the soldiers who kill Luvah, can be consubstantial with others based upon
a common humanity, without feeling the need to sacrifice anyone.
Many critics, among them Lincoln, argue that Los's understanding of Jesus is still
problematic. For example, Lincoln suggests that Los is operating within a destructive
sacrificial system because he helps Jerusalem build a shrine to Jesus and talks with Rahab
in a manner that indicates that he is saved in a way that she is not. Thus, Lincoln argues,
Los is deluded, his creativity destroyed as he accuses Rahab of sin in a way more
reminiscent ofEntuthon Benithon than Golgonooza (270-71 ). However, all Los simply
tells Rahab that he, too, was once willing to sacrifice others and that now, his values have
changed: "I was once like thee a Son/Of Pride and I also have pierced the Lamb of God in
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pride & wrath" (p.113 second portion,ll. 51-52; E 3 80).
While these words might sound self-righteous, particularly those words that
presume to identify Rahab's motives, they express a concept that is crucial to Blake's
ethical perspective, the idea that it makes no sense to sacrifice others to save oneself from
sin, judgment, or mortality. In lines 23 - 51, Los briefly recounts the narrative that will
comprise the fall narrative of Blake's later illuminated work, Milton. As Wilkie and
Johnson correctly observe, this segment of The Four Zoas seems oddly misplaced, and to
anyone not already familiar with Milton, the short, condensed version of Milton's fall
narrative would be almost incomprehensible (192). Nevertheless, Los's basic argument is
clear. He objects to the idea that an innocent victim can save a guilty party , or that such
sacrifices are the price of forgiveness. In this brief passage, Los recounts the fall of Satan
and the process by which others repeatedly seek victims who will die to atone for Satan's
faults. Most refuse, some run away, some kill another person, until finally Jesus consents
to die, '�lling beneath Tirzah & Rahab" (p.115,1.50; E 3 81). The emphasis here is not on
Jesus' s death as such redeeming anyone, but on the fact that Jesus, unlike so many others,
was unwilling to sacrifice someone else to save himself, and, furthermore, was willing to
make himself consubstantial with someone who was condemned to death, even at the
expense of his own life.
Furthermore, Los tries to make Rahab understand that her sacrifices are not
sacred, redemptive acts; when she kills her victims, she is simply killing someone: "Thou
art that Rahab Lo the Tomb what can we purpose more" (p.115,1.51; E 3 81). His final
words are a plea; do not kill further. Someone has been willing to die for Satan. If that has
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not caused redemption, clearly there is no sacrificial victim who can. Finally, he asks
Rahab to bow before Enitharmon. This action is also simply a plea for Rahab to repent, to
do what Enitharmon has finally chosen to do and embrace Eternal Death rather than kill
others. Rather than being a self-righteous accusation, as Lincoln suggests, Los's encounter
with Rahab represents an absolute embrace of his own vulnerability. Los is willing to
respect the lives of others, even if it costs him his own life, and even if his life will not be
redeemed in another world. Los, like Jesus, is willing to give his life for another.
Thus, Blake's use of the Jesus narrative in The Four Zoas moves beyond his
previous critique of the doctrine of the Atonement in The Book ofAhania, pushing
Blake's ideas about order and sacrifice closer to a Burkean perspective. Kenneth Burke's
theory acknowledges that sacrifices of some kind are necessary for the preservation of
order, if only because all aims, and thus all terms of value, cannot carry equal weight at
every moment. In any given situation, one value must yield to another, and such sacrifices
are not necessarily scapegoating. Furthermore, if warfare is to be avoided, there must be
the possibility of yielding and of adapting one's own symbolic order in the face of the
reality of the other. Insisting on the purity of a system cannot be the central focus of a
system, or that system will begin sacrificing people for its own preservation.
This focus on purity is precisely what is at stake in the Urizenic and Losian
approaches to the Jesus narrative. If the Jesus narrative is understood in terms of a
Urizenic attitude, Jesus' s sacrifice must occur in order to preserve Urizen' s unyielding
system. Jesus cannot be allowed to forgive those who offend against Urizen's order
without 'someone''S being killed. Los's attitude, however, includes the willingness to yield
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the purity of the system in order to maintain relationship. Finally, Los sacrifices, not other
people, but his need to insure his own survival and control his own order. In the depiction
of the Tree of Mystery and its various victims, as well as in the representation ofLos's
unwillingness to buy his own life through the creation of more victims, Blake represents
different forms of sacrifice that are the result of different forms of order. Urizen's form of
order represents the imposition ·of a single unyielding and absolute code that must be
maintained through scapegoating and violence. Los's order also involves strongly held
values. These values culminate, however, in a refusal to sacrifice others to save himself
and in an attempt to make amends for the harm that he and his companions have done
when they were struggling so busily to preserve their own positions. This movement away
from scapegoating can only occur, however, because Los is willing to sacrifice total
control over his city of art, Golgonooza. He allows the aims of the Spectre and
Enitharmon to help guide his efforts. He does not cling to the purity of his own symbolic
order, so he becomes free to collaborate in the creation of order rather than imposing
upon others by creating and sustaining it entirely on his own terms.
Ultimately, this difference in attitude determines how one will interpret events. In
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the crucifixion of Christ remains
available only in forms of symbolic action- narratives or theological doctrines-and these
symbolic actions can yield to a variety of different interpretations. Blake suggests that the
Christian system built upon this narrative can vary. It can be understood in ways that
promote a self-interested attempt to cling to one's own system and one's own power at all
costs. Or, it can be used as a model for how to resist a system of scapegoating, even if one
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must sacrifice one's own life to do so. Resistance to the system of sacrifice only occurs
when one ceases to accuse others of sin, just as Jesus does in The Four Zoas and in
Blake's antinomian reading of the Gospels. Ceasing to accuse, however, does not preclude
a willingness to hold values and to express disapproval of the values of others, just as Los
expresses his disapproval ofRahab's murder of Jesus. To cease to judge and accuse
involves instead the renunciation of vengeance and the elimination of accusations that
serve to place one's self above the other, in a position of purity.
Furthermore, differing interpretations of events can disrupt the symbolic order and
transform it. This happens at the end of Night the Eighth. After the crucifixion, Rahab,
Jerusalem, and Los understand Jesus's death to be an Eternal Death, but Ahania and
Enion, who are still wandering outside the boundaries ofUrizen's and Los's domains,
anticipate Jesus' s return:
The Lamb of God has rent the Veil of Mystery soon to return
In Clouds & Fires around the rock [where Albion sleeps] & the Mysterious
tree [the Tree of Mystery]. (p.110 First portion, ll.1-2; E 385)
The belief in Jesus's Eternal Death causes Jerusalem to follow Rahab and to sacrifice her
children to the Urizenic system, but Rahab herself is so affected by Ahania's and Enion's
songs that she becomes self-divided. Her wavering turns Satan's followers against
Mystery, at least as it is embodied in the Christian narrative, so that Deism, or Natural
Religion, becomes the new form of Mystery-still sacrificial and still malevolent, but now,
from a Blakean standpoint, almost totally devoid of imaginative power. The Apocalypse
becomes possible in part because of this shift to an imaginatively weaker form of Mystery,
combined, of course, with Los's rejection of the sacrificial system. These two factors drive
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Los to rip apart the last symbolic underpinnings ofUrizen's sacrificial order and bring it
down.
This action, which begins Night the Ninth, sets off the Apocalyptic events which
reunite the Zoas. It is possible because events and the symbolic orders founded on them
are differently interpreted by different characters, thus producing transformations in the
symbolic order and making hisorical change possible. When Jesus's story can be
understood as a story of self-giving and forgiveness, and when characters and readers can
come to recognize that sacrifice can involve the acceptance of one's guilt, one's limited
perspective, and one's mortality, without a panicky quest for redemption, then
scapegoating is no longer necessary.
Yet Blake is not arguing on behalf of forgiveness and self-sacrifice as ultimate
values per se. Once one is in a fallen state, a state wherein the parts of a human being or a
human community are at war with one another, forgiveness, in the sense of yielding one's
claim over the other, is a necessary step in the process of Self annihilation mentioned by
the Spectre on page 84 (Second portion, 1.34; E 368). Forgiveness allows one to release
one's defensive attempt to show oneself pure by laying blame on another. Furthermore,
when the egotistical Selthood is diminished, Los and the others can renounce the desire to
insure their own survival or dominance by unjustly sacrificing others. Yet forgiveness
cannot be ultimate, because to make it so would place the Losian principle of yielding
above the bounding line of Urizen rather than joining the two into one. That joining must
be the ultimate aim, and it cannot occur if yielding is made ultimate. In fact, the worship of
self-surrender and yielding would deify the behavior of the victimized innocents of The
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Songs ofInnocence, people like little Tom Dacre, the chimney sweep, who sacrifice
themselves to a cruel Urizenic system, while believing themselves to be surrendering to an
all-loving God.
Since the ultimate aim cannot be forgiveness or surrender in Blake's system, at the
beginning of Night the Ninth, Los initiates the Apocalypse in a self-sacrificial act and does
not appear again until he returns as Urthona, one who is capable of creating the armor for
Intellectual Warfare and dwelling in the reign of Sweet Science. Forgiveness is simply one
step on a path towards a more perfect order. In The Four Zoas, both forgiveness and
revolutionary violence are terms which are part of a larger value system that Kenneth
Burke would call an ultimate dialectical order. That order will fully emerge in Night the
Ninth, the Apocalyptic climax of The Four Zoas. In the following section, we will
examine how an absolute dialectical order is created in Night the Ninth, as Blake gives
each Zoa a moment of dominance within the Apocalyptic conclusion of the poem. The
characteristics of each Zoa have a place, while each Zoa is also required, at some level, to
integrate the characteristics of other Zoas in a process of transformation.
The Apocalypse as Burkean Dialectic: Night the Ninth

Urthona, first in the divided and fallen form of Los and finally in his redeemed
state, is both the first and the last Zoa to play the dominant the role in Night the Ninth.
The Apocalypse begins when Los destroys Urizen's system by pulling the Sun and the
Moon down from the sky:
Los his vegetable hands
Outstretchd his right hand branching out in fibrous Strength
Siezd the Sun. His left hand like dark roots coverd the Moon
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And tore them down cracking the heavens across from immense to
unmense
Then fell the fires of Eternity with loud & shrill
Sound of Loud Trumpet thundering along from heaven to heaven
A mighty sound articulate Awake ye dead & come
To judgment from the four winds Awake & Come away (p.117,11.6-13; E
386)
As we saw earlier, the Sun is actually Los's own creation; a part ofLos's world is stolen
from him and placed in Urizen's temple. When Los rips the Sun from the sky, he destroys
the imaginative underpinnings that make Urizen's order convincing, and in doing so,
destroys the order itself After the events of Night the Eighth, Los is unwilling to
perpetuate Urizen's sacrificial system by going to war with Urizen or by allowing his own
creations to be appropriated for Urizen's temple.
However, in performing this act of resistance, Los releases powerful forces that
cost him his own life. While his fate is not really explained, the Spectre's body and
Enitharmon's are "buried in the ruins of the Universe/Mingled with the confusion"
(p.118,11.5-6; E 3 87). None of these characters will reappear until the end of the poem in
the form ofUrthona and his wife. This Zoa contains both the Spectre and Los united
within himself, and his wife is evidently changed sufficiently that the name ''Enitharmon" is
no longer used to identify her. She becomes simply 'lhe wife of Dark Urthona"
(p.173,1.11; E 405). Urthona is restored, but Los, Enitharmon, and the Spectre have made
a genuine sacrifice in allowing this reintegration to occur.
Critics offer a variety of reasons for Los's actions, and an equal number of
interpretations of Blake's Apocalypse in Night the Ninth. According to Bloom, for
example, Los attacks 'lhe deadness of the cosmos" out of despair (Apocalypse 267). Yet
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Los' s "uncomprehending but imaginatively correct attack upon nature" is exactly what
needs to happen, despite the negative motivation (266). In a position fairly common for
those who have been strongly influenced by Northrop Frye's approach to Blake, Bloom
asserts that this action initiates a period of "human integration," leaving the political
dimension behind. Like Bloom, Wilkie and Johnson also see despair in Los's action, while
affirming, nevertheless, that Los was correct in wanting a life greater than the one
constructed by the fallen Zoas. They, too, regard the Apocalypse as a largely spiritual
event, but they are more specific in their claim that Night the Ninth describes the
destruction of the material world and the "Resurrection of the body and the soul." This
event "must begin here and now," in this world, "but . . . need not be limited to the here
and now" (2 1 0).
In contrast to these critics are those like Aers and Hobson, who see this
Apocalypse in largely political terms. While Los' s action may have been an attack on the
symbolic order, it precipitates political revolution in the public realm. Aers disapproves of
that revolution. Hobson, on the other hand, makes an intricate argument, finding in Night
the Ninth both positive and negative revolutionary practices laid out for the reader by
Blake. But both of these critics, like David Erdman before them, agree that the apocalyptic
events in Night the Ninth are part ofBlake's long-term revolutionary project. 45
Taking a very different approach to the historical relevance of Night the Ninth,
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See Hobson. pages 1 5 1 --07 for an excellent brief overview of the traditional position, the
deconstructive argument of Donald Ault, and the anti-revolutionary position of David Aers. Hobson's own
fascinating discussion of Night the Ninth, which sees Blake as pursuing a quest for the appropriate agency
for social change, appears on pages 196-205, followed up by his overall statement about the entire poem
on pages 205-10.
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Rosso maintains that the entirety of Night the Ninth, after the pulling down of the
heavenly bodies, is Los's artistic creation. It is a non-violent symbolic action meant to
intervene in the real world by modeling a non-violent symbolic expression of violent
emotions and imagery.

As

such, Rosso claims, Los is engaging in an act of"imaginative

faith" ( 144). This argument, while interesting, requires us to make a shift in narrative
point-of-view without any real verbal cues to signal a new narrator. Los does disappear
from the action, but it seems more likely that he is buried beneath the rubble of the
universe than that he has suddenly become the narrator of the prophecy. Night the Ninth is
disturbingly violent, and an understandable desire to retain the values of forgiveness
promulgated in Night the Eighth may well be skewing Rosso's reading here. Furthermore,
Rosso's argument implies that the use of non-violent resistance in the form of symbolic
action would have predictably non-violent results, a position that seems unlikely,
particularly if the symbolic action in question depicted violent activities.
Arguably, much of the discussion of The Four Zoas is sidetracked by these very
issues, as readers, shocked by the disturbing violence in the text, attempt either to displace
the violence from the human realm altogether, as if it were some sort of separate cosmic
force,46 or to become so involved in their own condemnation of the violence that they fail
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It is only fair to admit that the text itself sometimes invites the tendency to separate the Zoas'
actions from human agency. As Bloom points out in his discussion of Tharmas's winnowing process near
the end of Night Nine, we. the readers, are experiencing things from a divine, removed perspective that
reveals the underlying promise that lies at the other end of the suffering that the Zoas' apocalyptic
activities bring about. The human beings experiencing it are simply suffering (279). Nevertheless, Blake
insists that the Four Mighty Ones are in us all, and, if so, their actions are not separate from us. It would
be inappropriate to think of the violence of the Apocalypse as an action of the Zoas that we as human
beings have nothing to do with. If violence cannot be avoided then human beings are the ones who will
both enact and suffer it.
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to separate their condemnation from Blake's argument. Furthermore, almost all of these
discussions, with the exception of Hobson and Lincoln, locate the argument of The Four
Zoas within either the spiritual or the material realm. These limitations are made possible
by a failure fully to grasp the way in which physical and mental worlds are unified for
Blake. If the Zoas dwell within individuals and within the social order, and if their
relationships with each other are described by means of a symbolic order, then the inner
spiritual lives of human beings, the symbolic order itself, and the events of public life are
going to be intricately interconnected in a causal chain that can move in any direction. A
new imaginative insight can change the symbolic order, a changed symbolic order can
change public events, and vice versa. However, since each of these spheres contains
different elements, it is unlikely that all elements would be transformed simultaneously,
particularly since fragmentation is the definition of a fallen world in Blake's scheme of
things. Thus, Blake's depiction of a cosmic order in the process of transformation will
include many, many activities, some of which he approves, some of which he disapproves,
but all of which may be a necessary part of the process. As Lincoln suggests, in Blake's
Apocalypse the fiery and violent aspects of the vision are a ''terrible necessity'' (194). They
are not good in comparison to the absolute aim, but, as temporary elements of a process
of change, they are better than permanent submission to Urizen's system.
Los's refusal to submit to this system any further is the source of his choice to
dismantle the Urizenic sky, and that choice contains something of the despair that Bloom
identifies and some of the imaginative faith that Rosso describes. When Night the Ninth
opens, Los and Enitharmon are both weeping for the dead Jesus, failing to discern his
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resurrected presence, and both sense their own impending "Non-Existence/For such they
deemd the death of the body'' (p.117,11.5-6; E 3 86). They are terrified, and they do not
have the faith in the Resurrection that Blake would undoubtedly want for them. 47
Nevertheless, this terror does not mean that Los's act is motivated simply by despair.
Rather, his action is the measure of just how completely he has surrendered his self
centered drive towards dominance and personal survival at all costs. Despite his sorrow
and his fear, Los does not try to save himself at the expense of another. Nor does he resort
to violence. Instead he rips Urizen's symbolic order apart by withdrawing the support
Urizen has derived from Los's creative energies. In doing so, Los continues the pattern of
non-violence that began when he and Enitharmon refused to sacrifice their children,
whatever the cost might be to themselves. As Rosso maintains, this kind of non-violent
resistence often plays a role in Apocalyptic literature, even in the Biblical revelation. This
resistance is "not the passive kind in which the persecuted play no role, but the active
resistance of heroic struggle that hastens divine intervention" (Rosso 132). Whatever
despair Los may have felt, his attack on Urizen's symbolic structure is still an act of
integrity.
Yet, despite its integrity, this action is not sufficient by itself to bring about the
complete reordering of the symbolic system that is necessary for the redemption of all the
47

Whatever complex relationship Blake imagined between body and soul, which he early on
describes as inseparable. belief in some sort of life beyond death is evident throughout Blake's recorded
conversations and in his letters, and this belief appears at varying periods of his life. In this passage, the
living Jesus is standing beside the couple all the time, even as they grieve for his death. In 1 800, during
the composition of The Four Zoas, Blake wrote a letter of sympathy to his patron William Hayley at the
death of Hayley's son. "May you continue . . . to be more and more perswaded. that every Mortal loss is an
Immortal Gain" (705). In 1 826, the year before his death, Blake tells Henry Crabb Robinson that "I
cannot consider death as anything but a going from one room to another" (370-71).
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Zoas. Los is only one of pieces necessary to the construction of a symbolic order that truly
reflects the nature of the Eternal Man as an individual or as a social body. Los's action is
the first of a long series of actions that will be necessary before the final consummation
can take place. Once the Apocalypse begins, it is time for other forces to act, finally, under
the guidance of Albion. He awakens to resume his proper role as the whole human being
who chooses and guides the actions of the parts, deciding what forces are to be dominant
in what situation.
From this point on, Albion, not Los, is the creator of the symbolic order, designing
what Kenneth Burke would call an ultimate dialectical order, an order that has a final
ethical aim, but that seeks to attain the aim by including other, lesser values within it.
Different values assume greater importance at different times, depending on the need of
the moment. Furthermore, the order itself can be affected by exposure to other orders that
enrich and challenge it. In The Four Zoos, Albion decides which Zoa must act next in
order to move the whole community towards the state of Universal Brotherhood,
Intellectual Warfare, and Sweet Science that is the ultimate goal of the process.
Dialectical transformation also occurs, in part, because once Albion takes his
proper place, each Zoa, each term within the system, becomes capable of embracing the
characteristics of its opposite without attempting to dominate or extinguish it. In other
words, it becomes evident that each Zoa is dependent on the functions of the others, even
when those functions appear to be opposites. The mutual dependence of opposite
dialectical terms is depicted in Blake's narrative as the Zoas move away from their desire
to dominate one another. Instead, they resume the more positive practice of earlier days,
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''When Heaven & Hell in Emulation strove in sports of Glory" (p.1 24,1. 1 3 ; E 393). As
primary responsibility for action moves from one Zoa to another, this mutual Emulation
develops anew. Each Zoa finds that he must embrace and enact the qualities that are
associated with other Zoas. For example, Los, the initiator of the Apocalypse, has begun
his transformation of the symbolic order by embracing a pattern of forgiveness and
openness which, as we have already seen, is deeply connected to his imaginative function.
But when Los pulls the Sun and Moon from the sky, he is creating a boundary using an
essentially Urizenic function, so that he can set limits on how he is contributing to
Urizen's order. In other words, he is combining the Losian form of order, the one that is
open to the other, with Urizen's boundary function. He does not impose a limit on Urizen
in the sense of trying to contain or destroy him, but he does limit his own cooperation in
Urizenic activity. This movement on Los's part results in the fall of the universe as Urizen
has constructed it.
Thus, despite the importance of non-violence in Los's own actions, his symbolic
gesture actually leads, not to peace, but to more violence, the violence that occurs when
the captives are freed and tum on their oppressors. Once Urizen's system is gone, there is
nothing to hold back the rage of the oppressed. Los's new willingness to limit his
cooperation with sacrificial activity disrupts the sacrificial system that contains violence,
and, at first, this results in more violence. So Blake makes it clear that violence is
necessary to the process of transformation, just as forgiveness is. Neither of these two
apparent opposites is ultimate. In fact, within the process of renewal, each Zoa requires
the other, and each makes a contribution that is is simply a stage on the journey. When
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Los forgives, he escapes from Urizen's system, which leads him to limit his cooperation
with Urizen' s system, thus involving him in the creation of boundaries. Yet that boundary
destroys the container that has held back the rage of those oppressed by Urizenic law and
Urizenic reason. Thus, the prisoners rise up and begin committing bloodshed.
This process, Blake might have argued, characterizes what actually happens in
history. A movement that refuses to cooperate with the current system, even if it is non
violent, can rip apart a symbolic order and release pent-up, even violent, energies in the
social order. Nevertheless, the imaginative function can only transform society when it
ceases to support domination, even at the risk of producing violence. Furthermore, the
openness of imaginative vision must be balanced by sufficient boundaries to refuse certain
kinds of participation in oppressive social orders, even as it is willing to open itself to
awareness of and compromise with others' perspectives.
Once violence develops, however, it will soon be necessary for a new boundary
function to emerge in order to contain the release of revolutionary energy. In The Four
Zoas, Los's non-violent action sets loose uncontrollable energy. Violence breaks out as
"The poor smite their opressors they awake up to the harvest . . . The opressed pursue like
the wind there is no room for escape" (p. 1 1 7,11. 19 & 23; E 387). At some level, this
pursuit is simple justice. Yet the narrator tells us, ''Their opressors have falln they have
Stricken them they awake to life/Yet pale the just man stands erect & looking to heavn"
(p. 1 1 7,11.24-25). Ore's rage has been released, and the chaos that emerges cannot be
entirely just because it is without limit. The Tree of Mystery begins to burn, a good thing,
but flames also enter "the Holy City'' and 'Vniversal Confusion" reigns. (P. 1 1 9,11. 1 7 &
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24; E 388). New boundaries become necessary again, because the violence that is enacted
by the oppressed is not itself a final or positive state. The truly just person is not yet
satisfied.
Thus, when Albion awakes, the first Zoa that he calls upon is Urizen, whose
boundary function, operating sanely, is needed in this situation of violence and bloodshed:
See you not all this wracking furious confusion
Come forth from slumbers of thy cold abstraction come forth
Arise to Eternal births shake off thy cold repose
Schoolmaster of souls great opposer of change arise
That the Eternal worlds may see thy face in peace & joy
That thou dread form of Certainty maist sit in town & village
While little children play around they feet in gentle awe
Fearing thy frown loving thy smile O Urizen Prince of light (p.120,11.18-25;
E 389).
Albion is calling upon the original Urizen, the Urizen who knew how to emulate kindness
and gentleness even as he offered limits. Albion recognizes that even as change may be
necessary, so is opposition to change that moderates and sets limits upon a violent process
of transformation. 48
After a brief pause, however, Albion rebukes Urizen for forgetting the true nature
of his function. He limits Urizen' s right to contain Luvah, saying: ''Let Luvah rage in the
dark deep even to Consummation/For if thou feedest not his rage it will subside in peace"
(p.120,ll.33-34; E 3 89). This limiting ofUrizen's powers places Urizen, the part, in
subordination again to Albion, the whole Eternal Man. It also affirms Urizen in his
48It is important to realize that a number of critics see this address in negative terms. Lincoln

states that Albion's words are absurdly oversimplified in light of the violence of the moment ( 1 94.:). Otto's
response has already been note¢ he believes that the Eternal Man has jtlst waked up and is not in touch
with what is going on. It is true that Urizen changes only after he is threate11£d, but this does not mean
that the affirmation is not also important. Urizen has caused confusion by setting improper boundaries;
Albion reminds him of what true boundaries would have looked like and then rebukes Urizen's error.
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essential boundary function while rej ecting Mystery, the devil-term of the text:
My anger against thee is greater than against this Luvah
For war is energy Enslavd but thy religion
The first author of this war & the distracting of honest minds
Into confused perturbation & strife & honour & pride
Is a deciet so detestable that I will cast thee out
If thou repentest not & leave thee as a rotten branch to be bumd
With Mystery the Harlot & with Satan for Ever & Ever
Error can never be redeemd in all Eternity
But S in Even Rahab is redeemd in blood & fury & j ealousy (p. 1 20,ll.4 1 -49;
E 3 90)
Luvah' s rage has gotten out of control because Urizen has tried to destroy the very
principle of passion rather than setting gentle limits upon it. Albion condemns Urizen's
religion of rigid morality and sacrificial scapegoating and calls it Error, because when law
suppresses desire it produces the very behaviors that law would fight. Yet, ironically,
Albion calls Urizen to renounce accusations and threats by threatening and setting an
absolute limit for Urizen himself Thus, limit is limited, rather than being given free reign
to limit as much as it likes.
Urizen is only able to return to his right mind and his humanity when he says:
Let Ore consume let Tharmas rage let dark Urthona give
All strength to Los & Enitharmon & let Los self cursd
Rend down this fabric as a wall mind & family extinct
Rage Ore Rage Tharmas Urizen no longer curbs your rage (p. 12 1 ,ll.23 -26;
E 3 90).
These lines immediately precede the renewal ofUrizen' s youth and his transformation.
They reflect the coming of a somewhat Losian kind of openness, although, at this point,
that openness is based in part, on a fear for his own self-preservation. Evidently, Urizen
does not yet trust that Albion is right, and that the other Zoas will cease to rage once
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Urizen stops trying to control them through his system of Mystery. At this point, Urizen
believes that if he stops ruthlessly limiting all the other Zoas, everything will rage out of
control. So his self-preservation is at risk either way. Yet, Urizen, now in the form of a
snake, chooses to regain his humanity even at the cost of his life. He recognizes that he
needs to embrace and emulate a quality that is more essentially Luvah's, passionate joy,
and it is his desire for joy that ultimately makes him take the risk of letting go and obeying
Albion's call: "I alone in misery supreme/Ungratified give all my joy unto this Luvah &
Vala" (p. 121,11. 1 7- 1 8; E 390). Urizen's ability to set an appropriate boundary can only be
restored through his embrace ofLos's quality of openness and Luvah's capacity for
passionate joy.
Nevertheless, at first it appears that Urizen's dire predictions are correct. When
Urizen withdraws support from his sacrificial system, the dead rise, many of them to a
ferocious judgment enacted by those whom they have oppressed. But at this point, at
least, the judgment is stringently limited. When the dead rise, the oppressed come with all
their wounds intact: ''They shew their wounds they accuse they seize the opressor
howlings began" (p.123,1.5; E 392). The oppressors see Jesus whom they have pierced
and they see their own nature, just as Urizen has had to see his own nature and the
inhumanity to which he had sunk. In a moment that some critics find troubling, the judge
pleads with the Prisoner for mercy and the Prisoner kicks him, confronting the judge with
his own cruelty and refusing forgiveness.
Ault suggests that this moment renders the text inconsistent, since it seems to
renounce the forgiveness that is present in the earlier passages about Los and Jesus (394).
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Yet, on a historical level, Hobson points out that such actions are sometimes necessary to
limit continued oppression by ruthless but hypocritical leaders. Furthermore, there is no
evidence that forgiveness is meant to be the ultimate value in this Apocalypse (203). It is
one value among many. Indeed, one of the values in the text is that those who have
refused to give the kinds of mercy that Jesus and Los both have offered must be faced
with their own cruelty. Yet the retribution for their cruelty is sharply limited. The Prisoner
kicks the judge in retaliation for a much more serious crime: " ... you scourgd my father to
death before my face/While I stood bound with cords & heavy chains. Your
hipocrasy/Shall now avail you nought" (p.123,ll.30-33; E 393). No further punishment of
the unjust judge is recorded. Punishment is not revoked, but it may well be severely
mitigated.
Almost immediately after this incident, the reader is invited to look forward to the
coming of further unity, as new links are forged between the apparent opposites of justice
and mercy, and as a new heaven opens up, literally, in the following lines.
The Cloud is Blood dazzling upon the heavens & in the cloud
Above upon its volumes is beheld a throne & a pavement
Of precious stones. surrounded by twenty four venerable patriarchs
And these again surrounded by four Wonders of the Almighty
Incomprehensible. pervading all amidst & round about
Fourfold each in the other reflected they are named Life's in Eternity
(p.123,ll.33-38; E 393)
The four Wonders Incomprehensible suggest the four incomprehensible and mighty ones
who live inside every person, the Zoas themselves, and their mutual reflection, even in the
midst of a bloody conflict, anticipates the mutual emulation of the Zoas, their form of
relationship in the earlier days and the state to which they now aspire to return.
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To further that return, Urizen begins to engage in the agricultural labor of plowing,
using a harness that is "ornamented/With beautiful art the study of angels the
workmanship of Demons/When Heaven & Hell in Emulation strove in sports of Glory"
(p.123,11. 11-13; E 393). As Lincoln suggests, Reason is used, at this point in the
narrative, not to regulate behavior or thought, but to work "against the stifling mental
habits it once fostered, undermining its own principles of order, destroying its fixed vision
of creation" (199). As Urizen plows under cities, villages, mountains, and celestial bodies,
he performs functions that resemble the destructive, revolutionary functions of Orc/Luvah.
He also breaks ground and plants a new seed of humanity, thus continuing his emulation
ofLos/Urthona's openness and capacity for creating the new. In emulating his fellow
Zoas' functions, he prepares to strive with them once again in "sports of glory'' rather than
bloody conflict.
Yet, as we have already seen, Albion calls upon Urizen to retain a kind of
boundary function, not the destructive function of the iron lawgiver and judge, but the
function of a teacher and lore master-the one who, in his wisdom, knows when to
encourage and when to reprove-the one who is loved so much that reproof is all the
restraint that is necessary. This, Albion suggests, is the proper role of law, not as the agent
of power, but as a presence capable of offering tender and compassionate guidance. Thus,
once Urizen has renounced his destructive power and submitted himself once again, to
Albion's authority, plowing up his own destructive creation, Albion is willing to place
Luvah back into Urizen's hands and let him set limits for Luvah mercifully, as he should
have done in the beginning. When Albion places Luvah in Urizen's hands, Urizen says:
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Luvah & Vala henceforth you are Servants obey & live
You shall forget your former state return O Love in peace
Into your place the place of seed not in the brain or heart
If Gods combine against Man Setting their Dominion above
The Human form Divine. Thrown down from their high Station
In the Eternal heavens of Human Imagination: buried beneath
In dark Oblivion with incessant pangs ages upon ages
In Enmity & war first weakend then in stem repentance
They must renew their brightness & their disorganized functions
Again reorganize till they resume the image of the human
Cooperating in the bliss of Man obeying his Will
S ervants to the infinite & Eternal of the Human form (p. 126,ll.6- l 7; E 3 95)
Some, like Otto, see these words as negative and judgmental. They also argue that the
time that Luvah and Vala spend in the pastoral realm after this judgment entaisl a
suppression of the energies of the body (Otto 308-09).
Yet, this episode is not the final and ultimate resolution of the text, nor is it
Luvah's and Vala's final destiny. It is simply a period of both rest and discipline for Luvah
and Vala. This time apart from one another and from the other Zoas allows time for the
wounds of Luvah's victimization to heal. The pastoral world also provides a rest from
violent passion. Insofar as this time apart serves both of these purposes, it allows Luvah
the chance to recognize where he himself went wrong, apart from the actions of U rizen. In
Night the Second, Luvah has claimed that the body should be cast away: "The hand of
Urizen is upon me because I blotted out/That Human delusion to deliver all the sons of
God/From bondage of the Human Form" (p.27,11. 16- 18; E 3 18). Later, when he rises from
Albion's feast and prepares to preside over the grape harvest, he asserts, "Attempting . to
be more than man We become less" (p. 135,l.21; E 403 ). Furthermore, he now weeps for
the pain of the "human harvest" and the threshing that he and Urizen, between them, have
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necessitated through their actions. In other words, Luvah emulates and accepts the
Urizenic boundary function, making it part of his own character. Once this transformation
takes place, Urizen has completed the primary function to which Albion has called him.
Then it is time for Tharmas and his Emanation, Enion, to take the forefront of the
action, at least briefly. Tharmas and Enion are able to rise again in strength because they
have forgiven each other and reunited. The two of them, in the form of children, have
dwelt in the pastoral land along with Luvah and Vala and have received maternal nurture
from Vala, As part of her care for the two children, Vala acts as a mediator for their
conflicts, which are still very much present even in their new, childish form. Like Luvah,
Tharmas is able to emerge from his period of enclosure with new strength. Despite the
tendency to chaos that he exhibits earlier in the poem, Tharmas's trumpet blasts help to
order the apocalyptic events, and his music is what calls the dead to awaken. Furthermore,
when Urizen threshes the human wheat, Tharmas is the one who winnows it, driving the
chaff into his seas. Here, the chaos that is Tharmas's special province is able to render
service to an overall principle of order. From now until the final lines of the poem,
Tharmas will assist Urizen and Urthona with the tasks assigned to them by Albion,
although, before, he had driven Los/Urthona to create systems of order for him in an effort
to destroy Urizen. Now he can rejoice at the destruction of Mystery without needing to
take vengeance upon either Urizen or Luvah, and without the need to dominate Urthona.
Luvah, however, is the one who will finally destroy Mystery for good. He is the
next Zoa to preside over the Apocalyptic events, and his activity reflects his character
throughout the text. But now his passions are allowed free reign only at the behest of
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Albion, the Universal Man, rather than in rebellion against him. The Eternal Man calls
Luvah into action by telling him that the Vintage is ready. This is the moment in which
Luvah actually casts off his crown of thorns, the sign of his role as victim, and declares
that he must not try to be more than human. Interestingly, however, his first role in the
Apocalypse is not to harvest and crush his grapes. At first, Luvah simply uses his bulls to
help crush and grind Unzen's crop of corn, putting the two into cooperation with one
another, rather than in competition. Once the enmity of Luvah and Urizen is put aside,
Urizen's Apocalyptic labors are complete and he disappears from the action . .
Luvah, on the other hand, goes forth to harvest the grapes and make wine. He and
his sons gather the grapes with joy and then place the grapes in the winepress. In the
process, they destroy the last vestige of Mystery, but they also create a terrible hell for the
human grapes within the winepress and a destructive drunken rout for themselves. The
narrator reports that Luvah's sons and daughters are "[d]rownd in the wine" and must be
buried "in lamentation," (p.136, 11. 18-20; E 404). Furthermore, the human grapes within
the winepress suffer, literally, the pains of hell. They are consumed in "fierce flames," they
writhe in chains surrounded by "ceaseless fires" and whatever is left once the ''Human
Odors" escape, the remainder that the narrator describes as the "desire of Being," longs to
escape from ''the Pangs of Eternal Death" (p.136, 11.22, 23, 4, 8, & 15; E 404).
Furthermore, when Tharmas and Urthona come to stop the carnage, they find that
Luvah's children, drunken and exhausted, have begun ''to torment one another and to
tread/The weak" (p.13 7,11.20-21; E 405). This segment of the poem is in many ways the
most violent, particularly because Luvah and his offspring seem to delight in the suffering
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of their victims. The suffering seems excessive, and even Hobson, a critic who is
supportive of Blake's revolutionary tendencies, finds this passage to be impossibly violent,
suggesting that it represents revolution gone wrong, as in the Terror in France, where
leaders began to engage in remorseless violence, what Hobson calls "elite violence" rather
than the "mass violence" of the mistreated populace (205 ).
Certainly, Robson's association of the winepress with the Terror is legitimate, and,
in comparison with the ideal, this grotesquely painful violence is certainly wrong.
Nevertheless, the poem as a whole tends towards unity throughout Night Nine, and it
must be remembered that Albion called Luvah to this action immediately following a feast
reminiscent of the one in which Urizen prepares to sacrifice Luvah. The orgy of violence
around and in the winepress appears to be a necessary part of the structure of the
Apocalypse, however repugnant it may be. The ideal is not yet possible at this point in the
poem, and the reason is to be found in the language describing the tiny, despised creatures
who dance around the winepress: seeds, roots, earthworms, beetles, centipedes, spiders,
maggots, and weeds of various kinds. Otto obj ects that these creatures all feed on death
and that this is one more incident of the oppression of the body, one with which Luvah
cooperates (232). But the narrator describes these creatures with nothing but respect and
compassion. Of the thistle, the narrator says that he is "indignant," that "[his] bitterness is
bred in his milk" and that he "lives on the contempt of this neighbor" (p. 136, 11.36-37; E
405 ). This phrase could apply to all the creatures listed in this scene. But, when they drink
and make music around the winepress, these obscure creatures "shew their various
limbs/Naked in all their beauty dancing round the Wine Presses" (p. 136,1.38-3 9; E 405 ).
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The suffering that so delights them is horrible and it is not part of an ideal order, but Blake
implies that it is better than a world in which these despised creatures never have their
moment to exalt and to affirm their own beauty, even if it comes at the expense of others.
Luvah's debauchery is not simply a drunken, violent orgy. Albion uses the wildness of
Luvah's passionate nature to create a limit on how much the lowliest creatures are allowed
to suffer without recompense. 49
Nevertheless, this moment is not an expression of the final good, and Albion,
saddened by all the suffering that the Vintage has cost, sends Tharmas and Urthona to
stop it. Luvah is "put for dung on the ground," (p.137, 1.24; E 405), another act that
sounds dreadful and final, until we see Luvah and Vala rise again just a few lines later, to
again be cast down by Albion until the Spring. Albion's actions contain Luvah's passion,
while nevertheless affirming that it has a part in moving all of the Zoas closer to the ideal.
However, once Luvah is cast down, Urthona's time of precedence arrives, and he
"rose in all his regenerate power" (p. 137, 1.34; E 405). But even now, the perfect end has
not come, because more suffering is required. Urthona grinds Urizen's com, and bakes the
"Bread of Ages" (p.138,1.17; E 406). Once this work is done, the Apocalypse is over, but
that does not mean that the old Los's forgiveness is now the norm. When Urthona is
making the bread, he is participating in an act of judgment, and the imagery surrounding
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Clearly this brief explanation is. ethically speaking, not entirely satisfactory. One thinks of
Hegel' s ''slaughter-bench" of history, in which historical progress justifies the horrible suffering of
individuals caught up in the process of historical change (27). However brutal this argument may seem, it
still seems to be the argument that Blake is making. Certainly, it would be inaccurate to report that Blake
was himself emotionally pleased by such suffering, but he does seem to believe that this kind of moment is
historically and symbolically necessary, and that symbolic and social orders can only be transformed by
periods of agonizing disruption, which can include orgies of cruelty and death.
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him is Urizenic. Urthona's ovens are guarded by "[t]he grey hoar frost" and "his pale wife
the aged Snow" (p.138,ll.9-10; E 406). Furthermore, this action becomes an occasion for
forms of thought and reasoning that are described in Urizenic terms:
Nature in darkness groans
And Men are bound to sullen contemplation in the night
Restless they tum on beds of sorrow. in their inmost brain
Feeling the crushing Wheels they rise they write the bitter words
Of Stem Philosophy & knead the bread of knowledge with tears & groans
(p. 13 8, 11. 11-15; E 406)
Urthona, who in his divided life as Los, Enitharmon, and the Spectre has fought with and
resented Urizen, here embraces Urizen's labors, making them his own. It is only after this
process is complete that the ideal can be approached, as the Universal Man walks forth,
seeing the world washed and beautiful again, and dwelling in harmony with the animals.
In the last lines of the poem, the previous initiators of conflict, Urizen and Luvah,
are not on the scene. Tharmas is present, a shepherd minding his sheep, and Urthona is
present, a metalworker, who rises
In all his ancient strength to form the golden armour of science
For intellectual War The war of swords departed now
The dark Religions are departed & sweet Science reigns (p.139, 11.8-10; E
407).
These lines, the last of the poem, are variously interpreted. While most critics see the
ending of the poem as a moment of redemption and healing, in fact, as an ideal moment,
Ault suggests that the poem ends where the story begins, with Urthona at his forge; thus,
he argues, no progress is made in the poem. The text is simply a circle that folds back
upon itself, and the entire process is doomed to repeat itself (463-67). Otto agrees with
the idea that the action of the poem is doomed to be repeated, and he suggests that the
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entire ending of the poem is the depiction of a false transcendence (334-44). 50 Yet the tone
of the poem seems to insist otherwise. A few lines before the end of the text, the wild
beasts, Urthona's Lions, come to the Eternal Man and say ''How is it that we have walkd
thro fires & yet are not consumd/How is it that all things are changd even as in ancient
times" (p. 138,ll.39-40; E 407). This tone of wonder permeates the last thirty lines of The
Four Zoas. At the end of the poem, the ideal emerges, the ideal of sweet Science, which
earlier in the text could not even be imagined.
Ault is correct, however, that the text implies only a pause in the conflict. Luvah
and Urizen are not on the scene, but, as the narrator tells us at the beginning of The Four
Zoas, the four mighty ones dwell in every person, and they are immortal. Urizen and
Luvah will return, and, despite the fact that each of these characters has become a part of
the whole, reflecting and emulating the qualities of the others, nevertheless they will come
into conflict again. Thus, Urthona creates the armour of intellectual War. To make armour
requires a boundary function, and to use armour is to affirm a bounding line. But to fight
an intellectual War implies a readiness to embrace difference, an openness to intellectual
change and transformation-that is to say, an openness to dialectic in the Burkean sense.
Furthermore, an intellectual War requiring the armour of science does not require actual
blood and actual death. At the end of The Four Zoas, Blake affirms an ideal that will allow

SOi:n all fairness to Otto, his argument is based largely upon examination of the drawings in The
Four Zoas manuscript. Such an examination is certainly beyond the scope of this project, which focuses

almost exclusively on the verbal text. Thus, any sure criticism of Otto's argument would be presumptuous.
It is worthwhile, however, to refer the reader to Magno's and Erdman's facsimile edition and
commentary. These two critics provide a reading of the visual text that is far closer to the more traditional
and optimistic reading, thus demonstrating that Otto's evaluation of the drawings and prints is not beyond
question (100-02).
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the process of conflict to resume and continue at a new level, a level that assumes the
kinds of compromises and transformations that have taken place already in Night the
Ninth. Later conflicts will embody processes of movement and transformation, but without
the need for bloodshed, because a model of intellectual combat has emerged that does not
require the annihilation of one position by the other. It is recognized that one can fall
vanquished in one battle and arise to lead in another, that each function can take its tum at
the lead and then retreat when it is no longer needed.
Sweet Science is the kind of knowledge that grows out of a process of rotation,
movement, and transformation like the one that has taken place in Night the Ninth, except
that it no longer requires the death that was the residue of"the dark Religions," those rigid
systems--be they religious, scientific, or artistic--that required one term, one function, or
one source of power to assume dominance and retain it forever at the expense of the
others. Sweet Science is sustained by Intellectual, not Corporeal, war. Like Mystery, it is a
kind of order, but it is an order capable of transformation, without domination or violence.
In other words, it is an order in which the bounding line ofUrizenic order and the Losian
quality of openness and transformation are both affirmed and given place, allowing room
for the other Zoas to thrive as well. No longer are reason, boundary, or order, treated as
hindrance, while imagination, vision, and rebellion are portrayed as act. Hindrance can be
any of the above pursued with rigid zeal and self-righteous desire for domination, played
out in a system of order, a dark Religion, that maintains itself by sacrificing others. Action
requires that, Reason and Imagination, boundary and vision, order and rebellion all work
together in concert to create a flexible and changeable order by means of intellectual
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warfare. Order still requires sacrifices, and the process of transformation can be
devastating, but finally what is sacrificed is the desire to dominate or destroy the other.
Like Burke's purification of war, Blake's intellectual war requires the purification of
motives through the transformation of both symbolic orders and attitudes. In the final
section of this chapter, I will revisit Kenneth Burke's theory in order to understand more
fully how the Burkean model can inform our reading of The Four Zoas.
Blake 's The Four Zoas and the Burkean Model

In chapter 3, we examined the link between Blake's Urizen and the "Blakean
bearded patriarch" of Burke's Epilogue to The Rhetoric ofReligion (276). In chapter 4,
this comparison is less apt, since Blake's bearded Urizen no longer represents symbolic
order itself, as he did in Urizen and Ahania. Instead, there is a more complex set of
parallels and contrasts to examine. The Four Zoas comes closer to a Burkean
antinomianism than any of Blake's early works. In The Four Zoas, Blake retains his belief
that rigid law and rigid symbolic orders can be destructive, a view he shares with Burke.
The connection between these destructive orders and scapegoating also remains. But in
The Four Zoas, Blake has come to share Burke's view that, even if both law and symbolic
systems can be problematic, they are nonetheless unavoidable, necessary, and even at
times genuinely positive and valuable.
In changing his view of order, Blake's aim shifts away from the annihilation of
order posited in the Lambeth prophecies and focuses instead on its transformation. He
suggests the creation of a mobile system, like Burke's ultimate dialectical order. Ultimate
and absolute goals remain, but they allow for a mobility of terms that lends flexibility to
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the system. These flexible orders also allow room for their adherents to be influenced, or
even transformed, by other symbolic systems. In other words, in The Four Zoas, like
Burke, Blake differentiates between two kinds of order. He rejects the kinds of order
promulgated by authorities who ''would say No definitively to any further questioning"
(RR 303). In its stead, like Burke's bearded patriarch, he argues for a symbolic order that
permits "the progressive criticism of itself' (RR 303), through what Blake calls intellectual
warfare.
In order to achieve this goal, Blake offers a model for the transformation of the
Christian narrative as it was understood within his culture. But the question remains, why
this system? Why, if one objects to social injustice, choose to transform the very order
that, according to many educated radicals of the time, had been a primary agent of that
disorder? Why not simply abandon it and work with another order? Why would Blake
work so hard to rehabilitate an order that he himself had so trenchantly criticized in so
much of his work, the chimney sweeper poems, for example? Furthermore, if one objects
to either economic oppression or to scapegoating practices, why choose a symbolic order
that is built on sacrifice? After all, sacrificial language can readily be transformed into self
mortification or used as a basis for encouraging others to submit to mistreatment, either in
the name of the sacred order or in emulation of a divine victim, as Night 7a so vividly
depicts.
Certainly Blake's immersion in radical Protestant culture, with its traditional use of
Christianity to attack state power, provides a sufficient historical explanation.
Furthermore, the quotations we have already seen_ft..Qlij. :Blake's letters and conversations
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indicate that Blake accepted a variety of Christian ideas, however unorthodox his
interpretations of them were. But the question can also be answered in logological terms,
and the best way to do that is to pursue the Burkean understanding of a term that is
important to both thinkers-Mystery. We have already seen how Mystery functions for
Blake as a way of holding Urizen's system together. Burke's definitions of Mystery can
help us to understand how this process works, even as it helps to explain Blake's
privileging of religious language in the creation of his ultimate dialectic. Burke, however,
does not treat Mystery as a devil-term. His definition is somewhat more complex.
In a neutral definition, Burke describes mystery as an unavoidable outgrowth of
both limited knowledge and differentiation. The inevitable limits of our knowledge breed a
sense of mystery. The genders, insofar as they are different from one another, are
mysteries to one another. Furthermore, "[ m]ysteries will arise socially, from different
modes of life. The king will be a mystery to the peasant, and vice versa" (308). Even the
developmental differences between parents and children, or the differences between
persons who have different skills or training can produce a sense of mystery that will affect
the formation of the symbolic. Where a sense of mystery is present, it can easily be used to
support symbolic orders, as Urizen sustains his empire, or as Ore sustains his familial
relationships. Thus, Burke offers a more negative definition. He defines Mystery as a
condition brought about by social hierarchies, which can "elicit 'God-fearing' attitudes
towards agents and agencies that are not divine" (RM 123). Burke suggests several forms
of "mysticism" that derive from the worship of a fragment of reality: the fascination with
another social class, with a lover, with a drug, with money, all of which can be mystified
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so that they are treated as if they were the whole of reality. There are the "mysteries of
empire" (RR 307). Finally, there is the mysticism of warfare (RM 332), which, as we have
seen, both he and Blake associate with scapegoating.
There are any number of logical connections between symbolic order, hierarchy,
and scapegoating. We have already examined several of these. But there is one that we
have not yet explored, and that is the connection between hierarchy, mystery, and the call
to sacrifice. "Sacrifice," Burke writes, "is the essence of religion" (RM 266), and for
Burke, mystery is religious, whether or not it is connected with a religion. Of course,
sacrifice here does not necessarily mean the sacrifice of another person in an act of
scapegoating. It can represent the yielding of material things or of parts of oneself so that
a higher aim can be served. But, since Mystery is to some degree unavoidable, it is
absolutely necessary that we be extremely conscious of our tendency to fall into it. It is
absolutely necessary that we choose carefully that to which we will yield ourselves. We
must be careful about what we sacrifice and for what deities.
The rigid symbolic orders that both Burke and Blake describe are alike in that they
are fraught with Mystery and they demand from their adherents a kind of total worship, a
worship of the system itself, which must be preserved at all cost. They demand sacrifice to
the system itself, sacrifice of the adherents and sacrifice of the violators. Those who
comply with the order can sense their consubstantiation with others in the system and
experience a sense of union through it. Those who do not comply can be made
consubstantial through their punishment. Finally, those who believe in the system but fail
to meet its demands can at times find consubstantiation through the sacrifice of a victim
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who substitutes for them. The desire for union, the drive towards perfection, the yearning
to yield oneself to a cause or an order that is greater than oneself, the mysteries built into
the natural world, the differentiations built into our symbolic systems, all of these things
hold within them the potential to set this process into motion, whether or not we are
conscious of it, and whether or not the system we participate in is religious or secular.
Thus, aside from his personal religious beliefs, Blake's religious language provides
the ideal vehicle for demonstrating the changes that must occur for a rigid symbolic order
to undergo a positive transformation. Burke contends that religious language
acknowledges the necessity for sacrifices-although the particular sacrifices required could
certainly be debated. Blake rejected most of the sacrifices that eighteenth-century
Christianity would have demanded of him. He did not believe that he should mortify his
flesh. He did not believe that sexuality was evil. He did not believe that obedience to God
meant obedience to the state and its church, or obedience to any number of its laws. He
did not believe that war with France or any other nation was holy. But, by the time he
wrote The Four Zoas, Blake did believe in the necessity for "Self annihilation," the
sacrifice of that part of the self that needs to dominate others, and he does so in reverence
for ''the Human Form Divine," as it manifested both in himself and in others. His is a
radical Protestantism that pushes against all systems because no system is great enough
fully to express the grandeur of that whole Human Form, with its possibilities of growth,
vision, and imagination.
Burke, on the other hand, never claimed to be religious, but despite his
agnosticism, he, too, casts down the false gods, the false and rigid systems of order that
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lead to false self-moritification bloodshed, scapegoating, and sacrifice. At the end of A
Rhetoric of Motives, he calls upon his readers to seek "God as the beloved cynosure and
sinecure, the end of all desire" (333), by which he apparently means nothing specific, but
rather, the idea of the perfect, the idea of the absolute, beneath which anything that can be
said or explained or placed into a symbolic order proves absolutely inadequate. The name
"God" is the placeholder for an unnameable god-term, the absolute that is never reached in
any system of order, but the idea of which prevents our worship of the partial orders that
we can create. If we seek that unnameable god-term, Burke seems to be suggesting, we
can avoid settling for any particular system, simply excluding the terms, ideas and people
that do not fit our preconceived notions. More importantly, we can let go of the belief that
any particular order is worthy of human sacrifice, If the god is unnameable, then our best
description can change every time new evidence, new knowledge, or new insight appears.
The god may be unnameable, but the practical ethic is clear: "And finally let us observe, all
about us, forever goading us, though it be in fragments, the motive that attains its ultimate
identification in the thought, not of the universal holocaust, but of the universal order . .
. "(RM 333). Peace is the absolute, necessary as it is to the avoidance of total destruction.
At the same time, Burke, deeply influenced by Marxism throughout his career, continues
to criticize the imperialist way of life that is not only prone to warfare, but profoundly
unjust.
Finally, a just peace is the limit that provides an outer boundary for Blake's and
Burke's antinomianism. Neither of these antinomians is truly without law, insofar as the
term "law" refers to a moral value that is treated as an absolute. Both Blak� and Burke
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embrace an ultimate law of peace, but not a law that is based upon command or upon an
intellectual system that functions as if it were unchangeable and complete within itself For
neither Blake nor Burke is it possible for language, or any form of symbolic order, to
structure reality in a way so adequate that it can stand unchanging forever as a description
of reality or as a mode of insuring j ustice. To the contrary, any system that is treated as
capable of such perfect description or legislation will, inevitably, become tyrannical. It will
not allow its terms to change, even when no one understands them any longer. It will not
allow its terms to change even when they have become obsolete. Finally, it becomes an
end in itself, and as such, it becomes something for which people will kill or persecute
either without self-doubt or with the intent of quelling their doubt or guilt through the
sacrifice of others. Any peace such a system offers will come at the cost of human vitality
and creativity. Whether in peace or war, such a system is an agent of death.
Thus, the notion of an ultimate "dialectic." For Burke, the term "dialectic" is
always used to talk about how we change the meanings of our language and of our
systems. Dialectic also has to do with how opposites tend to create and imply one another.
This shift in meaning is, in fact, one of the primary means by which we transform our
systems, shifting those opposites about, finding new opposites for old words, creating new
syntheses out of old pairings of opposites. For Burke, the willingness to be ''corrupted" by
an opponent's system, rather than to retain the purity of one's own by means of warfare, is
central to the purposes of rhetoric. If an order is dialectical, with peace as an overarching
value, it becomes possible to let the system change, even let it be influenced by the
opposing system. Of course, such transformations always require sacrifices, but these
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sacrifices need not be human bodies. They can be attitudes. They can be ideas. Certainly,
there is sacrifice involved in allowing oneself to be open to a system different from one's
ideas. At the least, one mus sacrifice the illusion of perfection and purity if one is to truly
listen to the ideas of others.
This type of process, the willingness to water down a rhetorical order in order to
protect real human lives, and the willingness to embrace one's opposite, is depicted
throughout Night the Ninth of The Four Zoas. At the beginning, Urizen, Luvah, and
Urthona all seem to want a system that dominates all the others, and none of them wants
to acknowledge his dependence upon others' gifts. Rather than acknowledging that
dependence, they try to appropriate the others' powers through tyrannical means,
dep&nding upon them without admitting it to themselves. Each creates a system which
subordinates other parts of the Human Form Divine to himself Yet, in Night the Ninth,
when Albion, the whole person, reassumes decision-making powers, dialectic becomes the
standaftl- Once every Zoa has participated in this process, the bloodshed can stop. Still,
such a peace is an ideal seldom realizable within the real world.
Nevertheless, as Burke points out in The Rhetoric of Order, sometimes, in an
imperfect world, we must be satisfied with an ultimate goal accompanied by imperfect
means. We must strike rather than kill, kill rather than butcher. Peace remains the aim, but
it is sometimes impossible to create peace by means of peace. Blake accepts this idea as
well. Yet historical context affects the degree to which each of these men is willing to
support violence as a means for achieving a just peace. For Burke, writing at the height of
the Cold War and in the shadow of Hiroshima, the times when violence is to be chosen as
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a means to peace would be few indeed.
For Blake, at the end of the eighteenth century, violence, when initiated by the
oppressed, is a purifying fire that must be endured at times, the unavoidable outbreak of
long-suppressed tensions and energies. In The Four Zoas, violence without forgiveness is
dangerous, but once the "Seltbood" the self interested only in its own survival, is broken
down through forgiveness, even then, some violence may necessarily occur, as the most
oppressed persons in a culture break free. For Blake, violence is never to be desired, it is
never the ideal, but, for the oppressed, it is better than becoming a perpetual sacrifice to
the order that tortures them. For Blake, there is a marked difference between the sacrifices
made in the service of a tyrannical order and the punishment of the oppressor that is
intended to liberate. The violence of the winepress is better than the continued persecution
of the weak, but intellectual war, unaccompanied by bloodshed, is better than both. The
Four Zoas is itself a symbolic action, an act of intellectual warfare waged against the
powers that sacrifice the minds and bodies of others to retain rigid systems. For the Blake
of The Four Zoas, revolutionary warfare alone cannot lead to the ultimate, dynamic peace
that is intellectual war. Nor can forgiveness. These two opposites must come together,
and when they do, perhaps peace can begin to emerge as the end result of a flexible and
forever changing dialectical order.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion

While it is true that the Druids and their sacrificial altars appear most frequently in Milton
and Jerusalem, works that Blake engraved during the nineteenth century, the previous chapters
should make it more than clear that Blake's interest in scapegoating does not begin with the
sacrificial acts portrayed in these late works. Nor should we assume when Los exclaims in
Jerusalem that "I must create my own system, or be enslav'd by another man's" that his interest
in systems and system-building is something new, even though Jerusalem embodies the most
intricate system-building of Blake's career. Using the lens of Kenneth Burke's theory, we see that,
even in the 1 790's, Blake's work exhibits something close to an obsession with scapegoating in
both its mild and in its most violent and demeaning forms. Furthermore, the concern with
scapegoating is always connected with concerns about reason, about order, and about systematic
thinking in general. Our interest in scapegoating in William Blake's writings should not be limited
to an interest in Druid sacrifice, and it most certainly should not be limited to the later texts,
where sacrificial imagery is the most prominent. Indeed, from the beginning of his career, Blake
argues that scapegoating, violent and non-violent, is one of the most fundamental by-products of
the rigid systems that he so deplores. Yet,· he also learned that the systematic is inescapable. Thus,
in The Four Zoas, he begins to accept the fact of systematic forms of order and to employ them
himself, not in an accidental, unavoidable way, but deliberately; an interest in exploring inclusive,
mobile, yet systematic structures will remain with him for the rest of his career. This much we
know.
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We also know that Blake wants Mental Fight, or Intellectual War, to remain and prosper,
while he hopes for an end to Corporeal War, and he hopes that his work, and his way of thinking
about symbolic order, will be a part of that process. Yet there are certainly questions that remain
unanswered, specifically about the role of violence in Blake's vision. Blake is clear that the
violence of the established orders is simply victimage, and he sees it as an absolute evil, or, to use
his terms, it is error, negation, or hindrance. On the other hand, Revolutionary violence seems to
be less than ideal, but, nevertheless, sometimes necessary. The rebellion ofFuzon in The Book of
Ahania is simply destructive, but the winepress of The Four Zoas is purgative. The difference

appears to be, primarily, one of attitude.
The same question about the role of violence would be difficult for Kenneth Burke to
answer, although Burke is clearer that answering this particular question is not his primary
concern. Burke's obsession is words, and his concern is to describe different kinds of symbolic
orders and the mechanisms by which they shift and change. Nevertheless, he has definite ethical
commitments, and he shapes his discussions of language in such a way as to demonstrate that
particular values are being harmed or helped by particular ways of understanding and using
language. In the early Burke, the Burke of Permanence and Change and Attitudes Towards
History, Burke's analysis is most concerned about the ways in which language can create change,

and the changes he seems most concerned to make are economic. It is the Marxist Burke who is
most prominent in these texts. The abusiveness of the economic order seems to be his primary
ethical concern. Later, in The Grammar ofMotives, The Rhetoric ofMotives, and The Rhetoric of
Religion, Burke's interest in economic justice remains, but his primary focus is on the purification

of war. The need to avoid world conflict and later nuclear holocaust is the ultimate ethical aim. In
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his later years, this concern for peace is accompanied by a concern for environmental issues, and
he becomes more concerned about how the uses and abuses of language affect our treatment of
the natural ecological system. None of these values are argued for; they are simply present, and
Burke assumes that we will recognize their importance, just as we recognize the importance of
our own personal survival. He assumes that the ethical is built into language, that we aspire to
ultimate moral aims in part because our language is necessarily structured hierarchically. But he
also asserts, straightforwardly, that no value can be pursued with purity all the time. Only in the
realm of the symbolic can pure motivations reign, not in the world of bodily action.
However, despite these ultimate commitments to justice, to peace, and to ecological
balance, all of them, apparently, a commitment to the continuation of life and vitality, Burke does
not offer us a procedure for sorting out when is the moment to make what compromise. He
certainly does not imply that we should always be flexible, insofar as pure flexibility would be as
rigid a system as any. What Burke finally tells us is that transformative dialectic is necessary, but
so is some level of stable order, and the two will always remain in dialectical relationship with
each other. Ethical systems, scientific systems, in fact, any systems of order, are to remain flexible
and open to self-critique. Yet Burke declines, even more than Blake, to tell us just when to make
what kind of compromise. While Burke is motivated by particular ethical aims, he is not an
ethicist. He is a ''word man," a rhetorician, and if he is more interested in describing how language
works than he is in telling us how to -�ehave. Furthermore, his ethical concerns are, in part, rooted
in the nature of language. If rigid systems cause warfare and other forms of scapegoating, it is, in
part, because they are unreal, untrue to the dialectical nature of language itself and untrue to the
nature of the ever-shifting physical realm in which we find ourselves. Ultimately, Burke is asking
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us to be realistic, and thus somewhat skeptical, about what language can do.
Perhaps this is what most divides Kenneth Burke from William Blake, whose vision, while
ironic like Burke's about specific systems of order in the world as we know it, seems always
about to leap into purity, always on the edge of proclaiming or even creating the absolute, the true
Apocalypse, the thing that someday, somehow, will be given to human beings if they make room
for imagination and vision. On the one hand, Burke tells us that we must "tum precisely in the
direction of a neo-Stoic cosmopolitanism, with ideals of tolerance and resignation to the
bureaucratic requirements implicit in the structure of modem industry and commerce," in order to
avoid "fanaticism and dissipation" (GM 318). On the other hand, Blake proclaims:
I will not cease from Mental Fight,
Nor shall my Sword sleep in my hand:
Till we have built Jerusalem,
In Englands green & pleasant Land. (Milton pl.1,ll.13-16; E 95-96)
Then he goes on to quote from the book ofNumbers: ''Would to God that all the Lords people
were Prophets" (Numbers 11:29). One cannot help but suspect that the twentieth-century Burke,
like so many of Blake's eighteenth century and nineteenth-century contemporaries, caught a whiff
of fanaticism in language like this.
Yet the Jerusalem that Blake seeks here is an ideal that he hopes to bring to England, to
here and now, and the continuing presence of that ideal raises a very basic and important
question: How is it possible to have a system of order that changes, that responds to different
situations in different ways, that allows different values, even, to take precedence at different
times, without putting oneself in the position of being ethically uncommitted? Certainly Blake is
never ethically uncommitted. In fact, many of his values do not change all that significantly
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throughout the l 790's and even on into the nineteenth century, as he engraves Milton and
Jerusalem. Always, he places imagination and vision high on the list of values. Sometimes he

seems to imply that imagination is genuinely better than other faculties. On other occasions, he
seems to argue that imagination and reason are essentially equal, but that he must advance
imagination because it is degraded and demeaned within his culture. In any case, imagination,
enthusias� vision, Poetic Genius, and the like are all connected terms, and deeply important to
Blake. Throughout his career, Blake is concerned about human sexuality, desiring to see it
celebrated rather than repressed. Always, he resents the permanent enslavement of groups of
people, either through literal enslavement, as blacks were enslaved in the Americas, or through
economic enslavement at home. Whatever terms rotated for Blake, within a moving system of
order, these terms never rotated very far..
The later nineteenth-century texts Milton, Jerusalem, and The Ghost ofAbel are,
unfortunately, beyond the scope of this project, but even a brief examination reveals that in these
later works, the same moral commitments remain, along with Blake's continuing obsession with
the relationship between order and scapegoating. Blake's own vision grows ever more systematic,
but his critical use of Druids, with their violent ritual sacrifices, also enter the scene in growing
numbers. Furthermore, these later texts also maintain elements of the ultimate dialectical order
that appears in The Four Zoas. This is clearest, perhaps, in Jerusalem, where all kinds of thinkers,
including Newton, Locke and others whom Blake perpetually resents in most of his writings,
appear as part of his system, not at the pinnacle of the syste� but present nevertheless. In Milton,
one of the most impressive visual images of the text portrays John Milton as a muscular, divinely
human being, who molds the clay form of the Druidical Urizen into a new shape and thus prevents
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his Urizen from sacrificing him on a Druid altar. Here, the rhetorical power of art to reshape the
symbolic order is powerfully portrayed.
Yet there is also evidence that Blake's own system hardens a bit in these later texts, and
that Blake becomes more interested in those questions of how the stability of his values connects
to the rotating and open order he esteems. A hint of this interest appears in The Four Zoas. Los
forecasts the plot of the later illuminated text, Milton, as he remonstrates with Rahab concerning
her sacrifice of Jesus, and tells her that we must learn to differentiate between states and
individuals within these states. The state does not change, he says, but the person can. In Milton,
this basic idea of states is developed and transformed, becoming far more complex. The angels of
the Presence tell Milton that individuals do not change; they are eternal, but they can change their
state. Furthermore, the angels indicate that some states can change, and are in fact created to
change: "Reason is a State/Created to be Annihilated & a new Ratio Created" (p.32,ll.34-3 5; E
132). Finally, there are Forms that cannot be annihilated or changed, ever. While an individual of a
species can be destroyed, the form or idea of it remains. 1
Furthermore, some critics, like Jeanne Moskal, author of Blake, Ethics and Forgiveness,
see these later works as advocating a total renunciation of violence. In this texts, Moskal
maintains, Blake renounces violence and embraces an ethic of forgiveness and gentleness. The
sense that these later works are different from the earlier ones, more systematic, less violent, more
Christian, and more otherworldly, has marked much critical discussion. In these later works, the
dialectic between forgiveness and violence appears diminished, and forgiveness emerges, some
would argue, as a god-term. However, it is difficult to say whether Blake in fact changed his
1 The Platonic element here is obvious. despite Blake's renunciation of Greek and Roman models, or

rather. his denunciation of them, in the introduction to Milton (E 95).
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values significantly, or whether he simply identified himself as existing historically within a time in
which he was called upon to play the role that Los plays in The Four Zoas, that is, the role of the
peacemaker, the exemplar of forgiveness, who, in the process of Self- annihilation, makes
Apocalypse possible.
In any case, Milton 's increasing attention to shifting individuals and permanent states
appears to signal a different approach and a different response to the need for a permanent moral
aim, something that does not shift with the system. In any case, the Burkean theory used in this
study would provide an important backdrop for examining these later works as well. Such a study
might help provide answers to questions that remain about the relationship between order and
scapegoating in Blake's thought, particularly as regards the ethical questions arising from the
dialectic between that which must change and that which is fixed, the changing state and the
permanent form.
Even ifwe stop our analysis with The Four Zoas, however, we nevertheless gain
something significant. Not only do we get a clearer picture of Blake's development between 1 798
and 1 806, particularly as regards his views about symbolic order and scapegoating. We also can
gain a new perspective on the ethical implications of the rhetoric we use, whether or not Blake or
Burke is able to tell us how to make specific ethical decisions. When Blake attempts to eliminate
order altogether, in an attempt to rid the world of Urizenic oppression, he finds himself at a
logical and an historical dead end. Hierarchy is built into language, and in any given moment, we
must create an order. In both the symbolic and the historical realms, the revolutionary order can
be as cruel and relentless as the order of the longstanding tyrant. Or, as Burke tells us,
revolutionaries can also scapegoat, reversing the order of oppression and cleansing themselves by
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condemning those who have traditionally been at the top of the order. Such condemnations need
not automatically be entirely j ust. Whatever one' s position, an over-confidence in one' s own
righteous dogma, as opposed to the unrighteous dogma of another, is dangerous.
On the other hand, a considerable number of contemporary critical theories have a strong
antinomian element, not necessarily the Protestant antinomianism that one finds in Blake and, for
that matter, Burke, but antinomianism, nevertheless, insofar as the rational structure or the
traditional symbolic order, are in some way resisted. From Derrida, to Foucault, to Deleuze and
Guattari, we find thinkers who, in very different ways, recognize the dangers inherent in the
frozen word, the frozen system, the deified order. Some may emphasize the dangers of
scapegoating, while others may focus on other forms of oppression, violence, and so on. Yet for
many, there is the tendency to make resistance in some sense ultimate, even as the impossibility of
a true ultimacy is granted and acknowledged. In a fundamental sense, there is, at the root of every
antinomian effort, a tendency to self-contradiction-the kind of self-contradiction that occurs when
one creates a metanarrative that says that there is no such thing as a metanarrative, or a
metarhetoric that says that there is no such thing as a metarhetoric, or a law that there can be no
law.
One of the great gifts that Burke and Blake both offer is the awareness of that
contradiction, accompanied by a refusal, finally, to carry the antinomian renunciation of system all
the way. Finally, Burke is not skeptical of system-building; he is skeptical of the deification of a
system. Finally, in The Four Zoas, Blake does not condemn Reason; he condemns the deification
of reason. Like our contemporary antinomians, they have reasonable suspicions. The tendency to
deify one' s own position, to freeze words into something certain and unchanging in a way that
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words can never be, is real enough and dangerous enough, and, as Blake shows us, it is, this
tendency thinly masks the Selthood, the Self that wishes to hold itself intact and superior in the
face of every claim that would resist it. Yet in reading Burke and Blake, we also recognize that
the deification of an antinomian anti-system is finally no different than the deification of any other
symbolic order. Both can wreak the same havoc, produce the same defensive tendency to oppress
others, and in the end, cause us to seek a scapegoat when we are unable to retain the purity of our
own belief.
Finally, Blake and Burke both recognize and accept the human tendency to seek
perfection. Blake seeks it, in fact, with an avidness that would probably make Kenneth Burke
somewhat nervous. But neither will allow us to think that a given, pre-existing system is already
perfect. While they do not tell us how to make specific ethical decisions, both Burke and Blake
offer us a way of thinking about the limits of language that allows us to be skeptical about our
certainties without completely renouncing our faith in a world beyond language, our belief in our
ability to talk about that world, or our moral commitments. Blake and Burke both offer us a
dialectical tightrope walk between structure and openness, between the yearning for perfection
and the impossibility of attaining it, between perfect certainty and perfect doubt. In a world tom
between extreme and warring perspectives, many of them asserted wilh remarkable levels of self
confident· certainty, that tightrope is no small gift.
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